FOUR  CENTURIES 

OF  THE 

RANAMA    CANAL 


WILLIS  FLETCHER  JOHNSON 


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FOUR  CENTURIES  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 


Vaughan  &  Keith,  Photo. 


WILLIAM   H.  TAFT, 
United  States  Secretary  of  War. 


FOUR  CENTURIES  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 


BY 
WILLIS  FLETCHER  JOHNSON,  A.M.,  L.H.D. 

AUTHOR    OF     •  A    CENTURY    OF    EXPANSION,"    ETC. 


WITH    MAPS    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS 


NEW    YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

1906 


•  6" 


Copyright,  1906 

BY 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


Published  November,  iqob 


aukcroft  UbaQf 


TO 

WILLIAM  H.  TAFT, 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  JURIST,  ADMINISTRATOR,  DIPLOMAT, 
AND,   UNDER   THE   PRESIDENT,   CHIEF   BUILDER   OF 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL;  IN  SINCERE  THOUGH  IN- 
ADEQUATE COMMEMORATION  OF  ESTEEMED 
FRIENDSHIP    AND    INVALUABLE    AID; 
THIS     VOLUME     IS     GRATEFULLY 
AND  AFFECTIONATELY  DEDI- 
CATED BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


PREFACE 

I  SHALL  try  in  this  book  to  tell  the  story  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  incidentally  that  of  Panama  itself  so  far  as  the 
latter  is  necessary  to  the  completeness  of  the  former.  It 
will  be  impossible  for  me  to  do  so  with  any  great  elaboration 
of  detail.  The  vastness  of  the  topic  forbids  it;  unless  in- 
deed this  single  volume  were  to  be  multiplied  into  many. 
The  story  is  more  than  four  centuries  long,  and  it  impli- 
cates, literally,  mankind  from  China  to  Peru.  Any  one  of 
half  a  dozen  of  its  phases  might  well  monopolise  a  volume. 
But  I  shall  hope  to  give  in  these  pages  some  account  of  all 
the  really  salient  and  essential  features  of  the  story,  and 
especially  to  make  clear  the  relationships  of  cause  and  effect 
among  them,  and  to  show  how,  by  virtue  of  a  somewhat 
devious  train  of  incidents  and  circumstances  leading  from 
Christopher  Columbus  to  Theodore  Koosevelt,  this  country, 
in  opportunity  and  privilege,  in  authority  and  responsi- 
bility, has  become  at  Panama  the  ^'heir  of  all  the  ages."  It 
will  also  be  impossible  for  me  to  give  much  detailed  descrip- 
tion of  the  Isthmian  country,  of  its  conditions  of  resources, 
soil,  and  climate,  of  its  people,  or  of  the  technical  features 
of  the  canal  and  its  auxiliary  works.  To  each  of  half  a 
dozen  such  topics,  also,  a  volume  might  well  be  given.  If 
I  touch  upon  these  more  lightly  and  briefly  than  upon  his- 
torical matters,  that  will  be  because  this  is  to  be  a  history 
rather  than  a  descriptive  treatise. 

It  is  now  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  since  I  be- 
came, as  a  student  of  affairs  and  as  a  writer  upon  them, 
interested  in  the  chief  proposals  and  problems  of  Isthmian 
transit.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  had  then  achieved  his  splen- 
did success  at  Suez,  and  was  beginning  his  grandiose  but 
fatuous  undertaking  at  Panama ;  an  American  company  was 

vii 


viii  PEEFACE 

planning  the  final  and  fruitless  essay  at  Nicaragua;  and 
James  B.  Eads  was  elaborating  for  Tehuantepec  the  most 
ambitious  scheme  of  his  engineering  genius.  In  those  proj- 
ects, applied  to  routes  which  had  been  selected  by  Cortez, 
I  became  absorbed,  and  in  all  the  years  since  that  time  I 
have  striven  to  keep  myself  in  touch  with  them,  as  long  as 
two  of  them  lasted,  and  with  the  one  triumphant  survivor 
down  to  the  present.  It  was  also  my  privilege,  through  the 
courtesy  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  espe- 
cially of  its  Secretary  of  War,  the  Hon.  William  H.  Taft, 
to  spend  some  time  at  Panama  and  there  to  study  historical 
data,  political  and  social  conditions,  and  the  various  prob- 
lems of  the  canal  enterprise,  under  exceptionally  favourable 
conditions  of  authority  and  intimacy,  at  what  was  probably 
the  most  important  formative  period  thus  far  in  the  career 
of  the  Isthmian  Kepublic  and  of  our  relations  to  it.  The 
result  will  be  found  in  this  volume,  in  which  I  shall  embody 
information  acquired  through  personal  investigation  at 
Panama  as  well  as  in  Washington  and  New  York,  and 
through  inquiry  of  authoritative  sources  at  Paris  and 
Bogota — the  five  cities,  in  four  lands  and  three  continents, 
in  which  the  modern  history  of  Panama  and  the  Panama 
Canal  has  been  chiefly  made. 

Much  more  might  be  said,  not  only  than  I  shall  have  space 
to  say,  but  also  than  it  would  be  fitting  for  me  to  say.  Much 
has  been  imparted  to  me  which  is  of  indispensable  value  to 
me  in  preparing  this  work,  in  directing  me  to  other  data, 
and  in  enabling  me  .to  judge  correctly  among  diverse 
opinions  and  reports,  but  which  confidence  forbids  me  to 
reveal.  I  am  deeply  indebted,  for  information,  opportunity, 
and  aid,  to  Dr.  Amador,  the  President  of  Panama,  and  to  his 
son.  Dr.  R.  A.  Amador,  the  Panaman  Consul-General  in 
New  York ;  to  Dr.  Arosemena,  then  First  Designate  of  Pan- 
ama ;  to  Seiior  Obaldia,  the  Panaman  Minister,  and  to  Senor 
C.  C.  Arosemena,  the  Secretary  of  Legation,  at  Washington ; 
to  Senors  J.  A.  Arango,  Tomas  Arias,  Ramon  M.  Valdes, 
and  other  gentlemen  at  Panama ;  to  the  lamented  John  Hay, 


PKEFACE  ix 

then  Secretary  of  State;  to  Mr.  William  H.  Taft,  Secretary 
of  War;  to  Mr.  F.  B.  Loomis,  then  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State;  to  Mr.  John  Barrett,  then  American  Minister,  and  to 
Mr.  Joseph  Lee,  then  Secretary  of  Legation,  at  Panama;  to 
Mr.  Charles  E.  Magoon,  then  counsel  to  the  Canal  Commis- 
sion and  since  Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone ;  to  Rear-Admiral 
John  A.  Walker,  then  Chairman  of  the  Canal  Commission; 
to  Mr.  John  F.  Wallace,  then  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Canal; 
to  Colonel  William  C.  Gorgas,  Chief  of  the  Sanitary  Staff 
of  the  Canal  Zone;  to  Mr.  William  Nelson  Cromwell,  Coun- 
sel to  the  French  Panama  Canal  Company;  and  to  many 
others.  I  desire  also  to  make  grateful  acknowledgments  to 
the  Editors  of  The  Forum  magazine  and  of  The  Tribune 
newspaper,  of  New  York,  for  permission  to  use  in  this 
volume  portions  of  various  articles  contributed  by  me  to  the 
pages  of  those  publications. 

With  all  its  shortcomings, — which  I  sincerely  trust  no 
reader  will  realise  as  keenly  as  the  writer, — this  book  will 
be  offered  to  the  public  with  a  hope  that  it  will  in  some 
measure,  by  suggesting  inquiry  and  stimulating  study  as 
well  as  by  imparting  information,  increase  appreciation  and 
right  knowledge  of  an  undertaking  which  is  not  only  the 
greatest  in  our  history  but  also  the  greatest  of  its  kind 
in  the  history  of  the  world,  and  which  is  to  be  completed  not 
only  for  the  immeasurable  advantage  of  the  American  nation 
but  also  for  the  promotion  of  the  welfare  of  all  mankind. 

Willis  Fletcher  Johnson. 
New  Yobk,  Octob&r,  1906. 


CONTENTS 

Chapter  I 
THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

PAGE 

Columbus's  Aim  not  to  Find  a  New  Continent  but  to  Find  a  "Water 
Highway  from  Europe  to  Asia — Theories  of  the  World  from 
Aristotle  to  Toscanelli — Some  Ante-Columbian  Adventures — 
The  Alleged  Letter  and  Map  of  Toscanelli — The  Reports  of  Marco 
Polo  and  Mandeville — Thinae — Columbus  in  Quest  of  the  Land  of 
the  Great  Khan — His  Identification  of  America  with  Asia — The 
"Garden  of  Eden" — Origin  of  the  Legend  of  the  Strait — Isth- 
mian Explorations  of  His  Fourth  Voyage — The  Map  of  Wald- 
seemiiller — Persistence  of   Columbus's   Delusion        ...       1 

Chapter  II 

THE  SECRET  OF  THE  STRAIT 

The  Quests  of  Ojeda  and  Bastidas — La  Cosa  and  Vespucci — First 
Colonies  on  the  Gulf  of  Darien — Pizarro  and  Enciso — The  Ad- 
vent of  Balboa — Rivalry  with  Enciso — Discovery  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean — Pedrarias  Davila  and  His  Deviltries — The  First  Ships 
in  the  South  Sea — Judicial  Murder  of  Balboa — Founding  of 
Panama — The  Pearl  Islands — Explorations  at  Nicaragua  and 
Tehuantepec — Work  of  De  Soto  and  His  Colleagues — The  Voy- 
age of  Magellan — Cortez  and  the  Mythical  Strait — First  Pro- 
posal of  a  Canal — Alvaro  de  Saavedra  Ceron — Four  Rival  Canal 
Routes  in  the  Time  of  Cortez — Decree  of  Charles  V — Reversed 
by  Philip  II — Advent  of  the  English  Freebooters — Morgan  the 
Buccaneer — Sharpe  and  Wafer — William  Paterson's  Colonial 
Enterprise — Explorations  of  Condamine  and  Ulloa    .         .         .18 

Chapter  III 

EARLY  PLANS  AND  RIVALRIES 

Humboldt's  Observations  and  Recommendations — Nine  Canal  Routes 
across  the  Americas — Discussions  of  Panama  and  Darien — The 
"Secret  of  the  Strait"  again — Goethe's  Remarkable  Prophecies — 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Rise  of  American  Interest  in  the  Canal  Scheme — The  First  Pan- 
American  Congress — The  First  Nicaragua  Canal  Company — A 
French  Franchise  at  Panama — Question  of  the  Level  of  the  Two 
Seas — Various  American  Expeditions  to  Nicaragua — Interest 
of  the  French  Government — Humboldt's  Renewed  Suggestions — 
Louis  Napoleon's  Schemes  at  Nicaragua 39 

Chapter  IV 

THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

Origin  of  the  British  Claims  in  Central  America — The  Mosquito 
Indians  and  Their  Kings — Planting  of  British  Colonies — Con- 
troversies with  Spain — Rapid  Expansion  of  Belize  and  Mosquitia 
— The  Bay  Islands — Aggressions  upon  Nicaragua — The  Ameri- 
can Migration  to  California — Treaty  with  New  Granada — Enter- 
prises at  Nicaragua — Hise's  Treaty — Squier's  Treaty — Seizure  of 
Tigre  Island — The  Recommendations  of  Abbott  Lawrence — 
Negotiation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty — Its  Provisions — Dis- 
satisfaction with  Its  Terms — Walker  the  Filibuster — The  British 
Treaty  with  Nicaragua 51 

Chapter  V 

SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

Felix  Belly  and  His  Concessions — Effective  Protest  of  the  United 
States — End  of  Louis  Napoleon's  Schemes — The  Tehuantepec 
Route — Rival  Explorations  at  Panama — Persistent  Efforts  of 
Frederick  Kelly  to  Find  a  Route — A  Sea-Level  Canal  Considered 
— Renewal  of  French  Enterprises — The  Proposed  Chiriqui 
Colony — Surveys  of  Lull  and  Menocal — Gradual  Development  of 
American  Policy — The  Dickinson-Ayon  Treaty  with  Nicaragua 
— Seward's  Proposal  of  a  "Canal  Zone" — Grant's  First  Enuncia- 
tion of  the  Policy  of  "an  American  Canal" — The  First  Inter- 
oceanic  Canal  Commission  and  Its  Surveys — The  Nicaragua 
Route  Selected — The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  in  the  Way — More 
French  Schemes  at  Panama — Wyse's  Survey  and  De  Lesseps's 
Scheme — Call  for  an  International  Engineering  Congress  .         .     65 

Chapter  VI 

"CONSULE  LESSEPS" 

The  International  Congress  of  1879 — Dominated  by  De  Lesseps — 
Its  Composition  and  Organisation — The  Committee  on   Choice 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

of  Route — Panama  Approved — American  Opposition  to  the 
French  Plans — Organisation  of  a  Nicaragua  Canal  Company — 
De  Lesseps's  Visit  to  Washington — Hayes's  Message — Advanced 
Ground  Taken  by  the  American  Government — De  Lesseps's 
Change  of  Tactics — The  "American  Committee"  and  Its  Work — 
The  Tehuantepec  Ship  Railroad  Project — Blaine's  Futile  Diplo- 
macy— The  American  Policy  Stated — Controversy  over  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty — Abrogation  Proposed — Blaine's  Discomfiture 
at  the  Hands  of  Granville — Frelinghuysen's  Continuation  of 
the  Controversy — An  Impasse — Inauguration  of  De  Lesseps's 
Undertaking — "Le  Grand  Frangais" — Blundering  and  Plunder- 
ing— Failure  and  Bankruptcy  of  the  Panama  Company — Tragic 
End  of  De  Lesseps — Confirmation  of  the  American  Policy  .         .     78 

Chapter  VII 

WHY  THE  FRENCH  FAILED 

Profligacy  in  Finance — "Forty-Seven  Miles  of  'Graft'" — How  the 
Money  was  Wasted  and  Stolen — Snow-Shovels  at  Panama! — 
Extortions  of  Colombian  Administration — A  Real  Estate  Trans- 
action— Improving  a  Providential  Opportunity — What  We 
Escaped  by  Establishing  the  Canal  Zone — French  Neglect  of 
Sanitation — Mismanagement  of  Hospitals — Too  Many  Experi- 
ments with  Machinery — Imperfect  Surveys — Improper  Disposi- 
tion of  Material — Errors  for  Americans  to  Avoid     .         .         .99 

Chapter  VIII 

NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

Efforts  of  the  French  to  Reorganise  Their  Scheme — Extension  of 
Their  Franchise — Formation  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany— The  Technical  Committee  and  Its  Report — American 
Activity  at  Nicaragua — The  Frelinghuysen-Zavala  Treaty — 
Cleveland's  Attempted  Reversal  of  American  Policy — Charter- 
ing of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company — Its  Construction  Company 
— Work  at  Nicaragua — Embarrassment  and  Failure  of  the  Com- 
pany— A  Long  Campaign  in  Congress — Various  Proposals  for 
Government  Aid  at  Nicaragua — The  Ludlow  and  Walker  Canal 
Commissions — The  Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syndicate — The  Voyage 
of  the  Oregon — An  Impressive  Object-Lesson — A  Triangular 
Fight — Final  Discomfiture  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company — 
Seeking  Abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty — The  First 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Pauncefote  Treaty — Report  of  the  Third  Canal  Commission — 
Nicaragua  Favoured — Desperation  of  the  Panama  Company — 
Negotiations  for  Sale  at  Panama — Change  of  the  Commission's 
Report — Resolution  of  the  Pan-American  Congress — The  Final 
Struggle  at  Washington — Enactment  of  the  Spooner  Bill     .  108 

Chapter  IX 

NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

Validity  of  the  French  Company's  Sale  of  Its  Property  to  the  United 
States — Seeking  a  Treaty  with  Colombia — Terms  of  the  Pre- 
liminary Protocol — Bad  Condition  of  Colombian  Finances — A 
Covetous  Plan  of  Colombian  Politicians — German  Interest  in  the 
Isthmus — Efforts  to  Defeat  the  American  Project — Rebellion  at 
Panama — Intervention  by  the  United  States — Colombian  Protest 
— Departure  of  Sefior  Concha — The  Hay-Herran  Negotiations — 
Terms  of  the  Treaty — Colombia's  Attitude  toward  It — Election 
of  a  New  Colombian  Congress — President  Marroquin  in  Con- 
trol— Attempts  to  Extort  Blackmail  from  the  French  Com- 
pany— Anxiety  in  Paris — Colombian  Plans  for  Delay — Lapsing 
of  the  Treaty — Adjournment  of  the  Colombian  Congress     .         .  130 

Chapter  X 

THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

The  Story  of  Colombia's  Dealings  with  the  Isthmus — Bolivar's 
Achievement  of  Independence — Panama's  Union  with  New 
Granada — Revolt  against  the  Bogota  Government — Herrera's 
Revolution — Isthmian  Independence  Restored — Federal  Union 
again — Bad  Faith  of  a  Packed  Congress — Separation  Proposed 
— Mosquera's  Promises  of  Reform — Reorganisation  of  the  Fed- 
eral System — "Organised  Anarchy" — The  Conquest  of  Panama — 
"The  Milch  Cow  of  the  Confederation" — Nunez  and  His  Coup- 
d'Etat — Repudiation  and  Despotism — "Ratification"  of  a  New 
Constitution — Marroquin's  Description  of  Colombia — Panama's 
Warning  to  Bogota — Dr.  Amador — The  Colombian  Reply — J.  A. 
Arango's  Revolutionary  Plans — Captain  Beers's  Mission — Or- 
ganising a  Revolution — The  Junta — Dr.  Amador's  Mission  to  the 
United  States — Appeal  to  William  Nelson  Cromwell — "Shadowed" 
by  a  Colombian  Spy — "Desanimado" — Bunau-Varilla's  Oppor- 
tune Arrival — "Esperanzas" — At  the  State  Department — 
Secretary  Hay's  Frank  Talk — Dr.  Amador's  Return  to  Pan- 
ama— Arrival  of  the  Nashville  at  Colon — The  Day  Set — Arrival 
of  the  Colombian  Army — Conduct  of  General  Huertas — "Spar- 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

ring  for  Time"  at  Panama — "Do  It  Now !" — Arrest  of  Colombian 
Generals — Action  of  the  Gunboats — Declaration  of  Panaman 
Independence — Organisation  of  a  Provisional  Government — 
Soldiers  Stranded  at  Colon — United  States  Protection  of  Pan- 
ama— Departure  of  the  Colombian  Troops — Recognition  of  the 
New  Republic — Colombian  Protests — Mission  of  General  Reyes — 
His  Extraordinary  Proposal — Constitutional  Progress  at  Panama  150 

Chapter  XI 

AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

Criticisms  of  American  Action — Justification  of  Our  Policy — The 
Orders  to  American  Ships — Treaty  Rights  and  Obligations — Pro- 
priety of  Recognising  Panama — The  Domestic  Obligations  of 
the  President — Legal  Obligations  to  Colombia — Annals  of  Isth- 
mian Outbreaks — Colombia's  Inability  to  Govern  Panama — Pro- 
tection of  Isthmian  Transit — A  Covenant  that  "Ran  with  the 
Land" — Equity  to  Colombia — Colombia's  Own  Inequity — No 
Analogy  with  Our  Civil  War — Law  and  Equity  to  Other  Na- 
tions— No  Dog-in-the-Manger  Policy — "International  Eminent 
Domain" — Good  Faith  of  the  American  Policy        .         .         .  187 

Chapter  XII 

THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

The  Constitutional  Convention — Adoption  of  a  Constitution — Salient 
Features  of  that  Instrument — The  Legislature — The  Executive — 
The  Judiciary — Miscellaneous  Provisions — Organisation  of  the 
Permanent  Government — A  Non-Partisan  Regime — The  Flag — 
Coinage — An  Endowed  Republic — The  Canal  Treaty — Diplomatic 
Relations  with  the  United  States — Area  and  Bounds  of  the  Re- 
public— Its  Physical  Features — Description  of  the  Coasts — 
Chiriqui  Lagoon — Colon — The  Bay  of  Panama — The  Pearl 
Islands — Principal  Cities  of  the  Republic — The  Line  of  the 
Railroad  and  Canal — Features  of  the  Canal  Route — Earth- 
quakes— The  Climate — Temperature — Humidity — Tropical  Con- 
ditions at  Their  Best 209 

Chapter  XIII 

AN  ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY  EPISODE 

Development  of  Partisanship — Inclinations  toward  Military  Revolu- 
tions— General    Huertas's    Demand     for    the    Resignation    of 


xvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Cabinet  Ministers — An  Amazing  Letter — Threatening  the  Presi- 
dent— Appeal  to  the  American  Legation — Mr.  Lee's  Discreet 
Advice — A  Significant  Reminder — Keeping  the  Peace  on  a 
Holiday — General  Huertas's  "Order  of  the  Day" — Another  Rail- 
ing Letter — A  Critical  Review  of  the  Army — Action  and  Advice 
of  the  American  Minister — Warships  in  the  Harbour  and  Marines 
in  the  Suburbs — Resignation  of  General  Huertas — Disbandment 
of  the  Army— The  Crisis  Safely  Passed 238 

Chapter  XIV 

A  MISSION  OF  READJUSTMENT 

Panaman  Discontent  with  an  American  Executive  Order — The  Postal 
and  Customs  Services  Involved — Diplomatic  Correspondence — 
Secretary  Taft's  Mission — Pensacola  and  Its  Memories — Recep- 
tion at  Panama — American  Intentions  Promptly  Stated — Dip- 
lomatic Conferences — A  Notable  Banquet — American  and 
Panaman  Speechmaking — Excursion  to  the  Pearl  Islands — 
Announcement  of  the  Result  of  the  Negotiations — The  New 
Executive  Order — Gratification  of  the  Panamans — Secretary 
Taft's  Address  to  the  People — Interest  in  President  Roosevelt's 
Reelection — Net  Result  of  the  Mission — Permanence  of  the 
Settlement 256 

Chapter  XV 

ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

The  Old  Colombian  Spirit  not  Dead — Dr.  Porras  and  the  Revolution 
— The  Rise  of  a  Partisan  Opposition — Dr.  Porras's  Citizenship 
Impeached — Railings  against  the  Court's  Judgment — Memorial 
of  the  Liberal  Directorate  to  Secretary  Taft — A  Bitter  Arraign- 
ment of  the  Panaman  Government — Inquiries  as  to  the  Intentions 
of  the  United  States — Exaggerations  of  Partisan  Campaign 
Utterances — A     Conservative     Reply — American     Policy     Well 


Pefined 


Chapter  XVI 

BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

The  Canal  the  Thing — Its  Construction  at  last  Assured — Delusions 
Concerning  the  "Mighty  Mountain  Wall"  of  the  Cordilleras — 
No  Barrier  to  a  Sea-Level  Canal — What  We  Secured  from  the 
French  Company — The  First  Canal  Commission — The  President's 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

Orders — Government  of  the  Canal  Zone — Organisation  of  the 
Commission — Governor  Davis's  Proclamation — Engineering  Work 
— ^Wallace  Made  Chief  Engineer — Organisation  of  His  Staff — 
Thoroughness  of  the  Preliminary  Surveys — The  Gatun,  Bohio, 
and  Gamboa  Dams — The  Culebra  Cut — New  Steam-Shovels — 
Four  Plans  of  Construction  Considered — The  Sea-Level  Plan 
Decidedly  Favoured — Plans  of  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla,  Lindon 
W.  Bates,  and  Cassius  E.  Gillette — Arguments  in  Favour  of  a 
Sea-Level  Cut — The  Questions  of  Earthquakes,  the  Chagres, 
Cost,   and   Time 280 

Chapter  XVII 

REORGANISATION 

Dissatisfaction  with  the  Commission — Too  Much  Red  Tape  and 
Delay — Recommendations  for  Reorganisation — Failure  of  Con- 
gress to  Act — The  President's  Action — A  New  Commission 
Formed — The  Executive  Committee — The  President's  Rules  for 
the  Conduct  of  the  Commission — A  Promise  of  Increased  Effi- 
ciency— The  Question  of  Purchasing  Supplies  in  the  Cheapest 
Market — Secretary  Taft's  Business-like  Policy — Protests  of  the 
"Stand-Patters" — Purchase  of  All  the  Panama  Railroad  Stock 
by  the  Government — Mr.  Bristow's  Report  on  Traffic — Chief 
Engineer  Wallace's  Resignation — Its  Circumstances  and  Causes — 
Interview  between  Messrs.  Taft  and  Wallace — Their  Statements 
about  It — A  Painful  Episode — Appointment  of  John  F.  Stevens 
as  Chief  Engineer — The  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers — The 
President's  Instructions — Two  Reports  on  Plan  of  Construction — 
The  Majority  for  a  Sea-Level  Canal — The  Chief  Engineer's  Re- 
port— Action  of  the  Canal  Commissioners  and  the  Secretary 
of  War — The  President's  Recommendation  for  a  High-Level 
Lock  Canal — The  Final  Decision  by  Congress     ....  297 

Chapter  XVIII 

THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

Progress  of  Medical  Science — Vital  Statistics  of  the  French  Canal 
Company — Reappearance  of  Yellow  Fever  at  Panama — Demoral- 
isation of  the  American  Colony — Neglect  of  Precautions — Mis- 
takes of  Our  Government — Vigorous  Action  Taken  by  Governor 
Magoon — Some  Orders  that  Meant  Business — Difficulties  in  the 
Way  of  Sanitation — Thorough  Inspection  and  Disinfection — 
The    War    against    Mosquitoes — Admirable    Work    of    Colonel 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Gorgas — Gradual  Suppression  of  the  Disease— Its  Complete 
Elimination — A  Reward  Offered  for  the  Reporting  of  a  Case 
— Healthfulness  of  Panama  Compared  with  Other  Places — 
Social  Improvements — The  Problem  of  Feeding  the  Workmen 
— Governor  Magoon's  Commissary  System — Suppression  of 
Gambling — The  Eight-Hour  Law  and  the  Civil  Service       .         ,  326 

Chapter  XIX 

STULTILOQUENTIA 

The  Tribe  of  Gifted  Hopkins  Not  Extinct— A  Political  Propagandist 
at  Bogota — Seeking  a  Mare's  Nest  on  the  Isthmus — Adding  to  the 
Joy  of  Nations — A  Misinterpreted  Metaphor — Foolish  Com- 
plaints at  Culebra — A  Sample  of  Descriptive  Balderdash — A 
Libel  upon  the  Isthmus  and  Its  People — Poultney  Bigelow's 
Encyclopaedic  Researches  in  Twenty-Eight  Hours  and  Ten  Min- 
utes— The  Facts  in  the  Case — Mr.  Stevens's  Comprehensive  Con- 
tradictions— Governor  Magoon's  Effective  Reply — Probable 
Animus  of  Mr.  Bigelow's  Outbreak — His  Railings  to  Aliens 
against  the  American  Army — President  Roosevelt  on  False 
Accusers 340 

Chapter  XX 

THE  NEXT  THING 

The  Task  at  Panama  Well  Begun — Need  of  Considering  the  Future — 
Plan  of  the  Canal  and  Auxiliary  Works — The  Question  of 
Labour — A  Great  Army  of  Workmen  Needed — Permanent  Colo- 
nists also  Needed — Can  the  Two  be  Combined? — Permanent 
Chinese  Immigration  Undesirable — Negro  Colonisation  to  be 
Deprecated — Russians  and  Boers  Suggested  but  not  Available — 
The  Country  Unsuited  to  American  Labour — Possibility  of  Secur- 
ing Spanish  and  Italian  Workingmen — Chinese  Contract  Labour 
as  a  Last  Resource,  to  be  Sent  Back  when  the  Work  is  Done — 
American  Relations  with  the  Panaman  Government  and  People — 
Sensitiveness  of  the  Isthmians— Tact  the  Supreme  Desideratum 
of  Americans  in  Dealing  with  Southern  Neighbours — The  Point 
of  View — Panama  to  Remain  Panaman,  and  not  to  be  Made 
American — No  More  "Damned  Greasers"  than  "Damned 
Yankees" — Need  of  Radical  Improvement  in  Our  Trade 
Methods— The  Future  of  Isthmian  Sanitation      .         .         .         .352 


CONTENTS  xix 

Chapter  XXI 
PANAMA 

PAGE 

Some  Fascinating  Memories — The  Approach  by  Way  of  Colon — 
A  Dismal  Spot — Beauties  and  Splendours  of  Isthmian  Land- 
scapes— Fertile  but  Little  Cultivated  Lands — Agricultural  and 
Other  Possibilities — Scenes  in  the  Villages — The  Streets  of  Pan- 
ama as  They  Were— The  Parks  and  Buildings— The  Old  Sea 
Wall — The  Seamy  Side  of  Panama — Vice — Absence  of  Drunken- 
ness— An  "Orgy"  at  State  Expense — Open-Air  Concerts — A 
Sunday  in  Panama — Business  and  Shopping — The  Thrifty  Land- 
lord—Cab Fares  and  Hotel  Bills— Traditions  of  "Graff- 
Courteous  and  Cultivated  Society — A  Cosmopolitan  Menu — 
Panama  as  a  World's  Highway — Some  Suggestive  Measure- 
ments— A  Prophetic  Vision 370 

APPENDICES 

I.  The  New  Graxadan  Treaty  of  1846 391 

II.  The   Claytox-Bulwer  Treaty     ......  393 

III.  The   Hay-Pauxcefote   Treaty 398 

IV.  The  Spooxer  Bill 400 

V.  Paxama's  Declaratiox  of  Ixdepexdece       ....  405 

VI.  The  Hay-Buxau  Varilla  Treaty 408 

VII.  The  Goverxor's  Proclamatiox  to  the  Caxal  Zone     .         .  419 

VIII.  The  First  Admixistrative  Order         .....  423 

IX.  The  Paxamax  Protest         .......  426 

X.  The   Revised    Executive   Order 430 

XI.  Data  of  Existing  Ship  Caxals 436 

Index 443 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PORTRAITS 

PAGE 

The  Hon.  William  H.  Taft         .....        Frontispiece 

Founders  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  .         .         .         .         .164 

President  Amador,  of  Panama       .......  209 

The  Hon.  Joseph  Lee   .........  242 

The    Hon.  John   Barrett     ........  248 

The  Hon.  Charles  E.  Magoon 330 

VIEWS 

Remains  of  Old  Panama       ........  26 

American  Headquarters  at  Empire       ......  99 

Hospital  on  Ancon  Hill,  Panama        ......  104 

Landscape  from  Gold  Hill  ........  281 

The   Culebra   Cut 290 

Canal  Administration  Building,  Panama     .....  353 

Old-Time  Cabins,   Empire 371 

Typical  Village  Street,  Empire 373 

The  Cathedral,  Panama       ........  377 

Panama,  from  the   Bay 387 

MAPS 

The  World  according  to  the  Theories  of  Ptolemy       ...  7 

The  World  according  to  Waldseemuller       .....  16 

Various  Proposed  Isthmian  Canal  Routes    .....  41 

The  Republic  of  Panama       .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .216 

The  Panama  Canal  Route     ........  228 

Map  Contrasting  Trade  Routes  by  Way  of  Panama  and  Pataoonla  385 


xrL 


FOUR  CENTURIES    OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

The  design  of  Spanish  adventurers  in  the  fifteenth  century 
is  being  fulfilled  by  American  engineers  in  the  twentieth 
century.  That,  in  epitome,  is  the  story  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  as  it  came  vividly  to  mind  during  a  recent  visit  to  the 
Isthmus.  There  were  present  on  that  historic  ground  the 
associates  and  agents  of  President  Roosevelt,  and  there  were 
also  those  whose  family  names  were  on  the  rolls  of  Colum- 
bus's and  Balboa's  companies,  and  some  whose  ancestors 
probably  came  to  the  American  shores  with  those  discover- 
ers. Such  meeting  of  the  representatives  of  the  new  and 
the  old  was  suggestive,  and  it  recalled  the  fact  that  Columbus 
was  the  practical  founder  of  the  Panama  Canal  enterprise, 
which,  after  four  centuries  of  delay.  President  Roosevelt 
has  undertaken  to  complete.  Columbus  was  the  first  to  pro- 
pose a  water  highway  from  Europe  to  Asia,  westward,  by 
way  of  the  Atlantic.  It  was  such  a  highway  that  he  sought, 
and  not  the  new  world  which  he  actually  found.  The  pre- 
Columbian  voyages  and  explorations  of  the  Northmen  had 
given  Europe  no  knowledge  of  America,  and  down  to  the 
time  of  the  illustrious  Genoese,  Europe  stood,  figuratively, 
with  its  face  toward  Asia,  and  with  its  back  turned  toward 
the  "Sea  of  Darkness,"  as  the  Atlantic  was  often  called. 
So  Columbus  had  no  thought  of  finding  a  new  continent,  and 
no  notion  that  one  existed;  nor  indeed  did  he  ever  fully 
realise  that  he  had  found  one.    The  lands  which  he  dis- 


2  THE  QUEST  OE  COLUMBUS 

covered  he  regarded  to  the  end  of  his  life  as  merely  some 
outlying  islands  or  fringes  of  the  Asian  continent,  and  as 
impediments  or  obstacles  to  be  passed  by  in  some  way,  in 
order  to  reach  the  mainland  empire  of  Cathay.  His  theory 
was  not  that  such  a  land  as  America  existed,  but  that  by 
crossing  the  Atlantic  Ocean  he  would  come  directly  to  the 
shores  of  China  and  Japan;  for  he  clung  to  the  old  fallacy 
that  whatever  was  not  Europe  or  Africa  must  be  Asia. 
(Isidore  of  Seville  had  taught  more  than  eight  centuries 
before,  concerning  the  globe:  "Divisus  est  autem  trifarie; 
e  quibus  una  pars  Asia,  altera  Europa,  tertia  Africa.") 

It  is  true  that  his  theory  had  been  held  by  others,  long 
before.  Aristotle,  Seneca,  and  Pliny  had  written  the  belief 
that  one  might  reach  the  Indies  of  Asia  in  a  few  days  by 
sailing  westward  from  Spain.  Strabo  had  put  upon  record 
the  same  theory,  adding  that  Menelaus,  after  the  fall  of 
Troy,  sailed  past  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  around  Africa, 
and  so  reached  India.  It  is  not  impossible  that  some  ad- 
venturous navigators  in  those  early  days  had  actually 
crossed  the  Atlantic,  and,  like  Columbus,  had  mistaken 
America  for  Asia.  Hanno  of  Carthage  is,  not  incredibly, 
declared  by  Pliny  to  have  sailed  around  Africa  to  Arabia, 
thus  anticipating  the  plans  of  Henry  the  Navigator  and  the 
achievements  of  Vasco  da  Gama.  Antonio  Galvano,  the 
Portuguese  historian,  citing  Berosius,  Gonsalvo  Ferdinand 
de  Oviedo,  and  Pliny,  tells  us  that  "in  the  six  hundred  and 
fiftieth  year  after  the  Flood  there  was  a  king  in  Spain 
named  Hesperus,  who  in  his  time,  as  it  is  reported,  went 
and  discovered  as  far  as  Cape  Verde,  and  the  Island  of  St. 
Thomas,  whereof  he  was  Prince;  and  Gonsalvo  Ferdinand 
de  Oviedo  affirmeth  that  in  his  time  the  Islands  of  the  West 
Indies  were  discovered,  and  called  somewhat  after  his  name, 
Hesperides;  and  he  allegeth  many  reasons  to  prove  it,  re- 
porting particularly  that  in  forty  days  they  sailed  from 
Cape  Verde  unto  those  Islands."  Again,  upon  the  authority 
of  Aristotle  ("Lib.  de  Mirandis  in  Natura  Auditis"),  Gal- 
vano relates : 


SOME  EARLIER  VENTURES  S 

"In  the  year  590  before  the  incarnation  of  Christ,  there 
went  out  of  Spain  a  fleet  of  Carthaginian  merchants,  upon 
their  own  proper  costs  and  charges,  which  sailed  toward 
the  west  through  the  high  seas,  to  see  if  they  could  find  any 
land;  and  they  sailed  so  far  that  they  found  at  last  the 
islands  which  we  now  call  the  Antilles  and  New  Spain; 
which  Gonsalvo  Ferdinand  de  Oviedo  saith  were  then  dis; 
covered;  although  Christopher  Columbus  afterwards,  by  his 
travel,  got  more  exact  knowledge  of  them  and  hath  left  us 
an  evident  notice  where  they  be.  But  all  these  historians 
which  wrote  of  these  Antilles  before,  as  of  doubtful  and  un- 
certain things,  and  of  places  undiscovered,  do  now  plainly 
confess  the  same  to  be  the  country  of  New  Spain.'' 

Coming  down  to  a  much  later  date,  the  same  scribe  tells 
us  that  "in  the  year  1344,  King  Peter,  the  fourth  of  that 
name,  reigning  in  Aragon,  the  chronicles  of  his  time  report 
that  one  Don  Lewis,  of  Cerda,  grandson  of  Don  Juan  of 
Cerda,  craved  aid  of  him  to  go  and  conquer  the  Canary  Isl- 
ands, standing  in  28  degrees  of  latitude  to  the  north,  be- 
cause they  were  given  to  him  by  Pope  Clement  the  Sixth, 
who  was  a  Frenchman ;  by  which  means,  in  those  days,  there 
grew  a  great  knowledge  of  those  islands  in  all  Europe,  and 
particularly  in  Spain;  for  such  great  Princes  would  not 
begin  nor  enterprise  things  of  such  moment,  without  great 
certainty.  .  .  .  About  this  time  also,"  continues  our 
author,  "the  Island  of  Madeira  was  discovered  by  an  Eng- 
lishman named  Macham;  who,  falling  out  of  England  into 
Spain,  with  a  woman  of  his,  was  driven  out  of  his 
direct  course  by  a  tempest,  and  arrived  in  that  island  and 
cast  anchor  in  that  haven  which  is  now  called  Machico,  after 
the  name  of  Macham.  And  because  his  lover  was  then  sea- 
sick, he  went  on  land  with  some  of  his  company;  but  in 
the  meantime  his  ship  weighed,  and  put  to  sea,  leaving  him 
behind;  which  accident  occasioned  his  lover  to  die  of  grief. 
Macham,  who  was  passionately  fond  of  her,  erected  a  chapel, 
or  hermitage,  in  the  island,  to  deposit  her  remains,  naming 
it  Jesus  Chapel,  and  engraved  on  the  stone  of  her  tomb  both 
their   names   and   the   occasion   that  brought   them   there. 


4  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

After  this  he  made  himself  a  boat  out  of  a  tree  (trees  being 
there  of  a  great  circumference),  and  went  to  sea  in  it,  with 
those  men  of  his  company  that  were  left  with  him,  and  fell 
in  with  the  coast  of  Africa,  without  sail  or  oar.  The  Moors, 
among  whom  he  came,  took  it  for  a  miracle,  and  presented 
him  to  the  King  of  the  country,  who,  also  admiring  the 
accident,  sent  him  and  his  company  to  the  King  of  Castile. 
In  the  year  1395,  King  Henry  III  reigning  in  Castile,  the 
information  Macham  gave  of  this  island  and  also  of  the  ship 
wherein  he  went  thither,  moved  many  of  France  and  Castile 
to  go  and  discover  it  and  the  Great  Canary."  Still  later,  in 
1428,  ^4t  is  written  that  Don  Peter,  the  King  of  Portugal's 
eldest  son,  who  was  a  great  traveller,  went  into  England, 
France,  Germany,  and  from  thence  to  the  Holy  Land  and 
other  places;  and  came  home  by  Italy,  taking  Kome  and 
Venice  in  his  way;  from  whence  he  brought  a  map  of  the 
world  which  had  all  the  parts  of  the  world  and  the  earth 
described.  The  Strait  of  Magellan  was  called  in  it  The 
Dragon's  Tail.  .  .  ."  Who  was  the  author  of  this  extraor- 
dinary map,  and  what  became  of  it,  are  unknown.  There  are 
many  other  chronicles  of  early  voyages  to  the  Canary  and 
Madeira  Islands,  and  of  voyages  along  the  African  Coast, 
even  to  and  around  the  Cabo  de  Bona  Speranza,  or  Cape  of 
Good  Hope. 

One  of  the  most  important  steps  toward  the  enterprise  of 
Columbus  was  taken  in  1245  and  1253.  In  the  former  year 
Friar  John,  of  Piano  Carpini,  was  sent  by  Pope  Innocent  IV 
as  a  missionary  to  the  Great  Khan,  and  in  the  latter  year 
William  of  Rubruquis,  a  monk,  was  sent  by  King  Louis  (St. 
Louis)  of  France  on  a  similar  errand.  These  pious  and  ob- 
servant men  learned  much  from  the  Chinese  whom  they 
met  about  their  empire  of  Khitai,  or  Cathay,  and  especially 
that  at  the  east  it  bordered  upon  a  great  sea.  This  was  the 
first  definite  information  to  that  effect  which  Europe  had 
received  since  classical  times,  and  it  set  philosophers  and 
geographers  to  thinking.  Since  Europe  fronted  upon  an 
ocean  at  the  west,  and  Asia  fronted  upon  an  ocean  at  the 


TOSCANELLI'S  MAP  AND  LETTER  5 

east,  it  seemed  probable — nay,  it  seemed  certain — that  those 
oceans  were  one  and  the  same,  and  by  sailing  due  west  from 
Europe  the  eastern  shore  of  Asia  would  be  reached.  But 
though  this  theory  was  thus  revived  and  discussed  in  the 
thirteenth  century,  it  was  not  for  two  hundred  years  adopted 
as  a  rule  of  action ;  and,  with  all  these  preliminaries,  it  seems 
to  be  pretty  well  established  that  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
fifteenth  century  there  was  only  one  man  who  practically 
believed  in  a  westward  waterway  from  Europe  to  the  Indies, 
or  who  was  sufficiently  earnest  in  his  belief  to  put  it  to  the 
test. 

It  was  about  1474  that  the  great  enterprise  was  definitely 
conceived.  Columbus  was  then  at  Lisbon,  upon  the  very 
brink  of  the  unexplored  Atlantic.  For  aid  and  encouragement 
in  his  scheme  he  is  said  to  have  entered  into  correspondence 
with  his  countryman,  Paolo  Toscanelli.  Whether  he  really 
did  so  or  not,  whether  the  famous  map  and  letter  of  Tos- 
canelli were  what  they  were  said  to  be  or  were  mere  forgeries, 
and  indeed  whether  Columbus  had,  in  advance  of  his  first 
voyage,  any  definite  scientific  theory,  are  questions  imma- 
terial to  the  present  argument,  which  need  not  be  considered 
here.  The  recent  researches  and  writings  of  Mr.  Harrisse, 
Mr.  Vignaud,  and  their  contemporaries  have  thrown  much 
light  upon  the  early  career  of  Columbus,  and  have  placed  it 
in  a  somewhat  different  aspect  from  that  familiar  to  readers 
of  Irving  and  other  early  historians.  It  is  sufficient  for 
our  purpose  to  note  that  grave  doubt  has  been  thrown  upon 
the  whole  story  of  Toscanelli's  aid  and  encouragement  to 
Columbus,  but  to  note,  also,  that  whatever  be  the  truth  of 
that  matter,  the  theory  and  the  aim  of  Columbus's  venture 
remain  indisputable;  and  they  are  all  with  which  this  writ- 
ing is  concerned. 

According  to  the  old  story,  then,  Toscanelli,  a  Florentine 
and  one  of  the  foremost  geographers  of  his  time,  sent  to 
Columbus  two  documents,  priceless  for  information.  One 
was  a  map  which  he  had  prepared,  partly  according  to  the 
theories  of  Ptolemy,  but  somewhat  more  according  to  the 


6  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

reports  of  Marco  Polo.  The  other  was  a  copy  of  a  letter 
which  Toscanelli  is  said  to  have  w^ritten  to  Ferdinand  Mar- 
tinez, or  Martins,  of  Lisbon,  in  answer  to  some  questions 
which  King  Alfonso  V  of  Portugal  had  asked.  The  map 
was  a  map  of  the  world,  showing  the  eastern  coast  of  Asia 
to  be  at  the  western  side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  about  4,000 
miles  west  from  Europe.  The  northern  part  of  China  was 
called  Cathay,  and  the  southern  part  Mangi,  or  Mangu.  Off 
the  coast  were  two  great  islands,  one  of  which,  Cipango,  or 
Zipangu,  may  be  identified  with  Japan,  and  the  other,  Antilla 
(which  had  been  mentioned  by  Aristotle),  corresponding 
with  Formosa.  There  was  also  some  indication  of  the 
Philippine  Archipelago.  The  letter  to  Martinez  was  an  ex- 
planation of  the  map  and  an  argument  of  the  practicability 
of  sailing  from  Lisbon  due  west  to  China,  a  distance,  as  Tos- 
canelli believed,  of  only  4,000  miles;  for  King  Alfonso  had 
asked  whether  in  Toscanelli's  opinion  the  Indies  and  China 
could  be  reached  by  sailing  across  the  Atlantic  more  readily 
than  by  circumnavigating  Africa.  In  after  years  Arias 
Perez  Pinzon,  son  of  Martin  Alonzo  Pinzon,  the  fellow- 
voyager  of  Columbus,  testified  that  he  and  his  father  had 
seen  in  Rome,  in  the  Vatican  library,  a  manuscript  written 
by  a  historian  "contemporary  with  Solomon,"  in  which  it 
was  set  forth  that  by  sailing  due  westward  from  the  Pillars 
of  Hercules  a  distance  of  95  degrees  of  longitude,  one  might 
reach  the  "Land  of  Cipango,"  a  country  equal  in  size  to  Eu- 
rope and  Africa  united.  The  identity  of  that  alleged  manu- 
script has  not  been  certainly  determined.  That  it  was  of 
Solomon's  time  seems  most  improbable.  That  it  was  the 
work  of  Marco  Polo  is  by  no  means  impossible,  or  even  im- 
probable. The  chief  interest  of  it,  if  Pinzon's  report  was 
true,  is  that  it  seems  to  have  hinted  at  a  new  continent,  in- 
stead of  merely  the  eastern  part  of  Asia,  and  that  it  makes 
the  distance  from  Spain  to  Cipango  about  the  same  as  that 
which  Toscanelli  and  Columbus  reckoned — their  figures 
being  120  degrees  from  the  Azores  to  Thinae,  the  latter 
being  probably  a  considerable  distance  west  of  Cipango.    It 


\^tat9 


EEROES  OF  PTOLEMY  7 

may  be  noted,  by  the  way,  that  95  degrees  of  longitude  west- 
ward from  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  bring  us  a  little  beyond 
the  extreme  western  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

These  geographical  details  of  the  Pacific  coast  of  Asia  are 
said  to  have  been  derived  by  Toscanelli  chiefly  from  the  re- 
ports of  Marco  Polo  and  Sir  John  Mandeville — travellers 
who  were  once  ignorantly  denounced,  as  was  Herodotus,  as 
great  liars,  but  who  have  since  been  vindicated,  as  he  was,  in 
their  remarkable  and  substantial  accuracy.  Aristotle  had 
mentioned  Antilla,  from  sources  of  information  which  seem 
to  have  been  lost  soon  after  his  time.  Ptolemy  knew  noth- 
ing of  Asia  further  east  than  Thinae,  if  indeed  he  can  be  said 
to  have  known  anything  of  that  legendary  place.  Just  what 
or  where  Thinae  was  is  matter  of  conjecture.  It  may  have 
been  a  province  of  China,  or  China  itself.  It  may  have  been 
the  old  Chinese  capital  of  Si-Ngan,  in  Shen-Si,  in  east  longi- 
tude 109° ;  or  Tai-Yuan,  in  Shan-Si,  in  east  longitude  112°30'; 
or  yet  Lo-Jang,  in  east  longitude  113°.  Ptolemy,  following 
Herodotus,  put  it  in  what  is  now  east  longitude  150°,  and 
two  or  three  degrees  south  of  the  equator ;  that  is  to  say,  in 
the  Pacific  Ocean  northeast  of  New  Guinea.  That  was  only 
one  of  many  similar  inaccuracies.  Thus  he  placed  the 
mouth  of  the  Ganges  midway  between  Hainan  and  Luzon; 
the  Golden  Chersonesus  just  northwest  of  New  Guinea ;  the 
great  island  of  Taprobane  (Ceylon)  west  of  Sumatra  and 
the  Malay  Peninsula ;  and  the  Chinese  city  of  Sera,  now 
Cha-Ngan,  which  really  is  in  east  longitude  110°,  he  put 
in  east  longitude  147°,  or  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  east  of 
Japan. 

Ptolemy,  moreover,  supposed  Asia  and  Africa  to  be  con- 
nected at  the  south  as  well  as  at  Suez,  and  the  Indian  Ocean 
to  be  an  inland  sea  resembling  the  Mediterranean.  Accord- 
ing to  his  mind,  beyond  the  Golden  Chersonesus,  or  Malay 
Peninsula,  lay  a  great  gulf,  which  we  know  as  the  Gulf  of 
Siam.  Its  further  shore,  instead  of  ending  at  Cape  Cam- 
bodia, he  carried  southward,  making  it  continuous  with 
Borneo  and  the  western  end  of  Australia,  and  then,  about 


8  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

20  degrees  south  of  the  equator,  brought  it  due  westward 
so  as  to  join  Africa  at  Zanzibar  or  Mozambique.  How 
access  was  had  to  this  inland  Indian  Ocean  from  the  Atlantic 
does  not  appear,  though,  as  we  have  seen,  Aristotle,  Seneca, 
Pliny,  and  others  had  held  that  there  was  such  access.  Of 
the  southern  shore  of  the  land  south  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
of  the  eastern  shore  of  the  land  east  of  the  Gulf  of  Siam, 
Ptolemy  professed  no  knowledge. 

Of  course  this  over-extension  of  the  Asian  continent  east- 
ward correspondingly  restricted  the  remaining  space  in  the 
circuit  of  the  globe,  between  the  east  coast  of  Asia  and  the 
west  coast  of  Europe;  and  this  error  in  reckoning  was  fur- 
ther exaggerated  by  under-estimating  the  size  of  the  earth 
itself.  Perversely  enough,  the  discovery  of  facts  in  some 
measure  increased  the  error.  For  Marco  Polo  and  Mande- 
ville,  in  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries,  explored 
the  remainder  of  the  Asian  continent,  clear  to  the  Pacific 
coast,  and  confirmed  the  reports  of  Friar  John  of  Piano 
Carpini  and  William  of  Rubruquis  in  describing  its  frontage 
upon  a  great  ocean,  which  was  forthwith  assumed  to  be  the 
Atlantic.  As  they  showed  Thinae  to  be  far  inland  from  that 
coast,  it  was  assumed  that  the  Asian  continent  extended 
much  further  eastward  than  the  longitude  which  had  been 
attributed  to  Thinae,  and  that  there  was  therefore  only  a 
small  part  of  the  earth's  circle  left  between  Asia  and  Europe. 

In  constructing  his  scheme  of  geography,  then,  Toscanelli 
clung  to  the  old  error  of  supposing  there  to  be  only  one 
ocean ;  and  the  still  greater  error  of  vastly  underestimating 
the  distance  across  it  from  Europe  westward  to  China. 
Ptolemy  had  known  the  world,  or  had  thought  he  did,  from 
Thinae  in  the  east  to  the  Canary  Islands  in  the  west,  and  the 
Portuguese  under  Henry  the  Navigator  had  advanced  knowl- 
edge westward  to  the  Azores  and  the  Cape  Verde  Islands. 
Working  from  these  data,  Toscanelli  divided  the  circuit  of 
the  globe  into  360  degrees,  subdivided  into  24  hours  of  15 
degrees  each.  Then  he  reckoned  that  the  distance  from 
Thinae  to  the  Azores  was  16  of  the  24  hours,  or  240  of  the 


THE  CIKCUIT  OF  THE  GLOBE  9 

360  degrees,  or  two-thirds  of  the  circumference  of  the  globe. 
There  remained,  then,  between  the  Azores  and  Thinae,  going 
westward,  only  eight  hours  or  120  degrees,  or  one-third  the 
circumference  of  the  globe.  Moreover,  as  Thinae  was  a  con- 
siderable distance  inland  from  the  eastern  coast  of  Asia, 
there  was  thus  left  between  Asia  and  Europe  room  for  only  a 
comparatively  narrow  ocean,  about  the  actual  width  of  the 
Atlantic.  He  is  said  to  have  written  to  Columbus  in  1474 
that  from  Lisbon  westward  to  Quisai — now  Hang-Chow — 
then  the  capital  of  China,  was  only  6,500  miles.  Practically, 
Toscanelli  eliminated  the  American  continents  and  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  vastly  exaggerated  the  extension  of  Asia 
toward  the  east,  putting  the  eastern  coast  of  Asia  near  where 
the  western  coast  of  America  is.  These  incorrect  estimates 
prevailed  for  a  long  time.  Antonio  Galvano,  writing  as  late 
as  1555,  and  reviewing  all  the  records  of  his  predecessors, 
said: 

"I  gather  by  all  the  precedent  discoveries  that  the  whole 
earth  is  in  circuit  360  degrees,  and  to  every  degree  ancient 
writers  allow  seventeen  leagues  and  a  half,  which  amount 
to  6,300  leagues ;  yet  I  take  it  that  every  degree  is  just  seven- 
teen leagues.  However  it  be,  all  is  discovered  and  sailed 
from  the  east  to  the  west,  almost  even  as  the  sun  compasseth 
it ;  but  from  the  south  to  the  north  there  is  great  difference ; 
for  towards  the  north  pole  there  is  discovered  no  more  than 
77  or  78  degrees,  which  come  to  1,326  leagues,  and  towards 
the  south  pole  there  is  discovered  from  the  equinoxial  to  52 
or  53  degrees,  that  is,  to  the  Strait  Magellan  passed 
through,  which  amounts  to  about  900  leagues;  and  putting 
both  these  said  sums  together,  they  amount  to  about  2,026 
leagues.  Now,  take  so  many  out  of  6,300  leagues,  there  re- 
maineth  as  yet  undiscovered,  north  and  south,  above  the 
space  of  4,000  leagues.'' 

Accepting  Toscanelli's  erroneous  reckoning  of  the  width  of 
Asia,  Columbus  estimated  that  he  would  reach  China  and 
Japan  at  just  about  the  distance  from  Spain,  and  in  just 
about  the  longitude,  in  which  he  actually  found  America. 
With  the  legends  of  Atlantis,  St.  Brandan,  and  the  Island 


10  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

of  the  Seven  Cities,  we  need  not  now  concern  ourselves. 
Columbus  appears  to  have  put  no  faith  in  them.  His  aim 
was  to  reach  the  Indies,  to  wit,  Cathay,  Mangi,  Cipango,  and 
Antilla,  and  to  do  so  by  means  of  an  unbroken  waterway 
westward  across  the  Atlantic.  In  this  it  was  providential 
that  he  did  make  the  error  which  we  have  noted  concerning 
the  distance,  for  he  would  scarcely  have  ventured  to  set  out 
upon  a  supposed  journey  of  more  than  12,000  miles  across 
an  unknown  sea. 

This  aim  appeared  in  almost  every  part  of  his  great  work. 
When  he  set  forth  on  his  first  voyage  in  1492,  he  carried, 
according  to  his  subsequent  statement,  letters  from  the 
sovereigns  of  Leon  and  Castile  to  the  Great  Khan  of  Tar- 
tary.  In  his  Journal,  on  the  very  opening  page,  he  recorded 
that  he  was  being  sent  to  India,  to  "a  Prince  who  is  called 
the  Great  Khan,"  and  that  he  was  about  to  sail  westward, 
on  and  on,  until  he  should  "arrive  at  the  Indies."  There 
was  not  a  word  nor  a  thought  about  the  seeking  of  a  new 
continent.  His  maps  and  charts  indicated  the  coasts  of 
Europe  and  Africa,  from  the  British  Isles  to  Guinea,  and, 
directly  opposite  them,  in  the  same  latitude,  at  the  west  side 
of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  the  coast  of  Asia,  with  Cathay  at  the 
north  and  Mangi  at  the  south,  and  with  Cipango  lying  almost 
exactly  where  Florida  really  was.  Toward  Cipango  he 
directed  his  course,  and  kept  it  so  well  that  he  arrived  at  the 
Bahamas,  off  the  Florida  coast.  It  was  a  part  of  his  mis- 
sion to  convert  the  Great  Khan  of  Tartary  to  Christianity, 
wherefore  he  called  the  first  island  he  reached  San  Salvador, 
the  Land  of  the  Holy  Saviour,  and,  supposing  it  to  be  a  part 
of  the  Indies,  he  called  the  inhabitants  Indians.  When  the 
natives  spoke  of  the  mainland  lying  north  and  west,  he  as- 
sumed it  to  be  Cathay,  and  when  they  told  of  a  greater 
island  at  the  south,  called  Cuba,  he  supposed  it  to  be 
Cipango.  Sailing  southward  among  the  Bahamas,  he 
thought  himself  among  the  Philippines,  or  other  Asian  isl- 
ands described  by  Marco  Polo,  and  on  reaching  Cuba  he 
had  no  doubt  that  it  was  Cipango.    When,  however,  Marco 


DELUSIONS  OF  NOMENCLATUEE  11 

Alonzo  Pinzon  reported  to  him  that  the  natives  were  speak- 
ing of  a  place  called  Cubanacan,  he  identified  that  name 
with  Kublai  Khan,  and  assumed  that  he  was  on  the  mainland 
of  Cathay,  and  about  only  100  leagues  from  the  capital  of 
the  Great  Khan.  This  practice  of  confusing  native  names 
in  the  American  islands  with  those  in  Asia  of  which  he 
had  heard,  was  continued,  with  further  misleading  results. 
Thus,  when  he  heard  the  island  of  Santo  Domingo  called 
Quisqueya,  he  identified  it  with  Quisai,  the  Chinese  metropo- 
lis mentioned  by  Marco  Polo;  and  when  the  natives  named 
the  place  as  Cibao  he  supposed  that  name  to  be  a  corruption 
of  Cipango.  Constantly,  as  Lamartine  observed,  the  phan- 
tom of  Asia  interposed  itself  between  Columbus  and  Amer- 
ica, to  rob  him,  for  a  chimera,  of  a  great  reality.  Finally, 
on  his  return  from  this  voyage,  Columbus  explicitly  reported 
to  the  King  of  Portugal  that  he  had  not  been  to  any  of  the 
African  lands  claimed  by  that  monarch,  but  to  Cipango  and 
to  India ;  the  Spanish  sovereigns  addressed  him  as  "Viceroy 
and  Governor  of  the  Islands  discovered  in  the  Indies" ;  and 
the  general  supposition  in  Europe  was  that  he  had  reached 
the  eastern  coast  of  Asia,  and  that  Cuba  was  a  part  of  the 
mainland  of  Cathay.  The  letter  of  Columbus  to  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella,  reporting  the  result  of  his  voyage,  was  en- 
titled a  "letter  .  .  .  concerning  the  Islands  discovered  in 
the  Indian  Sea,"  or,  "the  Islands  of  India  beyond  the 
Ganges,"  and  in  the  opening  passages  of  that  letter  Colum- 
bus said:  "On  the  33rd  day  ...  I  came  to  the  Indian 
Sea." 

This  delusion  was  not  corrected  but  rather  confirmed  by 
his  second  voyage.  He  then  explored  the  many  islands  of 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  believed  himself  to  be  among  the 
7,440  islands  near  Cipango,  described  by  Marco  Polo,  who 
probably  referred  to  Formosa  and  the  Loo  Choos,  or  possibly 
the  Philippines.  Marco  Polo,  following  Aristotle's  nomen- 
clature, had  named  an  island  in  that  region  Antilla,  whence 
Columbus — or  else  Peter  Martyr— gave  to  these  islands  the 
name  of  the  Antilles.    Thence  Columbus  revisited  Cuba, 


12  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

skirting  its  southern  coast  for  a  long  distance.  Natives  as- 
sured him  that  nobody  had  ever  travelled  so  far  as  its  west- 
ern extremity,  wherefore  he  was  confirmed  in  his  belief  that 
it  was  indeed  the  mainland  of  Asia.  Again  the  native 
nomenclature  led  him  into  self-deception,  for  hearing  of  a 
province  named  Mangon,  he  unhesitatingly  identified  it  with 
the  Mangi  of  Marco  Polo.  When  he  was  told  it  was  in- 
habited by  people  with  tails,  who  wore  long  garments  to 
conceal  those  appendages,  he  found  in  that  report  further 
confirmation  of  his  belief;  for  he  recalled  that  Sir  John 
Mandeville  had  mentioned  the  alleged  existence  of  such  a 
tribe  in  Asia.  Thus  encouraged,  he  kept  on,  expecting  to 
reach  the  Golden  Chersonesus,  or  Malay  Peninsula,  and  thus 
circumnavigate  the  world,  returning  to  Europe  by  way  of 
the  Indian  Ocean.  He  in  fact  went  as  far  as  the  Bay  of 
Philippina,  or  Cortez,  and  then  turned  back,  still  confident 
in  his  belief  that  Cuba  was  Cathay,  and  that  Hispaniola,  or 
Santo  Domingo,  was  Cipango.  Nor  did  he  learn  the  truth 
on  his  third  voyage,  but  instead  added  to  his  stock  of  errors. 
Directing  his  course  further  southward  than  before,  in 
order  to  ascertain  whether  the  people  of  equatorial  Asia 
(which  he  supposed  South  America  to  be)  were  like  those 
of  Africa,  he  reached  the  Island  of  Trinidad,  and  the  coast 
of  Venezuela.  He  correctly  judged  the  land  at  the  south  and 
west  of  the  Gulf  of  Paria  to  be  part  of  a  great  continent, 
though  he  persisted  in  the  error  of  supposing  it  to  be  either 
Asia  or  a  continent  lying  just  south  of  Asia.  But  he  cher- 
ished the  extraordinary  notion  that  it  occupied  the  "highest 
part  of  the  globe,"  and  was  the  seat  of  the  Garden  of  Eden, 
and  that  the  great  torrent  of  fresh  water  which  flowed  into 
the  Gulf  of  Paria  proceeded  from  the  fountain  which  fed 
the  Tree  of  Life! 

The  fourth  and  last  voyage  of  Columbus  was  dominated 
by  the  same  erroneous  conceptions,  and  was  in  addition 
marked  with  the  beginning  of  that  quest  for  the  "Secret  of 
the  Strait"  which  so  greatly  occupied  the  attention  of  his 
successors  for  many  years,  and  which  has  scarcely  yet  been 


EXPLOKING  THE  ISTHMUS  13 

wholly  relinquished.     Says  the  historian  and  explorer  Gal- 
vano,  citing  Gomara: 

"In  this  same  year,  1502,  Christopher  Columbus  entered 
the  fourth  time  into  his  discovery,  with  four  ships,  at  the 
command  of  Don  Ferdinand,  to  seek  the  Strait  which,  as 
they  said,  did  divide  the  land  from  the  other  side.    .    .    . 
They  went  first  to  the  Island  of  Hispaniola,  to  Jamaica,  to 
the  river  Azua,  to  the  Cape  of  Higueras,  to  the  Islands 
Gamares,  and  to  the  Cape  of  Honduras,  that  is  to  say,  the 
Cape  of  the  Depths.     From  thence  they  sailed  towards  the 
east,  unto  the  Cape  Gracias  d  Dios,  and  discovered  the  prov- 
ince and  river  of  Veraguas,  and  Rio  Grande,  and  others 
which  the  Indians  called  Hiemra;  and  from  thence  he  went  ( 
to  the  River  of  Crocodiles,  which   is  now  called  Rio   de  I 
Chagres,  which  hath  its  springs  near  the  South  Sea,  within  I 
four  leagues  of  Panama,  and  runneth  into  the  North  Sea; 
and  so  he  went  unto  the  island  which  is  called  Isla  de  Bas- 
timentos,  that  is,  the  Isle  of  Victuals ;  and  then  to  Porto  | 
Bello,  that  is,  the  Fair  Haven ;  and  so  unto  Nombre  de  Dios,  \ 
and  to  Rio  Francisco,  and  so  to  the  Haven  of  Retreat;  and 
then  to  the  Gulf  of  Cabesa  Cattiva,  and  to  the  Islands  of 
Caperosa;  and,  lastly,  to  the  Cape  of  Marble,  which  is  200 
leagues  upon  the  coast ;  from  thence  they  began  to  turn  again 
to  the  Island  of  Cuba." 

Thus  is  the  story  briefly  told  by  the  old  historian,  with 
some  terminology  strange  to  modern  ears.  To  paraphrase 
the  narrative,  and  to  amplify  it  in  the  light  of  other  knowl- 
edge, we  may  say  that,  being  refused  entrance  to  the  harbours 
of  Hispaniola,  Columbus  directed  his  course  westward,  pass- 
ing completely  by  Cuba  without  realising  the  fact  and  its 
significance,  and  reached  Roatan,  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the 
coast  of  Honduras.  There,  on  the  mainland  of  Central 
America,  he  found  native  tribes  more  civilised  than  any  he 
had  seen  before,  and  accordingly  assumed  that  at  last  he  was 
approaching  the  capital  of  the  Great  Khan.  The  mainland 
of  Honduras  he  believed  to  be  continuous  with  Cuba  and  to 
be  Cochin  China,  the  southeastern  part  of  Asia ;  and  he  sup- 
posed that  if  he  went  northward  he  would  presently  reach 
that  south  coast  of  Cuba,  along  which  he  had  sailed  on  his 


14  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

second  voyage,  and  would  thus  be  compelled  to  return  east- 
ward. Thus,  to  our  lasting  regret,  he  was  deterred  from 
going  on  to  Yucatan  and  visiting  that  country  while  it  was 
yet  in  the  glories  of  Mayan  civilisation.  Instead,  he  turned 
southward,  to  seek  the  Golden  Chersonesus,  and  to  go  home 
to  Europe  by  way  of  the  Strait  of  Malacca,  which  he  believed 
was  to  be  found  somewhere  between  Honduras  and  Vene- 
zuela— between  Cochin  China,  Cathay,  and  Mangi  at  the 
north,  and  the  Garden  of  Eden  at  the  south.  That  "Secret 
of  the  Strait"  thereafter  engaged  his  chief  attention.  He 
rounded  Cape  Gracias  a  Dios,  and  so  went  down  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  along  Costa  Rica,  to  the  Chiriqui  Lagoon,  and 
along  the  coast  of  Veraguas,  the  western  part  of  the  Carib- 
bean coast  of  Panama.  There  he  reckoned  that  he  was  only 
ten  days'  journey  from  the  mouth  of  the  Ganges  River.  The 
natives  told  him  he  was  nearing  what  they  called  "a  narrow 
place  between  two  seas."  They  meant,  of  course,  a  narrow 
strip  of  land,  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  But  Columbus,  al- 
ways believing  that  which  he  wished  to  be  true,  confidently 
assumed  it  to  be  a  narrow  strip  of  w^ater — the  much  desired 
Strait.  No  such  Strait  appearing,  however,  he  pressed  on 
to  the  eastward  along  the  Panama  coast,  entering  the  Bay  of 
Limon  and  the  mouth  of  the  Chagres  River.  On  November 
2,  1502,  he  entered  the  Bay  of  Porto  Bello,  east  of  Colon,  and 
thence  proceeded  to  Nombre  de  Dios.  Finally  at  El  Retrete, 
on  December  5,  he  abandoned  for  a  time  the  quest  of  the 
Strait  in  that  direction  and  turned  back  to  the  westward, 
to  explore  more  carefully  the  coast  of  Panama  along  which 
he  had  already  sailed.  He  spent  the  winter  there,  chiefly  on 
the  coast  of  Veraguas,  which,  because  of  its  gold  mines,  he 
firmly  believed  to  be  a  part  of  the  Golden  Chersonesus.  He 
vainly  sought  to  plant  a  permanent  colony  on  the  Belen 
River.  At  the  end  of  April  he  set  out  again  in  quest  of  the 
Strait.  Reaching  the  Mulatas  Islands,  near  Point  Bias,  he 
identified  them  with  a  part  of  Mangi,  or  southeastern  Asia. 
Past  them  he  proceeded  as  far  as  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf 
of  Darien,  and  then,  instead  of  entering  it  and  exploring  its 


FAILUKE  AND  SUCCESS  15 

waters  and  shores,  the  very  native  habitat  of  the  Legend 
of  the  Strait,  he  turned  northward  and  eastward,  and  on 
May  1  started  back  for  Hispaniola,  never  again  to  approach 
the  mainland  of  the  American  continent. 

Thus  he  ended  his  career  under  the  same  delusion  which 
had  marked  its  beginning,  and  left  his  actual  aim  unaccom- 
plished, though  in  the  unconscious  fulfilment  of  a  far  greater 
aim.  He  died  in  the  unshaken  belief  that  he  had  reached 
the  Asian  coast,  and  in  ignorance  of  his  real  discovery  of  a 
thitherto  unknown  continent,  and  without  finding  the  myth- 
ical Strait  for  which  he  sought.  He  had  indeed  "builded 
better  than  he  knew."  In  his  will  he  reaffirmed  the  error 
he  had  cherished,  declaring  that  "It  pleased  the  Lord  Al- 
mighty that  in  the  year  1492  I  should  discover  the  Continent 
of  the  Indies  and  many  islands,  among  them  Hispaniola, 
which  the  Indians  call  Ayte  and  the  Monicongos,  Cipango." 
It  was  not  until  1508,  two  years  after  his  death,  that  Cuba 
was  circumnavigated,  and  thus  found  not  to  be  a  part  of  the 
mainland;  though  it  may  be  that  Amerigo  Vespucci,  in 
1497-8,  practically  achieved  that  enterprise  without  realising 
its  significance,  by  sailing  around  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  from 
Yucatan  to  Florida. 

It  is  true  that  upon  the  Admiral's  coat-of-arms  was  placed 
the  well-merited  inscription,  "A  Castilla  y  k  Leon,  Nuevo 
mundi  dio  Colon" — To  Castile  and  Leon,  Columbus  gave  a 
New  World.  But  it  is  not  certain  that  Columbus  himself 
was  the  author  of  that  inscription,  or  of  the  phrase  "New 
World."  Peter  Martyr  seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  speak 
of  the  lands  discovered  by  Columbus  as  the  "New  World," 
in  a  letter  written  by  him  in  1494,  while  Amerigo  Vespucci,  in 
1503,  was  probably  the  first  to  use  the  phrase  in  a  published 
book ;  but  Vespucci  cherished  the  same  delusions  that  Colum- 
bus did.  Writing  to  Lorenzo  de  Medici,  on  July  18,  1500, 
after  his  voyage  to  America,  he  reported  that  about  a  month 
before  he  had  "arrived  from  the  Indies;"  of  the  Venezuelan 
and  Colombian  coast,  which  he  had  explored,  he  said  he  had 
concluded  that  "this  land  was  a  continent,  which  might  be 


16  THE  QUEST  OF  COLUMBUS 

bounded  by  the  eastern  parts  of  Asia,  this  being  the  com- 
mencement of  the  western  part  of  the  continent;"  he  spoke 
of  having  discovered  "a  very  large  country  of  Asia ;"  and  he 
promised  in  his  next  voyage  to  discover  "the  Island  of 
Taprobane,  between  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Gulf  of  the 
Ganges."  Orontius  Finaeus,  in  1531,  upon  a  geographical 
globe,  indicated  Florida  as  the  eastern  coast  of  Asia,  and 
Mexico,  Central  America,  and  South  America  as  an  enormous 
peninsula  extending  south  and  east  from  the  continent  of 
Asia. 

Centuries  afterward,  the  illustrious  scientist,  Alexander 
von  Humboldt,  in  his  "Personal  Narrative,"  spoke  of  the  old- 
est existing  map  of  America  as  that  of  John  Ruysch ;  a  map 
of  the  world,  annexed  to  a  Roman  edition  of  Ptolemy  in 
1508.  "We  there,"  said  Humboldt,  "find  Yucatan  and  Hon- 
duras figured  as  an  island,  by  the  name  of  Culicar.  There 
is  no  Isthmus  of  Panama,  but  a  passage,  which  permits  of  a 
direct  navigation  from  Europe  to  India.  The  great  southern 
island  bears  the  name  of  Terra  de  Parias."  That  map  was 
dated  two  years  after  the  death  of  Columbus,  and  probably 
embodied  the  best  conception  of  American  geography  which 
he  and  his  contemporaries  had  been  able  to  form. 

Since  Humboldt's  time,  however,  there  has  come  to  light 
another  map,  of  an  earlier  date.  This  is  a  map  of  the  world 
drawn  by  Martin  Waldseemiiller  (also  known  as  Ilacomilus, 
or  Hylacomylus,  his  own  translation  of  his  name  into  Greek), 
in  1507.  This  map  follows  in  general  the  theories  of  Ptol- 
emy, but  of  course  shows  much  that  was  unknown  to  that 
earlier  geographer.  It  is  especially  interesting  in  connec- 
tion with  the  subject  now  in  hand,  for  the  reason  that  it  indi- 
cates North  America  and  South  America  as  entirely  separate 
continents,  with  a  broad  seaway  between  them,  connecting 
the  Atlantic  with  the  Pacific.  The  North  American  conti- 
nent is  called  on  it  Parias,  and  the  southern  continent  bears 
the  name  of  America.  This  map  apparently  accompanied  a 
little  Latin  book,  written  by  Waldseemuller  and  published 
in  April,  1507,  in  which  it  was  suggested  that  the  New  World 


jias«ailUW«y 


THE  NAME  "AMEKICA"  17 

should  be  named  for  Amerigo  Vespucci.  ^'Quarta  orbis  pars, 
quam  quia  Americus  invenit  Amerigen,  quasi  America  ter- 
ram,  sive  American,  nuncupare  licet;''  or,  "the  fourth  part 
of  the  world,  which  it  is  proper  to  call  America,  or  Ameri- 
can Land,  since  Amerigo  discovered  it."  Again,  in  another 
chapter :  "Alia  quarta  pars  per  Americum  Yesputium,  ut  in 
sequentibus  audietur,  inventa  est :  quare  non  video,  cur  quis 
jure  vetet  ab  Americo  inventore  sagacis  ingenii  viro  Ameri- 
gen,  quasi  Americi  terram,  sive  Americam,  dicendam;"  or, 
"the  other  fourth  part  (of  the  world)  was  discovered,  as  will 
appear  in  what  follows,  by  Amerigo  Vespucci;  wherefore  I 
do  not  see  why  any  one  can  lawfully  object  to  its  being  called 
the  Land  of  Amerigo,  or  America,  after  Amerigo  or  Americo, 
the  man  of  genius  who  discovered  it  by  his  sagacity."  (It 
will  be  recalled  that  Amerigo  Vespucci  is  said  to  have  ac- 
companied Ojeda  to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  in  1499,  and  to 
have  been  the  first  European  to  set  foot  upon  Terra  Firma, 
as  the  mainland  of  the  American  continent  was  then  called.) 
Nevertheless,  the  error  of  his  conceptions  and  of  his  con- 
clusions in  no  way  detracts  from  the  glory  of  Columbus.  He 
went  to  seek  a  new  road  to  a  known  continent.  Instead,  he 
found  two  hitherto  unknown  continents,  and  to  their  colo- 
nised inhabitants  in  after  centuries  he  left  the  lesser  work  of 
creating  by  artifice  the  water  highway  which  he  had  sought, 
but  which  he  had  sought  in  vain  because  nature  had  failed  to 
create  it. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  SECRET  OF  THE  STRAIT 

Columbus  sought  the  "Secret  of  the  Strait."  He  was  not, 
however,  the  first  European  to  visit  the  American  Isthmus. 
Galvano,  deriving  his  authority  from  Gomara,  records  that 
"in  the  year  1502,  one  Alfonso  Ojeda  went  to  discover  Terra 
Firma,  and  followed  his  course  till  he  came  to  the  Province 
of  Uraba.  The  next  year  following  also  one  Rodrigo  Bas- 
tidas,  of  Seville,  went  out  with  two  caravels.  .  .  .  They 
took  their  course  toward  the  west  to  Santa  Martha,  and  Cape 
de  la  Vela,  and  to  Rio  Grande,  or  the  Great  River ;  and  they 
discovered  the  haven  of  Zamba,  the  Coradas,  Carthagena, 
and  the  islands  of  St.  Bernard,  of  Baru,  and  Islas  de  Arenas ; 
and  went  forward  unto  Isla  Fuerta,  and  to  the  point  of  Cari- 
bana,  standing  at  the  end  of  the  Gulf  of  Uraba,  where  they 
had  sight  of  the  Farallones,  standing  on  the  other  side,  hard 
by  the  river  of  Darien ;  and  from  Cape  de  la  Vela  unto  this 
place  are  two  hundred  leagues,  and  it  standeth  in  nine  de- 
grees and  two  parts  of  latitude."  There  are  other  records 
bearing  upon  these  adventures,  and  it  is  difficult  to  determine 
with  confidence  the  true  story. 

According  to  some,  Alfonso,  or  Alonzo,  de  Ojeda  landed 
at  Darien  as  early  as  1499;  having  with  him  as  his  pilots 
Amerigo  Vespucci  and  Juan  de  Cosa,  the  latter  being  the 
Biscayan  navigator  and  cartographer  who  was  the  owner 
and  master  of  the  Santa  Maria  and  the  companion  of  Colum- 
bus on  his  first  voyage.  The  weight  of  testimony,  however, 
inclines  to  the  belief  that  in  that  voyage  Ojeda  and  his  famous 
comrades  visited  only  the  coast  of  Venezuela  and  did  not  go 
west  of  Cape  Gallinas,  and  that  we  should  give  the  credit  of 
discovering  the  mainland  of  the  Isthmus  to  another,  who  has 

18 


BASTIDAS,  THE  ISTHMIAN  PIONEEK  19 

been  called  ^^Spain's  noblest  and  best  conquistador.'^  Rodrigo 
de  Bastidas,  a  native  of  Seville,  sailed  from  Cadiz  in  October, 
1500,  with  La  Cosa,  and,  passing  by  Hispaniola  and  the  other 
islands  of  the  West  Indies,  was  probably  the  first  of  all 
Europeans  to  reach  the  American  Isthmus,  at  or  near  Porto 
Bello.  Thence  he  skirted  the  coast,  southward  and  eastward, 
entering  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  or  the  Gulf  of  Uraba,  as  far  as 
the  mouth  of  the  Atrato  River,  and  going  along  the  Colom- 
bian coast  as  far  as  Cape  Gallinas,  at  the  extremity  of  the 
Goajira  Peninsula,  and  the  entrance  of  the  Gulf  of  Vene- 
zuela and  thence  striking  off  on  a  tangent  for  Hispaniola.  The 
object  of  that  voyage  was  partly  to  get  pearls  and  gold,  but 
more  to  find  the  "Secret  of  the  Strait,"  the  entrance  to  that 
fabled  passageway  from  ocean  to  ocean  of  which  there  were 
Innumerable  traditions  among  the  natives  from  California 
to  Peru,  and  of  which  you  may  still  hear  confident  reports 
among  the  Indians  of  San  Bias,  and  the  natives  in  the  Val- 
ley of  the  Atrato.  Bastidas,  then,  was  the  pioneer  at  Pan- 
ama, two  years  in  advance  of  Columbus.  His  quest  was  un- 
successful, but  it  inspired  Columbus  himself  to  follow  him, 
and  many  others.  In  1505,  from  May  to  December,  La  Cosa 
and  Amerigo  Vespucci  diligently  explored  the  Gulf  of  Darien 
and  ascended  the  Atrato  River  about  200  miles,  in  quest  of 
a  passageway  to  India ;  and  two  years  later  they  went  thither 
again,  not  for  the  Strait  but  for  gold,  of  which  they  found 
much.  Indeed,  the  profits  of  the  voyage  were  so  great  that 
they  made  a  second  visit  to  the  same  region  in  1507,  this 
time  seeking  gold  rather  than  the  Strait.  In  1506  came  Juan 
Diaz  de  Solis,  and  Vincente  Yanez  Pinzon,  the  latter  the 
commander  of  the  ^ina  on  Columbus's  first  voyage ;  who  in 
1497-8  had  sailed  with  Amerigo  Vespucci  from  Yucatan  to 
Florida.  They  reached  Juanaja,  the  easternmost  of  the  Bay 
Islands,  and  sighted  the  mainland  near  Truxillo,  and  thence 
surveyed  the  coast  westward  and  northward  almost  to  Yuca- 
tan. Two  years  later  they  were  sent  again  on  the  same 
errand,  but  turned  southward  and  followed  the  South  Ameri- 
can coast  as  far  as  the  Rio  de  la  Plata.    It  may  be  a  cause  of 


20  THE  SECEET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

passing  wonder  that  they  did  not  enter  the  mouth  of  the 
Amazon,  and  ascend  that  river,  supposing  it  to  be  the  much 
sought  Strait. 

The  next  important  name  on  the  roll  is  that  of  Alfonso,  or 
Alonzo,  de  Ojeda,  already  mentioned,  one  of  the  most  bril- 
liant and  gallant  of  the  cavaliers  of  Spain,  and  the  hero  of 
a  thousand  thrilling  tales.  Having  shown  his  exceptional 
efficiency  as  a  commander  at  St.  Thomas,  he  was  in  1508  ap- 
pointed Governor  of  what  is  now  the  Caribbean  coast  of 
Colombia.  The  King  of  Spain,  in  shameful  disregard  of  the 
rights  of  Diego  Columbus,  divided  that  region  into  two 
provinces,  with  a  line  of  demarcation  running  north  and 
south  through  the  Gulf  of  Uraba.  All  eastward  from  that 
line,  to  Cabo  de  la  Vela,  he  called  Nueva  Andalusia,  or  New 
Andalusia,  and  made  Ojeda  its  governor,  while  all  westward, 
to  Cabo  Gracias  d  Dios,  he  called  Castilla  del  Oro,  or  Golden 
Castile,  and  appointed  as  its  governor  Diego  de  Nicuesa,  or 
Niquesa.  In  1509  these  governors  set  out  for  their  provinces, 
with  instructions  to  press  diligently  the  search  for  the 
"Secret  of  the  Strait."  Concerning  them,  we  may  again 
quote  Galvano: 

"In  the  year  1508,  one  Alfonso  de  Ojeda,  with  the  favour  of 
Don  Ferdinand,  purposed  to  go  to  Terra  Firma,  to  conquer 
the  Province  of  Darien.  He  went  forth  at  his  own  charges, 
and  discovered  the  Firm  Land,  where  it  is  called  Uraba, 
which  he  named  Castilla  del  Oro,  that  is,  Golden  Castile,  be- 
cause of  the  gold  which  they  found  among  the  sand  along  the 
coast;  and  they  were  the  first  Spaniards  that  did  this.  Al- 
fonso de  Ojeda  went  first  from  the  Island  of  Hispaniola  and 
the  City  of  San  Domingo,  with  four  ships  and  three  hundred 
soldiers,  leaving  behind  him  the  bachelor  Enciso,  who  after- 
wards compiled  a  book  of  these  discoveries.  And  after  him 
there  also  went  a  ship  with  victuals,  ammunition,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty  Spaniards.  He  went  on  land  to  Cartha- 
gena;  but  there  the  people  of  the  country  took,  slew,  and 
ate  seventy  of  his  followers;  whereupon  he  grew  very 
weak.  ...  In  the  year  1508,  one  Diego  de  Niquesa  pre- 
pared seven  ships  in  the  Port  of  Beate,  to  go  to  Veraguas, 
and  carried  in  them  almost  eight  hundred  men.    When  he 


THE  COMING  OF  BALBOA  21 

came  to  Carthagena,  he  found  there  Alfonso  de  Ojeda,  much 
weakened  by  his  former  loss ;  but  then  they  joined  together, 
and  went  on  land,  and  avenged  themselves  on  the  people. 
In  this  voyage  Diego  de  Niquesa  went  and  discovered  the 
coast  called  Nombre  de  Dios,  and  went  unto  the  Sound  of 
Darien,  and  called  it  Puerto  de  Misas,  which  is  upon  the 
Kiver  Pito.  When  they  were  come  unto  Veraguas,  he  went 
on  shore  with  his  army,  his  soldiers  being  out  of  hope  to  re- 
turn to  Hispaniola.  Alfonso  de  Ojeda  began  a  fortress  in 
Caribana  against  the  Caribbees;  which  was  the  first  town 
the  Spaniards  builded  on  the  firm  land;  and  in  Nombre  de 
Dios  they  builded  another,  and  called  it  Nuestra  Senora  de 
la  Antigua.  They  builded  also  the  town  of  Uraba.  And 
there  they  left  for  their  captain  and  lieutenant  one  Fran- 
cisco Pizarro,  who  was  there  much  troubled.  They  builded 
other  towns  also  whose  names  I  here  omit.  But  these  cap- 
tains had  not  that  good  success  which  they  hoped  for." 

Nicuesa  died  at  sea.  La  Cosa  was  among  those  of  Ojeda's 
men  who  were  slain  by  the  savages.  Ojeda  also  died,  leav- 
ing as  his  successor  in  command  Francisco  Pizarro,  an 
Estremaduran  adventurer,  formerly  a  swineherd,  and  after- 
ward the  conqueror  of  Peru.  Pizarro,  despairing  of  accom- 
plishing much  on  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  was  actually  abandon- 
ing the  enterprise  and  leaving  the  place  when  he  met  Martin 
Fernandez  de  Enciso  coming  to  him  with  succour.  Enciso 
had  been  a  partner  of  Ojeda,  and,  beside  being  a  competent 
adventurer  and  administrator,  was  one  of  the  ablest  cos- 
mographers  of  his  time,  and  wrote  in  1519  "Suma  de 
Geografia,"  the  first  Spanish  book  ever  published  about 
America.  With  this  aid  and  encouragement  Pizarro  re- 
turned to  his  place. 

There  now  came  npon  the  scene  the  most  important  figure 
of  all.  This  was  an  impoverished  Hidalgo  of  Estremadura, 
by  name  Vasco  Nunez  de  Balboa.  He  had  gone  to  the 
Isthmian  coast  in  1500,  with  Bastidas,  and  thence  to  His- 
paniola. While  Bastidas  was  arrested  and  imprisoned  by 
Bobadilla,  Balboa  settled  down  as  a  farmer,  at  which  occupa- 
tion he  had  little  success.  Finally,  overwhelmed  with  debts, 
he  fled  from  his  creditors  concealed  in  a  cask,  which  was  put 


22  THE  SECKET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

aboard  one  of  Enciso's  ships,  and  was  thus  conveyed  to  San 
Sebastian,  which  was  the  seat  of  Pizarro's  government  on  the 
Gulf  of  Darien.  There  he  got  Enciso  recognised  as  the  suc- 
cessor of  Diego  de  Niquesa  as  Governor  of  Castilla  de  Oro, 
and  with  Enciso  founded  the  colony  and  city  of  Santa  Maria 
del  Antigua  on  the  west  coast  of  the  Gulf,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Darien  Kiver,  near  the  Atrato  River.  Balboa  had 
visited  those  regions  before,  with  Bastidas  and  La  Cosa,  and 
was  thus  better  informed  about  it  than  the  others;  and  he 
advised  the  building  of  the  town  on  the  west  shore  of  the 
Gulf,  because  he  knew  the  natives  there  were  more  friendly 
than  those  on  the  east  shore,  who  had  made  such  havoc  with 
Ojeda's  party.  He  himself  became  Alcalde  of  the  town ;  and 
then  presently  quarrelled  with  Enciso,  overthrew  his  govern- 
ment, and  arrested  him  and  sent  him  back  to  Spain.  En- 
ciso appears  to  have  been  a  man  of  overbearing  disposition, 
with  whom  it  was  difficult  for  any  one  to  remain  on  friendly 
terms.  Balboa  owed  him  no  thanks,  either,  although  he  had 
made  his  escape  from  his  creditors  on  one  of  Enciso's  ships ; 
for  Enciso  was  not  privy  to  that  trick,  but  was  angry  when 
he  learned  of  it,  and  was  with  difficulty  restrained  from  ma- 
rooning Balboa  on  a  desert  island  where  he  would  have 
perished  miserably. 

Thus  Balboa  became  Governor  of  Castilla  del  Oro,  getting 
a  commission  from  the  Royal  Treasurer  at  Hispaniola;  he 
married  the  daughter  of  Careta,  a  powerful  native  prince  of 
Darien,  and  made  an  alliance  with  Comogre,  another  native 
prince;  and  was  on  the  high  road  to  distinction.  Enciso, 
however,  on  arriving  in  Spain  got  the  ear  of  the  King,  and 
poured  into  it  a  tale  which,  in  spite  of  the  excuses  of  Bal- 
boa's friend  Zamudio,  moved  His  Majesty  to  send  for  Balboa 
to  return  to  Spain  and  to  explain  his  extraordinary  con- 
duct. This  was  awkward.  It  would  be  impossible  to  give  a 
satisfactory  explanation,  and  Balboa  would  probably  be  re- 
moved from  the  governorship  which  he  had  usurped,  and 
perhaps  be  cast  into  prison.  In  this  desperate  predicament 
Balboa  determined  to  do,  if  possible,  some  great  deed  which 


DISCOVEKY  OF  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  23 

would  command  the  favour  of  the  King — or  perish  in  the 
attempt.  He  had  heard  from  the  chieftain  Comogre  and 
other  natives  various  tales  of  a  great  water  lying  not  far  to 
the  south  and  west,  and  also  of  a  land  where  gold  was  so 
abundant  that  people  made  bowls  and  cups  of  it,  instead  of 
pottery.  The  reference  was,  of  course,  to  the  Pacific  Ocean 
and  Peru.  He  shrewdly  assumed  that  if  he  could  discover 
those  regions,  the  King  would  overlook  that  irregular  episode 
with  Enciso.  Accordingly  he  organised  an  expedition  for 
the  purpose.  He  sailed,  on  September  1,  1513,  for  Coiba,  on 
the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  between  Punto  Tiburon  and 
Caledonian  Bay,  with  a  company  of  290  men.  Leaving  half 
of  his  force  with  the  ships,  and  securing  100  Indian  guides 
and  bearers,  he  started  inland  on  September  6.  Privations 
and  difficulties  were  great  in  those  savage  jungles  and  prog- 
ress was  slow.    But  at  last,  on  September  25, 

— '*  With  eagle  eyes 
He  stared  at  the  Pacific, — and  all  his  men 
Looked  at  each  other  with  a  wild  surmise, — 
Silent,  upon  a  peak  in  Darien." 

He  was  still  some  distance  from  that  new-found  sea,  but 
thereafter  more  rapid  progress  toward  it  was  made.  On 
September  29  he  reached  the  shore,  strode  into  the  water,  and 
proclaimed  possession  of  it  in  the  name  of  the  King  of  Spain. 
It  was  the  day  of  St.  Michael,  wherefore  he  named  the  water 
the  Golfo  de  San  Miguel,  or  Gulf  of  St.  Michael,  as  it  is 
called  to  this  day.  He  had  by  happy  chance  crossed  the 
Isthmus  at  its  very  narrowest  part,  by  the  route  long  after- 
wards surveyed  for  a  canal  and  known  as  the  Caledonian 
Canal  route — the  shortest  route  but  not  at  the  lowest  level. 
He  spent  some  time  exploring  the  coast,  and  saw  afar  the 
beautiful  Pearl  Islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama.  "He  em- 
barked himself,"  says  Galvano,  "against  the  will  of  Chiapes, 
who  was  lord  of  that  coast,  who  wished  him  not  to  do  so 
because  it  was  very  dangerous  for  him.  But  he,  desirous  to 
have  it  known  that  he  had  been  upon  those  seas,  went  for- 


24  THE  SECRET  OF  THE  STRAIT 

ward,  and  came  back  again  to  land  in  safety,  and  with  great 
content,  bringing  with  him  good  store  of  gold,  silver,  and 
pearls,  which  they  there  took."  The  ''seas"  upon  which  he 
sailed  were  the  Gulf  of  St.  Michael.  He  landed  upon  the 
northern  shore  of  that  gulf,  and  secured  the  friendship  of  a 
powerful  chief  of  that  region,  named  Tumaco,  or  Tumaccus. 

Balboa  then  returned  to  his  capital,  and,  instead  of  pro- 
ceeding to  Spain  in  answer  to  the  royal  summons,  he  sent 
thither  an  account  of  his  great  achievement.  He  had  not 
hoped  too  much  for  its  effect.  The  King,  appreciative  and 
grateful,  reckoned  that  the  man  was  doing  too  profitable  a 
work  to  be  interrupted  by  coming  home  to  Spain  to  answer 
Enciso's  charges,  so  he  sent  him  word  to  stay  where  he  was, 
not  merely  as  Governor  but  also  as  Adelantado  of  the  new 
coast  and  lands  he  had  discovered. 

Unfortunately,  however,  Balboa's  messenger  did  not  reach 
Spain  until  after  the  King  had  despatched  the  infamous 
Pedrarias  Davila  to  the  Isthmus  to  supersede  him  and  to 
hurry  him  to  Spain.  "In  the  year  1514,"  says  Galvano, 
citing  Peter  Martyr,  ''and  in  the  month  of  May,  there  went 
out  of  St.  Lucar,  one  Pedro  Arias  de  Avila,  at  the  command 
of  Don  Ferdinand.  He  was  the  fourth  Governor  of  Cas- 
tilla  del  Oro,  or  Golden  Castile,  for  so  they  named  the  coun- 
tries of  Darien,  Carthagena,  and  Uraba,  and  that  country 
which  was  newly  conquered.  He  carried  with  him  his  wife, 
the  Lady  Elizabeth,  and  1,500  men,  in  seven  ships;  and  the 
King  appointed  Vasco  Nuiiez  de  Balboa  Governor  of  the 
South  Sea,  and  of  that  coast."  Pedro  Arias  de  Avila  is  vari- 
ously known  in  history  as  Pedrarias  Davila  and  as  Pedrarias. 
There  are  now  some  most  estimable  people  living  in  Pan- 
ama who  bear  the  name  of  Arias,  for  whose  sake  we  shall  do 
well  not  to  identify  them  more  than  we  can  help,  through 
similarity  of  name,  with  that  "Timour  of  the  Indies ;"  where- 
fore let  him  be  disguised  as  Pedrarias.  He  was  one  of  the 
worst  of  the  early  conquistadors,  having  little  real  ability  to 
counterbalance  his  infernal  cruelties  and  wickednesses,  the 
best  thing  about  him  being  his  old  age,  which  made  his  days 


'  JUDICIAL  MUEDER  OF  BALBOA  25 

comparatively  few  in  the  land  which  he  cursed.  Oviedo 
reckoned  that  on  the  Day  of  Judgment  Pedrarias  would 
have  to  confront  the  souls  of  2,000,000  of  his  murdered  vic- 
tims. Probably  this  was  an  exaggeration,  but  it  is  note- 
worthy that  not  one  reputable  historian  of  his  time  at- 
tempted to  defend  the  character  and  career  of  the  man. 

Pedrarias  reached  Santa  Maria  del  Antigua  and  at  once 
arrested  Balboa.  The  presiding  judge  was  Gaspar  de  Es- 
pinosa,  a  just  man,  and  Balboa  was  acquitted.  Thereafter 
a  bitter  conflict  prevailed  between  Balboa  and  Pedrarias, 
which  was  much  intensified  by  Balboa's  manly  refusal  to 
repudiate  his  Indian  wife  and  marry  a  daughter  of  Pedrarias 
— an  arrangement  which  the  Bishop  of  Darien  proposed  as  a 
means  of  ending  the  quarrel.  However,  an  apparent  truce  was 
in  time  made  and  then  Balboa  proceeded  with  great  plans 
for  the  exploration  of  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  which  he 
called  the  South  Sea,  and  especially  for  reaching  the  "Golden 
Land"  of  Peru.  He  recrossed  the  Isthmus  in  1516,  starting 
from  Adas,  a  new  port  on  the  Caribbean  side,  and  some  say 
he  carried  with  him  overland  four  brigantines  which  he 
launched  into  the  Pacific,  while  others  say  he  carried  only 
the  tools  and  materials  for  constructing  two  ships.  We  need 
not  concern  ourselves  as  to  the  choice  between  the  tales. 
Either  attributes  to  him  a  marvellous  achievement  for  those 
days.  With  these,  the  first  ships  which  ever  sailed  those 
waters!,  he  took  possession  of  the  Pearl  Islands,  and  then  was 
about  to  start  for  Peru,  of  which  latter  country  he,  instead 
of  Pizarro,  should  have  been  the  discoverer  and  conqueror. 
But  during  the  delay  caused  by  waiting  for  some  supplies,  he 
was  approached  by  a  treacherous  messenger  from  Pedrarias, 
who  persuaded  him  to  stop  and  return  to  Adas,  where  he  was 
put  through  a  mockery  of  a  trial,  and  beheaded.  The  cap- 
tain of  the  soldiers  who  arrested  him  under  the  orders  of 
Pedrarias  was  his  old  comrade,  Francisco  Pizarro. 

Thus  perished,  in  1517,  the  man  who  first  crossed  the 
American  Isthmus  and  reached  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Pacific — a  wise  statesman,  a  brave  soldier,  a  daring  and 


26  THE  SECKET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

resourceful  explorer ;  a  man  of  unconquerable  determination, 
of  great  gifts  of  leadership,  and,  for  those  times,  of  con- 
siderable humanity.  Even  his  flight  from  Hispaniola,  and 
his  conduct  toward  Enciso,  seem  petty  faults  by  the  side  of 
the  glaring  iniquity  of  his  murderer.  However,  it  is  to  be 
recorded  that  Pedrarias,  fearing  he  was  to  be  dismissed  from 
his  governorship,  in  1519  founded  the  city  of  Panama — not 
the  present  city,  but  the  old  one,  a  few  miles  away,  which 
was  destroyed  by  Henry  Morgan,  the  Welsh  buccaneer,  in 
1671,  and  of  which  now  scarcely  a  trace  remains,  save  a 
picturesque  old  church  tower.  He  also  continued  the  search 
for  the  Strait,  surveyed  the  coast  from  a  little  below  the 
Tuyra  River  up  to  Costa  Rica,  and  first  heard  of  Lake  Nic- 
aragua, which  was  said  to  connect  directly  with  both  seas 
and  thus  to  form  the  Strait  for  which  he  was  seeking. 

Galvano  attributes  to  Pedrarias,  also,  the  discovery  and 
conquest  of  the  Pearl  Islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  which 
have  been  ascribed  to  Balboa.  "In  the  beginning  of  the  year 
1515,"  he  says,  apparently  on  the  authority  of  Peter  Martyr, 
and  also  of  Gomara,  "the  Governor,  Pedro  Arias  de  Avila, 
sent  one  Gaspar  Morales  with  150  men  unto  the  Gulf  of 
St.  Michael,  to  discover  the  islands  of  Tararequi,  Chiapes, 
and  Tumaccus.  There  was  a  Cacique,  Balboa's  friend,  which 
gave  him  many  canoes  or  boats  made  of  one  tree,  to  row  in, 
wherein  they  passed  unto  the  Island  of  Pearls;  the  lord 
whereof  resisted  them  at  their  coming  to  land.  But  Chiapes 
and  Tumaccus  did  pacify  him,  in  such  order  that  the  captain 
of  the  isle  had  them  come  unto  his  house,  and  made  much 
of  them,  and  received  baptism  at  their  hands,  naming  him 
Pedro,  after  the  Governor's  name ;  and  he  gave  unto  them,  for 
this,  a  basket  full  of  pearls,  weighing  an  hundred  and  ten 
pounds ;  whereof  some  were  as  big  as  hazel  nuts ;  of  20,  25,  26, 
or  31  carats,  and  every  carat  is  four  grains.  There  was  given 
for  one  of  them  one  thousand  two  hundred  ducats."  Pizarro, 
by  the  way,  was  with  Morales  on  this  expedition. 

In  that  same  year,  1515,  Pedrarias  also  sent  Gonsalvo  de 
Badajos  and  Louis  de  Mercado,  with  one  hundred  and  thirty 


Calm,  Photo. 


THE  REMAINS  OF  OLD  PANAMA. 


GIL  GONZALEZ  DAVILA  27 

men,  to  make  further  explorations  of  the  Isthmian  regions. 
They  went  by  sea  from  Darien  to  Nombre  de  Dios,  and 
thence,  with  Indian  guides,  struck  southward  along  the  coast. 
They  found  much  gold,  and  captured  forty  negro  slaves  who 
had  apparently  escaped  from  Portuguese  masters,  for  Peter 
Martyr  tells  us  they  were  branded  with  hot  irons  according 
to  the  Portuguese  practice  of  those  times.  After  a  long 
march,  however,  the  expedition  came  to  grief  at  the  hands  of 
a  native  Cacique,  named  Parisa,  who  killed  or  captured 
nearly  all  of  them.  Thereupon  Pedrarias  sent  out  his  son, 
Juan  Arias  de  Avila,  to  inflict  revenge  upon  the  natives  and 
to  continue  the  explorations.  Juan  went  westward  to  Cape 
de  Guerra,  and  thence  to  Punta  de  Borico  and  to  Cape 
Blanco.  "They  discovered  250  leagues,  as  they  affirm,"  says 
Galvano,  "and  peopled  the  city  of  Panama." 

Among  those  who  worked  under  or  with  Pedrarias  in  his 
explorations  were  Gonzalez  Gomez  Espinosa,  whose  rela- 
tive, the  judge  Caspar  Espinosa,  supplied  the  funds  for  the 
conquest  of  Peru,  and  whose  name  is  now  conspicuously  and 
most  honourably  borne  in  Panama;  Fernando  Ponce,  Bar- 
tholomew Hurtado,  and  Gonsalvo  de  Badajos.  A  contempo- 
rary, but  by  no  means  a  colleague,  was  his  own  kinsman,  Gil 
Gonzalez  Davila  (de  Avila).  The  last  named,  a  man  of  fine 
character  and  high  ability,  arrived  at  the  Isthmus  in  1517 
with  a  commission  to  explore  the  west  coast.  Pedrarias 
wanted  a  monopoly  of  the  undertaking  himself,  and  accord- 
ingly refused  to  provide  him  with  ships  for  the  purpose, 
whereupon  Gil  took  his  two  caravels  apart  at  Porto  Bello, 
carried  them  across  the  Isthmus,  rebuilt  them,  and  launched 
them  into  the  Pacific;  thus  practically  repeating  Balboa's 
feat.  This  was  in  1522.  Gomara  records  that  he  "armed 
four  ships  in  the  Island  of  Tararequi,  standing  in  the  South 
Sea,  with  intent  to  discover  the  coast  of  Nicaragua,  and  espe- 
cially a  strait  or  passage  from  the  South  Sea  into  the  North 
Sea." 

He  went  up  the  Pacific  Coast  as  far  as  the  Bay  de  Salinas, 
and  then  went  inland  and  discovered  the  great  lake  of  which 


28  THE  SECEET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

reports  had  been  heard;  his  pilot,  Andrea  Nino,  meantime 
going  along  the  coast  as  far  as  Tehuantepec,  vainly  seeking 
the  mysterious  Strait.  The  principal  native  chieftain  of 
that  region,  with  whom  Gil  made  a  treaty,  was  named 
Nicarao,  wherefore  the  Spaniards  called  the  lake  Nicaro 
Agua,  or  Nicaragua^ — the  Sea  of  Nicarao.  It  was  not  until 
three  years  later,  in  the  year  1525,  however,  that  it  was  as- 
certained that  this  lake  and  the  smaller  Lake  Managua,  while 
connected  with  the  Caribbean  Sea  by  a  river,  were  in  no  way 
connected  with  the  Pacific,  and  therefore  gave  no  solution 
of  the  "Secret  of  the  Strait."  There  were  ancient  legends, 
which  indeed  survive  to  this  day,  among  the  natives  of  Cen- 
tral America,  that  once  a  waterway  existed  across  that 
region,  by  way  of  the  San  Juan  River,  Lake  Nicaragua,  and 
Lake  Managua,  to  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  and  that  it  was  closed 
up  by  volcanic  action. 

Worthy  of  note  in  passing,  too,  are  various  others  who  in 
that  time  sought  the  "Secret  of  the  Strait."  Francisco  Her- 
nandez de  Cordova,  Hernando  de  Soto  (afterward  the  dis- 
coverer of  the  Mississippi  River),  Christopher  Morantes,  and 
Lopez  Ochoa,  in  1517,  explored  the  coast  of  Yucatan  and  the 
Gulf  of  Campeachy ;  and  Juan  de  Grijalva  in  1518  continued 
those  explorations  along  the  Mexican  coast  as  far  as 
Tampico;  and  Alvarez  de  Pineda  made  the  circuit  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  It  was  on  the  same  errand,  "to  find  a 
shorter  route  to  Cathay,"  that  France  sent  Giovanni  da  Ver- 
razzano  and  Jacques  Cartier,  who  explored  the  coasts  further 
north  from  Hatteras  to  Labrador.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
quest  of  the  mythical  Strait,  there  might  have  been  no  French 
colony  planted  in  Canada.  Meantime,  the  famous  explorer 
Magellan  joined  in  the  search,  sailing  southward,  and  was 
of  them  all  alone  successful.  He  did  indeed  find  a  strait, 
and  the  only  strait  existing  across  the  American  continents; 
but  that  waterway,  which  bears  his  name,  was  much  too  re- 
mote in  the  far  south  to  satisfy  those  who  were  seeking  a 
short  cut  to  the  East  Indies.  The  search  at  Darien  there- 
fore was  continued,  and  was  presently  taken  up  by  another 


HERNANDO  CORTEZ  29 

famous  man,  to  whom  Keats,  in  the  familiar  lines  already 
quoted,  ascribed  the  great  achievement  of  Balboa. 

Hernando  Cortez  was,  like  Balboa,  an  impoverished  noble- 
man of  Estremadura.  He  went  to  Hispaniola  in  1504,  thence 
to  Cuba,  and  in  1518  to  Mexico,  where  his  marvellous  achieve- 
ments easily  gave  him  rank  as  the  greatest  of  all  the  Spanish 
conquerors,  and  as  second  in  fame  to  only  Columbus  him- 
self among  the  discoverers  and  explorers  of  America.  After 
the  conquest  of  Mexico  and  Central  America,  he  was  in  1523 
directed  by  Charles  V  to  engage  in  the  quest  of  the  Strait, 
and  he  entered  upon  that  work  with  characteristic  zeal.  Al- 
ready he  had  heard  in  Mexico  of  the  Strait  and  had  in  1520 
tried  to  get  from  Montezuma  information  concerning  it. 
Montezuma  had  pleaded  ignorance,  but  had  provided  Cortez 
with  maps  and  guides,  with  the  aid  of  which  Cortez  had  sent 
Diego  Ordaz  to  explore  the  Huasacualco  River,  which  Cortez 
called  Quacalco  and  which  is  now  known  as  the  Coatzacoal- 
cos.  In  1521  Gonzalo  de  Sandoval  had  completed  the  con- 
quest of  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  and  had  ascertained 
that  no  Strait  existed  in  that  region,  though  the  Huasacualco 
River  was  utilised  as  a  part  of  an  overland  route  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 

But  in  1523  Cortez  was  still  hopeful  of  discovering  the 
elusive  Strait,  and,  what  was  more  to  the  purpose,  he  was 
convinced  of  the  desirability  and  the  practicability  of  creat- 
ing such  a  Strait  if  one  were  not  found  to  exist.  To  find  a 
way  or  make  one  was  his  strenuous  rule.  How  intent  he 
was,  and  how  important  he  deemed  the  quest,  were  shown  in 
a  letter  which  he  wrote  to  the  King  in  1524,  saying  that  he 
had  determined  to  send  five  ships  upon  the  strait-seeking 
errand,  and  expected  the  enterprise  would  cost  him  more 
than  ten  thousand  pesos  in  gold;  a  heavy  expense,  yet  one 
which  he  would  gladly  incur,  because,  he  said,  "If  the  Strait 
is  found,  I  shall  hold  it  to  be  the  greatest  service  I  have  yet 
rendered.  It  would  make  the  King  of  Spain  master  of  so 
many  lands  that  he  might  call  himself  the  Lord  of  the  whole 
world."    He  also  sent  out  a  fleet  to  search  the  Pacific  Coast 


30  THE  SECRET  OF  THE  STRAIT 

for  that  end  of  the  Strait,  with  orders  to  keep  on  southward 
until  it  reached  the  scene  of  Magellan's  discovery,  while  those 
on  the  Caribbean  side  were  to  examine  the  coast  all  the  way 
northward  to  Labrador.  ''Thus/'  said  the  conqueror  of 
Mexico,  "on  the  one  side  or  the  other  I  shall  not  fail  to  solve 
the  secret."  He  spoke  in  the  same  letter  to  Charles  V  of 
California  and  other  lands  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  as  of  great 
value  and  well  worth  exploring ;  ''but,"  he  added,  "being  well 
aware  of  the  great  desire  of  your  Majesty  to  know  the  secret 
of  this  Strait,  and  of  the  great  advantage  the  crown  would 
derive  from  its  discovery,  I  postpone  all  other  schemes  and 
interests,  some  of  them  of  the  highest  moment,  to  pursue  this 
object  alone." 

"In  this  year  1524,"  says  Galvano,  quoting  the  "General 
History"  and  "Conquest  of  Mexico"  of  Gomara,  "Cortez  sent 
one  Christopher  de  Olid  with  a  fleet  of  the  Island  of  Cuba, 
to  receive  the  victuals  and  ammunition  which  Alonzo  de  Con- 
treras  had  prepared,  and  to  discover  and  people  the  country 
about  Cape  de  Higueras  and  the  Honduras;  and  to  send 
Diego  Hurtado  de  Mendoza  by  sea,  to  search  the  coast  from 
thence  even  unto  Darien,  to  find  out  the  Strait  which  was 
thought  to  run  into  the  South  Sea,  as  the  Emperor  had  com- 
manded. He  sent  also  two  ships  from  Fanuco,  to  search 
along  the  coast  unto  Florida.  He  commanded  also  certain 
brigantines  to  search  the  coast  from  Zacatullan  to  Panama. 
This  Christopher  de  Olid  made  a  league  with  Diego  Velas- 
quez against  Cortez.  He  took  Gil  Gonzalez  de  Avila 
prisoner,  and  killed  his  nephew  and  the  Spaniards  that  were 
with  him,  and  showed  himself  an  enemy  to  Cortez,  who  had 
spent  in  that  expedition  30,000  Castellans  of  gold  to  pleas- 
ure him."  The  treason  of  Christopher  de  Olid  and  the  hos- 
tility of  Pedrarias  compelled  Cortez  to  turn  his  attention 
away  from  the  Strait.  In  1532,  however,  he  sent  Diego 
Hurtado  de  Mendoza  from  Acapulco  200  leagues  down  the 
Pacific  Coast,  without  making  any  important  discovery. 

At  about  this  time,  indeed,  men  began  to  doubt  the  exist- 
ence of  a  natural  waterway,  and  to  consider  the  practicabil- 


FIEST  PLANS  FOR  A  CAKAL  31 

ity  of  constructing  an  artificial  one.  The  pioneer  in  this 
ambitious  scheme,  after  Cortez  himself,  appears  to  have  been 
Alvaro  de  Saavedra  Ceron,  who  had  been  a  follower  of  Bal- 
boa, and  later  became  one  of  the  most  faithful  and  efficient 
lieutenants  of  Cortez,  whose  cousin  he  was.  He  was  a 
brother  of  the  Ferdinand  de  Saavedra  who  was  at  the  head 
of  the  colony  founded  by  Cortez  at  Truxillo,  in  1525.  As 
early  as  1517,  Gomara  tells  us,  he  turned  his  attention  to  the 
secret  of  the  Strait.  Doubting  the  existence  of  a  natural 
strait,  he  recalled  the  narrowness  and  low  elevation  of  the 
Isthmus  at  Panama,  where  he  had  been  with  Balboa.  In 
1529,  according  to  Galvano,  he  prepared  plans  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  at  that  point,  and  was  about  to  lay 
them  before  the  King  of  Spain  when  death  ended  his  promis- 
ing career. 

It  is  related  that  Cortez,  learning  that  Magellan's  ships  had 
passed  through  the  Patagonian  Strait  into  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
sent  three  ships  to  join  that  expedition  and  to  go  with  it 
to  the  Moluccas,  and  open  up  navigation  between  Mexico 
and  the  East  Indies.  "There  went  as  Governor  in  those 
ships,  one  Alvaro  de  Saavedra  Ceron,  cousin  to  Cortez,  a  man 
fit  for  that  purpose."  Saavedra  reached  the  Moluccas  in 
1528,  and  in  June  of  that  year  set  out  to  return  to  Mexico, 
but  was  detained  at  the  Island  of  Tidore  until  the  next  year. 
In  1529  he  again  essayed  to  return.  He  visited  Papua 
and  the  Marquesas  Islands,  and  then  "perceiving  that  the 
time  and  weather  were  then  somewhat  better  for  his  purpose, 
made  sail  toward  the  Firm  Land  and  city  of  Panama,  where 
he  might  unload  the  cloves  and  merchandise  which  he  had, 
that  so  in  parts  it  might  be  carried  four  leagues  to  the  river 
of  Chagres,  which  they  say  is  navigable,  running  out  into  the 
North  Sea  not  far  from  Nombre  de  Dios,  where  the  ships 
ride  which  come  out  of  Spain;  by  which  ways  all  kinds  of 
goods  might  be  brought  unto  them  in  shorter  time  and  with 
less  danger  than  to  sail  around  the  Cape  of  Bona  Speranza. 
For,  from  Molucca  unto  Panama,  they  sail  continually  be- 
tween the  tropics  and  the  line ;  but  they  never  found  wind  to 


32  THE  SECRET  OF  THE  STRAIT 

serve  that  course,  and  therefore  they  came  back  again  to 
Molucca  very  sad,  because  Saavedra  died  by  the  way ;  who,  if 
he  had  lived,  meant  to  have  opened  the  land  of  Castilla  del 
Oro  and  New  Spain  from  sea  to  sea.  Which  might  have 
been  done  in  four  places,  namely,  from  the  Gulf  of  San 
Miguel  to  Uraba,  which  is  25  leagues;  or  from  Panama  to 
Nombre  de  Dios,  being  17  leagues  distance;  or  through 
Xaquator,  a  river  of  Nicaragua,  which  springeth  out  of  a  lake 
three  or  four  leagues  from  the  South  Sea  and  falleth  into  the 
North  Sea.  The  other  place  is  from  Tehuantepec  through  a 
river  to  Verdadera  Cruz,  in  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  which 
might  also  be  opened  in  a  strait.  Which  if  it  were  done,  then 
they  might  sail  from  the  Canaries  unto  the  Moluccas,  under 
the  climate  of  zodiac,  in  less  time  and  with  much  less  danger 
than  to  sail  about  the  Cape  of  Bona  Speranza  or  by  the 
Strait  of  Magellan,  or  by  the  northwest.  And  yet  if  there 
might  be  found  a  strait  there,  to  sail  into  the  Sea  of  China, 
as  it  hath  been  sought,  it  would  do  much  good." 

Thus,  according  to  Gomara  and  Galvano,  at  this  early 
date  the  four  major  canal  routes,  so  much  discussed  and 
surveyed  in  our  own  time,  were  indicated :  Darien,  Panama, 
Nicaragua,  and  Tehuantepec;  and  the  superiority  of  one  of 
them  over  the  routes  by  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  by  the  Strait 
of  Magellan,  and  by  the  problematic  North  West  Passage, 
was  appreciated.  Meantime,  it  is  of  curious  interest  to  ob- 
serve, there  arose  at  the  very  outset  the  long  maintained 
rivalry  between  Panama  and  Nicaragua  for  the  location  of 
the  canal.  While  Saavedra  was  planning  at  Panama,  Pedra- 
rias  turned  for  a  time  from  the  congenial  work  of  torturing 
and  massacring  the  natives  of  Nicaragua,  and  of  reducing 
a  population  of  2,000,000  to  200,000,  and  sent  his  lieutenant 
Estete  to  establish  an  overland  traffic  route  from  the  lakes 
to  the  Pacific,  and  also  to  survey  a  route  for  a  canal.  It 
does  not  appear,  however,  that  any  definite  plans  for  such  a 
canal  were  at  that  time  made,  and  happily  in  1530  Pedrarias 
died. 

Charles  V  continued  earnestly  and  urgently  in  his  desire 


PHILIP  II  KEVEESES  CHAKLES  V  33 

and  his  efforts  for  a  waterway  across  the  Isthmus,  and  in 
1534  directed  Andagoya,  the  Governor  of  Costa  Firme,  as  the 
Panama  region  was  then  called,  to  make  surveys  in  the  valley 
of  the  Chagres  River  and  elsewhere,  to  determine  the  most 
practicable  route.  That  functionary  seems  to  have  been,  in 
that  matter  at  least,  an  unworthy  successor  of  Balboa  and 
Cortez,  for  he  showed  no  stomach  for  the  undertaking  and 
soon  declared  it  to  be  quite  impossible.  Others  were  more 
resolute  and  optimistic.  The  historian  Gomara,  in  his  official 
^'History  of  the  Indies,"  dedicated  to  Charles  V,  in  1551,  un- 
hesitatingly declared  a  canal  to  be  practicable  at  any  of  the 
four  places  named  by  Galvano.  He  recognised  the  obstacles, 
but  refused  to  regard  them  as  insurmountable.  "There  are 
mountains,"  he  wrote,  "but  there  are  also  hands.  Give  me 
the  resolve,  and  the  task  will  be  accomplished.  If  determina- 
tion is  not  lacking,  means  will  not  fail ;  the  Indies,  to  which 
the  way  is  to  be  made,  will  furnish  them.  To  a  King  of 
Spain,  seeking  the  wealth  of  Indian  commerce,  that  which  is 
possible  is  also  easy."  But  not  even  with  this  eloquent  en- 
couragement was  Charles  V  able  to  effect  the  enterprise,  but 
he  was  compelled  to  leave  it  as  unfinished  business  to  his 
successor. 

Philip  II  at  first  took  up  the  matter  hopefully.  In  1567 
he  sent  an  engineer,  Batista  Antonelli,  to  survey  the  Nica- 
ragua route,  but  got  from  him  as  a  result  an  unfavourable 
report,  of  difficulties  too  great  to  be  overcome.  Soon  after 
this,  however,  he  reversed  his  policy.  The  difficulties  re- 
ported by  Antonelli  discouraged  him,  the  rising  power  of  the 
English  at  sea  made  him  fear  lest  he  should  not  be  able  to 
control  the  canal  if  one  v/ere  constructed,  and  finally  the  re- 
actionary bigotry  which  so  completely  dominated  him  and 
dwarfed  his  statesmanship  led  him  to  conclude — according 
to  the  Jesuit  historian,  Jose  de  Acosta — that  it  would  be 
contrary  to  the  Divine  Will  to  unite  two  oceans  which  the 
Creator  of  the  world  had  separated,  and  that  to  attempt  so 
impious  a  deed  would  surely  provoke  some  appalling  catas- 
trophe.   Accordingly  he  not  only  abandoned  all  schemes  for 


34  THE  SECKET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

a  canal,  but  he  forbade  the  making  of  them,  decreed  that  no 
canal  should  be  constructed,  and  imposed  the  penalty  of 
death  upon  any  one  who  should  make  known,  or  should 
attempt  to  seek,  a  better  route  across  the  Isthmus  than  the 
overland  trail  from  Porto  Bello  to  Panama ;  especially  inter- 
dicting attempts  on  the  Mandingo  or  Atrato  River.  Mr. 
W.  L.  Scruggs,  in  his  "History  of  the  Colombian  and  Vene- 
zuelan Republics,"  quotes  an  official  document,  written  in 
1743,  by  Dionysius  Alceda,  Governor  of  Panama,  in  which 
reference  was  made  to  this  prohibition  of  navigation  of  the 
Atrato  River,  "owing  to  the  facility  it  affords  for  passing 
from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,"  and  which  positively 
declared  that  "this  passage  was  effected  in  the  year  1679  by 
the  arch  pirates  John  Guartem,  Edward  Blomar,  and 
Bartholomew  Charles." 

There  was  indeed  cause  for  Philip  to  fear  the  maritime 
might  of  England.  The  Islands  and  the  Peninsula  were  nomi- 
nally at  peace.  But  English  privateers,  freebooters,  and  buc- 
caneers began  to  harry  the  treasure  fleets  of  Spain.  About 
1570  they  became  such  a  terror  in  the  Caribbean  that  Span- 
ish trade  was  practically  driven  from  the  Isthmus  to  the 
roundabout  route  through  the  Strait  of  Magellan.  Then 
in  1579  Francis  Drake  went  to  the  latter  scene  and  played 
havoc  with  the  Spanish  ships  in  the  South  Sea,  so  that  a 
return  to  the  Isthmian  route  was  deemed  advisable;  Nica- 
ragua, however,  being  chosen  instead  of  Panama.  In  those 
times  there  was  no  thought  of  canal  building,  and  the  task 
of  holding  the  overland  trail  against  the  freebooters  was 
sufficient  to  tax  the  power  and  ingenuity  of  Spain.  For  a 
generation  the  plan  of  an  Isthmian  waterway  slumbered  and 
slept ;  to  be  revived  in  1616,  when  Philip  III  directed  Diego 
Ferdinand  de  Velasco,  Governor  of  Castilla  del  Oro,  to  make 
surveys  for  a  canal  by  way  of  the  Gulf  of  Darien  and  the 
Atrato  River — the  very  route  which  Philip  II  had  most  for- 
bidden. Yelasco's  report  has  been  lost  to  the  world,  and  its 
nature  is  unknown,  but  its  results  were  nothing. 

The  pernicious  activities  of  the  freebooters  and  buccaneers 


FREEBOOTERS  ON  THE  ISTHMUS  35 

were  meantime  maintained,  and  an  actual  state  of  war  be- 
tween England  and  Spain  added  to  the  embarrassments  of 
the  latter.  In  1655  the  English  seized  the  Island  of  Jamaica, 
and  vigorous  efforts  were  made  to  establish  an  English  foot- 
hold in  Central  America.  Wallace  indeed  had  established 
himself  in  Belize,  as  early  as  1638.  Other  settlements  were 
made  on  the  coasts  of  Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  and  a  party 
of  adventurers  under  Edward  David  went  up  the  San  Juan 
River,  stormed  Fort  San  Carlos,  sacked  Leon,  and  explored 
the  shores  of  Lake  Nicaragua.  Thus  for  the  first  time  the 
English  were  led  to  realise  the  magnitude  of  that  sheet  of 
water  and  its  potential  value  as  part  of  a  transit  route  from 
sea  to  sea.  From  that  time  dated  the  persistent  English  at- 
tempts to  get  control  of  Nicaragua. 

The  Spanish  rebuilt  Fort  San  Carlos,  only  to  have  it  again 
attacked  by  a  second  English  expedition.  Then,  in  a  desper- 
ate effort  to  baffle  the  English,  a  Spanish  engineer,  Fernando 
de  Escobedo,  determined  to  make  the  San  Juan  River  more 
difficult  for  them  to  navigate.  He  accordingly  opened  the 
southern  branch  of  that  river,  the  Rio  Colorado,  through 
which  to  divert  some  of  the  waters  of  the  main  stream.  In 
that  mad  enterprise  he  succeeded  beyond  expectation,  and 
the  result  in  time  was  the  ruin  of  the  good  natural  harbour 
at  Greytown.  The  freebooters  no  longer  ventured  to  go  up 
the  river,  but  they  blockaded  its  mouth,  and  when,  in  1685, 
L'Olonnais  entered  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  and  thence  marched 
to  Granada,  and  sacked  it,  the  Nicaraguan  route  as  a  high- 
way of  commerce  became  for  a  time  a  thing  of  the  past. 

Nor  did  the  British  neglect  the  lower  Isthmus,  of  Panama 
and  Darien.  That  worst  of  all  buccaneers,  the  Welshman 
Sir  Henry  Morgan,  in  1671  seized  and  sacked  Porto  Bello, 
and  then  marched  across  the  Isthmus  and  did  the  same  in- 
fernal work  at  Panama,  so  effectively  that  the  city  was  never 
rebuilt  on  the  old  site.  In  that  nameless  tragedy  Spanish 
commerce  across  that  Isthmus  was  all  but  destroyed,  and  it 
received  its  death  blow  nine  years  later,  when  another  British 
freebooter,    Captain    Sharpe,    landed    in    Caledonian    Bay, 


36  THE  SECKET  OF  THE  STEAIT 

marched  over  to  the  Tuyra  River,  and  destroyed  the  town  of 
Villa  Maria.  But  this  latter  expedition  had  a  still  more 
important  result  than  such  harrying  of  the  Spaniards.  One 
of  Sharpe's  companions  was  Lionel  Wafer,  an  ambitious,  if 
not  an  entirely  trustworthy,  observer.  On  his  return  to  Eng- 
land, he  reported  that  in  that  part  of  the  Isthmus  there  was 
no  mountain  range  at  all.  There  were  only  detached  hills, 
among  which  were  broad,  low  valleys,  extending  across  the 
narrow  Isthmus  from  sea  to  sea. 

This  report  attracted  the  attention  of  that  extraordinary 
man,  William  Paterson,  of  Scotland,  the  founder  of  the  Bank 
of  England,  and  he,  about  1694,  conceived  the  grandiose 
scheme  of  planting  on  the  Isthmus  of  Darien  a  British 
colony,  which  should,  in  his  own  words,  secure  for  Great 
Britain  "the  keys  of  the  universe,  enabling  their  possessors 
to  give  laws  to  both  oceans,  and  to  become  the  arbiters  of  the 
commercial  world."  Thus  did  this  canny  Scot  repeat  the 
glowing  estimates  of  Cortez  and  Gomara.  He  energetically 
set  about  the  execution  of  the  project.  "The  Company  of 
Scotland  Trading  to  Africa  and  the  Indies"  was  organised 
by  him,  and  was  incorporated  by  the  Scotch  Parliament.  A 
large  party  of  colonists  was  recruited,  and  sailed  from 
Leith,  1,200  strong,  on  July  26,  1698.  It  arrived  at  the 
Isthmus  on  November  4,  and  established  itself  at  Puerto 
Escoces,  or  Scotch  Port,  in  Caledonian  Bay,  founding  the 
"cities"  of  New  Edinburgh  and  New  St.  Andrews,  near  the 
site  of  Pedrarias's  Adas,  where  Balboa  was  put  to  death. 
Unfortunately  for  the  enterprise,  the  situation  chosen  was  a 
most  unhealthful  one,  the  English  and  Dutch  East  India 
Companies  were  bitterly  and  effectively  opposed  to  it,  and 
exerted  much  political  and  commercial  influence  against  it, 
the  English  and  Dutch  colonists  in  the  West  Indies  were  for- 
bidden to  trade  with  the  new  company,  and  the  Spaniards 
and  Indians  were  openly  hostile.  In  June,  1699,  the  dis- 
couraged colonists  abandoned  the  place  and  departed,  but 
two  months  later  were  succeeded  by  another  company.  The 
latter  had  scarcely  got  settled  on  shore  when  word  came  that 


FAILUKE  OF  PATEESON'S  SCHEME  37 

a  Spanish  force  at  Tubacanti,  on  the  Santa  Maria  River,  was 
preparing  to  attack  it  in  concert  with  a  fleet.  The  colonists 
hastened  to  anticipate  the  attack  with  a  march  against  the 
Spaniards,  whom  they  defeated  and  dispersed,  but  on  return- 
ing to  their  "city"  they  found  themselves  confronted  by  a 
Spanish  fleet  too  strong  to  be  successfully  resisted.  Ac- 
cordingly they  evacuated  and  abandoned  the  place,  in  April, 
1700. 

That  was  the  end  of  the  whole  enterprise,  save  that  the 
names  of  Caledonian  Bay  and  Puerto  Escoces  remained  upon 
the  map,  and  that  Paterson,  after  personal  survey  of  the 
Isthmus,  was  led  to  record  his  conviction  of  the  practicabil- 
ity of  a  canal.  In  his  "Central  America  in  1701,"  he  wrote 
that  if  such  interoceanic  communication  were  established, 
through  its  ports  would  flow  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  com- 
merce of  the  East  Indies,  amounting  to  not  less  than  |150,- 
000,000  a  year ;  while  the  time  and  expense  of  the  voyage  to 
China  and  Japan,  and  the  richest  parts  of  the  East  Indies, 
would  be  lessened  by  more  than  one-half,  and  the  consump- 
tion of  European  commodities  in  those  countries  would  soon 
be  more  than  doubled  and  thereafter  would  be  yearly  in- 
creased. There  is  interesting  food  for  speculation  in  the 
reminder  that  Paterson's  enterprise  was  undertaken  only  a 
few  years  before  the  union  of  England  and  Scotland,  which 
occurred  in  1707,  and  in  the  inquiry  of  what  might  have  hap- 
pened had  that  union  been  effected  before  his  undertaking, 
or  had  his  venture  been  postponed  until  after  the  union. 
In  such  case,  it  is  to  be  assumed,  there  would  have  been 
no  effective  English  opposition  to  his  colony,  but  on  the  con- 
trary it  would  have  received  earnest  support  from  English 
commerce  and  from  the  English  army  and  navy.  With  such 
support,  it  would  probably  have  been  successful.  The  Isth- 
mus of  Panama  would  have  become  an  English  colony,  and 
generations  ago  an  Isthmian  canal  might  have  been  suc- 
cessfully constructed  under  the  British  flag. 

With  the  final  collapse  of  Paterson's  enterprise,  the  whole 
scheme  of  an  Isthmian  canal  practically  lapsed  for  a  century. 


38  THE  SECEET  OF  THE  STKAIT 

Charles  Maire  de  la  Condamine,  the  astronomer,  was  sent  by 
the  French  government  in  1735  to  measure  an  are  of  the 
meridian  on  the  plain  of  Quito,  and  on  his  return  in  1740 
he  addressed  the  French  Academy  of  Sciences  in  behalf  of  a 
canal  at  Nicaragua,  which  he  declared  to  be  quite  prac- 
ticable. He  was  accompanied  across  the  Isthmus  by  Don 
George  Juan,  and  by  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  the  distinguished 
Spanish  scientist  and  statesman  who  was  afterward  gov- 
ernor of  Louisiana  in  1764 ;  but  competent  as  the  expedition 
was,  it  appears  to  have  made  only  most  superficial  examina- 
tions of  the  ground.  During  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century  a  few  sporadic  and  futile  essays  were  made  to  select 
a  route.  Augustin  Cramer  and  Miguel  del  Corral  surveyed 
the  Tehuantepec  route,  and  Ysasi,  Muestro,  and  Alexandre 
the  Nicaragua  route,  but  their  labours  were  fruitless.  The 
illustrious  Horatio  Nelson  led  an  expedition  to  Nicaragua 
in  1780,  to  seize  the  lakes  and  control  the  interoceanic  route, 
but  did  little  more  than  permanently  impair  his  own  health. 
The  next  year  Manuel  Galisteo  surveyed  the  Nicaragua  route 
and  reported  to  the  Spanish  government  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  construct  a  canal  from  the  lakes  to  the  Pacific. 
In  1788  a  Spanish  engineer  officer,  Manuel  Milla,  was  sent 
by  his  government  over  the  Caledonian  Bay  route,  which 
Sharpe  and  Wafer  had  traversed  long  before,  and  which 
Paterson  had  surveyed.  His  report  was  even  more  favour- 
able than  Wafer's  had  been  and  must  be  regarded  as  grossly 
exaggerating  the  ease  with  which  a  canal  could  be  con- 
structed there.  The  native  tribes  were  so  troublesome,  how- 
ever, as  to  keep  the  Spanish  government  from  making  any 
further  efforts  in  that  region.  Moreover,  both  war  and 
science  were  preparing  to  open  an  entirely  new  era  in  the 
history  of  the  Isthmus  and  of  interoceanic  trade. 


CHAPTER  III 

EARLY  PLANS  AND  RIVALRIES 

With  the  opening  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  new  era 
in  Isthmian  exploration  and  in  canal  schemes  was  begun.  Its 
foremost  pioneer  was  the  great  scientific  genius  Alexander 
von  Humboldt,  who  spent  the  years  from  1799  to  1804  in 
Mexico  (then  still  called  New  Spain),  Central  America,  and 
the  northwestern  states  of  South  America.  His  scientific 
researches  were  of  incalculable  value,  but  none  of  them  sur- 
passed in  interest  and  suggestion  his  observations  upon  the 
feasibility  and  desirability  of  constructing  an  artificial 
waterway  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans.  In  his 
"Political  Essay  on  New  Spain"  he  described  the  Central 
American  Isthmus,  the  "barrier  against  the  waves  of  the 
Atlantic,"  as  having  been  for  many  ages  "the  bulwark  of  the 
independence  of  China  and  Japan."  Only  by  making  a 
navigable  channel  across  that  Isthmus,  he  believed,  could 
"any  great  changes  be  effected  in  the  political  state  of 
Eastern  Asia."  Such  an  undertaking  was  "calculated  to 
immortalise  a  government  occupied  with  the  true  interests 
of  humanity."  Of  the  practicability  of  it  he  had  no  doubts. 
No  fewer  than  nine  routes  were  considered  by  him,  for  water- 
ways between  the  two  oceans.  The  first,  beginning  at  the 
north,  involved  the  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Peace,  and  Colum- 
bia rivers,  with  a  passage  over  the  "Stony"  or  Rocky  Moun- 
tains, which  latter,  he  was  informed,  were  in  some  places  as 
much  as  3,520  feet  high !  The  second  was  by  way  of  the  Rio- 
Bravo,  or  Rio  Grande  del  Norte,  in  Mexico,  and  the  Rio 
Colorado,  entering  the  Gulf  of  California.  The  third  was  at 
the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  Mexico,  making  use  of  the 
Coatzacoalcos  River.    The  fourth  was  at  Nicaragua,  where 


40  EAELY  PLANS  AND  KIYALKIES 

the  great  lakes  appeared  to  him  to  offer  special  facilities 
for  navigation,  as  did  also  the  San  Juan  River.  He  appears 
to  have  known,  as  he  certainly  should  have  known,  that  the 
San  Juan  River  flows  from  the  lakes  to  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
though  strangely  enough  one  of  his  maps  of  that  region  in- 
dicates it  as  flowing  into  the  lakes,  and  a  separate  river,  the 
Colorado,  flowing  into  the  Caribbean,  with  a  mountain  range 
between  them. 

The  fifth  route  was  that  at  Panama,  from  the  City  of  Pan- 
ama to  Venta  de  Cruces,  at  the  head  of  navigation  on  the 
Chagres  River,  near  Obispo  and  Gamboa,  on  the  present  rail- 
road and  canal  route.  To  this  he  devoted  most  attention  of 
all.  ''That  canal,"  he  said,  "would  have  to  pass  through  a 
hilly  tract,  of  the  height  of  which  we  are  completely 
Ignorant.  ...  It  is  very  astonishing  that  in  crossing  the 
Isthmus  neither  La  Condamine  nor  Don  George  Juan  and 
Ulloa  had  the  curiosity  to  observe  their  barometer,  for  the 
sake  of  informing  us  what  is  the  height  of  the  most  elevated 
point  on  the  route.  .  .  .  However,  it  appears  beyond  a 
doubt  that  we  find  the  principal  Cordillera,  or,  rather,  a 
range  of  hills  that  may  be  regarded  as  a  prolongation  of  the 
Andes  of  New  Granada,  between  Cruces  and  Panama.  It 
is  from  them  that  the  two  oceans  are  said  to  be  discernible 
at  the  same  time,  which  would  only  require  an  absolute 
height  of  290  metres.  However,  Lionel  Wafer  complains 
that  he  could  not  enjoy  this  interesting  spectacle.  He  as- 
sures us  that  the  hills  are  separated  by  valleys  which  allow 
free  course  for  the  passage  of  the  rivers.  If  this  be  true,  we 
might  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  canal  from  Cruces  to 
Panama,  of  which  the  navigation  would  be  interrupted  by 
only  a  very  few  locks."  The  290  metres,  or  951  feet,  sug- 
gested by  Humboldt,  was  really  more  than  three  times  the 
actual  height  of  the  loftiest  hill  on  the  route  ultimately 
selected  for  the  Panama  Canal. 

After  further  consideration  of  the  Panama  route,  Hum- 
boldt continued :  ''It  appears  to  me  that  the  expectation  of  a 
canal  of  seven  metres  in  depth  and  from  22  to  28  metres  in 


h 


HUMBOLDT'S  CANAL  PROPOSALS  41 

breadth,  which,  like  a  passage  or  strait,  should  go  from  sea 
to  sea  and  admit  the  vessels  which  sail  from  Europe  to  the 
Indies,  ought  to  be  completely  abandoned.  The  elevation  of 
the  ground  would  force  the  engineer  to  have  recourse  either 
to  subterraneous  galleries,  or  to  the  system  of  sluices;  and 
the  merchandises  destined  to  pass  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
could  only  thereafter  be  transported  in  flat-bottomed  boats 
unable  to  keep  the  sea.  .  .  .  Supposing,  then,  that  this 
canal  were  cut,  the  greatest  number  of  these  vessels  would 
probably  continue  their  voyage  round  Cape  Horn.  ...  It 
would  be  otherwise  with  the  products  of  Western  America,  or 
with  the  goods  sent  from  Europe  to  the  coast  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  These  would  cross  the  Isthmus  at  less  expense  and 
with  less  danger.''  But  he  urged  as  most  desirable  good 
roads  for  camel  traffic  at  Tehuantepec  and  at  Panama. 

Humboldt's  sixth  route  for  a  canal  was  that  from  Cupica, 
on  the  Pacific,  by  way  of  the  Napipi  and  Atrato  rivers  to  the 
Gulf  of  Darien.  "We  might  almost  say,"  he  wrote,  "that  the 
ground  between  Cupica  and  the  mouth  of  the  Atrato  is  the 
only  part  of  all  America  in  which  the  chain  of  the  Andes  is 
entirely  broken" — in  which  he  was  much  in  error.  It  will 
be  observed  that  he  ignored  the  Caledonian  and  Mandingo 
routes,  although  on  one  of  his  maps  the  Bay  of  Mandingo  is 
so  enormously  exaggerated  in  size  as  to  make  the  Isthmus  at 
that  point  scarcely  more  than  one-third  its  width  at  Panama. 
His  seventh  route  revived  the  old  legend  of  the  "Secret  of  the 
Strait,"  in  the  form  already  cited  in  the  records  quoted  by 
Mr.  Scruggs.  This  route  was  through  the  Ravine  of  Raspa- 
dura,  uniting  the  sources  of  the  Noanama  or  San  Juan,  and 
the  Quito,  Andagega,  Zitara,  and  Atrato  rivers.  "A  monk, 
cure  of  the  village  of  Novita,"  wrote  Humboldt,  "employed 
his  parishioners  to  dig  a  small  canal  in  the  Ravine  de  la 
Raspadura,  by  means  of  which,  when  rains  are  abundant, 
canoes  loaded  with  cacao  can  pass  from  sea  to  sea.  This  in- 
terior communication  has  existed  since  1788,  unknown  in 
Europe."  The  eighth  route  was  by  way  of  the  Rio  Callaga, 
in  Peru,  across  the  Andes  to  the  headwaters  of  the  Amazon. 


42  EARLY  PLANS  AND  RIVALRIES 

The  ninth  was  from  the  Gulf  of  St.  George  across  Patagonia. 
Five  of  these  routes,  the  second,  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and 
sixth,  were  seriously  considered  and  commended  by  him,  as 
worthy  of  practical  and  immediate  investigation.  To  him 
they  all  seemed  about  equally  desirable.  "They  are,"  he 
wrote  in  his  "Personal  Narrative,'^  "at  the  centre  of  the  New 
Continent,  at  an  equal  distance  from  Cape  Horn  and  the 
Northwest  Coast.  .  .  .  Opposed  to  each,  on  the  same 
parallel,  are  the  seas  of  China  and  India,  an  important  cir- 
cumstance in  latitudes  where  the  trade  winds  prevail.  All 
are  easily  entered  by  vessels  coming  from  Europe  and  the 
United  States.'^ 

The  observations  and  conclusions  of  Humboldt  gave  in- 
spiration upon  the  same  theme  to  another  great  genius,  John 
Wolfgang  Goethe.  In  the  record  of  his  "Conversations  with 
Eckermann  and  Soret,"  under  date  of  February  21, 1827,  it  is 
related : 

"He  spoke  much,  and  with  admiration,  of  Alexander  von 
Humboldt,  whose  work  on  Cuba  and  Colombia  he  had  begun 
to  read,  and  whose  views  as  to  the  project  for  making  a  pas- 
sage through  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  appeared  to  have  a 
particular  interest  for  him.  'Humboldt,'  said  Goethe,  'has, 
with  a  great  knowledge  of  his  subject,  given  other  points 
where,  by  making  use  of  some  streams  which  flow  into  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  end  may  perhaps  be  better  attained  than 
at  Panama.  All  this  is  reserved  for  the  future  and  for  an 
enterprising  spirit.  So  much,  however,  is  certain,  that  if 
they  succeed  in  cutting  such  a  canal  that  ships  of  any  burden 
and  size  can  be  navigated  through  it  from  the  Mexican  Gulf 
to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  innumerable  benefits  will  result  to  the 
whole  human  race,  civilised  and  uncivilised.  But  I  should 
wonder  if  the  United  States  were  to  let  an  opportunity  escape 
k  of  getting  such  a  work  into  their  own  hands.  It  may  be 
I  foreseen  that  this  young  State,  with  its  decided  predilection 
U  to  the  West,  will,  in  thirty  or  forty  years,  have  occupied  and 
'  peopled  the  large  tract  of  land  beyond  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains. It  may,  furthermore,  be  foreseen  that  along  the  whole 
coast  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  where  nature  has  already  formed 
the  most  capacious  and  secure  harbours,  important  com- 
mercial towns  will  gradually  arise,  for  the  furtherance  of  a 


GOETHE  ON  THE  CANAL  43 

great  intercourse  between  China  and  the  East  Indies,  and  the 
United  States.  In  such  a  case  it  would  be  not  only  desirable 
but  almost  necessary  that  a  more  rapid  communication 
should  be  maintained  between  the  Eastern  and  Western 
shores  of  North  America,  both  by  merchant  ships  and  men-of- 
war,  than  has  hitherto  been  possible  with  the  tedious,  dis- 
agreeable, and  expensive  voyage  around  Cape  Horn.  I 
therefore  repeat  that  it  is  absolutely  indispensable  for  the 
United  States  to  effect  a  passage  from  the  Mexican  Gulf  to 
the  Pacific  Ocean:  and  I  am  certain  that  they  will  do 
it.  ...  I  should  like  to  see  another  thing, — a  junction  of 
the  Danube  and  the  Rhine,  but  this  undertaking  is  so  gi- 
gantic that  I  have  grave  doubts  of  its  completion,  particu- 
larly when  I  consider  our  German  resources.  And,  thirdly 
and  lastly,  I  should  wish  to  see  England  in  possession  of  a 
canal  through  the  Isthmus  of  Suez.  Would  I  could  live  to 
see  these  three  great  works!  It  would  well  be  worth  the 
trouble  to  last  some  fifty  years  more  for  the  very  purpose  !^  " 

Both  of  these  illustrious  men  erred  as  prophets:  Hum- 
boldt in  saying  that  only  by  cutting  the  Isthmus  could  the 
political  status  of  Eastern  Asia  be  changed,  and  Goethe  in 
thinking  the  Danube-Rhine  canal  more  remote  and  doubtful 
than  the  Isthmian :  though  we  must  regard  with  admiration 
the  latter's  forecast  of  the  American  occupation  of  the 
Pacific  Coast  and  the  demand  for  an  Isthmian  canal  as  a  con- 
necting link  between  our  east  and  west  coast  lines,  as  well 
as  his  suggestion  of  British  possession  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

At  a  date  between  the  exploration  of  Humboldt  and  the 
prophecies  of  Goethe,  however,  statesmen  and  engineers  be- 
gan to  busy  themselves  with  practical  schemes  for  canal  con- 
struction. In  1814  the  Spanish  Government,  feeling  its  need 
of  doing  something  to  restore  the  waning  prestige  of  Spain 
and  to  renew  its  failing  hold  upon  its  American  colonies, 
decreed  the  construction  of  an  Isthmian  canal.  Before  any 
steps  could  be  taken  to  make  the  decree  effective,  however, 
the  Central  and  South  American  provinces  declared  and  es- 
tablished their  independence.  The  first  to  do  so  was  the 
Colombian  confederation,  which  comprised  Venezuela  (the 
present  republic  of  that  name),  Quito  (the  present  republic 


44  EAELY  PLANS  AND  RIValEIES 

of  Ecuador),  and  New  Granada  (the  present  republic  of 
Colombia) .  These  provinces,  under  the  lead  of  Miranda  and 
Bolivar,  began  their  struggle  for  independence  in  1811,  and 
in  1821  their  efforts  were  crowned  with  success.  A  year 
later,  in  1822,  the  Isthmian  provinces  of  Panama  and  Vera- 
guas  (the  present  republic  of  Panama)  followed  the  example, 
asserted  their  independence,  and  allied  themselves  with  New 
Granada.  The  Central  American  provinces  came  next.  In 
1821  the  independence  of  Guatemala  was  proclaimed  and  the 
other  provinces  joined  the  movement  the  next  year.  For  a 
time  Mexico,  under  the  Emperor  Iturbide,  tried  to  annex 
them,  but  upon  Iturbide's  defeat  by  Santa  Anna  in  1823 
the  five  republics — Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  Nica- 
ragua, and  Costa  Rica — became  independent  and  formed 
a  short-lived  federal  union. 

Very  soon  thereafter  the  governments  of  those  countries 
began  in  their  turn  to  urge  the  construction  of  a  canal.  The 
first  Central  American  envoy  to  the  United  States,  Antonio 
Jose  Canaz,  in  1825,  immediately  upon  his  arrival  at  Wash- 
ington, addressed  a  written  communication  to  the  American 
Government,  inviting  it  to  participate  with  Central  America 
in  the  enterprise  and  in  the  advantages  which  its  execution 
would  produce,  and  to  that  end  to  enter  into  a  treaty  which 
would  perpetually  secure  the  possession  of  the  canal  to  the 
two  nations.  Our  Secretary  of  State,  Henry  Clay,  was 
doubtless  in  sympathy  with  this  proposal,  but  could  scarcely 
commit  the  Government  to  it  offhand.  He  therefore  assured 
Seiior  Canaz  "of  the  deep  interest  taken  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  in  an  undertaking  so  highly  calculated 
to  diffuse  an  extensive  influence  on  the  affairs  of  mankind," 
and  instructed  Mr.  Williams,  the  United  States  envoy  to 
Central  America,  to  investigate  the  matter  and  to  report  all 
possible  data  concerning  the  practicability  of  constructing 
a  canal  at  Nicaragua.  At  the  same  time  commissioners  from 
New  Granada  were  in  Washington,  asking  the  United  States 
to  participate  in  the  first  Pan-American  Congress,  at  Pan- 
ama, in  June,  1826.     Fearing  that  Congress  would  discuss 


EFFORTS  AT  NICARAGUA  45 

the  question  of  human  slavery,  and  would  adopt  resolu- 
tions in  favour  of  emancipation,  the  United  States  Senate 
adopted  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  this  country  should 
not  be  represented  there,  save  in  a  diplomatic  way,  an^ 
should  not  enter  into  any  alliance  with  Central  and  South 
American  States.  Mr.  Clay  nevertheless  oflScially  declared 
to  the  envoys  that  the  question  of  a  canal  might  properly 
be  discussed  at  the  Congress,  and  that  such  a  canal,  if  ever 
it  should  be  constructed,  would  be  of  interest  to  all  the  world, 
while  its  greatest  benefits  would  accrue  to  this  continent. 

In  1825  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  Central  Amer- 
ica ordered  the  construction  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  and  gave 
to  a  promoter  named  Beniski  a  concession  for  the  enterprise. 
This  concession  was  afterwards  transferred  to  an  American 
company,  known  as  the  Central  American  and  United  States 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Canal  Company,  among  the  members  of 
which  were  De  Witt  Clinton,  the  builder  of  the  Erie  Canal ; 
Monroe  Robinson,  President  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States;  and  Stephen  Van  Rensselaer  and  A.  H.  Palmer,  of 
New  York  City.  A  second  scheme  was  the  outcome  of  the 
Congress  of  Panama,  and  was  organised  by  General  Wer- 
weer,  of  Belgium,  who  endeavoured  to  organise  a  Nicaragua 
Canal  Company.  He  secured  from  the  Nicaragua  Govern- 
ment, in  1829,  a  canal  concession  for  the  King  of  Holland, 
and  a  monopoly  of  the  coasting  trade.  This  latter  provision 
was  offensive  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  threatened  un- 
pleasant complications;  but  the  revolution  in  the  Nether- 
lands and  the  secession  of  Belgium,  the  next  year,  caused 
the  whole  project  to  be  abandoned. 

A  third  scheme  was  fathered  by  Simon  Bolivar,  then  Presi- 
dent of  New  Granada,  who  gave  to  a  Frenchman,  Baron 
Thierry, — a  picturesque  adventurer,  who  had  got  some  half- 
savage  Maoris  to  elect  him  ^'King  of  New  Zealand," — a 
franchise  for  a  canal  at  Panama.  The  next  year,  finding 
Thierry  was  unable  to  proceed  with  the  work,  Bolivar  under- 
took it  himself.  His  two  officers,  Lloyd,  a  British  engineer, 
and  Falcmar,  a  Swedish  captain,  surveyed  the  route,  but 


46  EARLY  PLANS  AND  RIVALRIES 

made  the  curious  error  of  reporting  that  there  was  three  feet 
difference  between  the  mean  levels  of  the  two  oceans.  This 
error  was  generally  accepted  as  a  fact,  and  was  enlarged 
upon,  until  it  was  widely  believed  that  the  Pacific  Ocean  was 
from  10  to  20  feet  higher  than  the  Caribbean  Sea.  The  Lloyd- 
Falcmar  route  was,  however,  on  the  whole  singularly  well 
chosen,  and  was  afterwards  substantially  adopted  for  the 
Panama  Railroad.  This  error  concerning  the  level  of  the 
two  oceans  was  not  original  with  or  confined  to  Lloyd  and 
Falcmar.  Many  years  before  Humboldt  had  referred  to  the 
"vulgar  opinion"  existing  in  every  age  and  clime,  that  of  two 
seas,  separated  by  an  isthmus,  one  was  invariably  higher 
than  the  other.  Strabo  mentioned  that  in  his  time  the  Gulf 
of  Corinth  was  believed  to  be  higher  than  the  -^gean  Sea, 
and  that  thus  it  would  be  dangerous  to  make  a  canal  across 
that  isthmus.  In  America,  Humboldt  recalled,  the  South 
Sea  or  Pacific  Ocean  had  long  been  supposed  to  be  higher 
than  the  Caribbean.  This  theory  had  been  combated  by 
Don  George  Juan,  however,  who  found  the  barometric  read- 
ings the  same  at  Panama  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chagres 
River.  A  French  engineer,  on  the  other  hand,  had  reported 
that  the  Red  Sea  was  38  feet  higher  than  the  Mediterranean. 
Humboldt's  own  observations  made  him  believe  that  if  there 
was  a  difference  between  the  Pacific  and  the  Caribbean,  it 
could  not  possibly  be  more  than  from  19  to  22  feet,  but  he  did 
not  believe,  as  he  afterward  declared,  that  there  was  any  dif- 
ference at  all. 

Another  interesting  speculation  of  Humboldt's  related  to 
the  possible  effects  which  the  construction  of  an  Isthmian 
canal  at  tide  level  might  have  upon  the  currents  of  the  ocean. 
"We  cannot  doubt,"  he  said,  "that  if  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
were  once  burst,  the  current  of  rotation,  instead  of  ascend- 
ing toward  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  issuing  through  the 
Bahama  Channel,  would  follow  the  same  parallel  from  the 
coast  of  Paria  to  the  Philippine  Islands.  The  effect  of  this 
opening,  or  new  strait,  would  extend  much  beyond  the  Banks 
of  Newfoundland,  and  would  either  occasion  the  disappear- 


AMEKICAN  INTEEEST  ABOUSED  47 

ance  or  diminish  the  celerity  of  the  Gulf  Stream."  But  such 
a  result  could  not  follow  the  construction  of  a  canal  with 
locks,  and  probably  would  not  follow  the  construction  of  one 
at  sea  level  on  account  of  its  small  size. 

That  the  United  States  should  become  interested  in  the 
Isthmian  canal  project  was,  as  Goethe  observed,  natural  and 
inevitable.  Henry  Clay,  the  Secretary  of  State,  as  we  have 
remarked,  in  1826  ordered  an  official  survey  of  the  Nicaragua 
route,  and  in  the  next  three  or  four  years  several  canal 
schemes  were  put  forward  in  this  country  to  no  avail.  The 
United  States  Senate  in  1835  adopted  a  resolution  for  the 
construction  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  and  President  Jack- 
son sent  Charles  Biddle  to  the  Isthmus  to  make  surveys  and 
negotiations ;  but  Biddle,  instead  of  visiting  Nicaragua,  went 
to  Panama,  and  privately  secured  Thierry's  concession, 
whereupon  he  was  repudiated  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, and  the  whole  business  lapsed.  Next  the  United 
States  of  Central  America  took  up  the  work  again,  President 
Morazan  sending  two  engineers,  Bailey  and  Bates, — the 
former  having  been  the  agent  of  an  English  corporation, — to 
survey  the  Nicaragua  route,  but  the  chief  result  was  a 
twelve  years'  war  with  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Central  American  Government  ended  the 
enterprise. 

Horatio  Allen,  the  engineer  of  the  Croton  Aqueduct,  in 
New  York,  in  1837  aroused  American  interest  in  the  scheme, 
and  got  Mayor  Aaron  Clark,  of  New  York  City,  and  other 
leading  citizens  of  New  York  and  Philadelphia  to  prepare 
a  plan  for  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  and  to  present  a  memorial 
to  Congress  on  the  subject,  in  January,  1838.  In  this  me- 
morial it  was  asked  that  the  Central  American  States,  the 
United  States,  and  all  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  should 
unite  in  opening  a  ship  canal  across  the  Isthmus,  and  that 
the  United  States  should  at  once  begin  the  preliminary  sur- 
veys. The  outcome  of  this  was  the  adoption  of  a  non-com- 
mittal resolution  by  Congress,  simply  expressing  deep  inter- 
est in  the  project.    Captain  Edward  Belcher,  in  1838,  made 


48  EAELY  PLANS  AND  EIVALKIES 

explorations  at  Nicaragua,  and  proposed  a  canal  with  its 
Pacific  outlet  in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca.  In  1839  the  United 
States  Government  sent  John  L.  Stephens  on  a  confidential 
mission  to  Central  America  to  do  the  work  which  Biddle 
had  failed  to  do.  He  recommended  the  construction  of  a 
canal  on  the  Nicaragua  route,  and  estimated  its  cost  at 
125,000,000,  but  added  that  the  country  was  at  that  time  too 
unsettled  and  revolutionary  for  capital  to  risk  investment 
in  it. 

In  the  political  chaos  which  then  prevailed,  various  wild 
schemes  were  launched.  Guatemala  sent  ecclesiastical  en- 
voys to  Rome,  to  get  the  Pope  to  patronise  the  canal  scheme. 
New  Granada  gave  vast  concessions  to  a  French  speculative 
scheme,  whose  promoters  professed  to  have  found,  by  Morel's 
surveys,  a  route  between  Porto  Bello  and  Panama  with  no 
elevation  above  10  1-2  metres.  This  preposterous  fiction 
was  pushed  by  Messrs.  Salomon  &  Co.,  until  Guizot,  for 
Louis  Philippe,  sent  Napoleon  Garella  to  find  out  the  truth. 
He  reported  that  the  elevation  of  the  lowest  pass  was  more 
than  115  metres.  At  about  this  time  Nicaragua  and  Hon- 
duras also  tried,  through  a  French  promoter,  to  get  French 
capital  interested  in  their  routes. 

In  time  the  French  Government  became  further  interested 
in  the  matter,  and  upon  the  strength  of  the  surveys  made  by 
Garella  and  Courtines  was  inclined  to  attempt  the  construc- 
tion of  a  canal  at  Panama,  which  should  have  25  locks,  be 
navigable  by  vessels  of  600  tons  only,  and  cost  |40,000,000. 
In  support  of  this  scheme  Guizot  read  in  the  French  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  on  June  10,  1843,  a  letter  which  Baron  von 
Humboldt  had  written,  on  August  1,  1842,  to  Salomon,  the 
French  promoter  already  mentioned.  In  this  letter  Hum- 
boldt referred  to  the  advice  which  he  had  formerly  given  to 
the  British  Embassy  at  Paris,  that  a  competent  engineer 
should  be  sent  to  explore  the  various  routes  across  the 
Isthmus,  and  expressed  regret  at  the  failure  to  act  upon  his 
advice.  "I  am,"  he  wrote,  "sorry  to  learn  that  you  are  no 
further  advanced  in  your  interesting  undertaking  than  you 


LOUIS  NAPOLEON  INTERESTED  49 

were  when  I  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  you  in  my  last  visit 
to  Paris.  Twenty -five  years  have  now  elapsed  since  the  proj- 
ect of  a  communication  between  the  two  oceans,  either  by 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  the  Lake  of  Nicaragua,  or  the 
Isthmus  of  Cupica,  has  been  proposed  and  discussed  topo- 
graphically; but  nothing  toward  realising  this  project  has 
even  yet  been  begun.  I  should  have  thought  that  the  English 
Embassy  might  have  found  the  means  of  inspiring  confidence 
by  proposing  to  send  a  scientific  engineer  to  study  the  valley 
between  the  two  seas  along  which  the  canal  might  be  cut 
to  the  western  part  of  the  port  of  Chagres.  Be  persuaded 
that  those  persons  who  make  use  of  the  authority  of  my  name 
to  support  the  idea  that  the  two  seas  are  not  on  a  level,  do 
so  only  in  order  to  excuse  themselves  from  engaging  in  the 
undertaking." 

In  1844,  Francisco  Castellon,  of  Nicaragua,  disgusted  with 
the  unsettled  political  state  of  Central  America,  went 
to  France  as  a  Nicaraguan  envoy,  to  try  to  persuade  Louis 
Philippe  to  establish  a  protectorate  over  Nicaragua,  and  to 
undertake  the  construction  of  a  canal.  The  King  paid  little 
attention  to  him,  but  Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  then  a 
State  prisoner  in  the  fortress  of  Ham,  became  deeply  inter- 
ested in  the  scheme.  That  ^^man  of  destiny"  began  to  regard 
it,  because  of  the  old  concession  to  Baron  Thierry,  as  prop- 
erly a  French  enterprise,  and  while  yet  in  prison  secured 
from  the  Nicaraguan  Government,  in  1846,  a  concession  and 
franchise  for  a  company  to  construct  the  "Canale  Napoleon 
de  Nicaragua."  So  interested  was  he  in  the  scheme  that  he 
informed  the  French  Government  of  it  and  begged  to  be  re- 
leased from  prison,  in  order  that  he  might  carry  it  out.  He 
promised  that  if  he  were  released  he  would  proceed  to  Amer- 
ica, and  trouble  France  no  more,  but  the  Government  refused 
to  grant  his  request.  In  the  same  year,  however,  he  escaped 
from  Ham,  and  went  to  London,  where  he  published  a  pam- 
phlet on  the  subject  of  an  Isthmian  Canal,  advocating  a 
route  in  Nicaragua  by  way  of  the  San  Juan  River  and  the 
two  lakes,  to  Realejo.     In  this  he  said: 


50  EARLY  PLANS  AND  RIVALRIES 

"The  geographical  position  of  Constantinople  rendered 
her  the  Queen  of  the  ancient  world.  Occupying,  as  she  does, 
the  central  point  between  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  she  could 
become  the  entrepot  of  the  commerce  of  all  these  countries, 
and  obtain  over  them  immense  preponderance;  for  in  poli- 
tics, as  in  strategy,  a  central  position  always  commands  the 
circumference.  This  is  what  the  proud  city  of  Constantine 
could  be,  but  it  is  what  she  is  not,  because,  as  Montesquieu 
says,  'God  permitted  that  the  Turks  should  exist  on  earth,  as 
a  people  most  fit  to  possess  uselessly  a  great  empire.'  There 
exists  in  the  New  World  a  State  as  admirably  situated  as 
Constantinople,  and  we  must  say  up  to  this  time  as  uselessly 
occupied.  We  allude  to  the  State  of  Nicaragua.  As  Con- 
stantinople is  the  centre  of  the  ancient  world,  so  is  the  town 
of  Leon  the  centre  of  the  New,  and  if  the  tongue  of  land 
which  separates  its  two  lakes  from  the  Pacific  Ocean  were 
cut  through,  she  would  command  by  virtue  of  her  central 
position  the  entire  coast  of  North  and  South  America.  The 
State  of  Nicaragua  can  become,  better  than  Constantinople, 
the  necessary  route  of  the  great  commerce  of  the  world,  and 
is  destined  to  attain  an  extraordinary  degree  of  prosperity 
and  grandeur.  France,  England,  and  Holland  have  a  great 
commercial  interest  in  the  establishment  of  a  communica- 
tion between  the  two  oceans,  but  England  has,  more  than  the 
other  powers,  a  political  interest  in  the  execution  of  this 
project.  England  will  see  with  pleasure  Central  America 
becoming  a  powerful  and  flourishing  State,  which  will  es- 
tablish a  balance  of  power  by  creating  in  Spanish  America 
a  new  centre  of  active  enterprise,  powerful  enough  to  give 
rise  to  a  feeling  of  nationality,  and  to  prevent,  by  backing 
Mexico,  any  further  encroachments  from  the  north." 

This  essay  attracted  much  attention  in  Great  Britain  and 
elsewhere  in  Europe.  But  two  years  later  the  revolution 
in  France  gave  its  author  his  opportunity  to  become 
President  and  to  plot  for  the  establishment  of  the  Second 
Empire,  and  the  canal  was  forgotten  by  him  in  those  larger 
ambitions. 


CHAPTER  rV 
THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

In  order  fully  to  understand  the  British  claims  in  Central 
America,  we  must  turn  back  nearly  two  and  a  half  centuries. 
In  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  British  freebooters 
established  themselves  at  various  points  on  the  coast  of 
Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  where  they  presently,  in  order  to 
secure  Government  countenance  and  protection,  abandoned 
their  piratical  ways  and  became  J)ona  fide  colonists,  develop- 
ing a  large  trade  in  the  fine  lumber  and  dyewoods  which 
there  abounded.  In  1670  a  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
Spain  confirmed  all  the  British  in  and  about  the  West  Indies 
forever  in  possession  of  all  the  lands  they  then  actually 
held.  The  Spanish  Government  two  years  later  declared 
that  this  applied  only  to  those  in  Jamaica  and  other  islands, 
and  not  to  those  on  the  mainland,  whom  it  regarded  as  free- 
booters and  pirates,  while  the  British  Government  insisted 
that  it  did  apply  to  the  lumber  colonists  of  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua. 

There  was  on  the  Nicaragua  coast  a  tribe  of  Indians  known 
as  the  Moscoes,  of  a  good-natured  and  easy-going  disposition. 
Early  in  the  seventeenth  century  it  received  from  British 
adventurers  a  certain  mixture  of  Caucasian  blood,  and  to 
this  was  added  a  strain  of  negro  blood  from  the  refugees 
from  a  wrecked  Dutch  slave  ship.  The  hybrid  race  which 
was  thus  produced,  of  Indian,  negro,  and  Caucasian  amal- 
gamation, proved  most  prolific,  and  soon  occupied  the  entire 
coast  from  the  Guayape  or  Patuca  to  the  San  Juan  River. 
The  name  Moscoe  was  transformed  into  Mosquito  and  the 
people  were  called  Mosquito  Indians  and  their  country  the 
Mosquito  Coast.     About  the  time  of  the  treaty  of  1670, 

51 


62  THE  CLAYTON-BULWEK  EPISODE 

the  chief  of  this  tribe,  Oldman  by  name,  was  persuaded  by 
the  British  settlers  to  proclaim  himself  King,  and  an  ally 
of  the  King  of  England.  According  to  some,  he  actually 
visited  England,  and  was  received  by  Charles  II.  Thus  in 
"Churchill's  Voyages"  we  read  that  "he,  the  King,  says  that 
his  father,  Oldman,  King  of  the  Mosquito  men,  was  carried 
over  to  England  soon  after  the  conquest  of  Jamaica,  and 
there  received  from  his  brother  King  a  crown  and  commis- 
sion, which  the  present  Old  Jeremy  still  keeps  safely  by  him ; 
which  is  but  a  cocked  hat  and  a  ridiculous  piece  of  writing 
that  he  should  kindly  use  and  relieve  such  straggling  Eng- 
lishmen as  should  choose  to  come  that  way,  with  plantains, 
fish,  turtle,  etc." 

Upon  his  death  in  1686,  Oldman  was  succeeded  by  his 
son  Jeremy,  who  the  next  year  went  to  Jamaica,  to  beg  the 
British  Government  to  take  him  and  his  "kingdom"  under 
the  protection  of  the  British  Crown.  The  Governor  seems 
to  have  regarded  the  application  with  suspicion  and  dis- 
favour, and  not  to  have  granted  Jeremy's  request.  Says  Sir 
Hans  Sloane :  "One  King  Jeremy  came  from  the  Mosquitoes 
(an  Indian  people  near  the  provinces  of  Nicaragua,  Hon- 
duras, and  Costa  Rica)  ;  he  pretended  to  be  a  King  there, 
and  came  from  the  others  of  his  country  to  beg  the  Duke  of 
Albemarle,  Governor  of  Jamaica,  his  protection,  and  that 
he  would  send  a  governor  thither  with  power  to  war  on  the 
Spaniards  and  pirates.  This  he  alleged  to  be  due  to  his 
country  from  the  Crown  of  England,  who  had  in  the  reign 
of  King  Charles  II  submitted  itself  to  him.  The  Duke  of 
Albemarle  did  nothing  in  this  matter."  The  British  settlers 
on  the  Mosquito  Coast  held  their  ground,  however,  and  some 
years  later  sent  Jeremy  to  Jamaica  again,  to  renew  the  re- 
quest for  protection.  This  time  he  was  a  little  more  suc- 
cessful. The  British  Governor  went  so  far  as  to  make  a 
private  agreement  with  him,  under  which  the  Governor  was 
to  support  the  "King"  with  money  and  arms,  and  the  "King" 
was  to  lend  the  Governor  a  company  of  fifty  men  to  capture 
runaway  slaves  in  Jamaica.    This  compact  was  ratified  by 


THE  "MOSQUITO  KING"  A  PUPPET  53 

the  Jamaica  Assembly,  and  was  thereafter  regarded  as  a 
practical  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Mosquito 
King. 

The  next  step  toward  British  rule  in  Central  America  was 
taken  in  1739-40,  when  efforts  were  made  to  rouse  the  Mos- 
quitoes and  other  Indians  to  join  the  British  in  the  war 
against  Spain,  and  British  fleets  operated  on  the  Mosquito 
Coast  and  also  along  the  Pacific  coast  of  Nicaragua.  Brit- 
ish troops  were  landed  in  the  Mosquito  territory,  British 
forts  were  built,  and  a  British  "Superintendent"  became 
practically  the  ruler  of  the  land,  though  the  Mosquito  "King" 
retained  the  outward  form  of  sovereignty.  Under  the 
Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which  ended  the  war,  no  definite 
disposition  was  made  of  the  Mosquito  territory,  and  the  Brit- 
ish remained  in  possession  of  their  holdings  there,  as  before, 
in  defiance  of  the  Spanish  protests.  When  the  Seven  Years' 
War  was  begun,  in  1754,  the  British  Government  offered  to 
relinquish  all  its  holdings  and  claims  on  the  mainland  to 
Spain,  if  the  latter  would  join  Great  Britain  against  France. 
Spain  declined  this  offer,  and  allied  herself  with  France,  and 
in  consequence  the  British  retained  possession  of  the  Mos- 
quito Coast  colonies,  and  this  possession  was  confirmed  by 
the  Treaty  of  Paris,  in  1763,  which  in  addition  gave  British 
subjects  the  right  to  cut  trees  and  engage  in  the  lumber 
trade  not  only  on  the  Mosquito  Coast  but  anywhere  along 
the  eastern  shore  of  Central  America,  though  it  also  pro- 
vided for  the  demolition  of  all  the  forts  which  the  British 
had  erected.     . 

In  1775  the  British  colonists  in  the  Mosquito  country, 
numbering  nearly  500,  with  twice  as  many  slaves,  and  with 
extensive  cotton  and  other  plantations  in  addition  to  the 
lumber  trade,  were  organised  as  a  dependency  of  Jamaica, 
with  a  Superintendent,  a  Council  of  Government,  and  a 
Court  of  Common  Pleas.  In  this  the  Spanish  Government 
apparently  acquiesced,  until  war  arose  again  between  the 
two  countries  in  1779,  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  expel 
the  British  colonists.     In  return  the  British  Government 


54  THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

sent  thither  a  fleet,  which  protected  the  colonists,  and  then 
a  second  fleet  under  Horatio  Nelson  (already  referred  to  in 
Chapter  II),  to  seize  the  San  Juan  River  and  the  lakes,  and 
thus  extend  British  rule  across  the  country  from  the  Carib- 
bean to  the  Pacific.  The  latter  enterprise  failed,  and  the 
British  colonists  were  in  time  driven  from  all  points  except 
the  Mosquito  Coast.  At  the  end  of  the  w^ar,  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  Great  Britain  formally  abandoned  her  claim  to 
sovereignty  on  the  mainland,  and  retained  nothing  but  the 
privilege  of  cutting  and  shipping  lumber  in  Belize  (now 
British  Honduras),  and  it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  this 
should  in  no  wise  derogate  from  the  Spanish  rights  of  sover- 
eignty over  that  territory.  The  British  settlements  on  the 
Bay  Islands  and  the  Mosquito  Coast  were  to  be  entirely 
abandoned. 

This  last  agreement,  however,  was  not  fulfilled.  The  Brit- 
ish made  no  pretence,  even,  of  withdrawing,  and  the  Spanish 
made  no  attempt  to  compel  them  to  do  so,  save  to  protest 
against  their  remaining.  A  little  later,  in  1786,  a  new  con- 
vention was  made,  under  which  the  Spanish  greatly  en- 
larged the  area  in  Belize  in  which  the  British  might  cut  tim- 
ber, while  the  British  government  agreed  "to  give  the  most 
positive  orders"  for  the  evacuation  of  all  other  regions  by 
British  subjects,  and,  if  they  disregarded  the  orders,  to  with- 
hold from  them  all  succour  or  protection,  and  to  "disavow 
them  in  the  most  solemn  manner."  Even  in  Belize,  where 
they  had  lumber  rights,  the  British  were  not  to  establish 
any  agricultural  plantations,  or  any  manufactures,  or  to 
make  any  permanent  settlements.  Despite  this,  many  Brit- 
ish colonists  remained  on  the  Bay  Islands  and  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  and  held  their  ground  against  various  efforts 
of  the  Spanish  to  expel  them.  Some  time  after  the  end 
of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  the  Treaty  of  1786  was  practically 
disregarded  by  the  British,  and  the  British  settlements  were 
confirmed  in  their  former  status. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  tell  just  when  or  in  what  form  the 
British   pretensions   and   aggressions   were   thus   renewed. 


BRITISH  PRETENSIONS  CHALLENGED  55 

James  Buchanan,  the  United  States  Minister  to  England,  in 
January,  1854,  in  a  "statement  for  the  Earl  of  Clarendon," 
discussed  this  question : 

"At  what  period,  then,  did  Great  Britain  renew  her  claims 
to  the  country  of  the  Mosquitoes,  as  well  as  the  continent  in 
general,  and  the  islands  adjacent,  without  exception?  It 
certainly  was  not  in  1801,  when,  under  the  Treaty  of  Amiens, 
she  acquired  the  Island  of  Trinidad  from  Spain,  without 
any  mention  whatever  of  further  acquisitions  in  America. 
It  certainly  was  not  in  1809,  when  she  entered  into  a  treaty 
of  alliance!^  offensive  and  defensive,  with  Spain,  to  resist  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  in  his  attempt  to  conquer  the  Spanish 
monarchy.  It  certainly  was  not  in  1814,  when  the  com- 
mercial treaties,  which  had  previously  existed  between  the 
two  powers,  including,  it  is  presumed,  those  of  1783  and  1786, 
were  revised.  On  all  these  occasions  there  was  no  mention 
whatever  of  any  claims  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Mosquito 
protectorate,  or  to  any  of  the  Spanish-American  territories 
which  she  had  abandoned.  It  was  not  in  1817  and  1819, 
when  acts  of  the  British  Parliament  distinctly  acknowledged 
that  the  British  settlement  at  Belize  was  ^not  within  the 
territory  and  dominion  of  His  Majesty'  but  was  merely  a 
'settlement  for  certain  purposes,  in  the  possession  and  under 
the  protection  of  His  Majesty;'  thus  evincing  a  determined 
purpose  to  observe  with  the  most  scrupulous  good  faith  the 
treaties  of  1783  and  1786  with  Spain." 

Steps  toward  the  reassertion  of  British  claims  were  taken, 
however,  with  or  without  authority,  as  early  as  1816.  The 
"Crown  Prince"  of  the  Mosquito  Indians,  George  Frederick, 
and  his  half-brother,  Robert,  were  taken  by  British  settlers 
to  Belize,  and  thence  to  Jamaica,  to  be  educated  and  also  to 
be  subjected  to  British  influences.  Upon  the  death  of  his 
father,  George  Frederick  was  taken  back  to  the  Mosquito 
Coast  in  a  British  warship,  and  was  formally  crowned  and 
enthroned  as  "King  of  the  Mosquito  Shore  and  Nation."  He 
soon  got  killed  in  a  drunken  brawl,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Robert,  who  showed  himself  more  friendly  to  the  Spanish 
of  Nicaragua  than  to  the  British,  and  was  accordingly  de- 
posed.    A  negro,  named  George  Frederick,  was  put  into  his 


66  THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

place,  but  he,  proving  unsatisfactory  to  the  British,  was  in 
turn  arbitrarily  displaced  in  favour  of  another  negro,  called 
Robert  Charles  Frederick,  who  was  taken  to  Belize,  dressed 
in  a  British  army  oflScer's  uniform,  and  crowned  King  of  the 
Mosquito  Coast.  This  was  in  April,  1825.  He  was  then 
taken  back  to  his  "kingdom"  for  a  time,  but,  his  reign  giv- 
ing little  satisfaction  to  the  British,  he  was  soon  practically 
exiled  to  Belize  and  was  kept  there  for  the  rest  of  his  life. 
In  his  place  Patrick  Walker,  the  private  secretary  of  the 
British  Superintendent  of  Belize,  was  established  as  a  sort 
of  regent  at  Blueflelds,  where  he  renamed  the  country  "Mos- 
quitia"  and  established  a  purely  British  administration. 

Since  there  seemed  little  prospect  of  extending  the  British 
power  northward,  the  sovereignty  of  Mosquitia  was  next 
declared  to  extend  southward  as  far  as  Boca  del  Toro,  on  the 
Chiriqui  Lagoon,  in  Panama,  and  there  thus  loomed  large  a 
scheme  of  British  rule  in  Central  America  from  Yucatan  to 
Darien.  This  scheme  was  promoted  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
Central  American  union  and  by  the  weakness  of  the  separate 
States  which  succeeded  it.  In  1835  a  Legislative  Assembly 
was  formed  in  Belize,  the  name  of  that  country  was  changed 
to  "British  Honduras,"  its  boundaries  were  much  enlarged, 
and  it  was  declared  to  be  a  British  possession  entirely  in- 
dependent of  any  Central  American  State.  The  Bay  Islands 
and  Mosquitia  were  similarly  declared  to  be  independent  of 
Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  and  the  British  Government  was 
asked  to  recognise  them  as  Crown  Colonies. 

Before  acting  upon  these  strenuous  proposals  of  its  agents, 
the  British  Government  sent  special  commissioners  to  in- 
vestigate matters,  and  also  a  naval  force  to  protect  its  colo- 
nists and  to  compel  Nicaragua  to  acknowledge  the  independ- 
ence of  Mosquitia,  not  as  a  British  colony  but  as  a  native 
kingdom  allied  with  Great  Britain.  Guatemala,  Nicaragua, 
and  New  Granada  protested  against  these  acts  and  pro- 
posals, while  Costa  Rica  acquiesced  in  them.  The  United 
States  was  for  some  time  silent  and  inactive.  It  was  too 
busy  with  its  plans  for  the  spoliation  of  Mexico  to  pay  much 


THE  ROUTE  TO  CALIFORNIA  67 

attention  to  what  was  going  on  so  far  southward.  More- 
over, it  had  not  yet  acquired  a  great  territory  on  the  Pacific 
Coast  with  which  it  needed  to  have  intercourse  by  way  of  the 
Isthmus.  Great  Britain  therefore  went  on  unchecked  and 
almost  unchallenged,  under  Lord  Palmerston's  vigorous 
leadership.  War  was  waged  against  Nicaragua,  with  the  re- 
sult that  British  control  was  established  on  the  San  Juan 
River,  and  Nicaragua  was  compelled  formally  to  relinquish 
forever  to  the  Mosquito  King  all  her  rights  in  that  region. 
It  needed  only  the  subsequent  British  seizure  of  Tigre  Isl- 
and in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  off  the  Pacific  coast  of  Nicaragua, 
to  make  the  British  conquest  and  control  of  that  Isthmus 
complete. 

It  was  not  until  matters  had  gone  thus  far  that  the  United 
States  was  roused  to  action,  and  even  then  it  was  aroused 
not  so  much  by  resentment  at  Great  Britain's  aggression  as 
by  the  desire  and  the  need  of  securing  a  line  of  communica- 
tion with  those  Pacific  Coast  possessions  which  it  was  seizing 
from  Mexico.  The  best  route  from  New  York  to  California 
was  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  in  order  to  secure 
the  use  of  that  route  the  United  States  made  in  1846 — at 
the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  war  and  long  before  the  dis- 
covery of  gold  in  California — a  treaty  with  the  Republic  of 
New  Granada,  which  was  destined  to  have  a  profound  and 
far-reaching  effect  upon  all  further  Isthmian  Canal  schemes. 
(See  Appendix  I.)  Under  that  treaty  the  United  States 
secured  the  exclusive  right  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama,  including  all  routes  in  the  country  between  the 
Chiriqui  Lagoon  and  the  Atrato  River,  and  in  return  under- 
took to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  such  routes  and  of  any 
lines  of  traffic  which  might  be  established  on  that  Isthmus, 
and  also  the  sovereignty  of  the  Isthmian  territory  against 
any  attack  by  alien  powers.  Under  this  treaty  American 
capitalists  promptly  proceeded  to  the  construction  of  a  rail- 
road across  the  Isthmus,  from  Aspinwall  (now  Colon), 
on  the  Caribbean  coast,  to  Panama,  on  the  Pacific  Coast, 
which  was  opened  for  traffic  in  1855,  and  which  has  ever 


68  THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

since  proved  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  whole 
problem  of  interoceanic  commerce. 

Nor  was  the  traditional  rivalry  of  Nicaragua  lacking.  In 
March,  1849,  New  York  capitalists  organised  the  "Compania 
de  Transito  de  Nicaragua,"  and  made  a  contract  with  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  for  the  construction  of  a  canal ;  and 
later  in  the  same  year  Cornelius  Vanderbilt  and  others 
organised  the  American  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal 
Company,  absorbed  into  it  the  "Compania  de  Transito  de 
Nicaragua,"  and  in  1851,  under  the  name  of  the  Accessory 
Transit  Company,  established  a  transit  route  across  Nica- 
ragua, with  steamboats  on  the  river  and  lakes  and  coach  and 
truck  lines  for  the  remainder  of  the  way.  This  was  for 
years  a  much  frequented  route  of  interoceanic  travel,  but  in 
time  was  overcome  and  destroyed  by  the  superior  facilities 
of  the  Panama  Railroad  route: 

Diplomacy  next  began  to  dominate  the  scene,  and  not  to 
the  advantage  or  the  credit  of  America.  The  British  seizure 
of  the  Mosquito  Coast  and  the  San  Juan  River,  and  the  Brit- 
ish designs  upon  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  were  so  great  a  menace 
to  existing  American  interests  at  Nicaragua  and  to  all  pros- 
pect of  extending  them  that  much  commercial  and  popular 
indignation  was  excited  in  the  United  States.  In  response 
to  this  President  Polk  and  his  Secretary  of  State,  James 
Buchanan,  sent  Elijah  Hise  in  1849  as  a  special  envoy  to 
Nicaragua  to  see  what  was  being  done  and  what  needed  to  be 
done.  Conceiving  it  to  be  his  duty  to  uphold  the  principles 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  regarding  the  treaty  concluded 
with  New  Granada  three  years  before  as  a  precedent  which 
it  would  be  proper  to  follow,  Mr.  Hise  soon  concluded  a 
treaty  with  Nicaragua,  giving  the  United  States  or  its  citi- 
zens the  exclusive  right  to  construct  a  transit  way,  railroad 
or  canal,  across  the  Isthmus  of  Nicaragua,  and  to  control  it 
and  guard  it  with  fortifications;  and  in  return  giving  to 
Nicaragua  an  American  guarantee  of  the  inviolability  of  her 
territorial  sovereignty. 

It  was  substantially  an  application  to  Nicaragua  of  the 


SQUIER'S  TREATY  WITH  NICARAGUA  59 

principles  which  had  just  been  applied  to  Panama.  But  there 
was  this  radical  difference  between  the  two  cases:  Great 
Britain  was  not  directly  interested  in  Panama,  while  she 
was  very  directly  interested  in  Nicaragua.  In  almost  every 
clause  Mr.  Hise's  treaty  ignored,  traversed,  or  defied  the  pre- 
tensions and  ambitions  of  Great  Britain  in  that  region.  So 
the  Washington  Government,  which  had  no  stomach  for  a 
direct  conflict  with  a  great  power,  flatly  repudiated  him  and 
all  his  doings,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  exceeded  his  in- 
structions; which  was  true  enough,  seeing  that  he  had  been 
sent  down  there  practically  without  any  instructions  at  all. 
In  his  place.  President  Taylor  and  his  Secretary  of  State, 
John  M.  Clayton, — who  had  succeeded  Polk  and  Buchanan 
while  Hise  was  in  Nicaragua, — sent  E.  G.  Squier  to  the 
Isthmus,  with  instructions  to  negotiate  with  Nicaragua  for 
an  ^'equal  right  of  transit  for  all  nations  through  a  canal 
which  should  be  hampered  by  no  restrictions."  In  addition 
he  was  bidden  to  be  careful  "not  to  involve  this  country  in 
any  entangling  alliances,  or  any  unnecessary  controversy." 

Mr.  Squier  went  to  work  with  zeal  and  with  discretion, 
and  in  September,  1849,  secured  from  Nicaragua  a  favour- 
able concession  for  a  canal,  in  behalf  of  the  Com.pany  already 
mentioned,  which  had  been  organised  that  year  by  Cornelius 
Vanderbilt.  But  he  also,  moved  by  much  the  same  spirit 
that  had  animated  Mr.  Hise,  made  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua, 
guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  and  the  sovereignty 
of  Nicaragua  over  the  territory  traversed  by  the  canal  and 
over  the  ports  at  its  terminals.  This,  again,  was  practically 
a  challenge  to  Great  Britain,  since  she  was  already  asserting 
her  sovereignty,  or  at  least  her  control,  over  much  of  the  line 
of  the  canal,  and  over  its  Caribbean  terminus.  The  British 
answer  came  promptly.  Honduras,  the  owner  of  Tigre  Isl- 
and in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  was  pressed  for  immediate  pay- 
ment of  an  old  British  claim,  the  obvious  intent  of  Great 
Britain  being  to  seize  the  Island  in  default  of  settlement. 
To  prevent  this,  Mr.  Squier  hastened  to  make  a  treaty  with 
Honduras,  under  which  Tigre  Island  and  certain  lands  on 


60  THE  CLAYTON-BULWER  EPISODE 

the  shore  of  the  Bay  of  Fonseca  were  practically  ceded  to 
the  United  States.  This  was  on  September  28,  1849.  On 
October  16,  following,  a  British  fleet  appeared  in  the  Bay 
of  Fonseca,  and  took  forcible  possession  of  Tigre  Island  in 
the  name  of  the  British  Government.  Mr.  Squier  at  once 
protested  against  such  seizure  of  what  he  regarded  as  the 
property  of  the  United  States,  and  ordered  the  British  to 
evacuate  within  a  week ;  which  they  declined  to  do. 

This  awkward  and  menacing  situation  was  disposed  of  at 
Washington  by  the  negotiation  of  one  of  the  most  famous 
and  most  criticised  treaties  in  American  history.  It  is 
probable  that  a  much  different  course  would  have  been  fol- 
lowed, had  it  not  been  for  some  very  necessary  political 
considerations.  President  Taylor  and  Secretary  Clayton 
were  Whigs.  But  there  was  a  Democratic  majority  in  the 
Senate,  which  would  have  to  pass  upon  any  treaty  which 
might  be  made.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  do  something 
which  would  meet  the  approval  of  the  political  opponents 
of  the  administration.  Mr.  Clayton  entered  into  negotiations 
with  the  British  Minister  at  Washington,  Mr.  Crampton,  and 
offered  practically  to  recognise  British  control  on  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  provided  Great  Britain  would  not  make  that 
control  an  obstacle  to  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  a 
neutral  canal.  To  this  the  British  Minister  and  British 
Government  assented.  The  American  Minister  to  England, 
Abbott  Lawrence,  however,  after  an  elaborate  investigation 
of  the  matter,  declared  that  the  British  claim  of  a  pro- 
tectorate over  the  Mosquito  territory  had  no  foundation  in 
history,  law,  or  justice,  and  argued  that  it  should  be 
abandoned,  or  at  any  rate  that  Great  Britain  should  relin- 
quish all  claim  to  or  control  of  the  Caribbean  terminal  of 
the  proposed  canal.  Unfortunately  the  Washington  Govern- 
ment did  not  support  Mr.  Lawrence  in  this  contention,  but 
proceeded,  over  his  head,  with  negotiations  in  which  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Mosquito  territory  from  Nicaragua,  and 
also  its  "close  political  connection"  with  Great  Britain,  were 
practically  conceded.     Sir  Henry  Bulwer  was  then  sent  as 


MAKING  THE  TREATY  61 

British  Minister  to  Washington,  and  work  upon  the  draft  of 
a  treaty  was  begun  by  him  and  Mr.  Clayton. 

It  was  while  this  work  was  in  progress  that  news  came  of 
the  British  seizure  of  Tigre  Island,  and  the  Democratic  ma- 
jority in  the  Senate,  quite  willing  and  perhaps  eager  to  em- 
barrass the  Whig  administration,  demanded  the  immediate 
consideration  of  Mr.  Squier's  treaties  with  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras,  and  asked  the  President  for  all  letters  and  papers 
relating  thereto.  This  request  was  refused,  "on  grounds  of 
public  policy,"  because  such  disclosure  of  documents  might 
embarrass  important  negotiations  then  pending;  and  then, 
in  order  to  strengthen  that  argument  for  refusal,  Mr.  Clay- 
ton urged  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  to  conclude  the  treaty  at  once. 
Sir  Henry  suggested  as  a  preliminary  that  the  United  States 
Government  should  disavow  and  cancel  Mr.  Squier's  treaty 
with  Honduras  and  his  acquisition  of  Tigre  Island,  in  return 
for  which  the  British  Government  would  disavow  and  undo 
its  agent's  seizure  of  that  Island.  This  was  done,  and  there 
upon  the  famous  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  concluded, 
signed,  sent  to  the  Senate,  and  ratified.     (See  Appendix  II.) 

It  provided  that  neither  the  United  States  nor  Great 
Britain  should  exclusively  control  the  Nicaragua  canal  or 
build  any  fortifications  along  it;  that  neither  should  ever 
take  possession  of,  fortify,  colonise,  or  exercise  dominion  or 
protection  over  any  part  of  Central  America;  that  they 
should  mutually  guard  the  safety  and  neutrality  of  the  pro- 
posed canal,  and  should  invite  all  other  nations  to  do  the 
same;  that  both  should  give  aid  and  support  to  any  satis- 
factory company  which  would  construct  the  canal ;  and  that 
thus  a  general  principle  should  be  established  for  application 
to  all  Isthmian  canals  or  railroads,  at  Panama  or  Tehuante- 
pee  as  well  as  at  Nicaragua.  On  the  face  of  it  this  seemed  a 
splendid  thing,  and  the  treaty  was  generally  applauded. 
But  there  was  something  deeper  than  the  face  of  it.  Even 
before  the  treaty  was  ratified,  the  British  Government  In- 
formed the  United  States  that  it  did  not  interpret  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  as  applicable  to  the  existing  British 


62  THE  CLAYTON-BULWEK  EPISODE 

settlement  in  Honduras  "or  its  dependencies," — to  wit,  the 
Bay  Islands  and  the  Mosquito  coast.  In  other  words.  Great 
Britain  was  to  be  confirmed  in  all  her  disputed  claims  in 
Central  America,  and  was  thus  to  be  enabled  to  do  to  a 
great  extent  the  very  things  the  treaty  forbade  the  United 
States  to  do. 

In  this  Mr.  Clayton  practically  acquiesced,  and  so  the 
treaty,  which  was  signed  on  April  18,  1850,  was  ratified  on 
July  5,  1850.  The  treaties  negotiated  by  Messrs.  Hise  and 
Squier  were  cancelled,  and  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  be- 
came the  supreme  law  of  the  land. 

Meantime  various  schemes  of  canal  construction  arose, 
only  to  be  defeated  by  the  circumstances  established  by  this 
very  treaty  whose  ostensible  object  was  to  promote  the  enter- 
prise. The  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  had  Andreas  Oersted,  a 
Danish  engineer,  in  1847,  survey  a  Nicaragua  canal  route 
which  instead  of  running  to  the  Bay  of  Fonseca  should 
reach  the  Pacific  through  Costa  Rican  territory.  Stephen 
Bailey  proposed  another  route  in  the  same  general  region. 
Immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.  Colonel  O.  W.  Childs,  a  distinguished  American 
canal  engineer,  was  sent  to  Nicaragua,  where  he  laid 
out  an  entirely  new  route,  having  its  Pacific  terminus  at 
Brito.  His  plans  were  approved  by  the  War  Department  at 
Washington,  and  also  by  British  official  engineers,  and 
formed  the  basis  of  the  actual  attempt  which  was  made  in 
after  years  to  construct  a  canal  in  Nicaragua.  But  all  these 
enterprises  were  hampered  and  frustrated  by  political  con- 
siderations. Friction  and  disputes  arose  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  over  the  interpretation  and  appli- 
cation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Great  Britain  in- 
trigued with  Costa  Rica  and  opened  the  way  for  a  boundary 
dispute  between  that  country  and  Nicaragua.  Presently, 
the  republics  of  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  and  Honduras  united 
in  a  federal  league,  while  Guatemala  and  Costa  Rica  re- 
mained aloof,  the  latter  almost  openly  hostile  to  the  com- 
bination. 


WKANGLING  OVEK  THE  TKEATY  63 

President  Pierce  and  his  Secretary  of  State,  William  L. 
Marcy,  took  up  the  controversy  with  Great  Britain,  sending 
Solon  Borland  as  a  special  agent  to  Central  America  and 
James  Buchanan  as  Minister  to  England,  with  instructions 
to  insist  upon  such  construction  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  as  would  require  Great  Britain  to  withdraw  from  the 
Mosquito  Coast.  This  demand  Lord  Clarendon,  the  British 
Foreign  Minister,  met  with  a  flat  refusal,  to  which  he  added 
that  the  British  Government  would  not  recognise  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  international  law,  and  would  not  consent  to  be 
questioned  further  by  the  United  States  concerning  her 
original  rights  in  Central  America.  The  American  answer 
to  this  should  have  been  Immediate  notice  of  abroga- 
tion of  the  Clayton  Bui wer  treaty.  Instead,  our  Govern- 
ment contented  itself  with  bombarding,  in  the  interest 
of  Cornelius  Vanderbilt's  company,  the  British-Mosquito 
settlement  of  Greytown,  at  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan 
River. 

Then  Walker,  the  filibuster,  began  in  1855  his  nefarious 
operations  in  Nicaragua,  and  affairs  in  all  that  part  of 
America  became  chaotic.  In  Honduras  some  further  work 
was  done  toward  establishing  satisfactory  interoceanic 
transit.  A  British  concern  known  as  the  Honduras  Inter- 
oceanic Railway  Company  was  organised  in  1854,  and 
secured  a  concession  for  its  route  across  that  country.  Dip- 
lomatic complications  ensued,  however,  among  Honduras, 
Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States,  with  the  result  that 
by  1857  all  plans  and  operations  were  practically  shelved. 
There  followed  some  futile  diplomatic  passages  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  in  which  abrogation 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  threatened  by  this  country, 
but  was  not  effected ;  and  then  Great  Britain  made  a  highly 
profitable  series  of  treaties  with  various  Central.  American 
States,  taking  advantage  of  the  facts  that  Walker's  filibuster- 
ing had  aroused  much  prejudice  against  the  United  States 
in  those  countries,  and  that  the  United  States  was,  more- 
over, too  much  concerned  with  its  own  domestic  troubles 


64  THE  CLAYTON-BULWEE  EPISODE 

and  impending  civil  war  to  pay  much  attention  to  its  south- 
ern neighbours. 

The  climax  of  these  diplomatic  achievements  of  Great 
Britain  was  the  negotiation,  in  1860,  of  a  treaty  with  Nica- 
ragua, in  which  Great  Britain,  with  an  appearance  of  much 
magnanimity,  agreed  to  abandon  her  protectorate  over  the 
Mosquito  Coast,  and  to  hand  the  whole  of  that  region  back 
to  Nicaragua,  in  return  for  which  Nicaragua  was  to  ac- 
knowledge the  validity  of  the  claims  which  were  thus  re- 
linquished. In  fact  the  British  withdrawal  was  only  nomi- 
nal, and  the  sovereignty  restored  to  Nicaragua  was  the 
merest  shadow,  for  it  was  stipulated  that  if  Nicaragua  at- 
tempted to  make  her  sovereignty  fully  effective  Great  Britain 
should  have  the  right  to  intervene  under  a  title  whose  valid- 
ity and  sufficiency  Nicaragua  had  now  herself  admitted. 


CHAPTER  y 

SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

While  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were  wran- 
gling over  their  ill-made  treaty,  another  French  essay  was 
made  in  Nicaragua.  Louis  Napoleon  had  temporarily 
abandoned  his  canal  scheme  in  favour  of  his  imperial  coup- 
Wetat,  but  he  took  it  up  again  during  the  Anglo-American 
deadlock  following  the  ratification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  in  a  way  which  caused  some  concern.  At  the  time  of 
Walker's  filibustering  operations,  one  Felix  Belly,  an  en- 
thusiastic French  adventurer  and  promoter,  organised  a  com- 
pany for  the  construction  of  a  canal  along  Oersted's  route, 
through  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica.  He  played  strongly 
upon  local  sentiment  in  those  countries  by  exploiting  the 
evils  of  Walker's  raids,  publicly  declaring  that  thitherto  all 
the  official  agents  of  the  United  States  in  Nicaragua  had 
been  accomplices  and  auxiliaries  of  Walker  and  other  fili- 
busters; and  in  order  to  protect  Nicaragua  from  any  more 
such  outrages  he  proposed  that  the  canal,  if  not,  indeed,  the 
whole  country,  should  be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
European  powers  which  had  just  guaranteed  the  integrity 
of  the  Turkish  empire,  to  wit,  France,  Great  Britain,  and 
Sardinia.  Working  with  shrewd  pertinacity  along  such 
lines.  Belly  persuaded  the  Nicaraguan  and  Costa  Rican  gov- 
ernments to  adjust  their  boundary  disputes,  and  then,  in 
May,  1858,  to  grant  him  a  canal  concession  for  ninety-nine 
years  on  the  Oersted  route.  He  was  to  have  all  the  privi- 
leges which  had  been  enjoyed  by  the  American  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Canal  Company,  and  in  addition  that  of  stationing 
two  French  warships  in  Lake  Nicaragua.  At  this  the 
United  States  Government  was  aroused,  and  it  warned  Nica- 

65 


66  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

ragua  that  such  stationing  of  French  warships  in  the  lake 
would  not  be  tolerated,  and  insisted  that  the  rights  already 
granted  to  American  citizens  must  be  respected.  Mr.  Cass, 
the  American  Secretary  of  State,  writing  to  Mr.  Mason,  the 
American  Minister  to  France,  spoke  plainly  as  follows,  his 
words  being  intended  for  the  French  Government: 

"The  general  policy  of  the  United  States  concerning  Cen- 
tral America  is  familiar  to  you.  We  desire  to  see  the  Isth- 
mian routes  opened  and  free  for  the  commerce  and  inter- 
course of  the  world,  and  we  desire  to  see  the  States  of  that 
region  well  governed  and  flourishing  and  free  from  the  con- 
trol of  all  foreign  powers.  The  position  we  have  taken  we 
shall  adhere  to,  that  this  country  will  not  consent  to  the 
resubjugation  of  those  States,  or  to  the  assumption  and 
maintenance  of  any  European  authority  over  them.  The 
United  States  have  acted  with  entire  good  faith  in  this  whole 
matter.  They  have  done  all  they  could  to  prevent  the  de- 
parture of  illegal  military  expeditions  with  a  view  to  estab- 
lish themselves  in  that  region,  and  at  this  time  measures  are 
in  progress  to  prevent  the  organisation  and  departure  of  an- 
other, which  is  said  to  be  in  preparation.  Should  the 
avowed  intention  of  the  French  and  British  governments  be 
carried  out  and  their  forces  be  landed  in  Nicaragua,  the  meas- 
ure would  be  sure  to  excite  a  strong  feeling  in  this  country, 
and  would  greatly  embarrass  the  efforts  of  the  Government 
to  bring  to  a  satisfactory  close  these  Central  American  diflS- 
culties  which  have  been  so  long  pending." 

In  the  face  of  that  strong  and  statesmanlike  assertion  of 
American  principles  and  purposes,  the  French  and  British 
governments  paused,  and  Nicaragua  quickly  reversed  her 
untenable  attitude.  Belly  and  his  schemes  were  swept  aside, 
and  in  March,  1861,  the  Central  American  Transit  Com- 
pany, directed  by  William  H.  Webb,  of  New  York,  received 
a  franchise  for  the  old  monopoly  of  navigation  on  the  San 
Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua.  The  French  menace  was 
not,  however,  past.  Louis  Napoleon  would  not  openly  sup- 
port Belly  in  his  schemes,  but  he  presently  took  them  up 
on  his  own  account.  He  was  already  deeply  involved  in 
schemes  for  the  practical  conquest  of  Mexico  and  the  crea- 


FKENCH  AMBITIONS  07 

tion  of  a  French  Empire  in  America,  and  he  conceived  the 
design  of  extending  his  aggression  southward  so  as  to  secure 
the  Nicaraguan  Isthmus  and  the  site  of  the  future  inter- 
oceanic  canal.  To  this  end  he  sent  Michael  Chevalier,  a  dis- 
tinguished French  engineer,  to  survey  a  route  and  to  obtain 
a  concession  for  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  in  which  errand 
Chevalier  was  successful.  Unfortunately  for  the  imperial 
intriguer,  however,  the  civil  war  in  America  came  to  an  end, 
and  the  United  States  Government  was  thus  enabled  to 
vindicate  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  practically  driving  the 
French  out  of  Mexico.  For  a  few  years  longer  Napoleon 
clung  to  his  Nicaragua  canal  scheme,  but  could  do  nothing 
with  it  before  the  German  war  of  1870  brought  his  career  to 
an  end.  Meantime,  in  1869,  the  Nicaragua  transportation 
line  which  had  been  established  by  Cornelius  Vanderbilt 
twenty  years  before  was  abandoned,  and  its  almost  worthless 
franchise  was  sold  to  an  Italian  corporation,  which  held  it 
for  twenty  years  and  then  resold  it  to  the  ill-fated  American 
Maritime  Canal  Company. 

Some  attention  was  also  paid,  from  time  to  time,  to  the 
Tehuantepec  route.  Thus  in  1842  Don  Jos^  de  Garay,  a 
Mexican  promoter,  sent  Gaetano  Moro,  an  Italian  engineer, 
to  survey  the  Mexican  Isthmus  for  a  railroad  or  a  canal 
route,  and  secured  a  concession  from  President  Santa  Anna. 
The  route  adopted  was  intended  for  both  a  railroad  and  a 
canal,  the  latter  to  be  fifty  miles  long  and  provided  with 
locks.  At  the  end  of  the  war  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  President  Polk  offered  to  double  the  |15,000,000  in- 
demnity to  be  paid  by  the  United  States  under  the  treaty  of 
Guadelupe  Hidalgo,  if  the  Mexican  Government  would  cede 
to  this  country  the  exclusive  right  of  way  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Tehuantepec.  This  offer  was  declined,  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment expecting  Garay  to  fulfil  his  plans,  which  he  failed 
to  do.  Instead,  he  sold  out  his  concession  to  a  syndicate  of 
New  York  capitalists,  and  after  the  Gadsden  treaty  in  1853 
the  Mexican  Government  confirmed  to  the  United  States  the 
privileges  it  had  granted  to  Garay,  for  a  Tehuantepec  rail- 


68  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

road.  There  was  still,  however,  too  much  ill-will  in  Mexico 
against  the  United  States  for  capitalists  to  risk  important 
investments  in  that  country,  and  moreover  the  Panama  rail- 
road was  being  pushed  to  completion ;  wherefore  the  Tehuan- 
tepec  scheme  was  abandoned,  to  be  revived  many  years  later 
by  Captain  James  B.  Eads,  with  his  imposing  project  of  a 
ship  railway,  and  finally  to  be  carried  to  completion  in  the 
twentieth  century  by  a  British  company  under  the  lead  of 
Sir  Weetman  Pearson,  in  the  construction  of  a  fine  railroad 
with  ample  shipping  terminals,  a  work  calculated  to  be  a 
not  insignificant  rival  of  the  Panama  railroad  and  canal. 

More  and  more,  however,  both  European  and  American  at- 
tention was  recalled  to  and  centred  upon  the  Panama  route, 
and  other  possible  routes  on  the  lower  Isthmus.  There 
arose  in  that  region  a  sharp  rivalry  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  This  had  its  origin  in  1850,  when 
Dr.  Edgar  Cullen,  of  Dublin,  residing  at  Bogota,  laid  before 
the  Royal  Geographical  Society  of  London  a  most  favourable 
report  upon  the  Caledonian  Bay  route.  Lord  Palmerston, 
flushed  with  his  Clayton-Bulwer  triumph,  and  expecting 
great  things  in  Nicaragua,  paid  no  attention  to  it,  but  practi- 
cal business  men  in  London  assumed  a  more  favourable  atti- 
tude. A  corporation  was  formed,  which  sent  out  Lionel  Gis- 
borne,  an  engineer,  to  make  surveys.  The  local  Indian  tribes 
drove  him  away  from  the  Caledonian  Bay  region,  and  he 
went  to  Panama.  There  he  began  surveys,  but  had  more 
trouble  with  the  natives,  and  finally  went  home  with  his 
work  unfinished.  He  made  a  favourable  report  upon  the 
Panama  route,  declaring  that  the  greatest  height  of  land 
to  be  overcome  was  only  150  feet  above  sea  level,  a  statement 
which  attracted  much  attention  in  England  and  on  the 
continent.  Meantime  Dr.  Cullen  secured  from  the  New 
Granadan  Government  at  Bogota  a  concession  for  a  canal 
on  the  Caledonian  Bay  route,  and  declined  the  earnest  en- 
treaties of  a  French  company  to  be  permitted  to  share  in  the 
enterprise. 

These  things  aroused  the  apprehension   of  James   Bu- 


FREDEEICK  KELLY'S  SURVEYS  69 

chanan,  then  American  Minister  to  England,  and  he  urged 
the  United  States  Government  to  do  something  to  counter- 
act them.  Accordingly,  Lieutenant  Isaac  C.  Strain,  of  the 
United  States  Navy,  was  sent  to  Caledonian  Bay  with  a  sur- 
veying party.  Marching  inland,  he  found  mountains  from 
1,000  to  3,500  feet  high  in  the  way  of  a  canal,  which  he  re- 
garded as  practically  insurmountable  obstacles.  He  there- 
upon returned  to  the  coast,  discouraged,  and  there  met  Gis- 
borne's  party  and  a  French  surveying  party.  Joining  forces 
with  the  former,  he  returned  inland  and  made  his  way  across 
the  Isthmus,  with  great  difficulty  and  with  complete  con- 
firmation of  his  first  unfavourable  impressions.  Thus,  as 
he  said,  he  ''dispersed  a  magnificent  and  dangerous  fallacy" 
— the  fallacy  originated  in  1680  by  Sharpe  and  Wafer. 

The  Caledonian  Bay  route  was  thereupon  abandoned.  The 
several  Atrato  routes  were  next  considered.  We  have  al- 
ready referred  to  the  legends  of  a  natural  waterway  in  that 
region  (quoted  by  Mr.  Scruggs  from  Governor  Alceda),  and 
of  the  canal  dug  by  a  priest  in  1788  in  the  Raspadura  Ravine 
(cited  and  credited  by  Humboldt).  It  was  further  said  that 
in  1799  the  attention  of  the  French  Government  had  been 
called  to  the  Raspadura  canal  by  a  French  pilot,  and  that 
in  1820  a  ship's  boat  had  been  taken  from  ocean  to  ocean  by 
that  route.  Moreover,  Humboldt,  as  the  result  of  personal 
observations  and  inquiries,  had  declared  that  no  chain  of 
mountains  or  even  ridge  of  partition  existed  in  that  region. 
If  these  reports  were  true,  it  seemed  that  there  was  the  most 
promising  route  for  a  canal.  In  order  to  determine  their 
truth  or  falsity  Frederick  Kelly,  an  American  capitalist,  in 
1851,  sent  J.  C.  Trautwine,  one  of  the  engineers  of  the  Panama 
Railroad,  to  explore  the  Atrato  valley.  The  result  was  that 
the  story  of  the  priest's  canal  in  the  Ravine  of  Raspadura 
was  pronounced  to  be  entirely  fanciful.  Two  more  survey- 
ing parties  were  sent  to  the  same  general  region  by  Mr.  Kelly 
in  1853,  with  unsatisfactory  results.  A  fourth,  sent  in  1854 
to  the  Atrato-Truando  route,  made  more  favourable  reports. 
Mr.  Kelly  then  went  to  England  and  France  and  aroused 


10  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

there  some  interest  in  his  researches  and  plans,  but  failed 
to  attain  any  practical  results. 

In  1857  President  Buchanan  sent  to  the  Atrato  region 
Lieutenants  Nathaniel  Michler,  U.  S.  A.,  and  T.  A.  Craven, 
U.  S.  N.,  to  make  surveys.  The  former  made  a  favourable 
report,  declaring  that  a  canal  could  be  constructed  at  that 
point,  at  a  cost  of  $134,000,000.  Lieutenant  Craven,  on  the 
other  hand,  condemned  the  entire  scheme  as  quite  imprac- 
ticable. Again,  Mr.  Kelly  asked  Colonel  Totten,  U.  S.  A.,  the 
chief  engineer  of  the  Panama  railroad,  his  opinion  concern- 
ing a  canal  at  Panama,  and  especially  concerning  one  at  sea 
level.  Colonel  Totten  replied  that  a  sea-level  canal  was  im- 
practicable, that  any  canal  that  was  cut  there  would  neces- 
sarily have  ten  or  twelve  locks,  and  that  it  was  by  no  means 
certain  that  the  Chagres  River  could  be  controlled  by  any 
engineering  device.  From  these  discouragements  Mr.  Kelly, 
who  was  one  of  the  most  resolute  and  unsparing  of  canal 
promoters,  in  1863  turned  to  the  San  Bias  route  as  a  last 
resort.  That  route  was  at  that  date  almost  unknown,  the 
formidable  San  Bias  Indians,  who  down  to  this  day  keep  all 
strangers  out  of  their  country,  having  prevented  explora- 
tions and  surveys.  A  party  was  sent  thither  by  Mr.  Kelly, 
but  the  Indians  would  not  permit  anything  like  a  thorough 
survey.  Enough  was  ascertained,  however,  to  convince  the 
explorers  that  a  tunnel  seven  miles  long  would  be  necessary, 
and  on  their  return  they  so  reported.  At  this  Mr.  Kelly 
reluctantly^,  but  finally,  gave  up  the  whole  enterprise. 

Lieutenant  Strain's  exposure  of  the  Caledonian  Bay  fal- 
lacy did  not  discourge  some  enthusiastic  French  promoters, 
who  in  1861  had  further  surveys  made  there  by  M.  Bourdiol, 
working  from  the  Pacific  coast.  He  did  not  succeed  in  cross- 
ing the  Isthmus,  but  reported  that  it  was  entirely  feasible 
to  make  a  canal  there,  and  that  the  extreme  elevation  of  land 
on  the  route  was  only  144  feet.  M.  Airian,  a  French  resi- 
dent of  Bogota,  also  made  surveys,  and  reported  that  there 
was  no  mountain  range  in  that  region,  but  only  scattered 
hills,  and  that  the  extreme  elevation  was  only  161  feet    A 


THE  CHIKIQUI  LAGOON  11 

third  Frenchman,  M.  de  Puydt,  professed  to  have  discovered 
another  route,  near  by,  with  an  elevation  of  only  101  feet, 
and  backed  up  his  report  with  some  old  Spanish  documents 
and  a  map  which  had  been  found  in  Madrid.  Two  properly 
equipped  surveying  parties  were  thereupon  sent  to  that 
region.  One  was  sent  by  a  speculative  company,  and  it  pro- 
fessed to  find  a  satisfactory  Atrato-San  Miguel  route  with 
an  extreme  elevation  of  190  feet.  The  other,  sent  by  the 
Compagnie  Gen^rale  Transatlantique,  reported  that  it  would 
be  practically  impossible  to  construct  a  canal  in  that  place. 

Nor  was  the  other  end  of  the  Panama  Isthmus  neglected. 
The  great  Chiriqui  Lagoon,  adjoining  the  Costa  Rica  border, 
on  the  Caribbean  coast,  appeared  to  furnish  an  advantageous 
starting  place  for  a  canal,  and  in  1859-60  President  Bu- 
chanan had  surveys  made  there,  though  not  so  much  for  a 
canal  as  for  a  railroad  and  for  a  naval  and  coaling  station. 
A  Chiriqui  Improvement  Company  was  formed  in  the  United 
States,  and  secured  valuable  concessions.  At  the  outbreak 
of  the  Civil  War  the  enterprise  languished,  but  in  1862 
President  Lincoln  planned  to  purchase  the  rights  of  the 
company  and  to  establish  there  a  great  colony  of  emanci- 
pated negroes.  The  employment  of  the  negroes  in  the  army 
and  elsewhere  caused,  however,  the  abandonment  of  this 
scheme. 

After  the  Civil  War  renewed  attention  was  given  to  the 
canal  project.  Rear-Admiral  Davis,  U.  S.  N.,  in  1866-67 
made  a  strong  report  against  the  Childs  route  in  Nicaragua, 
and  in  favour  of  a  canal  at  Panama.  Following  this,  in 
1869,  the  United  States  made  a  treaty  with  Colombia  (the 
new  name  of  New  Granada)  for  the  construction  by  this 
country  of  a  canal  at  Panama,  which  was  to  be,  as  after- 
ward explained,  "an  American  canal  under  American  con- 
trol," but  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  refused  to  ratify 
the  treaty  when  it  was  submitted  by  President  Johnson,  and 
the  submission  of  a  similar  treaty  by  President  Grant  in 
1870  met  with  the  same  deplorable  fate.  In  1872-73  the 
United  States  had  surveys  made  of  several  routes,  the  report 


72  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

upon  ^Nicaragua,  made  by  Commander  E.  P.  Lull  and  Lieu- 
tenant A.  G.  Menocal,  being  the  most  favourable.  This  so 
encouraged  the  Niearaguan  Government  to  expect  the  speedy 
construction  of  a  canal  by  the  United  States  that  in  1877  it 
refused  a  concession  to  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  who,  flushed 
with  his  great  success  at  Suez,  was  looking  to  America  for 
new  isthmuses  to  conquer. 

More  and  more  diplomacy  entered  into  the  problem,  and 
it  became  evident  that  there  would  have  to  be  a  strong 
assertion  of  the  American  policy  and  of  American  rights. 
In  1856  Secretary  Marcy  had  announced  his  intention  of 
asking  other  nations  to  join  in  guaranteeing  the  neutrality 
of  the  Panama  route.  Secretary  Seward  in  1862,  in  the 
midst  of  the  perplexities  and  complications  of  the  Civil  War, 
was  for  a  time  inclined  to  follow  that  unworthy  precedent, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  make  overtures  to  the  British  and 
French  governments  to  that  end.  On  both  these  occasions, 
however,  it  should  be  noted,  the  provocation  to  such  action 
was  found  in  serious  disorders  on  the  Isthmus.  A  better 
policy  was  enunciated  by  Mr.  Seward  in  1866,  when  the  re- 
turn of  peace  had  given  him  a  more  free  hand  in  dealing 
with  foreign  affairs.  He  then  suggested  the  purchase  of 
Tigre  Island  from  Honduras  as  a  coaling  station,  and  hinted 
at  the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  or  the 
declaration  that  it  had  already  become  void,  on  the  ground 
that  its  object,  the  construction  of  a  canal,  had  not  been 
accomplished  nor  even  attempted.  Mr.  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  our  Minister  to  England,  however,  deprecated  any 
further  controversy  with  Great  Britain  at  that  time,  wisely 
realising  how  great  a  controversy  with  that  country  was  al- 
ready on  hand,  in  the  Alabama  claims.  The  matter  of 
abrogating  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  therefore  not 
pressed. 

In  1868  the  highly  important  Dickinson-Ayon  treaty  was 
made  with  Nicaragua,  under  which  this  country  secured — 
though  not  exclusively — the  right  of  way  for  a  canal  across 
that  country.    In  return,  the  United  States  was  to  guarantee 


AMEEICAN  POLICY  ASSEKTED  73 

the  neutrality  of  the  canal,  under  the  supreme  sovereignty 
of  Nicaragua,  and  was  to  ask  other  nations  to  join  in  the 
guarantee.  Mr.  Seward  also  attempted  to  make  a  new 
treaty  with  Colombia  in  1869,  under  which  the  United  States 
should  have  exclusive  rights  in  the  canal  to  be  constructed 
there.  In  time  of  war  the  canal  was  not  to  be  open  to  ene- 
mies of  the  United  States,  and  there  was  to  be  a  twenty-mile 
"Canal  Zone"  under  the  neutral  guarantee  of  this  country. 
This  treaty  was  negotiated  but  failed  of  ratification.  It 
was  nevertheless  an  indication  of  the  change  of  official  and 
popular  sentiment  which  was  taking  place  in  this  country. 

Finally,  the  true  and  ultimate  American  doctrine  was 
enunciated  by  President  Grant — that  of  "an  American  canal 
under  American  control,"  though  this  exact  phrase  was  put 
forth  by  President  Hayes.  "I  regard  it,"  said  President 
Grant,  in  1869,  "as  of  vast  political  importance  to  this  coun- 
try that  no  European  government  should  hold  such  a  work." 
Later,  in  a  notable  article  in  the  North  American  Review, 
in  February,  1881,  he  wrote  these  golden  words: 

"In  accordance  with  the  early  and  later  policy  of  the  gov- 
ernment, in  obedience  to  the  often  expressed  will  of  the 
American  people,  with  a  due  regard  to  our  national  dignity 
and  power,  with  a  watchful  care  for  the  safety  and  pros- 
perity of  our  interests  and  industries  on  this  continent,  and 
with  a  determination  to  guard  against  even  the  first  ap- 
proach of  rival  powers,  whether  friendly  or  hostile,  on  these 
shores,  I  commend  an  American  canal,  on  American  soil,  to 
the  American  people." 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  expressed  by  him  in 
1869  that  in  that  year  he  appointed  an  Interoceanic  Canal 
Commission.  This  body  consisted  of  General  A.  A.  Hum- 
phreys, the  Chief  of  Engineers  of  the  United  States  Army ; 
C.  P.  Patterson,  Superintendent  of  the  Coast  Survey;  and 
Kear-Admiral  Daniel  Ammen,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Navigation  of  the  United  States  Navy.  Under  the  direc- 
tions of  this  very  competent  commission,  four  important 
surveys  were  promptly  undertaken.     The  first,  under  Com- 


U  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

mander  T.  O.  Selfridge,  U.  S.  N.,  proceeded  to  the  Isthmus  of 
Darien.  It  carefully  examined  the  Caledonian  Bay  route, 
confirmed  the  unfavourable  reports  of  Strain,  and  finally 
pronounced  that  route  impracticable.  The  same  expedition 
then  went  to  the  San  Bias  route  and  examined  it  far  more 
thoroughly  than  any  preceding  party  had  done,  in  the  end 
reporting  that  it,  too,  was  impracticable.  The  next  year, 
1871,  Commander  Selfridge  led  his  men  to  the  valley  of  the 
Atrato  River,  and  there  surveyed  two  routes.  One  of  these, 
the  Atrato-Tuyra,  he  pronounced  impossible.  The  other,  the 
Atrato-Napipi  route,  to  Chiri-Chiri  Bay,  impressed  him 
favourably,  and  he  made  a  report  recommending  its 
adoption. 

The  second  party,  under  Captain  R.  W.  Shufeldt,  went  in 
the  fall  of  1870  to  the  Mexican  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec  and 
carefully  surveyed  it.  The  resulting  report  was  to  the  effect 
that  a  canal  at  that  point  was  practicable,  but  was  not  ad- 
visable because  of  the  great  expense  of  constructing  it.  The 
third  party  was  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Chester  Hat- 
field. It  went  in.  1872  to  Nicaragua  and  investigated  the 
principal  routes  which  had  been  suggested  there.  Of  these 
it  rejected  Oersted's  as  impractical,  or  at  least  undesirable, 
and  recommended  Childs's.  Another  surveying  party,  under 
Captain  E.  P.  Lull  and  Lieutenant  A.  G.  Menocal,  followed 
in  the  same  region  and  with  the  same  result,  advocating  the 
construction  of  a  canal  on  Childs's  route,  with  its  Pacific 
terminal  at  Brito.  The  fourth  survey  was  effected  by 
Messrs.  Lull  and  Menocal  at  Panama,  on  the  route  from 
Panama  to  the  Bay  of  Limon.  The  report  was  to  the  effect 
that  a  canal  with  locks  might  be  constructed  there,  but  that 
the  Chagres  River  made  a  sea-level  canal  impossible. 

Upon  receiving  these  reports,  the  Interoceanic  Canal  Com- 
mission hesitated  to  decide  among  them,  and  ordered  some 
further  surveys  to  be  made.  It  sent  a  special  surveying 
party,  composed  of  Major  Walter  MacFarland  and  Captain 
W.  H.  Heuer,  U.  S.  A.,  engineers,  and  Professor  Henry 
Mitchell  of  the  U,  S,  Coast  Survey,  to  examine  the  Nica- 


NICARAGUA  FAVOURED  15 

ragua  and  Darien  routes.  Messrs.  Lull  and  Menocal  were 
sent  to  San  Bias,  and  confirmed  Selfridge's  unfavourable 
report.  Lieutenant  Frederick  Collins  was  detailed  to  ex- 
amine the  Atrato-Napipi  route,  and  reported  that  a  canal 
there  would  cost  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  more  than  Self- 
ridge  had  estimated.  At  last,  at  the  end  of  1875,  the  Com- 
mission had  secured  all  available  data,  and  on  February  7, 
1876,  it  made  a  unanimous  report  to  President  Grant  in 
favour  of  the  Nicaragua  route,  from  Greytown  to  the  San 
Juan  River,  to  Lake  Nicaragua,  through  the  Rio  del  Medio 
and  Rio  Grande  valleys,  to  Brito,  on  the  Pacific  Coast. 

This  report  was  received  as  practically  conclusive.  It 
was  evident,  however,  that  if  it  was  to  be  adopted  and  a 
canal  was  to  be  built  at  Nicaragua  according  to  President 
Grant's  policy  of  exclusive  American  control,  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  must  be  modified  or  abrogated.  The  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Hamilton  Fish,  therefore  began  tentative 
negotiations  with  Great  Britain  to  that  end,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  opened  negotiations  with  Nicaragua  for  a  canal 
treaty.  In  neither  case  was  anything  practical  effected,  and 
President  Grant's  administration  closed  with  the  canal  proj- 
ect apparently  as  far  from  realisation  as  ever.  It  left,  how- 
ever, to  the  succeeding  administration  of  President  Hayes  an 
invaluable  legacy  of  plans  and  sound  policy. 

Meantime  the  French  were  at  work  again.  In  the  winter 
of  1874-75  an  adventurer  named  Gorgoza  appeared  at 
Bogotd,  representing  himself  as  the  agent  of  a  French  com- 
pany which  was  ready  to  undertake  the  construction  of  a 
canal.  In  that  capacity  he  secured  a  hearing  before  the 
Colombian  Congress,  which  was  quite  ready  to  listen  to  any 
scheme  that  promised  to  put  money  into  its  treasury.  M. 
Gorgoza  positively  asserted  that  in  1868  he  had  himself 
solved  the  ^^Secret  of  the  Strait"  by  making  the  passage 
from  sea  to  sea  in  a  boat,  by  way  of  the  Atrato  River.  This 
achievement,  he  said,  he  had  reported  to  Commander  Self- 
ridge,  when  the  latter  was  surveying  that  region  for  the 
United  States  Government,  but  Sel fridge  had  simply  laughed 


76  SOME  FUTILE  SCHEMES 

at  him  for  his  pains.  It  is  quite  possible,  indeed  probable, 
that  this  latter  story  was  true.  There  is  little  doubt  that  if 
Gorgoza  did  tell  the  story  of  his  marvellous  voyage,  Selfridge 
laughed  at  him ;  for  Gorgoza  solemnly  declared  that  he  had 
been  accompanied  on  the  trip  by  two  other  men,  one  of  whom 
had  since  died,  while  he  really  could  not  remember  who  the 
other  was. 

On  the  strength  of  this  cock-and-bull  story,  however,  Gor- 
goza secured  a  concession  for  a  canal,  which  he  took  back 
to  Paris  in  triumph  in  the  fall  of  1876.  This  moved  a  lot 
of  "Old  Imperialists,"  who  still  hoped  to  effect  a  Bonapartist 
restoration,  to  organise  a  speculative  corporation  called  "La 
Society  Civile  Internationale  du  Canal  Interoceanique,"  for 
the  promotion  of  canal  schemes  on  the  lower  Isthmus.  At 
the  head  of  it  were  Lieutenant  Lucien  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
Wyse,  and  his  brother-in-law.  General  Etienne  Turr.  Count 
Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  the  builder  of  the  Suez  Canal,  was 
also  interested  in  it,  and  on  his  advice  Lieutenant  Wyse  went 
to  the  Isthmus  and  explored  Gorgoza's  Atrato-Tuyra  route, 
which  he  found  impracticable.  A  modification  of  it,  how- 
ever, from  the  Tuyra  River  to  Acanti  Bay,  commended  itself 
to  him  and  he  reported  in  its  favour.  De  Lesseps  was  not 
pleased  with  it,  and  on  his  urging  Wyse  again,  in  1877,  went 
to  the  Isthmus,  with  Lieutenant  Armand  Eeclus — a  member 
of  the  famous  family  of  that  name,  of  geographers  and 
scientists.  They  first  examined  the  San  Bias  route,  and 
found  it  impracticable,  and  then  Wyse's  Acanti  route,  which 
seemed  no  better,  Wyse  himself  confessing  it  to  be  quite 
hopeless. 

As  a  last  resort,  therefore,  they  proceeded  to  Panama. 
There  Reclus  undertook  a  survey  of  the  route,  while  Wyse 
hastened  to  Bogotd,  and  persuaded  the  Government  to  give 
him  a  concession  for  a  canal  anywhere  on  the  Isthmus,  pro- 
vided he  or  his  company  could  make  satisfactory  terms  with 
the  Panama  Railroad  Company.  Wyse,  on  his  part,  cove- 
nanted to  organise  a  construction  company  within  two  years, 
and  to  complete  the  canal  within  twelve  years  thereafter. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  DE  LESSEPS  SCHEME  77 

From  Bogotd  he  went  to  Nicaragua  and  devoted  his  atten- 
tion to  defeating  in  the  Legislature  of  that  country  a  bill 
giving  a  concession  there  to  a  rival  French  company.  Thence 
he  came  to  New  York,  and  made  a  bargain  with  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company.  Finally  he  returned  to  Paris,  in  Au- 
gust, 1878,  and  laid  his  plans  before  De  Lesseps  and  the 
Soci^te  Civile.  Reclus,  meantime,  had  done  little  more  at 
Panama  than  to  walk  across  the  Isthmus  along  the  line  of 
the  railroad,  but  on  the  strength  of  that  achievement  he  too 
returned  to  Paris  in  1878,  and  made  an  authoritative  and 
favourable  report  upon  the  Panama  route.  Thereupon  the 
Societe  Civile  decided  to  adopt  that  route,  the  canal  to  be 
cut  at  sea  level,  with  a  tunnel  four  and  a  half  miles  long. 
The  Atrato-Tuyra,  the  Acanti,  and  the  San  Bias  routes  were 
still  talked  about,  but  only  as  foils  to  that  at  Panama. 
Finally,  announcement  was  made  that  an  International 
Engineering  Congress  would  be  held  in  Paris  in  1879,  under 
the  presidency  of  De  Lesseps,  to  consider  and  definitely  pass 
upon  the  whole  question.  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that 
the  "Old  Imperialists"  thus  promoted  and  committed  them- 
selves to  a  canal  at  Panama,  of  which  Louis  Napoleon  had 
written  in  1848  that  it  "could  cross  only  a  country  which 
was  marshy,  unwholesome,  desolate,  and  uninhabitable, 
which  would  afford  a  passage  of  thirty  miles  through  stag- 
nant waters  and  barren  rocks,  yielding  no  spot  of  ground 
fitted  for  the  growth  of  a  trading  community,  for  sheltering 
fleets,  or  for  the  development  and  interchange  of  the  produce 
of  the  soiL" 


CHAPTER  VI 
"CONSULE  LESSEPS" 

The  International  Engineering  Congress,  or  Interna- 
tional Scientific  Congress,  as  it  has  been  variously  called, 
was  assembled  at  the  call  of  Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  in 
Paris,  on  May  15,  1879.  It  consisted  of  136  delegates,  offi- 
cial and  unofficial.  The  majority  of  them — seventy-four — 
were  Frenchmen,  as  w^as  not  unnatural,  and  were  friends  and 
supporters  of  De  Lesseps.  Indeed,  the  whole  body  was  most 
favourably  disposed  toward  that  distinguished  man,  who 
had  at  Suez  achieved  in  the  face  of  enormous  difficulties  a 
success  beyond  even  'the  loftiest  flights  of  his  own  imagina- 
tion. Eleven  members  were  from  the  United  States.  Of 
these,  only  two  were  officially  commissioned  by  the  American 
Government,  to  wit.  Rear- Admiral  Ammen  and  Lieutenant 
Menocal,  and  they  were  carefully  instructed  not  to  commit 
the  United  States  in  any  way  to  support  or  approval  of  the 
decisions  of  the  Congress.  Other  American  members,  who 
attended  in  an  unofficial  capacity,  on  De  Lesseps's  invita- 
tion, were  Nathan  Appleton,  of  Boston,  a  close  friend  of 
De  Lesseps;  Cyrus  W.  Field,  and  Commander  Selfridge. 

Whether  the  Congress  was  or  was  not  a  "packed"  body, 
with  a  predetermined  programme,  is  a  question  which  prob- 
ably never  can  be  satisfactorily  answered.  De  Lesseps  and 
his  friends  earnestly  protested  that  it  was  not.  Many  Amer- 
ican and  British  observers  with  equal  positiveness  declared 
that  it  was,  and  the  latter  opinion  probably  prevails  and  will 
continue  to  prevail  the  more  widely.  One  thing  is  certain, 
from  the  record,  that  it  was  a  great  misnomer  to  call  it  an 
"Engineering"  or  a  "Scientific"  congress.  It  was  nothing 
of  the  sort.     It  was  a  speculative  gathering.     Of  the  136 

78 


CUT  AND  DKIED  PLANS  79 

members,  only  forty -two  were  engineers  or  geographers.  The 
majority  were  politicians,  financiers,  speculators,  and  "pro- 
moters.'^ That  fact  gave  much  colour  to  the  charge  that  it 
was  a  "packed"  body,  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Congress 
did  not  dispel  that  impression. 

Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  himself  presided,  and  appointed 
a  number  of  committees,  the  most  important  of  which,  and 
the  only  one  which  we  need  consider,  was  that  on  the  choice 
of  route.  It  consisted  of  fifty-four  members,  and  was  be- 
lieved to  have  been  chosen  by  De  Lesseps  to  ratify  his  own 
judgment  in  favour  of  the  Panama  route.  Its  American 
members  were  Commander  Selfridge  and  Lieutenant  Meno- 
cal.  It  spent  some  time  in  consideration  of  the  various 
routes.  De  Lesseps  was  6utspoken  in  favour  of  the  Wyse- 
Reclus  route,  at  Panama,  which  was,  as  he  said,  to  go  up  the 
Chagres  River,  then  "under  the  Cordillera  by  means  of  an 
immense  tunnel,"  afterward  abandoned  in  favour  of  a  cut, 
and  then  down  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  Pacific;  at  sea  level 
all  the  way.  Mr.  Appleton  still  clung  to  the  San  Bias  route, 
as  the  shortest,  despite  its  forbidding  length  of  tunnel. 
Commander  Selfridge  advocated  his  Atrato  route,  at  Darien. 

If  this  committee  was  "packed,"  the  fact  did  not  at  once 
appear.  In  fact,  at  first  it  seemed  decidedly  hostile  to  the 
Panama  route,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  much  more  costly 
than  that  at  Nicaragua.  To  meet  and  dispose  of  this  ob- 
jection. Lieutenant  Wyse  modified  his  plans  so  as  to  pro- 
vide for  a  canal  with  locks,  which  would  be  cheaper  than  one 
at  sea  level.  This,  however,  would  deprive  the  Panama 
route  of  its  one  great  advantage  over  all  others,  and  it  was 
argued  that  if  there  must  be  locks,  a  lock  canal  at  Nicaragua 
was  preferable  to  one  at  Panama.  The  partisans  of  De 
Lesseps  began,  however,  to  make  it  clear  that  despite  their 
apparent  hesitation  at  first,  they  were  resolved  to  report  in 
favour  of  Panama.  A  number  of  the  committee,  including 
the  Americans,  the  English,  and  some  French  engineers, 
withdrew  from  the  proceedings  in  disgust.  Then  the  re- 
mainder of  the  committee  quickly  adopted  a  resolution  in 


80  "  CONSULE  LESSEPS  " 

favour  of  Panama,  and  submitted  it  to  the  whole  Congress, 
or  to  all  that  was  left  of  the  latter  body.  When  it  came  to  a 
vote,  only  98  of  the  136  delegates  recorded  themselves.  Of 
these,  seventy-five,  an  overwhelming  majority,  were  in  favour 
of  Panama.  But  of  these  seventy-five,  only  nineteen  were 
engineers,  only  five  were  practising  engineers,  and  only  one 
had  ever  set  foot  upon  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  In  such 
fashion  did  this  "scientific"  congress  decide  this  momentous 
question.  But  it  served  its  purpose.  On  October  20,  fol- 
lowing, the  Universal  Interoceanic  Canal  Company  was 
organised  and  incorporated  by  De  Lesseps  in  Paris,  under 
Wyse's  concession  of  May  18,  1878,  the  Soci6t6  Civile  having 
already  sold  out  to  him  its  rights. 

Public  reports  of  these  doings,  and  especially  the  official 
reports  of  Messrs.  Ammen  and  Menocal,  aroused  American 
interest  in  the  French  scheme,  and  moved  both  Houses  of 
Congress  to  apprehension,  and  to  resentment  against  what 
threatened  to  be  an  infringement  upon  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. American  enterprise  also  busied  itself  with  counter 
schemes.  A  Provisional  Interoceanic  Canal  Company  was 
organised,  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  canal  at 
Nicaragua,  among  its  members  being  Captain  S.  L.  Phelps, 
Rear-Admiral  Ammen,  General  George  B.  McClellan,  Lieu- 
tenant A.  G.  Menocal,  and  Messrs.  Levi  P.  Morton,  George 
W.  Riggs,  and  Hugh  J.  Jewett.  Lieutenant  Menocal  was 
commissioned  to  go  to  Nicaragua  to  secure  a  concession, 
which  he  did,  the  condition  being  that  the  company  should 
begin  work  within  two  years  from  May  22,  1880,  the  time 
being  afterward  extended  to  September  30,  1884.  There 
also  arose  some  distrust  of  De  Lesseps's  scheme  and  some 
reaction  against  him  in  France  itself,  on  account  of  which 
he  deemed  it  desirable  to  do  something  spectacular,  which 
would  appeal  to  the  imagination  and  arouse  enthusiasm. 
He  accordingly  went  to  Panama  in  the  fall  of  1879,  and 
"inaugurated"  the  canal  scheme  in  a  showy  fashion.  In 
February,  1880,  he  reported  that  the  plans  of  the  canal  were 
perfected.    It  was  to  be  a  tide-level  canal,  twenty -eight  feet 


PRESIDENT  HAYES'S  MESSAGE  81 

deep,  costing  |132,000,000,  and  under  a  European  guarantee 
of  neutrality.  Then  he  came  to  the  United  States,  was  en- 
tertained at  a  great  public  banquet  at  Delmonico's  in  New 
York  on  March  1,  and  proceeded  to  Washington  to  try  to 
conciliate  the  Government — an  impossible  task.  President 
Hayes  had  been  profoundly  impressed  by  Grant's  resolute 
American  canal  policy,  and  committed  himself  unreservedly 
to  its  maintenance.  He  received  De  Lesseps  courteously, 
but  on  March  8,  just  after  their  interview,  he  sent  to  the 
Senate  a  message  in  which  he  said : 

"I  deem  it  proper  to  state  briefly  my  opinion  as  to  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the  construction 
of  an  interoceanic  canal  by  any  route  across  the  American 
Isthmus.  The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  under  Amer- 
ican control.  The  United  States  cannot  consent  to  the  sur- 
render of  this  control  to  any  European  powers.  If  existing 
treaties  between  the  United  States  and  other  nations,  or  if 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  or  property  of  other  nations,  stand 
in  the  way  of  this  policy, — a  contingency  which  is  not  appre- 
hended,— suitable  steps  should  be  taken  by  just  and  liberal 
negotiations  to  promote  and  establish  the  American  policy 
on  this  subject,  consistently  with  the  rights  of  the  nations  to 
be  affected  by  it.  The  capital  invested  by  corporations  or 
citizens  of  other  countries  in  such  an  enterprise  must,  in  a 
great  degree,  look  for  protection  to  one  or  more  of  the  great 
powers  of  the  world.  No  European  power  can  intervene  for 
such  protection,  without  adopting  measures  on  this  con- 
tinent which  the  United  States  would  deem  wholly  inadmis- 
sible. If  the  protection  of  the  United  States  is  relied  upon, 
the  United  States  must  exercise  such  control  as  will  enable 
this  country  to  protect  its  national  interests  and  maintain 
the  rights  of  those  whosd  private  capital  is  embarked  in  the 
work. 

"An  interoceanic  canal  across  the  American  Isthmus  will 
essentially  change  the  geographical  relations  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United  States,  and  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  will 
be  the  great  ocean  thoroughfare  between  our  Atlantic  and 
our  Pacific  shores,  and  virtually,  a  part  of  the  coast  line  of 
the  United  States.  Our  mere  commercial  interest  in  it  is 
larger  than  that  of  all  other  countries,  while  its  relation  to 


82  "  OONSULE  LESSEPS '' 

our  power  and  our  prosperity  as  a  nation,  to  our  means  of 
defence,  our  unity,  peace,  and  safety,  are  matters  of  para- 
mount concern  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  No  other 
great  power  would,  under  similar  circumstances,  fail  to  as- 
sert a  rightful  control  over  a  work  so  closely  and  vitally 
affecting  its  interest  and  welfare. 

^'Without  urging  further  the  grounds  of  my  opinion,  I 
repeat,  in  conclusion,  that  it  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  assert  and  maintain  such  supervision  and 
authority  over  any  interoceanic  canal  across  the  isthmus 
that  connects  North  and  South  America  as  will  protect  our 
national  interests.  This,  I  am  quite  sure,  will  be  found  not 
only  compatible  with,  but  promotive  of,  the  widest  and  most 
permanent  advantage  to  commerce  and  civilisation." 


It  will  be  worth  while  to  pause  for  a  moment  in  our  nar- 
rative and  to  note  in  detail  some  of  the  terms  of  this  ad- 
mirable declaration;  especially  since  the  present  policy  and 
conduct  of  our  Government  have  been  ignorantly  or  heed- 
lessly criticised  as  a  new  and  dangerous  departure.  Noth- 
ing that  Theodore  Roosevelt  has  said  or  done  concerning 
the  Panama  Canal  has  surpassed  by  one  jot  or  tittle  the 
policy  enunciated  by  Rutherford  B.  Hayes  nearly  a  quarter 
of  a  century  before.  Mr.  Hayes  proposed  a  canal  under 
sole  and  exclusive  American  control.  No  European  power 
w^as  to  be  admitted  to  even  the  smallest  share  in  it.  If 
European  capitalists  invested  their  money  in  the  enterprise, 
they  must  look  to  the  United  States  alone  for  protection. 
Moreover — and  this  is  the  climax  of  the  matter — no  existing 
treaties,  and  no  rights  of  property  or  of  sovereignty  of  other 
nations,  were  to  be  permitted  to  stand  in  the  way  of  our 
assertion  of  such  control.  If  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
in  the  way,  it  must  be  abrogated.  If  any  foreign  power  had 
secured  concessions  or  property  rights  on  the  Isthmus,  it 
must  surrender  them.  If  one  of  the  Isthmian  States  at- 
tempted to  exercise  its  sovereignty  so  as  to  give  a  foreign 
power  control  over  a  canal,  that  sovereignty  must  be  trav- 
ersed, and  the  State  must  be  made  to  understand  that  its 
sovereignty  was  not  superior  to  the  rights  and  interests  of 


STRONG  AMERICAN  DOCTRINE  83 

the  United  States.  Mark  that  Mr.  Hayes  did  not  talk  about 
any  American  "privileges"  on  the  Isthmus,  but  about  our 
*^rights."  Of  course,  our  control  was  to  be  established — if 
possible — through  just  and  liberal  negotiations;  such,  for 
example,  as  those  which  we  essayed  with  Colombia  in  1903. 
But  suppose  negotiations  failed,  and  some  country  attempted 
to  assert  its  property  rights  or  rights  of  sovereignty,  as 
superior  to  and  inimical  to  the  rights  and  interests  and  wel- 
fare of  the  United  States?  Nothing  could  be  more  clear  and 
unmistakable  than  the  answer  implied  in  Mr.  Hayes's  mes- 
sage. No  matter  what  happened,  it  would  be  "the  right  and 
the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  assert  and  maintain  super- 
vision over  any  interoceanic  canal  across  the  Isthmus.'' 

Strong  doctrine,  that.  Put  forward  in  these  days,  it 
would  be  denounced  by  some  as  "strenuous,"  "imperialistic," 
"big  stick,"  and  what  not.  But  that  was  the  doctrine  of 
President  Hayes,  and  of  William  M.  Evarts,  his  Secretary  of 
State,  in  March,  1880.  It  was  a  much-needed  warning  to 
De  Lesseps  and  to  France,  that  this  country  would  not  per- 
mit the  canal  to  be  under  European  control  or  under  any 
European  guarantee  of  neutrality,  but  that  if  Frenchmen 
built  it  with  French  capital,  the  United  States  would  as- 
sume absolute  control  of  it;  French  property  rights  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding.  It  was  also  a  much-needed  warn- 
ing to  Colombia  to  quit  her  secret  dallyings  with  French  in- 
triguers. For  De  Lesseps  was  surreptitiously  trying  to  per- 
suade the  Colombian  Government  to  abrogate  its  Treaty  of 
1846  with  the  United  States,  or  at  least  that  part  of  it 
(Article  35)  which  gave  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  "the  right  of  way  or  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  .  .  .  free  of  all  incumbrances  or  restrictions 
whatever,"  upon  any  railroad,  canal,  or  other  means  of  trans- 
portation which  might  ever  be  constructed.  De  Lesseps  per- 
ceived that  that  treaty  provision  was  as  much  in  the  way  of 
his  canal  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  in  our  way  at 
Nicaragua,  and  so  he  bent  every  effort  to  secure  its  abroga- 
tion, in  which  he  might  have  succeeded  had  it  not  been  for 


84  "  CONSULE  LESSEES  " 

the  prompt  and  energetic  action  of  the  United  States.  The 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State  gave  Colombia  plainly 
to  understand  that  she  would  not  be  permitted  to  exercise 
her  sovereignty  in  the  matter  in  a  way  displeasing  to  the 
United  States.  It  will  be  well  to  keep  that  masterful  prec- 
edent in  mind  hereafter,  when  considering  American  rela- 
tions with  Colombia  at  a  later  date.  Nor  was  our  Govern- 
ment in  1880  content  with  mere  words.  Under  the  old  con- 
tract which  President  Lincoln  had  made  in  1862  with  the 
Chiriqui  Company,  it  took  possession  of  a  coaling  station  at 
Boca  del  Toro,  on  the  Chiriqui  Lagoon,  and  also  of  another 
at  Golfito,  and  Congress  appropriated  |200,000  for  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  use  in  taking  further  steps  to  con- 
trol the  Panama  route. 

In  the  face  of  this  resolute  attitude  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment, De  Lesseps  changed  his  tactics.  He  nominally 
abandoned  his  "European  control"  scheme,  and  announced 
to  his  French  supporters  that  President  Hayes's  message 
assured  "the  political  security  of  the  canal."  Then  he  went 
to  work  in  another  way  to  get  rid  of  the  troublesome  Colom- 
bian treaty,  and  also  to  kill  off  the  rival  Nicaragua  scheme. 
He  organised  an  "American  Committee,"  at  the  head  of 
which  was  the  Hon.  Richard  W.  Thompson,  who  had  been 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  under  President  Hayes;  and  he  en- 
gaged as  American  fiscal  agents  of  his  company  the  great 
banking  houses  of  J.  &  W.  Seligman,  Drexel,  Morgan  &  Co., 
and  Winslow,  Lanier  &  Co.  The  Committee  and  the  bankers 
were  supplied  with  vast  sums  of  money,  presumably  to  be 
used  in  influencing  American  opinion,  subsidising  the  Amer- 
ican press  as  that  of  France  was  subsidised,  and  affecting 
legislation. 

Some  of  the  activities  of  these  agents  were  soon  visible 
in  the  suggestion  which  was  made  by  various  public  men 
and  papers  in  America,  that  the  United  States  ought  not  to 
oppose  the  abrogation  of  the  Treaty  of  1846  with  Colombia, 
but  should  rather  itself  seek  it  and  take  the  initiative  to  that 
end.    Why?    Because  the  treaty  as  it  stood  might  presently 


THE  FKENCH  CAMPAIGN  86 

involve  us  in  some  of  those  foreign  entanglements  which 
the  "Fathers  of  the  Constitution''  had  so  deprecated  and  had 
so  earnestly  warned  us  against.  That  is  to  say,  France  was 
going  to  build  and  control  the  canal,  anyway,  and  if  we  did 
not  want  trouble  over  it,  we  would  better  get  out  of  the  road. 
Some  Americans,  whose  relations  with  De  Lesseps's  "Amer- 
ican Committee"  have  not  been  fully  disclosed  but  may  be 
imagined,  actually  set  forth  in  public  prints  that  for  the 
United  States  to  insist  upon  and  enforce  the  provisions  of 
that  treaty  would  be  such  a  violation  of  the  Colombian  con- 
cession to  the  De  Lesseps  company  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment might  be  called  upon  to  intervene  for  the  protection 
of  the  latter,  and  so,  if  we  did  not  wish  to  incur  trouble 
with  France,  we  would  better  abrogate  the  treaty  and  with- 
draw from  our  pretensions  upon  the  Isthmus. 

With  this  campaign  of  unparalleled  impertinence  set  afoot 
in  the  United  States,  and  with  lobbyists  working  day  and 
night  at  Washington  to  defeat  the  Nicaragua  project,  De 
Lesseps  in  April,  1880,  returned  to  France  with  the  air  of  a 
victor,  to  secure  capital  and  organise  a  construction  com- 
pany. He  reported  that  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal  would  be  a  mere  trifle  compared  with  that  at  Suez,  and 
that  American  opposition  to  it  arose  solely  from  Yankee 
jealousy  of  French  glory.  He  also  subsidised  a  large  part 
of  the  French  press  and  secured  the  active  support  of  a  num- 
ber of  influential  French  politicians. 

Meantime  there  was  a  serious  revival  of  interest  in  the 
Tehuantepec  route.  It  had  the  obvious  advantage  of  being 
much  further  north  than  either  of  the  others.  It  was  there- 
fore closer  to  the  coasts  of  the  United  States,  and  would 
afford  a  shorter  line  of  communication  between  them.  It 
would  also  give  a  shorter  route  from  Europe  to  all  points 
on  the  northern  Pacific  Ocean.  Climatically,  it  was  decidedly 
preferable  to  either  Nicaragua  or  Panama.  Politically,  it 
was  the  best  of  the  three,  for  it  was  entirely  included  within 
Mexico,  a  far  larger,  richer,  and  more  powerful  State  than 
Colombia  or  any  of  the  Central  American  republics,  and  one 


86  «  CONSULE  LESSEPS  '' 

enjoying  under  the  masterful  statesmanship  of  Porfirio  Diaz 
a  far  more  stable  and  enlightened  government.  The  one  grave 
objection  to  Tehuantepec  as  a  canal  route  was  the  greater 
width  and  elevation  of  the  Isthmus,  and  the  consequent 
necessity  for  so  much  more  cutting.  In  1880-81,  however,  it 
was  proposed  to  construct  not  a  canal  but  a  ship  railroad, 
by  means  of  which  the  largest  ocean  steamship,  fully  laden, 
would  be  taken  from  the  water,  placed  upon  an  enormous 
train  of  cars,  conveyed  overland,  and  put  into  the  ocean  at 
the  other  side.  Colossal  as  this  scheme  was,  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  think  it  was  visionary  or  impracticable.  It  was  con- 
ceived and  elaborated  in  detail  by  one  of  the  most  competent 
engineers  of  his  time.  This  was  Captain  James  B.  Eads, 
who  designed  and  built  the  great  steel  railroad  bridge  across 
the  Mississippi  River  at  St.  Louis,  and  who  was  the  author 
of  the  system  of  jetties  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  by 
means  of  which  the  entrance  to  that  river  was  made  and 
kept  deep  enough  for  navigation.  He  was  fully  convinced 
of  the  practicability  of  his  ship  railroad  scheme,  and  secured 
from  the  Mexican  Government  a  concession  on  favourable 
terms  for  building  it. 

The  summer  and  fall  of  1880  were  largely  taken  up  in  the 
United  States  with  a  Presidential  campaign  and  election, 
but  upon  the  reassembling  of  Congress  in  December  the  vari- 
ous Isthmian  transit  schemes  were  taken  under  considera- 
tion, and  in  that  winter  and  the  ensuing  spring  much  time 
was  devoted  to  discussion  of  them.  Captain  Eads  estimated 
the  cost  of  his  railroad  at  only  |18,750,000,  but  Congress 
declined  to  give  him  any  financial  guarantee,  and  he  was 
ultimately  compelled  to  abandon  the  splendid  enterprise. 
Neither  was  any  aid  given  to  the  Nicaragua  and  Panama 
undertakings.  Therefore  the  tactical  victory  remained  with 
De  Lesseps,  since  his  venture  was  the  only  one  which  did  not 
seek  nor  need  aid  from  the  American  Government.  It  was 
felt  in  Congress,  however,  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
was  a  barrier  against  American  action  on  any  of  the  Isth- 
muses, whether  for  building  a  canal  of  our  own  or  for 


BLAINE'S  "VIGOEOUS"  POLICY  87 

thwarting  the  unwelcome  schemes  of  France.  Accordingly, 
on  April  16,  1881,  a  joint  resolution  was  adopted,  requesting 
the  President  to  proceed  immediately  with  steps  for  the 
formal  and  final  abrogation  of  that  treaty. 

James  A.  Garfield  had  then  become  President,  and  had 
made  James  G.  Blaine  his  Secretary  of  State.  The  latter, 
who  had  long  cherished  a  marked  suspicion  of  and  antago- 
nism toward  Great  Britain,  and  who  was  inclined  toward 
what  was  called  a  ^^vigorous  and  aggressive"  foreign  policy, 
obeyed  the  instructions  of  Congress  with  promptness  and 
avidity,  and  with  rather  more  zeal  than  discretion.  He  be- 
gan his  negotiations  against  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by 
sending  a  circular  letter  to  the  American  Ministers  to  all 
the  great  powers,  to  be  repeated  by  them  to  the  governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited,  strongly — and  rightly — 
deprecating  the  proposal  to  establish  a  European  guarantee 
over  an  American  canal.  Such  a  guarantee,  he  argued, 
would  be  superfluous,  since  the  United  States  had  already 
"positively  and  efficaciously"  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of 
the  route  in  question,  to  wit,  at  Panama,  and  this  guarantee 
did  not  require  reinforcement,  accession,  or  assent  from  any 
other  power. 

The  proposed  European  guarantee  would,  moreover,  he 
argued,  be  offensive  to  the  United  States,  since  it  would  be 
an  uncalled-for  intrusion  into  a  field  which  this  country 
properly  considered  its  own  and  in  which  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  were  to  be  considered  before  those  of  any 
other  country,  save  Colombia.  Quoting  the  words  of  his 
predecessor,  Mr.  Evarts,  he  added  that  the  United  States 
would  insist  upon  its  right  to  take  all  needful  precautions 
against  the  canal's  ever  being  used  offensively  against  Amer- 
ican interests.  He  pointed  out  that  if  the  proposed  canal 
were  in  or  near  Europe,  it  would  be  proper  for  the  European 
powers  to  safeguard  it  in  their  own  interest,  and  that,  con- 
versely, as  it  would  form  practically  a  part  of  the  American 
coast  line,  remote  from  Europe,  it  was  similarly  proper  for 
the  United  States  to  safeguard  it,  and  to  do  so  without  any 


88  "  CONSULE  LESSEPS  " 

European  aid  or  intervention.  Finally  he  roundly  served 
notice  that  any  attempt  of  European  powers  to  guarantee 
the  neutrality  of  the  canal,  and  thus  practically  to  establish 
political  control  over  it,  would  be  viewed  by  the  United 
States  with  the  gravest  concern ;  and  any  attempt  to  super- 
sede the  American  guarantee  with  an  agreement  among  Eu- 
ropean military  powers,  would  be  regarded  as  a  hostile  alli- 
ance against  the  United  States. 

That  was  all  perfectly  sound  doctrine,  in  line  with  prec- 
edents already  well  established  by  our  Government.  There 
was  no  reason  to  suppose,  either,  that  it  would  be  challenged 
or  objected  to  by  any  of  the  powers  of  continental  Europe. 
But  Mr.  Blaine  made  the  mistake  of  reckoning  without 
Great  Britain.  That  kingdom  stood  in  an  entirely  different 
relation  to  the  American  Isthmuses  from  that  of  any  other 
power.  It  had  territorial  possessions  there,  and  treaty 
rights  there,  recognised  and  solemnly  guaranteed  by  the 
United  States.  This  letter  of  Mr.  Blaine's  was  practically 
an  attempt  to  ignore  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  was 
something  he  had  no  right  to  do,  and  which  from  a  tactical 
point  of  view  was  a  fatal  mistake.  He  was  putting  the  cart 
before  the  horse.  He  should  have  first  secured  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  could  easily  have 
been  done.  Then  this  circular  note  would  have  been  appro- 
priate and  effective.  His  mistake  was  in  issuing  first  the 
note,  which  should  have  come  second,  and  of  postponing  to 
the  second  place  that  which  should  have  come  first. 

Realising  the  special  interests  of  Great  Britain  in  Central 
America,  and  anticipating  British  resistance  to  his  policy, 
Mr.  Blaine  strove  to  fortify  his  position  by  rallying  the 
Central  American  States  to  his  side.  He  first  suggested  to 
those  States  the  desirability  of  their  reunion  into  a  con- 
federacy, as  of  old.  This  was  found  impracticable,  where- 
upon he  changed  his  tactics  and  invited  them  to  send  dele- 
gates to  a  "Pan-American  Congress,"  to  be  held  under 
his  management  at  Washington  in  November,  1882.  This 
scheme  appeared  to  some  like  a  revival  of  the  old  Panama 


BRITISH  PRESSURE  ON  NICARAGUA  89 

Congress  of  1826,  which  the  United  States  had  treated  with 
scant  courtesy,  and  was  more  favourably  received  by  the 
Central  American  States  than  his  first  suggestion  had  been. 
Indeed  it  was  approved  by  all  excepting  Costa  Rica,  which 
was  just  then  under  French  influence,  and  preparations  were 
made  for  the  holding  of  the  Congress. 

British  diplomacy,  however,  was  not  to  be  caught  napping. 
On  the  contrary,  it  got  to  work  more  quickly  and  more 
effectively  than  Mr.  Blaine's.  At  the  first  hint  of  American 
action  against  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment confirmed  its  hold  upon  the  Nicaragua  route.  This 
was  done  by  complaining  of  what  was  quite  true,  that  Nica- 
ragua had  failed  to  pay  the  promised  indemnity  to  the  Mos- 
quito Indians  and  had  otherwise  disregarded  the  treaty  of 
Managua  (of  1860 — see  Chapter  IV),  and  by  demanding  that 
the  case  thus  established  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of 
the  Emperor  of  Austria.  Now,  Nicaragua  had  ignored  her 
treaty  obligations  because  of  American  encouragement  and 
expectations  of  American  aid.  But  when  Great  Britain 
thus  called  her  to  account,  American  aid  was  not  forth- 
coming, and  she  was  accordingly  compelled  to  acquiesce  in 
the  British  proposals.  The  dispute  was  arbitrated  by  the 
Austrian  Emperor,  and  in  July,  1881,  his  decision  was 
rendered.  As  might  have  been  expected,  it  was  unfavour- 
able to  Nicaragua.  It  declared  that  "Mosquitia"  was  au- 
tonomous; that  Nicaragua  had  no  right  to  regulate  trade, 
levy  duties,  or  grant  concessions  in  Mosquitia;  that  the  in- 
demnity or  subvention  provided  in  the  treaty  of  Managua 
must  be  paid  by  Nicaragua ;  and  that  in  case  of  Nicaragua's 
failure  strictly  to  observe  the  treaty,  Great  Britain  had  a 
right  to  intervene,  for  the  protection  of  her  own  special 
interests.  Thus,  with  Nicaragua's  assent,  the  British  claim 
to  control  of  the  Caribbean  terminus  of  the  Nicaragua  canal 
was  re-established. 

It  was  only  when  this  had  been  done  that  Mr.  Blaine  made 
his  belated  move  for  the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty — a  move,  in  the  circumstances,  very  much  like  trying 


90  "  CONSULE  LESSEPS  " 

to  lock  the  stable  door  after  the  horse  had  been  stolen,  for  it 
was  an  attempt  to  prevent  Great  Britain  from  doing  some- 
thing after  she  had  done  it.  The  secret  of  this  blundering 
was,  doubtless,  the  same  that  had  been  baneful  ly  operative 
in  Buchanan's  time.  The  American  Government  wanted  to 
eat  its  cake  and  have  it  too.  It  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  yet  keep  that  instrument  still  in 
force.  It  wanted  to  free  itself  of  restrictions  under  it,  and 
yet  keep  Great  Britain  bound  by  those  restrictions.  And  it 
hesitated  to  abrogate  the  treaty,  as  it  could  have  done  at  any 
time,  for  fear  of  the  consequences  which  might  ensue  when 
Great  Britain  was  freed  from  its  suppositious  trammels. 
This  was  an  attitude  all  the  more  weak  and  unworthy  on  our 
part,  because  as  a  matter  of  fact  Great  Britain  had  never 
been  bound  by  the  treaty  in  a  more  than  nominal  way,  but 
had,  whenever  she  pleased,  been  able  to  find  in  it  a  loop- 
hole big  enough  to  permit  the  passage  of  a  coach  and  four. 

So  it  was  not  until  four  months  after  the  re-establishment 
of  practical  British  sovereignty  over  the  Mosquito  Coast,  to 
wit,  on  November  19,  1881,  that  Mr.  Blaine  definitely  moved 
for  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  He  then 
wrote  a  long  letter  to  the  British  Government,  through  the 
American  Minister  in  London,  James  Russell  Lowell,  elabo- 
rately reviewing  the  history  of  the  treaty  and  analysing  the 
changed  conditions.  He  pointed  out  that  the  United  States 
was  now  able  and  ready  to  build  the  canal,  but  that  while 
under  the  treaty  this  country  would  be  forbidden  to  send  a 
,  single  soldier  to  guard  it,  Great  Britain  would  be  free  to 
send  warships  thither  to  control  it.  This,  he  rightly  argued, 
was  unjust.  A  European  guarantee  of  neutrality  would  be 
ineffective,  because  a  European  war,  between  two  of  the 
guaranteeing  powers,  would  instantly  convert  the  canal  into 
a  scene  of  hostilities.  Again,  the  existence  of  that  treaty 
prevented  the  United  States  from  asserting  its  own  treaty 
rights  against  France  in  Panama.  For  these  and  other  rea- 
sons, he  insisted  that  the  Isthmuses  should  be  placed  under 
the  sole  protection  of  the  United  States,  in  return  for  which 


GKANVILLE^S  KEPLY  TO  BLAINE  91 

this  country  would  guarantee  absolute  neutrality  of  the 
canal  to  all  European  powers.  He  therefore  hoped  the 
British  Government  would  assent  to  a  modification  of 
the  treaty  in  accordance  with  American  demands — that  is, 
that  America  should  be  released  from  the  treaty,  while 
Great  Britain  should  still  be  bound  by  it. 

Before  this  weak  and  impotent  communication  reached 
England  or  was  known  to  the  British  Government,  the 
British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord  Granville — a  statesman  al- 
ways conspicuous  for  his  friendliness  to  America — had  des- 
patched a  note  to  Washington,  commenting  with  some  ex- 
pression of  surprise  upon  Mr.  Blaine's  circular  letter  of 
June  24,  reminding  the  American  Government  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  saying  bluntly 
that  the  British  Government  expected  all  the  provisions  of 
that  treaty  to  be  fulfilled.  This  note  was  dated  November 
10,  1881.  On  November  29  Mr.  Blaine  sent  to  Mr.  Lowell  a 
second  note,  elaborately  trying  to  reopen  the  phases  of  the 
case  which  had  been  definitely  closed  by  Mr.  Buchanan 
twenty-five  years  before.  He  argued,  as  Mr.  Buchanan  had 
argued,  that  the  treaty  engagements  had  been  entered  into 
misunderstandingly,  comprehended  imperfectly,  and  inter- 
preted contradictorily.  But  instead  of  concluding,  as  Mr. 
Buchanan  had  done,  that  in  spite  of  these  things  the  treaty 
might  stand,  he  insisted  that  it  should  be  revised  or  abro- 
gated. Mr.  Buchanan  in  1859  declared  himself  "entirely 
satisfied."  Mr.  Blaine  in  1881,  on  precisely  the  same 
grounds  and  no  others,  declared  himself  entirely  dissatis- 
fied. Had  Mr.  Blaine  based  his  dissatisfaction  and  his 
demand  for  revision  upon  occurrences  subsequent  to  Mr. 
Buchanan's  closure  of  the  case,  his  argument  might  have 
been  effective.  Failing  to  do  so,  he  subjected  himself  to 
Lord  Granville's  curt  reply,  that  his  contentions  were  "novel 
in  international  law." 

The  British  diplomat  continued,  on  January  7,  1882,  with 
a  long  historical  and  legal  argument,  effectively  traversing 
Mr.  Blaine's  two  letters.    He  reminded  the  American  Gov- 


92  "  CONSULE  LESSEES  " 

ernment  that  Great  Britain  had  at  one  time  offered  to  abro- 
gate the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  on  condition  that  there 
should  then  be  a  reversion  to  the  status  quo  ante,  but  that 
the  United  States  had  declined ;  and  in  fine  he  refused  to  let 
the  treaty  be  made  over  to  suit  the  United  States  without 
regard  to  British  interests. 

Meantime,  in  the  summer  of  1881,  President  Garfield  had 
been  murdered,  and  had  been  succeeded  by  Chester  A. 
Arthur.  In  time  there  was  a  reorganisation  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  Frederick  T.  Frelinghuysen  took  Mr.  Blaine's  place  as 
Secretary  of  State.  It  fell  to  his  lot  to  reply  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville's note  and  to  continue  the  controversy,  and  while  he 
did  so  to  no  substantial  effect,  he  somewhat  improved  upon 
the  controversial  standard  of  his  predecessor.  Writing  to 
Mr.  Lowell,  he  set  down  as  the  corner-stone  of  his  policy  the 
principle  of  the  Monroe  doctrine,  that  the  American  Gov- 
ernment could  not  assent  to  any  intervention  of  European 
powers  in  the  political  affairs  of  the  American  republics,  and 
therefore,  he  continued,  European  guarantee  of  the  neutral- 
ity of  an  American  canal  was  inadmissible. 

Proceeding  from  this  general  principle  to  a  consideration 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  he  argued  that  the  objects  of 
that  instrument  were  three  in  number.  One  was  the  con- 
struction of  a  Nicaragua  Canal.  It  had  failed,  after  many 
years,  to  effect  that  object,  and  therefore  in  that  respect  was 
to  be  considered  as  having  lapsed.  The  second  object  was  to 
prevent  Great  Britain  from  extending  or  establishing  settle- 
ments and  sovereignty  in  Central  America,  under  whatever 
guise.  This  object  also  had  failed,  he  said,  through  Great 
Britain's  flagrant  disregard  and  violation  of  the  treaty ;  and 
he  denied  the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  erect  the  timber-cut- 
ting camps  in  Honduras  into  a  colony.  The  third  object 
was  the  co-operation  of  the  two  governments  in  the  control 
of  any  canal  that  might  be  built,  at  Tehuantepec,  Nicaragua, 
or  Panama.  But  this,  argued  Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  obviously 
applied  to  only  the  projects  at  that  time  under  considera- 
tion, all  of  which  had  long  since  lapsed ;  and  it  could  not  be 


FRELINGHUYSEN  AND  GRANVILLE  93 

regarded  as  applying  to  entirely  new  projects  which  had 
originated  since  that  time.  Finally  he  argued,  with  much 
cogency,  that  the  United  States  treaty  with  Colombia,  of 
1846,  giving  this  country  exclusive  rights  over  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  had  been  concluded  before  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  and  was  not  superseded  by  the  latter;  and  therefore, 
whether  or  not  the  United  States  was  to  remain  bound  by 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  in  Nicaragua,  it  certainly  was  not 
so  bound  at  Panama,  but  had  a  free  hand  under  the  Co- 
lombian treaty  of  1846. 

Lord  Granville  replied  by  denying  that  Great  Britain  had 
violated  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  He  pointed  out  that 
that  treaty  was  by  its  own  terms  applicable  not  only  to  then 
existing  canal  schemes  but  also  "to  any  other"  which  might 
at  any  time  be  put  forward,  and  especially  to  any  at 
Tehuantepec  or  Panama.  As  to  the  colony  of  British  Hon- 
duras, he  defended  it  with  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's  own  argu- 
ment of  priority,  on  the  ground  that  it  had  been  established 
before  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty.  He  would  not  even 
concede  that  the  treaty  had  lapsed  in  respect  to  its  first  ob- 
ject, of  securing  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  because  no  time  had 
been  stipulated  in  which  that  canal  was  to  be  built.  Fi- 
nally, he  neatly  argued  that  the  United  States  ought  not  to 
bring  up  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  reason  for  abrogating  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  since  that  doctrine  had  not  been  re- 
garded as  a  bar  to  the  making  of  that  treaty.  The  corre- 
spondence between  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  and  Lord  Granville 
finally  ceased,  leaving  the  whole  controversy  about  where  it 
had  been  before.  The  United  States  was  hopelessly  handi- 
capped by  the  blunderings  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  time,  and  by 
Mr.  Blaine's  inept  attempt  to  reopen  them,  and  settlement 
of  the  vexatious  matter  was  deferred  to  a  later  date  and  to 
the  hands  of  a  more  diplomatic  statesman. 

From  these  fruitless  debates  American  attention  was 
turned  back  to  the  schemes  and  operations  of  De  Lesseps. 
That  ambitious  and  resourceful  promoter  went  rapidly  and 
resolutely    forward   with    his    great   undertaking.    Actual 


94  «  CONSULE  LESSEPS  " 

construction  work  was  begun  on  February  1,  1881,  and  an- 
nouncement was  made  that  within  a  year  thousands  of  men 
would  be  busy  all  along  the  line,  and  that  the  canal  would 
be  open  to  commerce  in  1888.  So  well  did  he  succeed  in 
arousing  interest,  enthusiasm,  and  confidence  in  the  enter- 
prise that  when  the  first  subscriptions  for  $60,000,000  cap- 
ital were  called  for,  |120,660,900  was  promptly  offered.  Of 
these  offerings,  $99,450,800  were  from  French  people,  mostly 
in  small  lots.  The  original  share-holders  were  102,230  in 
number,  about  16,000  of  them  being  women  in  their  own 
names.  Of  them,  80,839  had  from  one  to  five  shares  each, 
19,143  from  six  to  twenty  shares,  and  3,028  from  twenty-one 
to  fifty  shares. 

The  work  was  ^'inaugurated"  on  February  1,  1881.  In 
emulation  of  the  gala  performance  of  Verdi's  "Aida"  at  the 
opening  of  the  Suez  Canal,  Sarah  Bernhardt  went  to  Pan- 
ama and  presented  a  drama  in  the  wretched  little  box  of  a 
playhouse  which  was  then  the  only  theatre  of  the  city.  In 
October  of  that  year  about  three  hundred  Europeans  went  to 
the  Isthmus  to  prepare  for  extensive  operations,  and  in  1882 
thousands  of  men  were  at  work  from  Colon  to  Panama. 
Money  was  spent  lavishly.  Enormous  salaries  were  paid  to 
directors  and  engineers.  Thousands  of  buildings  were 
erected,  for  hospitals,  hotels,  warehouses,  and  what  not. 
Elegant  private  mansions  were  built  for  the  directors  of  the 
work.  Machinery  and  other  supplies  were  purchased  in 
vast  quantities,  largely  untried  and  unsuited  to  the  work. 
An  army  of  gamblers  and  harlots  invaded  the  Isthmus. 
Neglect  of  sanitation  gave  opportunity  for  pestilences  to  run 
riot  and  to  sweep  off  thousands  of  victims.  A  great  amount 
of  effective  work  was  done,  but  at  far  too  great  a  cost.  The 
general  state  of  affairs  was  scarcely  exaggerated  by  Froude, 
when  he  wrote  that  ''in  all  the  world  there  is  perhaps  not 
now  concentrated  in  any  single  spot  so  much  swindling  and 
villainy,  so  much  foul  disease,  such  a  hideous  dungheap  of 
moral  and  physical  abomination."  Meantime,  De  Lesseps 
remained  in  France,  probably  unconscious  of  half  that  was 


going  on  at  Panama.  Glowing  reports  came  of  what  was 
being  done,  and  his  fame  steadily  rose  to  the  climax  of  hero- 
worship.  In  1884  he  was  elected  to  the  French  Academy  as 
the  successor  of  Henri  Martin,  who  had  been  the  successor  of 
Adolphe  Thiers,  and  was  saluted  by  Leon  Gambetta  with  the 
title  of  "Le  Grand  Frangais,"  which  ever  afterward  clung  to 
him.  On  April  23,  1885,  he  was  formally  seated  among  the 
"Immortals,"  Victor  Hugo  being  his  sponsor  and  Ernest 
Renan  delivering  the  oration  of  welcome. 

Behind  all  this  brilliance,  the  shadows  were  gathering. 
In*  1885  a  serious  insurrection  occurred  on  the  Isthmus, 
largely  promoted,  if  not  incited,  by  French  intrigues.  The 
city  of  Colon  was  looted  and  burned,  and  Panama  was  saved 
from  a  like  fate  only  by  the  intervention  of  a  United  States 
naval  force,  which  went  thither  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  1846.  Against  this  perfectly  lawful  action  of  the 
American  Government  the  French  consul  bitterly  protested, 
and  French  sympathy  with  the  insurgents  was  further 
shown  by  the  asylum  given  to  the  insurgent  chief,  Aizpuru, 
on  board  the  French  flagship.  Two  years  later  came  the  be- 
ginning of  the  end.  Far  more  money  had  been  spent  than 
the  total  original  estimates,  yet  the  work  was  scarcely  two- 
fifths  done.  The  Congress  of  1879  had  reckoned  a  tide-level 
canal  twenty-eight  feet  deep  could  be  completed  for  |114,- 
000,000,  in  seven  or  eight  years.  By  1887  it  was  concluded 
that  a  lock  canal,  only  fifteen  feet  deep,  would  cost  $351,- 
000,000  and  would  take  twenty  years  to  build.  The  seven 
construction  companies  which  had  been  working  under  con- 
tracts withdrew  from  the  field,  and  in  November,  1887,  the 
whole  job  was  turned  over  to  M.  Eiffel,  the  French  engineer, 
who  had  had  the  contract  for  building  the  locks.  Efforts 
were  made  to  raise  more  money,  which  met  with  little  suc- 
cess. Government  aid  was  sought,  through  the  wholesale 
bribing  of  Ministers,  Senators,  and  Deputies.  A  popular 
petition,  signed  with  158,000  names,  asked  for  the  licensing 
of  a  national  lottery  for  the  raising  of  funds.  This  was 
granted,  but  proved  ineffectual. 


dd  "  CONSULE  LESSEPS '' 

The  crash  came  on  December  13,  1888,  when  the  company 
suspended  payments  and  went  into  bankruptcy,  and  on  Feb- 
ruary 4,  1889,  was  put  into  the  hands  of  a  receiver.  The 
Congress  had  estimated  the  cost  of  the  canal  at  1114,000,000. 
The  company  had  promised  to  finish  it  for  |120,000,000.  At 
the  end  of  1888  the  work  was  scarcely  two-fifths  done, 
while  nearly  |400,000,000  had  been  disposed  of.  This  colos- 
sal sum  was  said,  not  altogether  untruthfully,  to  have  been 
one-third  spent  on  the  canal,  one-third  wasted,  and  one- 
third  stolen.  Here  are  the  amounts  of  the  various  subscrip- 
tions : 

Original  capital,   $  60,000,000 

Subscription  of  1882, 25,000,000 

"  "  1883,  60,000,000 

"  ''  1884,  34,129,200 

"  "  1885,  6,837,500 

«  ''  1886, 91,760,000 

"  ''  1887,  51,778,400 

"  "  1888,  64,000,000 

Total,    1393,505,100 

Which  produced  in  cash, $201,546,740 

Losing  in  discounts,  etc., 191,958,360 

This  was  an  appalling  showing.  It  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
world,  even  of  France,  to  the  monstrous  futility  of  the  en- 
terprise as  it  had  been  conducted  There  was  no  salvation 
for  it  in  the  patronage  which  the  pinchbeck  conspirator 
Boulanger,  then  in  the  height  of  his  brief  popularity,  gave 
it,  in  proclaiming  himself  the  protector  and  promoter  of  the 
enterprise,  and  subscribing  for  twenty-five  of  its  bonds. 
The  United  States  Government  promptly  took  advantage  of 
its  opportunity  to  complete  the  discomfiture  of  the  concern 
that  had  flouted  and  defied  it.  A  few  days  after  the  com- 
pany's suspension  of  payments.  Senator  Edmunds  proposed 
a  resolution  expressing  American  disapproval  of  any  con- 
nection of  any  European  government  with  any  canal  across 
any  American  Isthmus,  which,  on  January  7,   1889,  was 


THE  PANAMA  DEBACLE  97 

adopted  by  an  all  but  unanimous  vote.  A  few  weeks  later,  in 
February,  Congress  adopted  another  resolution,  protesting 
against  French  control  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  appropri- 
ating 1250,000  to  be  used  by  the  President  in  the  protection 
of  American  rights  and  interests  on  that  Isthmus.  On  Feb- 
ruary 7,  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  of  Nicaragua,  an 
American  organisation,  chiefly  of  New  York  capitalists,  was 
incorporated  by  act  of  Congress. 

The  remaining  history  of  the  De  Lesseps  enterprise,  partly 
pathetic,  partly  tragic,  and  wholly  unsavoury  and  disgrace- 
ful, may  be  briefly  dismissed.  Humanity  forbids  us  long  to 
dwell  upon  such  a  theme.  Judicial  proceedings  and  Par- 
liamentary investigations  and  trials  were  conducted  at 
Paris  in  1892-93,  and  there  was  disclosed  to  the  horrified 
world  such  an  orgy  of  corruption  as  history  had  never  be- 
fore recorded.  A  hundred  Senators  and  Deputies  were  ac- 
cused of  having  taken  bribes.  The  Ministry  and  the  Police 
department  were  under  the  same  charge.  Ten  Senators  and 
Deputies,  including  five  former  Ministers,  were  brought  to 
trial,  together  with  the  Directors  of  the  Company.  Baron 
Jacques  Reinach,  the  financial  agent  of  the  company,  who 
had  done  much  of  the  bribing,  committed  suicide.  Arton,  a 
banker,  who  had  been  associated  with  him  in  the  dirty  work, 
fled  into  exile,  and  long  afterward,  in  1905,  also  killed  him- 
self. Cornelius  Herz,  the  third  member  of  the  triumvirate 
of  corruption,  went  to  England,  and  either  fell  or  pretended 
to  fall  ill,  so  that  he  could  not  be  extradited,  and  thus  spent 
the  rest  of  his  life.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  collapsed,  physic- 
ally and  mentally,  and  probably  never  fully  realised  what 
had  happened  or  what  afterward  happened.  On  January  10, 
1893,  these  sentences  were  pronounced:'  Ferdinand  de  Les- 
seps, five  years'  imprisonment  and  |600  fine,  and  his  son, 
Charles  de  Lesseps,  the  same ;  Baron  Cottu,  and  Marius  Fon- 
tane,  each  two  years'  imprisonment  and  |600  fine ;  M.  Eiffel, 
two  years'  imprisonment,  and  |4,000  fine.  The  sentence 
against  the  elder  De  Lesseps  was  never  executed,  and  that 
against  his  son  was  annulled  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.    The 


98  "  CONSULE  LESSEPS  " 

judgment  of  the  world  was  that  both  Ferdinand  and  Charles 
de  Lesseps  had  been  accused  and  condemned  without  cause, 
and  that  they  were  guiltless  of  the  iniquities  which  had  been 
perpetrated  in  their  names.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  died  on 
December  7,  1894,  without  ever  rallying  from  his  prostra- 
tion, and  his  fame  will  be  immortal  despite  the  melancholy 
ending  of  his  career. 

In  the  United  States  it  became  clear  that  extravagant 
sums  of  money  had  been  used  in  secret  if  not  illicit  measures 
to  promote  the  interests  of  Panama  and  to  hamper  and  de- 
feat the  rival  enterprise  at  Nicaragua.  It  was  proved  that 
combinations  for  trade  monopoly  had  been  formed  by  the 
Panama  railroad,  then  owned  by  the  French  canal  company, 
the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company,  and  certain  transcon- 
tinental railroads;  all  of  which  strengthened  the  resolution 
to  enforce  the  established  principle  of  an  American  canal 
under  American  control.  The  De  Lesseps  scheme  had  been 
conceived  and  elaborated  in  defiance  and  denial  of  that  prin- 
ciple, and  in  its  hopeless  collapse  it  left  that  principle  tri- 
umphant above  all  danger  of  future  challenge. 


CHAPTER  yil 
WHY  THE  FRENCH  FAILED 

There  is  a  familiar  story  of  a  lawyer  who  told  a  judge 
there  were  twelve  good  and  sufficient  reasons  why  his  client 
had  not  obeyed  a  summons  to  appear  in  court.  *^In  the  first 
place,"  he  began  in  recounting  them,  "he  is  dead."  "Never 
mind  the  other  eleven  reasons,"  said  the  judge.  Perhaps  it 
will  be  risking  a  similar  interruption  for  me  to  attempt  to 
tell  the  reasons  why  the  French  under  De  Lesseps  so  signally 
and  disastrously  failed  at  Panama,  after  even  the  brief  men- 
tion which  I  have  already  made  of  their  financial  wasteful- 
ness and  corruption.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the  reasons  are  so 
instructive  that  they  deserve  more  than  passing  notice ;  some 
of  them  apply  not  only  to  the  original  De  Lesseps  Company 
but  also  to  its  successor,  the  New  French  Canal  Company; 
and  some  of  them  were  such  as  were  not  realised  by  the 
world  at  large  at  the  time,  but  have  only  now  become  ap- 
parent to  those  who  have  visited  the  Isthmus  and  have 
studied  the  records  and  the  situation  there. 

Let  me  begin  with  the  matter  of  finances,  since  I  have  al- 
ready referred  to  it.  The  extent  of  the  profligacy  of  the  De 
Lesseps  regime  was  not  bounded  by  the  bribery  of  French 
officials,  the  subsidising  of  the  French  press,  and  the  exer- 
cise of  secret  and  sinister  influences  in  the  United  States. 
"The  trail  of  the  serpent  is  over  it  all,"  on  the  Isthmus  as 
well  as  at  Paris,  New  York,  and  Washington.  We  were 
standing  one  day  on  the  wind-swept  veranda  of  Major  Le 
Jeune's  cottage  at  Empire,  that  sightly  and  salubrious  hill 
where  camp  the  United  States  troops  which  guarantee  the 
order  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  also,  indirectly,  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama.    It  was  one  of  the  highest  points  on  the  Isthmus 

99 


100  WHY  THE  FREKCH  FAILED 

along  the  line  of  the  canal,  and  as  we  could  see  almost  from 
sea  to  sea  we  fell  to  likening  it  to  that  "peak  in  Darien" 
whereon  stout  Cortez — alias  Balboa — stood  and  gazed  on 
the  Pacific ;  in  the  midst  of  which,  reverting  to  the  topic  we 
had  been  discussing  on  our  way  thither,  I  asked  a  man  who 
knew,  "What  was  the  real  cause  of  the  French  failure,  and 
how  can  we  hope  to  succeed  where  De  Lesseps  failed?"  For 
answer,  he  persisted  in  the  lighter  fancies  of  our  vision,  and 
pointing  to  the  splendid  vistas,  toward  the  Pacific  and  to- 
ward the  Caribbean,  he  said:  "You  see  all  that?"  "Yes." 
"Forty-seven  miles  from  Colon  to  Panama?"  "Yes." 
"Well,  in  De  Lesseps's  time,  it  was  forty-seven  miles  of 
'graft.' "  "Yes ;  and  what  is  it  now  ?"  "Oh,  now  it  is  an 
American  Canal  Zone!" 

Nor  was  his  answer  altogether  obscure,  to  one  who  had 
seen  what  had  already  been  pointed  out  to  me.  There  was 
the  house  which  had  been  built  for  the  Director-General,  at 
stockholders'  expense,  at  a  cost  of  |100,000.  There  was  also 
his  summer  house,  at  La  Boca,  which  cost  |150,000  of  stock- 
holders' money.  He  drew  a  salary  of  |50,000  a  year,  and 
got  an  extra  allowance  of  |50  for  every  day — or  fraction  of 
a  day — in  which  he  travelled  along  the  line  in  that  sumptu- 
ous private  car  which  had  been  provided  for  him  at  a  cost  of 
142,000  of  stockholders'  money.  Stables  cost  $600,000;  the 
hospitals  at  Ancon  cost  |5,600,000,  and  those  at  Colon  |1,- 
400,000 — they  were  needed,  but  they  cost  three  times  as 
much  to  the  stockholders  as  they  did  to  the  builders.  Office 
buildings,  etc.,  cost — the  stockholders — 15,250,000.  Every- 
where the  grossest  extravagance  prevailed,  and  in  addition 
to  the  extravagance  there  was  invariably  an  enormous  "rake- 
off."  Where  a  |50,000  building  was  needed,  a  |100,000 
building  was  erected,  at  a  corrupt  cost  of  |200,000. 

The  same  conditions  prevailed  in  the  purchase  of  "sup- 
plies." In  one  place  I  saw  where  there  had  been  stored  a 
huge  consignment  of  snow-shovels — thousands  of  them. 
Snow-shovels  in  Panama !  In  another  place  there  had  been 
received  and  stored  some  15,000  kerosene  torches,  such  as 


"GKAFT"  101 

are  used  in  torchlight  processions.  They  were  sent  to  the 
Isthmus  at  the  beginning  of  operations,  for  use  in  the  grand 
celebration  which  was  to  mark  the  completion  of  the  canal ! 
Away  up  in  the  hills  of  Culebra,  in  the  almost  impenetrable 
jungle,  miles  from  navigable  water,  I  saw  a  number  of  sec- 
tional and  portable  iron  steamboats.  They  had  been  sent 
from  France,  and  carted  up  thither,  overland,  to  aAvait  the 
time,  years  afterward,  when  the  canal  should  be  constructed 
up  to  them  and  they  could  be  floated  in  it.  Such  examples 
might  be  repeated  a  thousand  times. 

Apparently,  agents  were  sent  all  over  France,  asking  man- 
ufacturers if  they  had  any  surplus  stocks  of  goods  of  which 
they  wished  to  get  rid.  If  the  answer  was  in  the  affirmative, 
as  of  course  it  usually  was,  they  were  told  to  ship  the  goods 
to  Panama.  But  they  were  nothing  that  was  wanted  or 
could  be  used  there.  No  matter;  ship  them  along.  So  they 
sent  cargo  after  cargo,  of  the  most  useless  things,  from  hair- 
pins to  grand  pianos.  Almost  every  week  the  men  at  Colon 
were  surprised  by  the  arrival  of  a  shipload  of  things  they 
had  not  ordered,  did  not  want,  and  could  not  use.  But  pro- 
test and  demur  were  vain.  They  were  told  to  take  the  things 
off  and  store  them  somewhere,  anywhere,  so  that  the  ships 
could  go  back  to  France  for  more.  The  system  was  simple 
and  effective.  The  manufacturers  got  rid  of  surplus,  out- 
of-date  and  almost  worthless  stock,  at  top  prices.  The  pur- 
chasing agents  got  large  commissions.  The  railroad  and 
steamship  companies  got  high  freight  rates.  The  managers, 
in  France  and  on  the  Isthmus,  got  a  rich  "rake-off,"  and  the 
stockholders  paid  the  bills. 

So  much  for  the  "graft,"  which  consumed  tens  of  millions 
of  dollars  and  which  was  alone  sufficient  to  cause  the  failure 
of  the  enterprise.  What  was  suggested  in  the  next  place, 
by  my  informant's  reference  to  the  "American  Canal  Zone"  ? 
This:  That  the  French  did  not  secure  control  of  such  a 
zone,  but  tried  to  build  a  canal  on  Colombian  soil,  under 
Colombian  control  and  jurisdiction.  That  was  not  their 
fault;  it  was  their  misfortune;  since  the  United  States  cer- 


102  WHY  THE  FEENCH  FAILED 

tainly  would  not  have  permitted  them  to  obtain,  or  Colombia 
to  grant,  control  of  such  a  zone.  But  what  did  it  mean  to 
the  French?  It  meant  that  they  were  left  at  the  mercy  of 
the  Colombian  police  and  of  the  Colombian  courts.  What 
that  meant,  in  turn,  let  a  single  example,  one  of  many, 
indicate. 

There  was  a  man  of  Panama,  who  owned  some  thirty  acres 
of  about  the  most  worthless  land  on  the  whole  Isthmus.  It 
might  have  been  used  as  a  breeding  place  for  malarial  mos- 
quitoes, or  as  a  playground  for  baby  alligators,  but  scarcely 
for  anything  else.  It  was,  however,  exactly  in  the  path  of 
the  canal  builders.  They  needed  it.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  that  they  should  have  it,  and  have  it  at  once.  So 
they  went  to  the  man  with  an  offer  of  purchase.  Ten  dollars 
an  acre  would  have  been  a  fair  price.  But  the  Frenchmen 
wanted  to  be  liberal  so  as  to  ingratiate  the  natives,  and  also 
were  willing  to  pay  a  large  price  for  the  sake  of  closing  the 
bargain  at  once,  so  they  offered  him  a  hundred  dollars  an 
acre.  He  flatly  declined  it.  How  much,  then,  did  he  want? 
Would  he  be  satisfied  with  a  thousand  dollars  an  acre?  Oh, 
no;  he  could  not  think  of  accepting  |30,000  for  his  land. 
Why  ?  Because  it  was  too  much,  and  he  did  not  wish  to  rob 
the  generous  Frenchmen  ?  Oh,  no ;  because  it  was  too  little. 
Well,  then,  how  much  would  he  accept?  He  answered,  with- 
out the  quiver  of  a  nerve,  |300,000. 

Of  course,  they  appealed  to  the  courts — Colombian  courts. 
Elsewhere  it  would  have  been  for  a  writ  de  lunatico  in- 
quirendo.  There  it  was  simply  for  condemnation  proceed- 
ings and  judicial  assessment  of  value.  They  presented  their 
case.  They  showed  that  the  land  was  necessary  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal,  but  they  proved,  by  abundant  tes- 
timony, that  for  any  other  purposes  it  was  practically 
worthless,  and  that  ten  dollars  an  acre  would  be  a  fair  price 
for  it.  All  that  was,  however,  quite  superfluous,  for  the  man 
did  not  dispute  it.  He  frankly  admitted  that  his  land  was  not 
worth  ten  dollars  an  acre,  and  that  in  other  circumstances  he 
would  have  been  glad  to  sell  it  at  that  price.     But,  he  added 


DEFECTIVE  SANITATION  103 

in  substance,  an  all-wise  Providence  had  made  him  the  owner 
of  that  land,  possession  of  which  was  essential  to  this  rich 
canal  company,  and  had  thus  put  it  into  his  power  to  exact 
for  it  whatever  price  he  saw  fit  to  name;  and  who  was  he, 
a  humble  but,  he  trusted,  a  pious  man,  that  he  should  slight 
the  opportunity  which  Providence  had  placed  before  him? 

That  was  all.  The  case  was  closed.  The  court  deliber- 
ated for  a  moment,  and  then  it  awarded  to  the  man  the  full 
$300,000  which  he  had  demanded.  In  similar  fashion,  in 
great  things  and  small,  the  French  company  was  bled  by 
Colombian  rapacity,  and  that  is  the  sort  of  thing  which  was 
abolished  and  thereafter  prevented  by  the  establishment  of 
American  administration,  jurisdiction,  and  control  over  the 
Canal  Zone.  That  is  something  which  might  well  be  consid- 
ered by  some  of  those  critics  who  have  condemned  our 
acquisition  of  the  zone  as  an  invasion  of  Colombian  sover- 
eignty and  as  a  measure  calculated  to  involve  us  in  un- 
pleasant and  dangerous  entanglements.  The  fact  is,  it  was 
essential  to  the  construction  of  the  canal. 

Another  reason  for  the  French  failure  had  to  do  with  san- 
itation, and  was  partly  the  misfortune  and  partly  the  fault 
of  the  De  Lesseps  company.  It  was  their  misfortune  that 
science  had  not  then  discovered  that  malaria  and  yellow 
fever,  the  most  serious  of  the  Isthmian  plagues,  are  propa- 
gated and  spread  chiefly,  if  not  entirely,  by  the  bites  of 
certain  varieties  of  mosquitoes,  and  that  therefore  the  most 
effective  means  of  extirpating  and  preventing  those  diseases 
are  to  be  found  in  the  destruction  of  the  mosquitoes,  and  in 
guarding  both  sick  and  well  against  their  bites — the  sick, 
that  the  insects  may  not  become  charged  with  virus  from 
them,  and  the  well,  that  they  may  not  become  infected  by 
mosquitoes  which  previously  have  bitten  the  sick.  But  if 
this  was  the  misfortune  of  the  French,  their  faults  were  no 
less  marked.  They  neglected  to  begin  their  enterprise,  as 
the  Americans  have  done,  with  a  complete  sanitary  renova- 
tion of  the  Isthmus.  They  were  content  to  go  on  with  the 
unspeakably  vile  conditions  then  prevailing,  with  the  worse 


104  WHY  THE  FEENCH  FAH^ED 

than  unpaved  streets,  covered  with  the  filth  of  ages,  with  the 
total  absence  of  sewers  or  of  a  water  supply,  and  in  general 
with  sanitary  arrangements  which  would  have  been  discredit- 
able in  Dahomey.  It  is  true,  they  built  fine  hospitals.  But 
they  were  for  the  cure  of  diseases  which  were  permitted  to 
run  riot,  unchecked.  Far  better  would  it  have  been  to  have 
sought  prevention  of  the  diseases. 

A  grave  fault  lay,  too,  in  the  management  of  the  hospitals. 
The  sites  selected  for  the  hospitals,  especially  at  Ancon, 
were  admirable.  The  buildings,  too,  were  well  planned  and 
well  constructed.  They  are  now  being  used  by  the  Ameri- 
cans, with  little  change,  and  with  much  satisfaction.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  find  a  better  operating  room  than  that 
at  Ancon,  the  delight  of  every  surgeon  who  sees  it.  The 
equipment,  of  medicines,  instruments,  etc.,  was  also  as  good 
as  was  possible  at  that  time.  But  the  management  was 
hopelessly  defective.  The  doctors  and  surgeons  were  com- 
petent. But  they  left  most  of  the  practical  details  of  admin- 
istration during  the  day,  and  everything  at  night,  to  the 
nurses.  The  latter  were  Sisters  of  Charity.  Of  those  ex- 
cellent and  devoted  women  I  would  not  say  a  word  that 
savoured  of  disrespect  or  ingratitude.  But  a  Sister  of  Char- 
ity is  not  necessarily  a  trained  nurse.  All  her  piety  and  de- 
votion may  give  her  no  practical  idea  of  sanitation,  of 
hygiene,  of  the  care  of  the  sick.  Nor,  with  all  due  reverence, 
can  the  saving  of  Aves  and  Paternosters  supply  the  need  of 
ventilation,  of  bathing,  and  of  fresh  dressings  for  wounds. 
To  say  a  prayer  in  a  hospital  at  evening  is  no  doubt  a  pious 
and  a  commendable  act.  But  we  can  scarcely  consider  it  so 
all-sufficient  as  to  warrant  the  physicians  and  nurses  in 
thereupon  going  away  for  the  night,  shutting  the  wards  up 
nearly  air-tight,  and  leaving  all  the  suffering  inmates  with- 
out care  or  comfort  or  attention,  until  it  was  time  to  say 
the  morning  prayers — and  incidentally  to  carry  out  the 
bodies  of  those  who  had  died  during  the  night.  Excellent 
sites,  excellent  buildings,  excellent  equipments,  excellent 
physicians  and  surgeons,  and  excellent  women — as  women — 


INEFFICIENT  APPLIANCES  105 

for  nurses,  but  a  practical  administration  which  was  a  grim 
travesty  of  therapeutics  and  sanitation,  and  which  would 
have  been  unworthy  of  the  Ninth,  not  to  mention  the  Nine- 
teenth, Century. 

Another  serious  error  was  made  in  the  use  of  experimental 
machinery.  Panama  was  the  happy  hunting  ground  of 
every  mechanical  inventor  with  a  fad,  where  he  could  get  his 
device  practically  tried  at  the  expense  of  some  one  else. 
Pick  and  shovel  were  old  and  well  tried,  of  course,  but  it  was 
not  alone  with  them  that  the  canal  was  to  be  cut.  Dredges 
and  steam  shovels  were  needed,  and  these  and  other  ma- 
chines were  too  often  untried,  impractical,  and  fantastic 
types,  which,  after  experiments  costly  in  both  money  and 
time,  were  found  unsuitable  or  worthless.  A  single  ex- 
ample, a  minor  one,  will  illustrate  how  the  French  were 
handicapped  by  imperfect  utensils.  The  crux  of  the  whole 
work,  after  the  sea-level  plan  was  abandoned  for  a  canal 
with  locks,  was  the  monster  dam  at  Bohio,  and  of  course 
the  crux  of  the  dam-building  was  to  find  a  secure  foundation. 
There  are  those  now  who  say  there  is  no  need  of  going  down 
to  bed-rock  for  the  foundation,  but  that  the  great  dam  can 
be  securely  built  upon  clay  or  gravel.  However  that  may 
be,  the  Frenchmen  clung  to  the  old  theory  that  a  rock  base 
was  necessary.  In  making  their  surveys  and  estimates, 
therefore,  they  made  borings  to  ascertain  the  depth  at  which 
the  bed-rock  lay,  so  as  to  determine  how  great  the  excavation 
would  have  to  be  and  how  high  the  structure  of  masonry. 
They  had,  however,  no  diamond  drills,  though  such  imple- 
ments were  in  common  enough  use  elsewhere ;  and  the  result 
was  that  when  they  struck  a  boulder  as  big  as  a  barrel,  they 
supposed  it  to  be  bed-rock,  and  so  reported  it,  when  in  fact 
the  actual  rock  was  fifty  feet  below. 

Not  to  extend  the  catalogue  of  errors  too  far,  another 
grave  mistake  lay  in  the  manner  and  place  of  their  disposal 
of  the  material  excavated,  especially  at  Culebra.  Our  pres- 
ent plan  is  to  take  it  a  long  distance  away,  and  indeed  to 
cart  most  of  it  down  to  the  coast  at  Colon,  to  raise  the  level 


106  WHY  THE  FKENCH  FAILED 

of  that  city  and  to  fill  in  the  surrounding  swamps.  The 
French,  however,  dumped  it  close  to  the  sides  of  the  cuttings. 
Now  the  cuttings  are  not  all  through  rock,  but  chiefly 
through  clay,  marl,  and  other  comparatively  soft  and  yield- 
ing soils.  They  are  so  soft  that  the  sides  of  the  cuttings  can- 
not be  left  nearly  as  steep  as  they  would  be  in  a  firmer  soil. 
A  steeper  slope  than  one  of  forty-five  degrees  is  likely  to  be 
marked  with  trouble,  the  side  wall  presently  bulging  and 
sliding  down  into  the  cut.  That  is  why  the  canal  must  be 
made  so  wide  at  the  surface  in  comparison  with  the  width  at 
the  bottom.  Now  the  French,  not  appreciating  these  con- 
ditions, and  seeking  to  save  time  and  labour  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, did  not  cart  the  excavated  earth  away,  but  piled  it 
up  on  the  high  ground  at  each  side  of  the  cutting,  where,  of 
course,  its  weight,  superimposed  upon  the  earth  which  be- 
longed there,  greatly  increased  the  tendency  of  the  sides  to 
bulge  and  slip  into  the  cutting,  and  thus  greatly  aggravated 
the  natural  conditions.  It  is  to  avoid  this  error  and  its  con- 
sequent mischief  that  the  American  engineers  have  ruled 
that  no  earth  shall  be  deposited  within  a  certain  and  very 
considerable  distance  of  the  cutting.  This  rule  necessitates 
the  building  of  many  miles  of  railroad,  to  carry  the  material 
away,  but  it  will  in  the  end  greatly  facilitate  and  expedite 
the  completion  of  the  canal. 

With  all  these  and  various  other  errors  to  handicap  them, 
we  can  but  wonder  that  the  French  accomplished  as  much 
as  they  did.  In  fact,  they  really  did  a  vast  amount  of  ad- 
mirable work,  most  of  which  is  now  being  utilised  by  the 
American  engineers.  They  also,  with  all  their  consign- 
ments of  snow-shovels  and  petroleum  torches,  and  with  all 
their  improvident  experiments  with  untried  and  impractical 
devices^  took  to  the  Isthmus  a  vast  amount  of  excellent  ma- 
chinery, tools,  and  hardware  supplies,  which  is  still,  much  of 
it,  in  first-rate  condition.  Our  engineers,  on  taking  posses- 
sion of  the  works,  found  vast  storehouses  stocked  with  hard- 
ware of  all  kinds,  practically  as  good  as  when  it  was  shipped 
from  France.    Moreover,  astounding  as  it  may  seem,  in  view 


EKKOKS  TO  BE  AVOIDED  107 

of  popular  impressions  of  Isthmian  climate  and  of  its  effect 
upon  metal  work  of  all  kinds,  they  found  locomotives  and 
other  steam  engines,  which  had  been  standing  neglected 
since  De  Lesseps's  day,  some  of  them  actually  in  the  open 
jungle,  which  needed  only  a  little  oiling  and  new  leather 
belting  to  be  set  to  work,  as  good  as  new.  The  dredges  down 
in  the  submerged  parts  of  the  canal  were  chiefly  rusty  junk. 
But  up  on  the  highlands,  around  Culebra  and  Empire  and 
Matachin,  machinery  has  been  preserved  from  ruin  in  a  sur- 
prising and  gratifying  way. 

It  would  be  ungracious  to  dwell  too  long  upon  the  errors 
of  the  French,  and  it  would  be  vainglorious  to  exploit  too 
highly  the  manner  in  which  Americans  are  avoiding  them. 
It  was  not  strange,  perhaps  it  was  inevitable,  that  the 
French  should  make  some  serious  blunders,  in  undertaking 
so  vast  a  work,  and  a  work  so  unlike,  in  some  fundamental 
particulars,  any  they  had  ever  undertaken  before.  It  would 
be  inexcusable  for  Americans  to  fall  into  the  same  errors. 
The  French,  too,  as  we  have  seen,  suffered  from  certain  un- 
fortunate conditions  beyond  their  control,  to  which  we  are 
not  subject.  We  have  the  advantage  of  the  great  advance 
which  has  been  made  in  the  last  score  of  years  in  medical 
science,  and  we  were  not  prevented  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
from  securing  control  of  the  Canal  Zone.  Much  more,  almost 
immeasurably  more,  is  properly  to  be  expected  of  us  than  of 
the  French.  That  we  shall  meet  those  expectations  in  a  satis- 
factory manner  is  to  be  hoped,  but  is  yet  to  be  proved. 
The  first  year  and  more  of  our  work  there,  as  we  shall 
presently  see  in  greater  detail,  was  by  no  means  free  from 
errors,  serious,  though  happily  not  disastrous.  There  are  at 
the  present  time,  moreover,  potentialities  and  even  menaces 
of  further  complications  of  an  embarrassing  and  even  dis- 
creditable character.  The  lesson  of  the  French  failure  is, 
therefore,  not  one  of  vaunting  on  the  part  of  Americans,  but 
rather  one  of  prudence,  circumspection,  and  that  eternal 
vigilance  which  is  the  price  of  honesty  and  efficiency  as  well 
as  of  liberty. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

The  French  did  not  propose,  however,  to  lose  all  they  had 
done  and  spent  at  Panama  without  a  struggle.  They  real- 
ised as  fully  as  the  most  censorious  of  their  critics  the 
blunders  which  had  been  made  and  the  appalling  corruption 
which  had  prevailed.  They  knew,  however,  that  much  good 
work  had  been  done,  and  their  confidence  in  the  practica- 
bility of  the  enterprise  was  not  diminished.  Resolute  and 
resourceful,  they  rose  from  the  ruins  of  the  De  Lesseps  com- 
pany with  splendid  determination.  The  receiver  of  the 
bankrupt  company,  M.  Brunet,  promptly  organised  a  com- 
mittee to  study  the  situation  and  to  devise  ways  and  means 
to  rehabilitate  the  enterprise  and  to  push  it  to  completion. 
This  committee  was  composed  of  nine  Frenchmen,  one  Bel- 
gian, and  one  Dutchman.  It  met  in  October,  1889,  and  two 
months  later  five  of  its  members  visited  Panama  for  personal 
observation  and  investigation.  In  May,  1890,  it  reported  to 
M.  Brunet  that  the  canal  could  be  completed,  on  the  high- 
level  plan,  with  locks,  and  recommended  the  organisation 
of  a  new  company  to  undertake  the  work.  M.  Brunet 
accepted  the  report  and  decided  to  act  according  to  its 
recommendations.  His  first  step  was  to  send  Lieutenant 
Wyse  to  Bogota  to  secure  an  extension  of  the  franchise. 
The  original  concession  dated  from  May  28,  1878.  On  De- 
cember 26,  1890,  Lieutenant  Wyse  secured  an  extension  of  it 
for  ten  years,  on  condition  that  the  new  company  should  be 
fully  organised  by  February,  1893.  This  condition  it  was 
found  impossible  to  fulfil,  but  the  Colombian  Government 
complaisantly — for  a  substantial  consideration — extended 
the  time  little  by  little,  until  on  August  4,  1893,  it  gave  a 

108 


THE  NEW  FRENCH  COMPANY        109 

concession  running  until  October,  1904,  at  which  date  the 
canal  must  be  opened  to  commerce.     Finally,  in  December, 

1898,  it  added  six  years  more  to  the  time  allowed,  giving 
until  October,  1910;  though  it  was  afterward  said  this  last 
extension  of  time  had  not  been  legally  made  and  was 
invalid. 

Meantime,  on  October  21,  1893,  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company  was  organised,  under  French  laws.  It  had  a  cap- 
ital of  113,000,000,  and  expected  to  complete  the  canal  for  a 
total  of  1180,000,000.  Under  its  agreement  with  the  receiver 
of  the  old  De  Lesseps  company,  it  was  to  take  as  its  own  all 
the  material  assets  of  the  latter,  and  when  the  canal  was 
completed,  forty  per  cent,  of  the  profits  was  to  be  retained 
by  the  new  company,  and  the  remaining  sixty  per  cent,  was 
to  go  to  the  old  company,  for  its  liquidation.  A  Technical 
Committee  was  formed,  of  distinguished  membership,  con- 
sisting of  one  Colombian,  one  Russian,  one  Belgian,  two  Ger- 
man, two  American,  and  seven  French  engineers.  Work 
then  proceeded,  on  the  lines  established  by  the  original  com- 
pany, until  in  1898  the  Technical  Committee  estimated  that 
ten  years  more  would  be  sufficient  to  finish  the  canal,  at  a 
cost  of  1100,000,000.  By  this  time,  however,  the  funds  of  the 
new  company  had  been  exhausted,  and  in  accordance  with 
its  statutes  a  commission  of  five  members — one  American 
and  four  French  engineers — was  appointed  to  consider  the 
question  of  further  procedure.  This  committee  canvassed 
the  situation  and  prospects  thoroughly,  and  in  February, 

1899,  unequivocally  approved  the  report  of  the  Technical 
Committee  and  advised  the  continuation  of  the  work.  That 
course  was  thereupon  adopted,  and  the  work  of  construct- 
ing the  canal  was  incessantly  pushed. 

The  rivalry  of  Nicaragua  was,  however,  by  no  means 
ended.  It  was  indeed  entering  upon  a  new  and  more  strenu- 
ous phase.  A  most  important  step  toward  the  construction 
of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua  was  taken  in  1884,  when  Mr.  Fre- 
linghuysen,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  and  General 
Joaquin  Zavala,  the  Nicaraguan  Minister  at  Washington, 


110  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

negotiated  a  treaty,  which  provided  that  the  United  States 
should  construct  such  a  canal,  to  be  owned  by  it  and  Nica- 
ragua jointly,  that  there  should  be  a  perpetual  alliance  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  and  that  the  United  States  should 
guarantee  the  territorial  integrity  of  Nicaragua.  This  was 
obviously  a  bold  challenge  to  Great  Britain.  It  violated  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  was  doubtless  intended  so  to  do, 
as  an  offset  to  Great  Britain's  former  violations  of  it;  and 
its  probable  result  would  have  been  to  drive  Great  Britain 
to  abrogation  of  that  treaty,  and  then  to  precipitate  a  diplo- 
matic struggle  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
over  control  of  the  Mosquito  Coast.  The  treaty  would  also 
have  made  the  United  States  to  some  extent  a  partner  of 
Nicaragua  in  the  possible  and  not  improbable  wars  of  that 
country  with  its  neighbours,  or  else,  and  more  probably, 
would  have  established  a  practical  American  protectorate 
and  control  over  Nicaragua. 

The  treaty  was  negotiated  in  the  last  months  of  President 
Arthur's  administration,  and  was  still  before  the  Senate 
awaiting  ratification  when  Mr.  Cleveland  succeeded  to  the 
Presidency.  One  of  the  early  acts  of  the  incoming  ad- 
ministration was  to  withdraw  several  treaties  from  the  Sen- 
ate, this  one  among  them,  and  so  it  failed  of  ratifica- 
tion. Mr.  Cleveland  made  it  plain  that  he  withdrew  and 
suppressed  it,  not  because  he  was  opposed  to  a  canal,  but 
because  he  was  opposed  to  a  purely  American  canal,  and 
because  he  regarded  the  alliance  with  Nicaragua  and  the 
guarantee  of  that  republic's  territorial  integrity  as  an 
entanglement  contrary  to  the  traditional  policy  of  this 
country.    He  said: 

"I  do  not  favour  a  policy  of  acquisition  of  new  and  distant 
territory,  or  the  incorporation  of  remote  interests  with  our 
own.  ...  I  am  unable  to  recommend  propositions  involv- 
ing paramount  privileges  of  ownership  or  right  outside  of 
our  own  territory,  when  coupled  with  absolute  and  unlim- 
ited engagements  to  defend  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
State  where  such   interests   lie.  .   .    .  Whatever  highway 


PKESIDENT  CLEVELAND'S  ATTITUDE  111 

may  be  constructed  across  the  barrier  dividing  the  two 
greatest  maritime  areas  of  the  world  must  be  .  .  .  re- 
moved from  the  chance  of  domination  by  any  single  power. 
.  .  .  An  engagement  combining  the  construction,  owner- 
ship, and  operation  of  such  work  by  this  Government,  with 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  for  its  protection,  with 
the  foreign  State  whose  responsibilities  and  rights  we  would 
share,  is  in  my  judgment  inconsistent  with  such  dedication 
to  universal  and  neutral  use." 


In  this  utterance  Mr.  Cleveland  did  far  more  than  to 
disapprove  the  Frelinghuysen-Zelaya  treaty.  He  flatly  re- 
versed and  repudiated  the  policy  of  his  predecessors,  Arthur, 
Hayes,  and  Grant,  which  was,  as  we  have  seen,  for  "a  canal 
under  American  control."  More  than  that,  he  repudiated 
the  policy  established  in  1846  by  the  treaty  with  New  Gra- 
nada, under  which  the  United  States  did  receive  "para- 
mount privileges  of  ownership  or  right  outside  of  our  own 
territory  .  .  .  coupled  with  absolute  and  unlimited  en- 
gagements to  defend  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  State 
where  such  interests  lie."  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Mr. 
Cleveland's  objections  to  the  Frelinghuysen-Zelaya  treaty 
would  have  been  equally  applicable  to  the  Treaty  of  1846. 
Happily  this  divergence  from  the  well-established  course  of 
the  United  States  was  not  maintained.  The  Nicaragua 
treaty  perished  unratified,  but  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment returned  to  and  continued  in  the  course  indicated  by 
President  Polk  in  1846  and  so  strongly  confirmed  by  Presi- 
dents Grant  and  Hayes  in  later  years. 

The  next  step  at  Nicaragua  was  taken  in  1887,  when  Lieu- 
tenant Menocal  was  sent  thither  at  the  head  of  an  elaborate 
survey  expedition,  to  determine  the  exact  route  of  the  pro- 
posed canal.  Following  this,  on  January  10,  1888,  a  bill 
was  introduced  into  Congress  for  the  chartering  of  the  Pro- 
visional Canal  Company  under  the  new  name  of  the  Mari- 
time Canal  Company  of  the  United  States,  and  after  more 
than  a  year's  fighting,  largely  against  the  insidious  opposi- 
tion of  the  moribund  Panama  Company,  the  bill  became  a 


112  NICAEAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

law  on  February  20,  1889.  A  necessary  concession  from 
Costa  Rica  was  in  the  mean  time  secured,  since  the  canal 
would  for  a  part  of  the  way  traverse  the  territory  of  that  re- 
public. The  company  thus  chartered  was  organised  on  May 
9,  1889,  with  Hiram  Hitchcock,  of  New  York,  as  its  Presi- 
dent. Its  capital  was  |150,000,000,  in  preferred  stock  at  five 
per  cent.,  and  |100,000,000  in  common  stock.  In  March, 
1890,  a  Construction  Company  was  also  organised,  under 
the  presidency  of  ex-Senator  Warner  Miller,  of  New  York, 
with  a  capital  stock  of  $12,000,000,  the  shares  of  which 
were  all  sold  at  fifty  per  cent,  discount,  thus  netting  only 
$6,000,000. 

Work  was  actually  begun  at  Greytown  on  June  8,  1890, 
and  was  pushed  with  considerable  energy  and  discretion, 
chiefly  in  building  a  breakwater,  wharves,  warehouses,  work- 
shops, etc.,  at  Greytown,  a  railroad,  and  a  part  of  the  canal ; 
and  large  supplies  of  material,  machinery,  some  steamboats, 
and  other  essential  appliances,  were  purchased.  In  this 
way  in  the  course  of  three  years  the  whole  of  the  |6,000,000 
capital  of  the  Construction  Company  was  exhausted.  There 
would  probably  have  been  no  difficulty  in  securing  additional 
capital,  to  almost  any  amount;  for  the  Nicaraguan  project 
was  popular  in  America,  as  an  offset  to  the  offensive  French 
scheme  at  Panama,  and  there  was  full  confidence  not  only 
in  the  practicability  of  it  but  also  in  the  integrity  and  effi- 
ciency with  which  it  was  being  promoted,  and  which  formed 
a  grateful  and  inspiring  contrast  to  the  blundering  and 
plundering  at  Panama.  But  in  1893  occurred  an  almost  un- 
precedented financial  stringency  in  the  United  States,  with 
widespread  depression  of  business.  In  those  circumstances 
it  was  impossible  to  get  more  capital,  and  in  consequence, 
on  August  30,  1893,  the  Construction  Company  was  com- 
pelled to  go  into  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  and  work  on  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  ceased,  never  to  be  resumed. 

Thereafter  for  ten  years  a  persistent  campaign  was  waged 
in  Congress,  led  conspicuously  and  with  unsurpassed  per- 
tinacity and  confidence  by  Senator  Morgan  of  Alabama,  for 


SEEKING  AID  FOR  NICARAGUA  113 

government  aid  for  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  or  for 
government  assumption  of  its  enterprise  at  Nicaragua. 
Twice  before  1893  Senator  Sherman  had  introduced  a  bill 
for  giving  a  government  guarantee  to  the  company's  bonds, 
to  the  extent  of  |100,000,000,  but  each  time  it  had  failed  to 
reach  a  vote.  In  1894  the  measure  was  reintroduced,  in  the 
Senate,  providing  for  a  guarantee  to  the  extent  of  $70,000,- 
000,  and  was  passed  by  the  Senate,  but  failed  of  a  vote  in  the 
House.  The  same  thing  occurred  in  1895,  but  on  this  occa- 
sion Congress  provided  for  a  commission  of  investigation. 
This  commission  was  headed  by  General  William  Ludlow,  a 
competent  engineer,  but  it  was  able  to  do  little,  because  the 
parsimony  of  Congress  provided  only  |26,176  for  its  ex- 
penses. It  did  some  careful  work,  however,  and  reported 
that  the  company's  plans  were  feasible.  In  this  year  a  new 
Construction  Company  was  organised,  but  lack  of  means 
and  the  lack  of  government  encouragement  prevented  it  from 
resuming  work.  During  the  next  two  years  Congress  de- 
voted much  time  to  futile  debates  upon  the  matter.  In  the 
session  of  1897-98  it  was  proposed  to  purchase  the  Maritime 
Company's  franchise  and  property  and  assume  all  its  lia- 
bilities, paying  its  stock-  and  bond-holders  and  other  cred- 
itors $4,500,000  in  bonds  and  $7,000,000  in  stock.  Again,  in 
1898-99,  a  similar  proposition  was  made;  the  Government  to 
pay  the  company  $5,000,000  in  bonds,  and  to  assume  all  its 
indebtedness,  in  return  for  its  franchise  and  property. 
Under  these  schemes  the  enterprise  was  to  pass  into  the 
hands  of  the  Government.  Neither  of  these  proposals, 
originating  in  the  Senate,  was  enacted,  nor  was  the  one 
which  originated  in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1898-99, 
and  which  provided  for  the  purchase  outright  of  a  strip  of 
land  from  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  extending  from  sea 
to  sea,  and  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  on  it,  at  a  cost 
of  $115,000,000. 

Another  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was  constituted  by 
Congress  in  June,  1897,  headed  by  Rear-Admiral  John  G. 
Walker,  U.  S.  N.,  and  with  an  appropriation  of  $300,000 — a 


114  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

liberal  increase  over  the  pittance  given  to  the  former  com- 
mission under  General  Ludlow.  It  went  to  Nicaragua, 
partly  to  investigate  matters  and  partly  to  gain  time,  for 
the  ten  years  of  the  Maritime  Company's  concession  expired 
in  April,  1897,  and  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  brave  show  of 
activity,  if  the  Nicaraguan  Government  was  to  be  persuaded 
to  extend  the  time.  Nicaragua  was,  in  fact,  feeling  anxious 
over  the  matter,  was  losing  faith  in  the  Maritime  Company, 
if  not  in  the  United  States,  and  was  beginning  to  look  else- 
whither for  some  one  to  build  her  canal.  She  was,  moreover, 
again  quarrelling  with  Costa  Rica,  over  the  old  boundary 
question.  In  June,  1897,  she  gave  to  an  English  steamship 
company  exclusive  privileges  on  and  along  the  San  Juan 
River  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  for  navigation  and  railroad 
building,  though  it  was  stipulated  that  the  rights  of  the 
Maritime  Canal  Company  were  to  remain  superior  and 
unimpaired. 

This  was  an  ominous  warning  to  the  latter  company,  but 
it  was  followed  by  something  worse.  On  October  31,  1898, 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  formally  declared  that  the 
Maritime  Company's  concession  would  become  null  and  void 
on  and  after  October  9,  1899,  and  would  thereupon  immedi- 
ately be  renewed  in  favour  of  a  new  combination  of  American 
capitalists,  which  was  known  as  the  Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syn- 
dicate, and  which  included  among  its  members  William  R. 
Grace,  John  D.  Crimmins,  John  Jacob  Astor,  Darius  O. 
Mills,  Levi  P.  Morton,  and  other  New  York  capitalists  and 
promoters.  Appeal  was  made  by  the  Maritime  Canal  Com- 
pany to  the  United  States  Government  for  protection,  or  for 
intervention  in  its  behalf,  and  the  whole  matter  w^as  pres- 
ently taken  under  consideration  by  Congress. 

The  aid  of  the  Government  had  indeed  been  urgently 
sought,  in  the  form  of  diplomatic  intervention,  early  in  1898, 
but  had  necessarily,  in  the  then  existing  circumstances,  been 
denied.  It  was  quite  evident  to  judicious  observers  that 
nothing  practical  could  be  done  by  the  United  States  with- 
out first  securing  abrogation  or  material  modification  of  the 


VOYAGE  OF  THE  OKEGON         115 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  But  at  the  beginning  of  1898  the 
United  States  was  obviously  within  measurable  distance  of  a 
war  with  Spain.  In  the  spring  of  that  year  that  war  actu- 
ally began.  It  was  therefore  deemed  desirable  to  maintain 
perfectly  cordial  relations  with  Great  Britain,  instead  of  re- 
opening an  irritating,  if  not  acrimonious,  controversy  with 
her;  especially  as  Great  Britain  was  the  only  important 
European  power  of  whose  sympathy  and  friendship  this 
country  felt  entirely  assured.  The  canal  company's  plans 
and  requests  were  therefore  put  aside  for  the  time.  At  the 
end  of  the  war,  however,  the  State  Department  made  repre- 
sentations to  Nicaragua  in  behalf  of  the  Maritime  Company, 
and  in  January,  1899,  the  war  being  ended,  a  general  canal 
campaign  was  opened  in  Congress. 

This  campaign  was  the  more  earnestly  and  vigorously 
pushed,  and  indeed  its  prosecution  was  imperatively  de- 
manded by  popular  sentiment,  because  of  a  striking  incident 
of  that  very  war  which  had  caused  a  postponement  of  canal 
activities.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  battleship  Ore- 
gon, perhaps  the  finest  in  the  navy,  was  at  San  Francisco, 
where  there  was  no  probability  of  her  being  needed.  She 
was  therefore  summoned  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  West 
Indies,  where  she  was  urgently  needed.  To  get  from  the 
Pacific  to  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  United  States,  she  was 
compelled  to  make  the  long  and  perilous  voyage  by  way  of 
the  Straits  of  Magellan,  13,400  miles,  instead  of  the  short- 
cut which  the  canal  would  have  provided,  of  only  4,600 
miles.  Had  the  Oregon  met  with  disaster  on  that  long  voy- 
age, our  victory  over  Spain  would  have  been  less  certain  and 
more  difficult.  Even  the  length  of  time  consumed  in  the 
voyage  might  have  been  costly  to  us,  had  the  Spaniards 
acted  more  promptly.  Happily,  thanks  to  the  excellence  of 
her  construction  and  to  the  intrepidity  and  skill  of  her  com- 
mander, Captain — afterward  Rear-Admiral — Clark,  the  ship 
made  the  run  in  record-breaking  time  and  in  perfect  safety, 
reaching  the  Florida  coast  in  entire  readiness  for  action.  At 
that  there  was  universal  rejoicing,  official  and  popular,  but 


116  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

there  was  also  a  widespread  resolution  that  there  should 
be  no  more  need  of  such  a  roundabout  voyage  from  one  part 
of  our  coast  to  another,  but  that  the  short-cut  of  the  Isth- 
mian canal  should  be  provided  at  the  earliest  possible  date. 

There  were  now  three  competitors  in  the  field,  all  earnest 
and  exigent,  and  all  well  represented  at  Washington.  These 
were  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  the  Grace-Eyre-Cragin 
Syndicate,  and  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company.  Each 
was  hostile  to  each  of  the  others,  and  each  realised  that  the 
success  of  either  of  the  others  meant  its  own  ruin.  The  re- 
sult of  the  triangular  contest  was  inconclusive.  The  Senate 
passed  a  bill  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua, 
as  a  national  enterprise.  This  would  have  been  a  practical 
triumph  for  the  Maritime  Company,  had  it  been  enacted. 
But  through  the  personal  opposition  of  the  Speaker,  Thomas 
B.  Reed,  it  failed  to  pass  the  House  of  Representatives. 
Meantime,  Admiral  Walker's  Commission  returned  and  pre- 
sented a  report  which,  while  divided  in  opinion  as  to  the 
cost  of  the  canal,  was  unanimously  and  emphatically  com- 
mitted to  the  practicability  and  desirability  of  a  canal  at 
Nicaragua,  following  the  Lull  survey  from  the  Caribbean 
Sea  to  Lake  Nicaragua,  and  the  Childs  survey  from  that 
lake  to  the  Pacific  Coast  at  Brito. 

Consideration  of  the  Panama  route  as  an  alternative  was, 
however,  vigorously  and  persistently  urged,  and  on  March 
3,  1899,  the  last  day  of  the  Congressional  session,  the  Presi- 
dent was  authorised  to  send  still  another  commission,  to 
investigate  both  Nicaragua  and  Panama.  An  appropriation 
of  11,000,000  was  made  for  the  purpose.  On  June  9,  follow- 
ing, the  new  commission  was  appointed,  Rear-Admiral 
Walker  being  at  its  head. 

Congress  thus  having  adjourned  without  affording  relief 
to  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  that  organisation  saw  its 
only  hope  of  continued  life  in  securing,  through  the  diplo- 
matic aid  of  the  State  Department,  a  reconsideration  of  the 
action  of  the  Nicaraguan  Government  in  forfeiting  its  con- 
cession.   Before  anything  could  be  done,  however,  the  fatal 


DISASTER  TO  NICARAGUA  117 

date,  October  9,  arrived.  Without  aid  from  Washington, 
the  Maritime  Canal  Company  would  have  been  ruined.  But 
the  State  Department  intervened,  with  a  request  that  Nica- 
ragua would  reopen  the  case.  This  request  was  granted,  so 
far  as  to  waive  the  technicality  of  the  lapse  of  the  concession 
through  time  limitation,  and  to  refer  the  whole  matter  to 
arbitration.  In  pursuance  of  that  scheme,  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  appointed  two  arbitral  commissioners,  and  in- 
vited the  company  to  do  the  same.  The  company  did  so, 
selecting  two  of  its  own  members.  To  such  choice  the  Nica- 
raguan Government  objected,  and  then  it  demanded  that  the 
company  should  select  two  Nicaraguans.  To  this  the  com- 
pany in  turn  objected.  Finally,  a  satisfactory  tribunal  was 
constituted,  which  took  the  whole  case  under  advisement, 
and  in  the  fall  of  1900  rendered  a  decision,  against  the  com- 
pany. This  the  company  refused  to  accept,  and  it  protested 
against  it  to  the  United  States  Government,  but  the  protest 
was  ineffective. 

Meanwhile  the  Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syndicate  was  becoming 
involved  in  embarrassments.  The  Nicaraguan  Government 
had  given  it  a  concession  under  the  mistaken  notion,  which 
seems  to  have  been  disingenuously  fostered  by  somebody  in 
the  interest  of  the  syndicate,  that  it  was  backed  by  the 
guarantee  of  the  United  States  Government.  When  it  found 
this  was  not  the  case,  the  Nicaraguan  Government  regarded 
the  syndicate  with  suspicion  and  disfavour,  and  sought  to 
cancel  its  engagement  with  it.  This  it  finally  did,  on  the 
ground  that  the  syndicate  had  failed  to  pay  its  bonus  of 
1500,000  at  the  stipulated  time. 

When  Congress  met  again,  in  the  fall  of  1899,  it  promptly 
took  up  again  the  canal  question  where  it  had  laid  it  down 
in  the  preceding  spring,  and  bills  were  introduced  into  both 
Senate  and  House  for  governmental  construction  of  the 
Nicaragua  Canal.  The  Senate  also  asked  the  President  to 
secure  abrogation  or  modification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  as  an  essential  preliminary,  but  the  House  bill  ig- 
nored the  treaty  and  the  rights  of  Great  Britain  under  it,  the 


118  NICAKAGUA  OK  PANAMA? 

author  of  the  bill  declaring  that  the  treaty  had  been  a  dead 
letter  since  the  day  on  which  it  was  signed.  This  measure 
was  passed  by  the  House,  by  an  overwhelming  majority,  but 
happily  failed  of  passage  in  the  Senate.  However  well 
meant,  it  was  egregiously  ill-timed,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
diplomatic  negotiations  were  at  that  very  moment  pending 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  for  an  amicable 
disposal  of  the  obstructive  treaty. 

These  negotiations,  conducted  by  the  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Hay,  and  the  British  Ambassador,  Lord  Pauncefote, 
culminated  in  a  treaty  which  was  laid  before  the  Senate  for 
ratification  on  February  5,  1900.  It  provided  that  an  Isth- 
mian canal  might  be  constructed,  operated,  and  regulated  by 
the  United  States  alone,  but  that  it  should  be  neutralised  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  so 
that  in  both  peace  and  war  it  should  be  open  to  both  the 
merchant  ships  and  the  w^^rships  of  all  nations,  and  should 
never  be  blockaded;  that  the  United  States  should  never 
erect  fortifications  commanding  the  canal  or  the  adjacent 
waters;  and  that  the  other  great  powers  should  be  invited 
to  join  in  the  guarantee. 

This  convention  was  doubtless  well  meant  by  both  its 
makers.  It  was,  however,  received  by  the  Senate  and  by 
the  majority  of  the  American  nation  with  surprise,  dis- 
appointment, and  strong  disapproval.  It  was  objected  that 
it  did  not  abrogate  nor  supersede  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
but  practically  reaffirmed  those  features  of  that  instrument 
which  were  most  objectionable  to  America;  that  it  required 
the  United  States  to  give  free  use  of  its  own  '?anal  to  any 
power  which  might  be  at  war  with  this  country  and  which 
might  wish  to  use  the  canal  for  this  country's  harm;  and 
that  it  violated  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  reversed  the  estab- 
lished policy  of  this  country  by  calling  for  European  guar- 
antees of  American  neutrality.  Under  the  lead  of  Senator 
Cushman  K.  Davis,  therefore,  the  Senate  amended  the  treaty, 
by  the  insertion  of  declarations  that  none  of  the  stipulations 
of  neutrality  should  be  interpreted  so  as  to  forbid  the  United 


THE  HAY-PAUNCEFOTE  TKEATY  119 

States  to  take  whatever  measures  it  saw  fit  for  its  own  pro- 
tection and  the  maintenance  of  order.  This  would  have  per- 
mitted the  United  States  to  close  the  canal  against  an  enemy 
in  time  of  war.  There  were  also  adopted  amendments  pro- 
posed by  Senator  Joseph  B.  Foraker,  specifically  declaring 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  to  be  superseded  by  this  new  one, 
and  striking  out  the  proposal  to  invite  other  powers  to  join 
in  the  guarantee  of  neutrality.  All  these  amendments  were 
in  accord  with  the  well-established  policy  of  the  American 
Government,  and  they  must  be  regarded  as  having  been  de- 
sirable, if  not  essential  to  our  welfare  as  a  nation  and  to  the 
success  of  the  canal  enterprise.  With  these  amendments, 
the  treaty  w^as  ratified  by  the  Senate  on  December  20,  1900. 
The  changes  made  were,  however,  unacceptable  to  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  and  the  treaty  was  accordingly  permitted  to 
lapse. 

Lord  Lansdowne,  the  British  Foreign  Minister,  was  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  effecting  a  settlement  of  the  old  con- 
troversy on  terms  satisfactory  to  the  United  States,  and 
with  that  end  in  view  he  made,  on  February  22,  1901,  a 
statement  of  his  reasons  for  not  accepting  the  amended 
treaty,  coupled  with  a  suggestion  that  a  new  one  be  negoti- 
ated in  its  place.  This  suggestion  was  acted  upon,  the  work 
being  undertaken  by  the  same  patient  and  benevolent  states- 
men who  had  framed  the  former  treaty,  and  on  November 
18,  1901,  the  second  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  signed.  It 
was  laid  before  the  Senate  on  December  5,  and  on  December 
16  it  was  ratified  by  that  body  without  amendment.  (See 
Appendix  III.)  This  memorable  convention,  which  in  due 
time  went  into  effect  and  has  since  been  law,  specifically 
abrogated  and  superseded  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty;  it 
gave  the  United  States  the  sole  power  to  construct,  operate, 
and  control  the  canal,  without  any  co-operation  or  guarantee 
from  Great  Britain  or  any  other  country;  and  it  gave  to 
the  United  States  practically  a  free  hand  over  the  canal  in 
time  of  war.  (On  this  latter  point,  it  is  true,  the  treaty  is 
somewhat  vague,  and  may  be  interpreted  according  to  the 


120  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

requirements  of  the  occasion.  While  it  forbids  the  block- 
ading of  the  canal  it  does  not  forbid  the  construction  of  forti- 
fications along  it.)  Thus  happily  the  half-century's  dispute 
over  the  inept  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  peacefully  and 
profitably  ended,  a  cause  of  much  misunderstanding  and  irri- 
tation between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  was  re- 
moved, and  the  chief  diplomatic  barrier  to  the  construction 
of  an  Isthmian  canal  was  swept  away,  and  international 
sanction  was  given  to,  and  indisputable  opportunity  was 
afforded  for,  the  fulfilment  of  the  policy  enunciated  by  Grant 
and  repeated  and  elaborated  by  Hayes,  of  an  American  canal 
under  American  control. 

The  report  of  the  third  Canal  Commission  was  received  by 
the  President,  and  was  transmitted  to  Congress  on  December 
4,  1900.  It  discussed  in  detail  the  comparative  merits  and 
demerits  of  the  Nicaragua  and  Panama  routes.  Its  prac- 
tical recommendation  was  for  the  construction  of  a  canal 
at  Nicaragua  on  the  lines  indicated  by  the  preceding  com- 
mission of  1897.  The  cost  of  the  enterprise  was  estimated 
at  1200,540,000 ;  or,  by  using  only  a  single  set  of  locks,  and 
narrowing  the  bottom  of  the  canal  to  100  feet,  at  |163,913,- 
000.  The  time  required  for  construction  was  set  at  ten 
years.  The  report  estimated  the  cost  of  a  canal  at  Panama 
at  only  |142,342,579,  or  nearly  $58,000,000  less  than  at  Nica- 
ragua, but  added  that  no  way  had  been  found  by  which  the 
United  States  could  secure  complete  ownership  and  control 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  unless  at  a  cost  that  would  make  its 
total  expense  much  higher  than  at  Nicaragua.  Therefore, 
in  conclusion,  it  said : 

"The  estimated  cost  of  building  the  Nicaragua  Canal  is 
about  158,000,000  more  than  that  of  completing  the  Panama 
Canal,  leaving  out  the  cost  of  acquiring  the  latter  property. 
This  measures  the  difference  in  the  magnitude  of  the  ob- 
stacles to  be  overcome  in  the  actual  construction  of  the  two 
canals,  and  covers  all  physical  considerations.  .  .  .  The 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  has  shown  no  disposition  to 
sell  its  property  to  the  United  States.  Should  that  company 
be  able  and  willing  to  sell,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 


NICARAGUA  RECOMMENDED  121 

price  would  not  be  such  as  would  make  the  total  cost  to  the 
United  States  less  than  that  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal.  The 
Panama  Canal,  after  completion,  would  be  shorter,  have 
fewer  locks,  and  less  curvature  than  the  Nicaragua  Canal. 
The  measure  of  these  advantages  is  the  time  required  for  a 
vessel  to  pass  through,  which  is  estimated  for  an  average 
ship  at  twelve  hours  for  Panama  and  thirty-three  hours  for 
Nicaragua.  On  the  other  hand,  the  distance  from  San  Fran- 
cisco to  New  York  is  377  miles,  to  New  Orleans  579  miles, 
and  to  Liverpool  386  miles  greater  via  Panama  than  via 
Nicaragua.  .  .  .  The  Government  of  Colombia,  in  which 
lies  the  Panama  Canal,  has  granted  an  exclusive  concession, 
which  still  has  many  years  to  run.  It  is  not  free  to  grant 
the  necessary  rights  to  the  United  States,  except  upon  con- 
dition that  an  agreement  be  reached  with  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company.  The  commission  believes  that  such  agree- 
ment is  impracticable.  .  .  .  The  governments  of  Nica- 
ragua and  Costa  Rica,  on  the  other  hand,  are  untrammelled 
by  concessions  and  are  free  to  grant  the  United  States  such 
privileges  as  may  be  mutually  agreed  upon. 

"In  view  of  all  the  facts,  and  particularly  in  view  of  all  the 
difficulties  of  obtaining  the  necessary  rights,  privileges,  and 
franchises  on  the  Panama  route,  and  assuming  that  Nica- 
ragua and  Costa  Rica  recognise  the  value  of  the  canal  to 
themselves,  and  are  prepared  to  grant  concessions  on  terms 
which  are  reasonable  and  acceptable  to  the  United  States, 
the  commission  is  of  opinion  that  'the  most  practicable  and 
feasible  route'  for  an  isthmian  canal  to  be  'under  the  control, 
management,  and  ownership  of  the  United  States'  is  that 
known  as  the  Nicaragua  route." 

It  was  doubtless  shrewd  and  wise  for  the  Commission  thus 
to  report  the  apparent  impracticability  of  making  satis- 
factory terms  with  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company. 
Nothing  could  have  been  better  calculated  to  bring  that  com- 
pany to  precisely  such  terms.  Indeed,  long  before  the  date 
of  this  report,  the  directors  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany had  begun  to  distrust  their  own  ability  to  finish  their 
job,  to  appreciate  the  force  of  American  objections  to  an  alien 
canal  on  American  soil,  and  to  realise  that  their  only  pru- 
dent course  was  to  transfer  their  undertaking  in  some  way 
to  American  control.    Resort  was  first  had  to  the  expedient 


122  NICAKAGUA  OK  PANAMA? 

of  reorganisation  under  an  American  charter.  Early  in  1900 
the  "Panama  Canal  Company  of  America"  was  organised 
and  incorporated  in  New  Jersey,  and  it  was  planned  to 
transfer  the  canal  to  it.  But  it  was  soon  seen  that  that 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  American  demands.  The 
ownership  of  the  canal  must  be  vested  not  in  any  private 
corporation,  French  or  American,  but  in  the  United  States 
Government.  Nothing  short  of  that  would  be  acceptable  to 
this  country,  despite  President  Cleveland's  protest  against 
such  a  policy,  only  a  few  years  before. 

The  French  company,  at  Panama,  did  not  desire  thus  to 
sell  out,  and  indeed,  was  prohibited  by  its  charter  from  so 
doing.  It  began  to  see,  nevertheless,  that  some  such  course 
was  inevitable,  and  accordingly  sought  permission  from  the 
Colombian  Government  to  make  a  transfer  of  its  concession. 
The  Colombian  Government  did  not  greatly  care  who  con- 
structed the  canal,  whether  a  French  corporation  or  the 
American  Government,  nor  indeed,  did  it  display  any  con- 
suming eagerness  to  have  the  canal  constructed  at  all. 
What  it  did  want  was  to  extort  as  much  profit  from  the  en- 
terprise as  possible,  in  the  shape  of  bonuses,  not  only  for  the 
original  concession  but  for  every  extension  of  time  that  was 
granted,  and  for  the  transfer  of  ownership.  The  New  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company  at  last  secured,  however,  on  certain 
conditions,  from  the  Colombian  Government,  permission  to 
sell  its  concession  and  unfinished  works  to  the  United 
States.  That  was  in  the  spring  of  1901.  Thereupon,  on 
May  8,  Rear-Admiral  Walker,  the  chairman  of  the  United 
States  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  categorically  asked  M. 
Hutin,  the  President  of  that  company,  if  the  company  was 
willing,  ready  and  able  to  sell,  and  if  so,  at  what  price.  He 
inquired  not  only  if  Colombian  permission  had  been  fully 
granted,  but  also  if  the  company  had  the  right  and  power  to 
sell  in  view  of  its  agreement  with  the  old  De  Lesseps  com- 
pany, and  also  of  its  terms  of  incorporation  under  the  laws 
of  France. 

Much  depended  upon  the  answer  to  these  questions,  for,  as 


NEGOTIATIOISrS  AT  PANAMA  123 

we  have  seen,  the  report  of  the  Canal  Commission,  which  had 
been  made  in  the  fall  of  1900,  favoured  the  Nicaragua  route 
largely  because  of  the  assumed  impossibility  of  securing 
complete  ownership  of  the  Panama  route  on  satisfactory 
conditions  and  at  an  acceptable  price.  If  now  the  Panama 
route  could  be  acquired,  that  recommendation  in  favour  of 
Nicaragua  might  be  revised  and  reversed.  The  fact  that 
the  Commission  had,  on  those  grounds,  reported  in  favour 
of  Nicaragua  was  unquestionably  what  chiefly  moved  the 
Panama  company  to  seek  permission  to  sell,  for  it  knew  that 
if  the  United  States  once  seriously  entered  upon  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  the  Panama  scheme 
would  be  ruined  and  dead  beyond  all  hope.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  this  move  of  the  Panama  company  to  get  per- 
mission to  sell  that  caused  our  Commission  to  suspect  that 
after  all  it  might  be  possible  to  secure  the  Panama  route 
on  terms  that  would  make  it  preferable  to  Nicaragua. 

M.  Hutin  replied  promptly,  on  May  15.  His  company,  he 
said,  had  unquestionable  legal  right  and  power  to  sell,  sub- 
ject to  certain  conditions  imposed  by  Colombia:  namely, 
that  the  United  States  should  be  the  purchaser,  and  that  the 
transfer  should  be  effected  on  or  before  March  1,  1902.  He 
was,  however,  unable  to  fix  a  definite  price.  That  would 
have  to  be  done  by  discussion,  or  by  arbitration.  Thus  the 
matter  stood  in  an  indefinite  state  for  some  months,  the 
American  Canal  Commission  seeking  and  awaiting  a  state- 
ment of  price  from  the  French  company,  at  any  rate  before 
Congress  should  reassemble  in  the  fall,  and  the  company 
hesitating  to  commit  itself  to  any  definite  sum. 

At  last,  on  October  2,  1901,  M.  Hutin  gave  to  Rear- 
Admiral  Walker  not  an  offer  of  sale  at  a  fixed  price,  but  a 
memorandum  of  estimate  of  value,  representing  the  maxi- 
mum of  the  company's  possible  demands  for  its  properties. 
It  was  not  stated  nor  intimated  that  the  sum  named  was 
the  least  the  company  would  accept,  or  even  that  it  would 
ask  such  an  amount.  The  estimates,  it  was  explained,  were 
to  serve  as  an  indication  of  what  the  canal  had  thus  far  cost 


124  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

the  French  company,  and  as  a  basis  of  negotiation.  The 
Canal  Commission,  however,  chose  to  regard  this  statement 
of  values  as  an  offer  of  sale,  or  rather  as  a  demand  of  price, 
and  accordingly  reported  the  lump  sum  total  of  the  esti- 
mates as  the  price  which  the  Panama  company  placed  upon 
its  property,  and  for  which  it  would  "sell  and  transfer  its 
canal  property  to  the  United  States."  The  sum  was  |109,- 
141,500.  Now  the  Commission  had  already  estimated  the 
difference  in  cost  between  the  two  routes  at  only  about 
f 58,000,000,  aside  from  the  cost  of  acquiring  Panama,  and 
had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  $40,000,000  was  the  maxi- 
mum price  which  the  United  States  should  pay  for  the 
Panama  concession  and  unfinished  works.  It,  therefore, 
regarded  the  sum  above  mentioned  as  more  than  twice  too 
large  for  this  country  to  pay,  and  repeated  its  recommenda- 
tion in  favour  of  Nicaragua.  The  statement  of  the  French 
company  it  regarded  as  confirming  its  former  anticipation 
that  "the  price  would  not  be  such  as  would  make  the  total 
cost  to  the  United  States  less  than  that  of  the  Nicaragua 
Canal."  In  fact,  the  payment  of  the  sum  named  would  have 
made  the  cost  of  the  Panama  Canal  the  greater  by  more  than 
$50,000,000. 

When  this  action  and  report  of  the  Commission  became 
known  in  Paris,  a  crisis  occurred  in  the  affairs  of  the  com- 
pany. Its  President  and  most  of  its  directors  resigned  their 
places  in  despair,  seeing  nothing  but  bankruptcy  and  ruin 
ahead.  A  general  meeting  of  the  stockholders  was  held  on 
December  21,  1901,  at  which,  after  much  debate,  it  was 
voted  to  negotiate  for  a  sale  of  the  canal  to  the  United 
States  on  the  best  terms  that  could  be  secured — presumably 
the  price  already  suggested  by  the  Commission  as  the  maxi- 
mum which  the  United  States  should  pay,  $40,000,000.  At 
the  same  time  it  was  earnestly  protested  that  the  Commis- 
sion had  misrepresented  or  misinterpreted  the  company's 
former  statement  of  values,  and  had  unjustly  "forced  the 
company's  hand"  by  reporting  that  it  demanded  such  a 
price  for  its  property.    A  definite  offer  of  sale  of  the  entire 


PANAMA  RECOMMENDED  125 

property  of  the  company  for  |40,000,000  was  made  to  the 
Commission  by  cable,  on  January  4, 1902,  and  was  confirmed 
by  later  mail  advices,  whereupon  the  Commission,  in  a  sup- 
plementary report,  on  January  18,  revised  and  reversed  its 
former  judgment  in  accordance  with  the  new  conditions  thus 
established,  and  recommended  the  adoption  of  the  Panama 
route  and  the  purchase  of  the  unfinished  French  canal. 

It  was  at  this  time  pretty  generally  recognised  through- 
out the  world  that  the  United  States  was  at  last  in  earnest, 
and  would  not  only  insist  upon  controlling  whatever  canal 
was  constructed  across  any  American  isthmus,  but  also 
would  itself  promptly  proceed  with  the  construction  of  such 
a  canal.  The  International  Conference  of  the  American 
States,  commonly  known  as  the  Pan-American  Congress,  in 
January,  1902,  unanimously  adopted  the  following  resolu- 
tion: 

^'The  Republics  assembled  at  the  International  Conference 
of  Mexico  applaud  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment to  construct  an  interoceanic  canal,  and  acknowledge 
that  this  work  will  not  only  be  worthy  of  the  American 
people,  but  also  in  the  highest  sense  a  work  of  civilisation 
and  to  the  greatest  degree  beneficial  to  the  development  of 
commerce  between  the  American  States  and  the  other  coun- 
tries of  the  world." 

In  this  resolution  the  common  sentiment  of  the  American 
republics,  and  indeed  of  the  world,  was  accurately  expressed. 
It  remained  for  the  United  States  to  justify  that  sentiment, 
and  this  was  not  done  without  one  more  struggle  at  Wash- 
ington. It  was  now  the  turn  of  the  advocates  of  Nicaragua 
and  those  interested  in  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  to  be 
stricken  with  despair,  since,  if  this  latest  report  of  the 
commission  were  acted  upon  favourably,  the  Nicaragua 
scheme  would  be  killed.  There  accordingly  arose  in  Con- 
gress the  final  and  most  vehement  controversy  over  canal 
routes,  the  culmination  of  the  age-long  duel  between  Nica- 
ragua and  Panama.  On  January  8,  before  the  revised 
supplementary  report  of  the  Commission  was  presented,  the 


126  NICARAGUA  OP.  PANAMA? 

House  of  Representatives  adopted  by  the  overwhelming  vote 
of  223  to  25,  Mr.  Hepburn's  bill  authorising  the  President 
to  proceed  to  the  construction  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua,  at 
a  cost  of  1180,000,000,  and  appropriating  |10,000,000  on 
account  for  immediate  use.  An  amendment  was  proposed  to 
this  bill,  leaving  the  choice  of  routes  to  the  discretion  of  the 
President,  but  it  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  120  ayes  to  170 
nays.  Briefly  stated,  the  argument  against  Panama  and  in 
favour  of  Nicaragua,  which  prevailed  at  this  time  and  which 
brought  about  this  vote,  was  that  the  Panama  route  was 
the  further  from  the  United  States,  making  the  voyage 
from  our  Atlantic  to  our  Pacific  coast  much  longer  than  by 
way  of  Nicaragua;  that  Panama  was  the  less  desirable  for 
sailing  vessels  on  account  of  the  prevailing  calms  in  the  Bay 
of  Panama ;  that  the  'Tanama  lobby"  was  not  to  be  trusted ; 
and  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  make  as  satisfactory 
arrangements  with  Colombia  as  with  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica.  There  was  also  the  general  sentiment  that  Nicaragua 
was  the  "traditional  American  route,"  while  Panama  was  a 
French  route. 

When  this  bill  was  reported  from  the  House  to  the  Senate, 
vigorous  opposition  was  promptly  manifested  toward  it.  It 
is  true.  Senator  Morgan  had  long  been  distinguished  as  the 
foremost  advocate  and  champion  of  Nicaragua.  But  there 
were  other  Senators  almost  equally  resolute  in  their  advo- 
cacy of  Panama,  and  their  number  was  much  increased  and 
their  position  was  greatly  strengthened  by  the  supplemen- 
tary report  of  the  Commission,  showing  how  cheaply  the 
Panama  Canal  could  be  purchased.  An  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  bill  was  therefore  offered  by  Senator  Spooner, 
which  amounted  practically  to  a  substitute  measure.  It 
authorised  the  President  to  purchase  the  rights  and  property 
of  the  Panama  company  for  not  more  than  |40,000,000,  to 
secure  by  treaty  with  Colombia  perpetual  control  of  the 
strip  of  land,  not  less  than  six  miles  wide,  through  which 
the  canal  was  to  run ;  and  then  to  proceed  with  the  work  of 
constructing  the  canal.     If,  however,  he  was  unable  in  a 


DAKIEN  RESURKECTED  127 

reasonable  time  to  make  the  necessary  bargain  with  Colom- 
bia and  with  the  Panama  Canal  Company,  then  he  was  to 
make  terms  with  Nicaragua  and  construct  the  canal  there. 

A  long  and  earnest  debate  followed,  during  which  all  the 
old  arguments  for  and  against  each  of  the  routes  were  re- 
hearsed, while  the  lobbyists  of  both  sides  were  indefatigable 
in  their  efforts  to  influence  Senatorial  votes.  In  addition, 
the  old  Darien  route  was  once  more  brought  forward.  It 
was  said  that  a  site  had  been  discovered  at  which  a  sea-level 
canal  could  be  constructed  with  only  twenty-nine  and  a  half 
miles  of  cutting,  or  nearly  twenty  miles  less  than  at  Pan- 
ama, and  with  no  curves,  dams,  or  locks.  There  would,  it 
was  true,  have  to  be  a  tunnel  nearly  five  miles  long  through 
the  mountains,  but  the  scheme  of  making  a  rock  tunnel  five 
miles  long  and  three  hundred  feet  in  diameter,  these  ardent 
propagandists  affected  to  regard  as  an  inconsiderable  trifle, 
nor  did  they  fear  the  possible  results  of  an  earthquake  shock 
upon  such  a  passageway.  It  was  shrewdly  observed,  how- 
ever, that  the  most  vehement  advocates  of  this  chimerical 
project  were  the  very  men  who  had  been  most  opposed  to  the 
construction  of  any  canal  at  all,  to  wit,  the  agents  of  certain 
transcontinental  railroad  lines.  The  game  was  quite  obvi- 
ous; too  much  so  to  delude  any  Senator  or  Representative 
who  did  not  desire,  for  a  consideration,  to  be  deluded.  It 
was,  first,  to  oppose  any  canal  at  all ;  and  then,  failing  that, 
to  set  the  Government  off  on  a  wild-goose  chase  after  some 
entirely  impossible  though  at  first  sight  plausible  route.  In 
this  way,  if  the  canal  was  not  ultimately  defeated,  it  would 
be  greatly  delayed,  and  every  year's  delay  meant  a  year's 
profit  to  the  railroad  monopoly.  It  was  actually  proposed 
that  if  the  Government  would  guarantee  the  bonds,  a  private 
corporation  would  supply  the  capital  and  do  the  whole 
work  at  Darien  in  four  years  at  a  cost  of  $100,000,000.  This 
precious  lure  was,  however,  disregarded  or  relegated  to  the 
limbo  of  fantastic  follies. 

There  was  a  long  fight  over  the  so-called  Spooner  bill  in 
the  Senate,  and  there  were  many  rumors  of  "abhorrent  and 


128  NICARAGUA  OR  PANAMA? 

forbidden  forces"  employed  by  lobbyists  for  and  against  it, 
most  of  which  probably  had  their  origin  in  nothing  more 
than  imagination  or  desire.  The  result  was,  however,  gen- 
erally regarded  as  doubtful  until  the  vote  was  actually 
taken.  That  incident  occurred  on  June  19,  1902,  when  the 
measure  was  adopted  by  the  overwhelming  vote  of  sixty- 
seven  to  six.  It  was  supposed  by  many  that  the  House  of 
Representatives  would  offer  strenuous  objection  to  this  com- 
plete transformation  of  its  own  measure,  but  such  proved 
not  to  be  the  case.  The  very  same  House  which  only  a  few 
months  before  had  voted  overwhelmingly  in  favour  of  Nica- 
ragua, and  had  strongly  voted  against  giving  the  President 
any  option  in  the  matter,  now,  on  June  26,  by  a  still  more 
overwhelming  vote — 259  to  8 — accepted  the  Spooner  amend- 
ment, giving  the  President  a  certain  discretion  in  the  matter 
but  directing  him  to  make  his  first  choice  at  Panama ! 

The  measure  thus  passed  by  Congress  was  signed  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  on  June  28,  and  thus  became  law — the  law 
under  which  the  world's  desire  is  now  being  fulfilled  at 
Panama.  (See  Appendix  IV.)  It  was  the  ending  of  a  con- 
troversy which  had  lasted  for  nearly  four  hundred  years. 
It  was,  in  fact,  the  death  warrant  of  the  Nicaragua  project, 
which  had  for  so  long  and  at  so  great  expense  been  kept 
before  American  attention.  It  is  true,  the  advocates  of 
Nicaragua  for  a  time  regarded  it,  or  affected  to  regard  it,  as 
a  victory  for  them,  on  the  ground  that  the  President  would 
find  it  impossible  to  make  satisfactory  terms  with  Colombia 
within  the  "reasonable  time"  prescribed  by  Congress,  and 
would,  therefore,  eventually  turn  to  the  Nicaragua  route; 
and  indeed,  this  expectation  came  very  near  to  fulfilment. 
The  moment  the  Spooner  bill  became  law,  the  tactics  of  the 
Nicaraguans,  and  of  the  enemies  of  any  canal,  were  changed, 
and  their  energies  were  directed  toward  the  creation  of 
obstacles  to  a  satisfactory  agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  Colombia.  There  is  reason  to  believe,  too,  that 
some  alien  influences  were  exerted  to  the  same  end.  In  a 
measure   these   were   successful.     The   United   States   and 


A  SUDDEN  CHANGE  129 

Colombia  did  not  reach  a  satisfactory  agreement.  But,  by  a 
dramatic  turn  of  events,  which,  however,  was  surprising  to 
none  but  those  who  were  wilfully  or  needlessly  blind,  the 
United  States  was  enabled,  with  little  delay,  to  attain  its 
end  without  such  an  agreement,  and  on  terms  actually  more 
advantageous  to  it  than  had  been  expected. 


CHAPTER  IX 
NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

A  LAW  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  was  at  last  enacted 
and  in  force.  It  was  next  necessary,  in  fulfilment  of  the 
provisions  of  that  law,  to  effect  a  valid  purchase  of  the 
French  canal  company's  rights  and  property,  and  to  make 
a  suitable  treaty  with  Colombia.  The  first  thing  to  be  con- 
sidered was  whether  the  laws  of  France,  under  which  the 
canal  company  was  incorporated,  would  permit  such  a  sale. 
The  officers  of  the  company,  and  the  company's  legal  counsel 
in  this  country,  were  confident  that  they  would.  But  some 
further  assurance  was  necessary  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
United  States  Government,  and  this  the  Attorney-General 
of  the  United  States,  Philander  C.  Knox,  undertook  to 
secure.  After  a  thorough  investigation  in  France,  he  gave 
his  opinion,  on  October  25,  1902,  that  the  French  laws  would 
permit  the  sale,  and  that  the  French  company  could  make 
the  sale  and  give  the  United  States  a  valid  and  indisputable 
title  to  the  property  thus  conveyed — at  least,  so  far  as 
France  was  concerned;  Colombia  was  to  be  reckoned  with 
separately. 

This  opinion  was  based  upon  the  revelations  and  results  of 
legal  proceedings  in  Paris.  The  offer  of  the  stockholders  of 
the  company  to  sell  to  the  United  States  had  been  referred 
for  consideration  to  the  Civil  Tribunal  of  the  Seine,  which, 
under  a  special  law  enacted  in  1893,  had  jurisdiction  over 
the  matter,  and  had  been  approved  by  it.  From  that  approv- 
ing decision  a  dissenting  stockholder  had  made  appeal  to 
the  Court  of  Cassation,  the  supreme  tribunal  of  French 
justice,  and  the  latter  instead  of  reversing  had  affirmed  it,  on 
August  5,  1902.    We  need  not  here  review,  even  in  epitome, 

130 


THE  TERMS  PROPOSED  131 

the  intricate  legal  arguments,  pro  and  contra,  which  were  in- 
volved in  the  case.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  after  an 
elaborate  and  painstaking  consideration  of  it  the  highest 
court  in  France  decided  that  the  transfer  could  legally  be 
made ;  that  after  a  detailed  personal  observation  and  inves- 
tigation by  the  Attorney-General,  the  opinion  above  men- 
tioned was  given,  and  that  no  serious  attempt  was  made 
thereafter  to  challenge  the  validity  of  the  transaction. 

The  next  step  was  much  more  difficult  and  more  tedious. 
It  was  necessary  to  secure  from  Colombia  a  treaty  giving  to 
the  United  States  perpetual  control  of  a  strip  of  territory, 
from  sea  to  sea,  and  Colombia  promptly  exhibited  an  incli- 
nation not  to  make  such  a  grant.  It  had  long  been  the 
characteristic  practice  of  both  Colombia  and  Nicaragua 
to  play  a  somewhat  capricious  part.  Each  was  ready 
to  offer  all  sorts  of  concessions  in  order  to  entice  canal 
projectors  to  it  and  away  from  its  rival,  but  the  moment  it 
felt  pretty  sure  its  route  was  to  be  chosen  it  would  increase 
its  demands  to  an  extortionate  degree.  So  it  was  with 
Colombia  in  1902-3.  During  the  long  duel  with  Nicaragua, 
Colombia  had  been  profuse  in  its  invitations  to  the  United 
States  to  go  thither  and  build  a  canal.  Now  that  the  duel 
was  practically  ended  in  its  favour,  it  began  to  demand 
terms  which  it  should  have  known  the  United  States  would 
not  and  could  not  grant. 

The  terms  proposed  by  the  United  States  and  accepted  by 
Colombia  in  a  preliminary  protocol  were  in  brief  as  fol- 
lows :  That  Colombia  should  approve  the  sale  of  the  French 
company's  rights  and  property  to  the  United  States;  that 
the  United  States  should  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  to 
construct,  operate,  and  control  the  canal ;  that  a  Canal  Zone 
five  kilometers  (3.105  miles)  wide  should  be  established,  to 
be  under  Colombian  sovereignty  but  under  United  States 
administration,  its  neutrality  to  be  guaranteed  by  the 
United  States,  and  the  sanitary  and  police  services  to  be 
jointly  maintained  by  the  two  governments;  that  the 
United  States  should  construct  all  necessary  ports,  light- 


132  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

houses,  hospitals,  etc.,  the  ports  to  be  free  and  the  canal 
tolls  to  be  equal  to  all  nations;  that  damages  arising  from 
the  construction  of  the  canal  should  be  appraised  by  a  joint 
commission  and  be  paid  by  the  United  States;  that  no  taxes 
should  be  levied  upon  the  canal  property;  that  Colombia 
should  not  cede  nor  lease  to  any  foreign  power  any  lands  or 
islands  adjacent  to  the  canal ;  that  the  canal  should  forever 
be  neutral;  that  Colombia  should  provide  the  forces  neces- 
sary for  the  policing  and  protection  of  the  canal,  but  if  she 
were  unable  to  do  so,  she  might  call  upon  the  United  States 
for  aid;  that  the  United  States  should  begin  work  upon  the 
canal  within  two  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
and  should  complete  it  within  twenty-four  years;  and  that 
the  United  States  should  pay  to  Colombia  a  bonus  of 
17,000,000  in  cash  and  after  fourteen  years  a  reasonable 
annuity,  the  amount  of  which,  it  was  at  first  proposed, 
should  be  fixed  by  mutual  agreement  or  by  arbitration,  but 
which  was  afterward  set  at  |250,000. 

These  terms  were  widely  regarded  in  the  United  States 
as  too  liberal  to  Colombia,  and  as  not  sufficiently  safeguard- 
ing the  vast  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  canal.  It 
was  thought  that  the  Canal  Zone  should  be  wider,  if  indeed 
it  did  not  include  the  whole  State  or  Department  of  Panama, 
and  that  it  should  become  outright  the  property  of  the 
United  States.  This  latter  idea  was  not  perhaps  held  by  a 
majority  of  the  American  people,  but  the  feeling  was  prac- 
tically universal  that  the  terms  proposed  set  forth  the  maxi- 
mum of  what  the  United  States  could  afford  to  offer  Colom- 
bia, and  the  minimum  of  what  it  could  afford  to  accept  in 
return.  Colombia,  however,  affected  to  regard  them  as 
entirely  too  illiberal  toward  her,  and  on  November  25,  1902, 
the  Colombian  Minister,  Senor  Jose  V.  Concha,  informed  Sec- 
retary Hay  that  he  could  not  accept  them  in  behalf  of  his 
government.  Whether  in  assuming  that  attitude  he  was 
acting  upon  his  own  judgment  and  initiative,  or  in  response 
to  instructions  from  Bogota,  did  not  appear.  Subsequent 
revelations,  however,  gave  much  colour  to  the  belief  that  he 


HAKD  TIMES  AT  BOGOTA  133 

was  in  entire  accord  with  his  home  government,  and  that 
both  were  intent  upon  either  the  extortion  of  extreme  terms 
from  the  United  States  or  the  defeat  of  the  American  proj- 
ect altogether  in  favour  of  some  other  interest. 

The  Colombian  Republic  was  at  that  time  in  a  bad  way. 
Its  government  was  of  revolutionary  origin  and  of  disputed 
validity.  Dr.  Manuel  Sanclemente,  elected  President  on 
July  4,  1898,  had  been  violently  deposed  and  thrown  into 
prison  by  a  coup-d^etat  on  July  31,  1900,  and  had  been  suc- 
ceeded as  "Acting  President"  by  the  Vice-President,  Dr. 
Jos6  Manuel  Marroquin,  a  man  of  fine  literary  and  scien- 
tific attainments,  but  not  gifted  with  the  genius  of  govern- 
ment, who  had  established  a  dictatorship  at  once  absolute 
and  ineflScient.  The  treasury  was  depleted,  the  silver  peso 
was  worth  only  38  1-2  cents  instead  of  50  cents,  and  the 
paper  currency,  of  which  350,000,000  pesos  were  in  circula- 
tion, was  so  debased  that  gold  was  at  2,500  per  cent,  pre- 
mium. In  1901-2  revenues  were  less  than  29,000,000  pesos, 
while  expenses,  swelled  by  the  chronic  state  of  war,  were 
more  than  40,000,000  pesos.  The  public  debt,  both  domestic 
and  foreign,  was  large  and  was  increasing  rapidly,  and 
could  not  be  stayed  by  the  activity  of  the  printing  presses, 
which  were  producing  reams  of  depreciated  paper  currency. 

In  such  circumstances,  what  must  have  been  the  covetous- 
ness  with  which  the  politicians  of  Bogota  regarded  the  |40,- 
000,000  which  the  United  States  proposed  to  pay  in  cash  to 
the  French  Canal  Company  for  its  concession  and  unfinished 
works!  It  occurred  to  them  that  the  canal  was  on  Colom- 
bian soil,  that  the  concession  for  its  construction  had  been 
granted  by  the  Colombian  Government,  that  the  whole  enter- 
prise thus  naturally  belonged  to  Colombia,  and  that,  there- 
fore, Colombia  ought  to  have  that  money,  or  at  least  a  large 
share  of  it.  Why,  indeed,  should  not  Colombia  have  it  all? 
Nothing  could  be  simpler.  The  French  company's  conces- 
sion had  only  until  October,  1910,  to  run.  Indeed,  it  had  not 
so  long,  but  only  until  October,  1904,  for  the  extension  of  it 
beyond  the  latter  date,  though  made  by  the  Colombian 


134  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

President,  had  not  been  ratified  by  the  Colombian  Congress. 
If  the  Congress  should  refuse  to  ratify  it,  the  concession 
would  lapse  in  October,  1904,  unless  the  canal  were  finished 
by  that  time.  It  was,  of  course,  a  physical  impossibility  for 
the  company  to  finish  the  canal  by  that  time,  and  so  the 
concession  would  lapse,  the  franchise  would  be  forfeited,  and 
all  the  rights  and  property  of  the  company  would  revert  to 
the  Colombian  Government,  which  could  then  sell  to  the 
United  States  on  its  own  terms  and  for  its  own  profit,  and 
the  usufruct  would  go  into  the  depleted  Colombian  treasury, 
to  which  it  would  be  a  veritable  godsend.  All  that  Colombia 
had  to  do,  therefore,  was  to  delay  action  for  a  couple  of 
years,  to  "sit  tight,"  and  that  |40,000,000  would  drop  into 
its  hands. 

Nor  was  that  potent  consideration  the  only  force  at  work. 
The  German  "colonial  party"  had  for  some  time  been  deeply 
interested  in  Colombian  affairs.  This  was  natural,  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  One  was,  that  the  Colombian  foreign 
debt  was  largely  held  in  Germany.  Another  was,  that  Ger- 
man commercial  interests  in  Colombia  were  large  and  were 
steadily  growing.  A  third  was,  that  the  Isthmian  canal 
might  be  of  practical  use  if  not  a  necessity  to  Germany  as 
an  alternative  route  to  her  insular  colonies  in  the  Pacific 
and  to  the  western  countries  of  South  America,  with  which 
she  was  developing  a  considerable  commerce.  Still  another 
was,  that  it  seemed  eminently  desirable  for  Germany  to 
obtain,  if  possible,  proprietary  or  at  least  leasehold  rights 
in  some  lands  somewhere  about  the  Caribbean  Sea.  With 
the  opening  of  the  canal,  and  with  the  development  of  the 
West  Indies  and  Central  and  South  America,  the  Caribbean 
would  become  a  centre  of  the  world's  commerce,  and  Ger- 
many, aspiring  to  commercial  supremacy,  could  ill  afford 
to  forego  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  her  rivals.  The  United 
States  was,  of  course,  securely  established  upon  the  borders 
of  the  Caribbean.  So  was  Great  Britain,  on  mainland  and 
on  islands.  So  was  France.  So,  too,  was  Holland.  Even 
Denmark  possessed  a  group  of  islands  in  those  waters.    It 


GEKMAN  INTEEESTS  135 

seemed  intolerable,  to  the  "forward"  party  in  Germany,  that 
the  German  empire  alone  should  be  denied  such  an  advan- 
tage. If  it  could  not  have  an  extensive  colony,  it  certainly 
should  have  a  naval  and  coaling  station. 

Some  aggressive  German  statesmen  of  the  "colonial" 
school  had  for  some  time  fixed  their  eyes  on  the  Danish  West 
Indies,  the  Dutch  West  Indies,  and  various  Venezuelan  and 
Colombian  islands,  as  promising  a  convenient  and  commo- 
dious addition  to  German  possessions.  Now  it  occurred  to 
them  that  control  of,  or  even  a  share  in  the  control  of,  an 
Isthmian  canal  would  be  a  supremely  felicitous  realisation 
of  their  ambitions.  True,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  might  be 
regarded  by  some  as  an  obstacle.  But,  they  argued,  America 
had  already  tolerated  the  French  enterprise  for  twenty 
years,  and  apparently  would  have  been  willing  for  the 
French  company  to  go  on  and  finish  the  canal.  Would  not 
that  complaisant  attitude  of  the  United  States  Government 
serve  as  an  estoppel  against  any  American  protests  against 
continuation  of  the  work  under  German  auspices?  If 
America  permitted  the  French  to  begin  the  canal,  how  could 
it  logically  forbid  the  Germans  to  complete  it?  The  United 
States  had  not  only  acquiesced  in  the  construction,  or 
attempted  construction,  of  the  canal  by  the  French  com- 
pany, but  it  had  actually  recognised  the  validity  of  the 
French  company's  title  by  negotiating  for  the  purchase  of 
it.  Logically,  then,  it  would  have  to  acquiesce  in  the  com- 
pletion of  the  canal  by  a  German  company,  and  would  have 
to  concede  the  validity  of  the  sale  of  the  unfinished  work 
to  such  a  company.  If,  then,  the  French  company  could  be 
prevented  from  selling  to  the  United  States,  and  persuaded 
to  sell  to  a  German  company  instead,  the  German  scheme 
would  be  successful  and  the  German  position  would  be 
impregnable.  Or  if  the  whole  matter  could  be  delayed  until 
the  French's  company's  franchise  had  been  forfeited  to 
Colombia,  and  then  Colombia  should  sell  to  a  German  com- 
pany instead  of  to  the  United  States,  the  same  end  would  be 
gained. 


136  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

There  was  in  this  ingenious  line  of  argument,  however,  one 
fatal  flaw,  or  a  flaw  that  would  surely  have  proved  fatal  had 
the  matter  ever  been  put  to  the  test.  The  United  States 
could  and  doubtless  would  have  objected,  consistently  and 
logically,  to  the  transfer  of  the  canal  from  a  French  to  a 
German  company,  because  it  had  long  before  laid  down  and 
maintained  the  principle  that  while  European  countries 
might  possess  property  in  the  Americas,  they  could  not 
transfer  it  from  one  to  another,  but  upon  relinquishing  it 
must  leave  it  independent  or  else  surrender  it  to  the  United 
States  or  some  other  American  power.  It  was  on  that 
ground  that  the  United  States  had  protested  against  any 
transfer  of  Cuba  from  the  ownership  of  Spain  to  that  of  any 
other  European  power,  and  had  announced  its  readiness  to 
go  to  war,  if  necessary,  to  make  that  protest  effective.  On 
that  principle  the  United  States  could  and  would  have  made 
effective  objection  to  the  transfer  of  the  canal  from  French 
to  any  other  European  ownership.  Happily,  however,  it 
was  not  necessary  to  take  that  stand.  Diplomacy  guards 
some  of  its  secrets  well,  and  it  is  not  now  possible  to  say 
with  confidence  to  what  extent,  or  indeed  if  to  any  extent  at 
all,  the  German  Government  or  any  of  its  agents  was  re- 
sponsible for  or  even  cognisant  of  these  designs  and  such 
efforts  as  were  made  for  their  fulfilment.  It  was  quite 
notorious,  however,  that  during  much  of  the  protracted 
period  of  negotiations  between  the  United  States -and  Colom- 
bia, and  between  these  countries  and  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company,  German  agents,  official  or  unofficial,  were  par- 
ticularly busy  at  Bogota  and  also  in  Paris,  and  seemed  to  be 
exceptionally  influential  with  the  Colombian  Government 
and  to  enjoy  its  confidence  and  its  favour  to  a  remarkable 
degree.  It  was  also  observed  that  Senor  Concha,  the  Colom- 
bian Minister  to  the  United  States,  in  both  Washington  and 
New  York,  was  in  close  and  frequent  association  with  other 
German  agents  and  apparently  much  under  their  influence. 
All  this  is  to  be  recalled  without  offence,  because  it  was,  of 
course,  quite  legitimate  for  Germany  to  seek  commercial, 


THE  KEYOLT  OF  1902  137 

industrial,  and  political  advantages  in  Colombia  to  whatever 
extent  she  could  without  traversing  or  infringing  upon  the 
rights  of  other  nations.  Moreover,  given  the  scene  of  an 
enterprise  which  had  been  for  four  centuries  the  world's 
desire,  and  which  was  yearly  growing  of  more  and  more 
importance  to  all  commercial  powers,  and  given  the  owner- 
ship and  nominal  control  of  that  region  by  a  State  at  once 
weak,  disordered,  and  peculiarly  susceptible  to  either  politi- 
cal or  pecuniary  considerations,  and  we  have  an  ideal  situa- 
tion for  the  exercise  of  diplomatic  intrigue. 

The  year  1902  marked,  moreover,  the  culmination  of  the 
latest  of  Colombia's  many  revolutionary  movements.  This 
widespread  insurrection  of  the  Liberal  party  against  the 
oppressive  Conservative  and  Clerical  government  had  been 
maintained  with  varying  success  for  several  years,  and 
early  in  1902  it  began  to  gather  chiefly  on  and  about  the 
Isthmus.  A  new  Governor  of  Panama — F.  Mutis  Duran — 
was  appointed  by  the  Bogotd  Government  in  February.  A 
few  weeks  later  the  danger  of  obstruction  of  commerce  and 
travel  over  the  Isthmus  became  so  marked  that  the  American 
Government  deemed  it  essential  to  send  a  naval  force  thither 
to  protect  the  rights  and  interests  of  this  country,  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  1846.  On  March  8  an 
American  vessel  reached  Colon  and  thereafter  commanded 
that  city  with  its  guns,  thus  exercising  a  most  salutary 
influence  over  the  belligerents.  Six  months  later  the  situa- 
tion grew  more  serious  at  the  southern  side  of  the  Isthmus, 
and  accordingly  on  September  12  another  American  vessel 
entered  the  harbour  of  Panama,  and  on  September  19  Ameri- 
can marines  were  landed.  This  action  was  taken  under  an 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Moody,  which  ran  in 
part  as  follows : 

"The  United  States  guarantees  perfect  neutrality  of  Isth- 
mus, and  that  a  free  transit  from  sea  to  sea  be  not  inter- 
rupted or  embarrassed.  .  .  .  Any  transportation  of  troops 
which  might  contravene  provisions  of  treaty  should  not  be 
sanctioned  by  you;  nor  should  use  of  road  be  permitted 


138  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

which  might  convert  the  line  of  transit  into  a  theatre  of 
hostility." 

This  order,  sent  on  September  12,  was  reasonable  and  logi- 
cal, and  intended  simply  to  maintain  our  fixed  policy  and 
to  fulfil  our  treaty  rights  and  obligations.  Against  it  the 
Governor  of  Panama  protested,  but  without  effect.  The 
American  authorities  persisted  in  their  intervention,  in 
which  they  were  clearly  within  their  rights  under  the  treaty. 
Indeed  they  were  doing  no  more  than  they  had  done  several 
times  before  with  Colombian  approval. 

Nor  was  the  American  intervention  confined  to  a  mere 
show  of  force.  Actual  force  was  exercised  to  prevent  either 
of  the  belligerents  from  interfering  with  traffic  over  the  rail- 
way, or  from  using  the  railway  as  an  engine  of  war.  Colom- 
bian troops  were  disarmed  on  September  22,  and  three  days 
later  insurgent  troops  were  prevented  from  using  the  rail- 
road and  were  actually  compelled  to  leave  a  train  which 
they  had  seized  and  entered.  There  was,  of  course,  no  inter- 
ference by  Americans  excepting  to  keep  the  railroad  neutral 
and  in  peaceful  operation.  The  principle  was  enunciated  and 
maintained  that  no  combatants  under  arms  should  be  trans- 
ported on  the  railroad,  no  matter  to  which  party  they  be- 
longed. That  was  because  to  permit  such  transportation 
would  be  to  make  the  railroad  an  adjunct  to  that  side  in  the 
war,  and  to  subject  it  to  attack  by  the  other  party.  If  the 
Colombian  troops  used  the  road,  the  insurgents  would 
attack  it,  and  the  United  States  would  either  have  to  permit 
such  attack,  which  might  suspend  the  traffic  on  the  road 
which  this  country  was  bound  under  the  treaty  to  keep  free 
and  open,  or  to  prevent  it  with  force,  which  would  make  this 
country  the  ally  of  Colombia  against  the  insurgents.  If  the 
insurgents  were  permitted  to  use  it,  the  case  would  be, 
mutatis  mutandis^  precisely  the  same.  The  only  logical  and 
safe  course  was,  then,  that  which  was  taken,  to  forbid  the 
military  use  of  the  road  by  either  party.  This  vigorous 
American  policy  had  the  desired  effect.    The  road  was  kept 


HEERAN  SUCCEEDS  CONCHA        139 

open  and  undisturbed,  and  the  belligerents,  disappointed 
and  discouraged  in  their  efforts  to  involve  the  road,  finally 
retired  from  that  region,  so  that  by  November  19  it  was 
deemed  prudent  to  withdraw  the  United  States  forces. 

Meantime,  of  course,  diplomatic  negotiations,  both  open 
and  secret,  had  been  going  on.  The  first  part  of  them  came 
to  an  end  at  the  beginning  of  December,  1902.  At  that  time 
Senor  Concha  suddenly  ceased  to  be  the  Colombian  Minister 
to  the  United  States,  and  was  succeeded,  as  Charge  d'- 
Affaires,  by  Dr.  Tomas  Herran.  He  denied  the  reports  that 
he  had  been  removed  from  his  place  by  the  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment, insisting  that  he  had  voluntarily  resigned,  and 
that,  indeed,  his  resignation  had  for  some  months  been  in 
the  hands  of  the  government,  he  having  presented  it  as  a 
protest  against  the  intervention  of  United  States  troops  dur- 
ing the  disturbances  on  the  Isthmus.  He  added  that  the 
proposals  of  the  United  States  for  the  canal  were  entirely 
unacceptable  to  him  and  to  his  government,  on  financial 
grounds,  and  that  it  would  be  far  more  profitable  to  Colom- 
bia to  have  matters  remain  as  they  were,  than  to  make  the 
proposed  treaty,  even  with  the  payment  of  a  bonus  of  $10,- 
000,000  instead  of  the  |7,000,000  first  proposed— the  United 
States  having,  during  the  negotiations,  agreed  to  such 
increase  of  the  bonus.  He  also  emphasised  the  determina- 
tion of  Colombia  not  to  surrender  to  any  extent  her  sover- 
eignty or  administrative  control  of  the  Isthmus,  and  her 
irreversible  opposition  to  the  creation  of  a  canal  zone  under 
American  administration.  Having  thus  delivered  himself, 
from  his  hotel  in  New  York,  Seiior  Concha  departed  for 
Europe,  in  the  company  of  a  prominent  German  with  whom 
his  association  had  long  been  intimate. 

This  incident  gave  new  hope  to  the  advocates  of  the  canal 
enterprise.  It  was  felt  that  Senor  Concha's  departure  from 
the  scene  removed  a  hostile  influence,  and  that  Dr.  Herran's 
succession  to  him  was  of  good  omen.  Dr.  Herran  was  known 
to  be  favourably  disposed  toward  the  canal.  He  was  at  once 
a  most  loyal  and  eflScient  servant  of  Colombia,  and  a  sincere 


140  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

friend  of  the  United  States.  His  capacity  and  integrity 
were  of  the  highest  order,  and  all  his  motives  were  above 
suspicion.  He  was  earnestly  desirous  of  effecting  an 
arrangement  whereby  the  United  States  should  become  the 
proprietor  and  builder  of  the  canal,  and  he  entered  into 
negotiations  with  Secretary  Hay,  early  in  December,  1902, 
with  that  end  in  view.  He  laboured  under  some  disadvan- 
tage, at  first,  in  being  not  a  full  Minister  but  merely  Charge 
d' Affaires,  and  also  in  being  much  hampered  by  the  hesi- 
tancy and  unreasonableness  of  the  Bogota  Government.  His 
patience  and  tact  triumphed  in  the  end,  however,  and  a 
convention,  known  as  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  was  signed  on 
January  22,  1903. 

Dr.  Herran  had  delayed  signing  it  much  longer  than  he 
personally  thought  fit,  under  the  constraint  of  the  urgings 
of  the  Bogota.  Government,  which  bade  him  to  hold  out  with 
all  possible  tenacity  for  a  more  ample  subsidy  from  the 
United  States.  Indeed,  at  the  end  Secretary  Hay  was  prac- 
tically compelled  to  deliver  to  him  an  ultimatum,  telling  him 
that  if  the  treaty  were  not  signed  by  a  certain  date,  the 
United  States  would  abandon  Panama  altogether  and  build 
a  canal  at  Nicaragua.  This  menace,  coupled  with  a  re- 
minder that  the  United  States  might  so  construe  and  enforce 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Treaty  of  1846  as  to  prevent 
the  construction  of  a  canal  at  Panama  by  any  other  power 
or  foreign  corporation,  brought  the  Bogotd  Government  to 
terms,  and  it  gave  Dr.  Herran  permission  to  sign  the  treaty. 
Nor  was  this  reminder  vain,  for  under  the  Treaty  of  1846 
the  United  States  indisputably  had  the  exclusive  right  of 
control  over  any  transportation  route,  whether  railroad  or 
canal,  that  might  at  any  time  be  established  across  that 
Isthmus. 

Under  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  Colombia  was  to  authorise 
the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  to  sell  and  transfer  to  the 
United  States  all  its  rights,  privileges,  concessions,  and  prop- 
erties, including  the  Panama  Railroad.  The  United  States 
was  to  have  perpetual  administrative  control,  for  canal  pur- 


THE  HAY-HERRAN  TREATY  141 

poses,  of  a  strip  of  land  30  miles  wide,  extending  across  the 
Isthmus,  the  sovereignty  of  which  was  to  remain  vested  in 
Colombia;  police  powers  were,  however,  to  be  exercised  by 
the  United  States.  There  were  to  be  three  sets  of  courts: 
One,  Colombian,  with  jurisdiction  over  causes  between 
Colombians  and  Colombians,  or  between  Colombians  and 
foreigners  other  than  citizens  of  the  United  States ;  a  second, 
American,  with  jurisdiction  in  cases  between  Americans,  or 
between  Americans  and  foreigners  other  than  Colombians; 
and  a  third,  jointly  American  and  Colombian,  with  juris- 
diction in  cases  between  Americans  and  Colombians,  and  in 
general  civil,  criminal,  and  admiralty  matters. 

In  return  for  the  concession  of  territory  and  the  canal 
franchise,  the  United  States  was  to  pay  Colombia  a  cash 
bonus  of  110,000,000  immediately,  and  $100,000  yearly,  be- 
ginning nine  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  These 
terms  were  decidedly  more  liberal  to  Colombia  than  those 
prescribed  in  the  original  protocol  under  which  the  negotia- 
tions were  begun.  Let  us  compare  them.  Under  the  protocol 
Colombia  was  to  get  a  bonus  of  |7,000,000  and  an  annuity  of 
1250,000  beginning  after  fourteen  years.  Under  the  treaty 
she  was  to  have  a  bonus  of  |10,000,000  and  an  annuity  of 
1100,000  beginning  after  nine  years.  If  she  had  invested  the 
bonus,  say  at  five  per  cent.,  she  would  have  had  under  the 
protocol  an  income  of  |350,000  a  year  for  fourteen  years, 
and  $600,000  a  year  thereafter,  while  under  the  treaty  she 
would  have  had  |500,000  a  year  for  nine  years  and  $600,000 
a  year  thereafter.  Under  the  protocol  she  would  have  got 
in  fourteen  years  an  accumulated  income  of  $4,900,000, 
while  under  the  treaty  she  would  have  got  in  the  same  time 
$7,500,000,  a  difference  of  $2,600,000  in  her  favour  under 
the  treaty.  These  points  are  to  be  borne  in  mind,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  while  Colombia  assented  to  the  original  proto- 
col, as  a  fair  basis  of  negotiation,  she  objected  to  the  treaty 
as  not  sufficiently  generous  to  her  in  its  financial  provisions. 

The  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  United  States  Senate  on 
March  17,1903,  and  it  was  assumed  that  the  Colombian  Con- 


142  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

gress  would  also  ratify  it  at  an  early  date.  The  Acting 
President — and  actual  Dictator — of  Colombia  was  under- 
stood to  be  favourable  to  it,  but  he  either  would  not  or  could 
not  exert  any  influence  in  behalf  of  the  treaty.  In  view  of 
his  dictatorial  conduct  in  other  matters,  and  of  the  various 
circumstances  already  described,  it  seems  not  unjust  to 
suspect  that  he  was  not  unwilling  to  witness  the  failure  of 
the  convention  which  had  been  made  under  the  direction  of 
his  administration.  Such  failure  would,  he  might  have  reck- 
oned, promote  Colombian  interests,  for  it  would  necessitate 
the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty,  and  by  the  time  that  was 
done  the  canal  concession  would  lapse  and  Colombia  would 
be  able  to  sell  the  franchise  and  the  unfinished  work  to  the 
United  States,  and  thus  secure  the  coveted  |40,000,000  for 
itself. 

The  animus  and  aim  of  the  Bogota  Government  were, 
moreover,  shown  by  a  significant  incident.  During  the  ne- 
gotiations over  the  Hay-Herran  treaty,  and  before  the  sign- 
ing of  that  document.  President  Marroquin  ordered  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  to  appoint  a  special  agent, 
who  should  come  to  Bogotd  when  Congress  assembled,  and 
who  should  have  full  power  to  transact  any  business  which 
might  come  up  between  the  company  and  the  government. 
It  was  explained  that  the  Colombian  Government  did  not 
mean  to  oppose  the  transfer  of  the  company's  rights  and 
property  to  the  United  States,  but  that  the  government 
would  require  of  the  company  a  "sum  of  money"  in  pay- 
ment for  permission  to  make  the  transfer,  and  would  also 
"cancel  every  liability  and  obligation"  which  it  had  assumed 
in  the  original  canal  concession.  This  obviously  meant  that 
the  Colombian  Government  would  compel  the  company  to 
surrender  to  it  a  part  if  not  the  whole  of  the  |40,000,000 
paid  by  the  United  States,  and  then  would  practically  abro- 
gate the  canal  concession  for  which  the  United  States  had 
paid  that  sum.  Never  was  there  a  more  barefaced  proposal 
to  "eat  a  cake  and  have  it,  too" — or  to  get  a  purchase  price 
without  delivering  the  goods. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  EXTOKTION  143 

Later  it  came  out  that  the  government  intended  to  exact 
one-fourth  of  the  $40,000,000  from  the  company.  The  agent 
of  the  canal  company  at  Bogotd,  who  had  been  appointed, 
but  not  with  such  power  as  President  Marroquin  had 
ordered,  reported  to  the  American  Minister  there,  Mr. 
Beaupre,  on  June  20,  that  the  Colombian  Government  had 
officially  informed  him  that  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  would 
be  ratified,  if  the  company  would  pay  the  government  |10,- 
000,000 — the  intimation  being,  of  course,  that  unless  that 
sum  was  paid,  the  treaty  would  not  be  ratified.  This  was 
after  the  Congress  which  was  to  pass  upon  the  treaty  had 
been  elected ;  indeed,  on  the  very  day  on  which  it  assembled. 
The  government  must  have  known,  when  it  made  that  propo- 
sition, therefore,  what  the  Congress  would  do,  and  must 
have  felt  sure  of  its  ability  to  secure  whatever  action  it 
desired  from  the  Congress.  In  other  words,  the  Congress 
would  do  whatever  President  Marroquin  wanted  it  to  do, 
and  if  the  treaty  failed  of  ratification,  it  would  be  because 
he  was  willing  or  desirous  that  it  should  fail. 

A  new  Congress,  which  should  act  upon  the  treaty,  was 
nominated  and  elected  in  Colombia  after  the  treaty  had  been 
made  and  its  terms  were  known.  That  body  was,  after  the 
fashion  of  Colombian  Congresses  ever  since  the  revolution  of 
President  Nunez,  practically  selected  through  government 
dictation.  Had  President  Marroquin  so  desired,  he  could 
have  secured  a  Congress  which  would  have  ratified  the 
treaty.  Instead,  he  dictated  the  election  of  one  that 
would  reject  it.  Even  in  advance  of  its  election  it  was 
openly  announced  that  the  Congress  would  be  hostile  to  the 
treaty.  In  some  cases,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  the  govern- 
ment dictated  the  election  of  men  conspicuously  hostile  to 
the  treaty,  if  not  to  the  whole  canal  scheme. 

These  facts  were  notorious,  not  only  at  Bogotd  and  Pan- 
ama but  in  the  United  States,  and  the  knowledge  of  them 
inspired  the  Washington  Government  to  instruct  its  repre- 
sentatives in  Colombia  to  warn  the  Colombian  Government 
frankly  of  the  sentiment  of  this  country  in  the  matter.    Mr. 


144  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

Beaupre  communicated  to  the  Colombian  Foreign  Minister 
the  substance  of  a  despatch  from  Secretary  Hay,  which  ran 
as  follows : 


"The  Colombian  Government  apparently  does  not  appre- 
ciate the  gravity  of  the  situation.  The  canal  negotiations 
were  initiated  by  Colombia,  and  were  energetically  pressed 
upon  this  Government  for  several  years.  The  propositions 
presented  by  Colombia  with  slight  modifications  were  finally 
accepted  by  us.  In  virtue  of  this  agreement,  our  Congress 
reversed  its  previous  judgment  and  decided  upon  the  Pan- 
ama route.  If  Colombia  should  now  reject  the  treaty  or 
unduly  delay  its  ratification,  the  friendly  understanding 
between  the  two  countries  would  be  so  seriously  compro- 
mised that  action  might  be  taken  by  Congress  next  winter 
which  every  friend  of  Colombia  would  regret." 


This  energetic  "reading  of  the  riot  act"  had,  however,  no 
restraining  effect  upon  the  Colombian  zeal  for  delay,  obstruc- 
tion, and  ultimate  loot.  The  body  which  was  to  pass  upon 
the  treaty  was  made  up  in  predetermined  hostility  to  that 
instrument,  or  at  any  rate  in  complete  servility  to  the  will 
of  the  Acting-President.  Thus  constituted,  the  Congress 
met  on  June  20,  1903.  It  quickly  showed  that  its  reputation 
of  hostility  to  the  treaty  was  deserved.  It  was  not  only 
hostile  to  the  treaty,  but  it  was  not  willing  to  give  the  advo- 
cates of  that  measure  a  fair  hearing.  It  made  no  secret  of 
its  bias  and  its  intentions,  and  these  were  generally  notori- 
ous at  Bogotd.  Just  a  week  after  the  Congress  met,  the 
American  Minister  reported  to  the  Washington  Government 
that  the  friends  and  partisans  of  President  Marroquin  were 
in  full  control  of  both  Houses,  and  that  thus,  he  thought, 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  assured,  since  President 
Marroquin  was  practically  pledged  to  it.  That  report  indi- 
cated only  the  unfortunate  extent  to  which  Mr.  Beaupre 
had  been  deceived  as  to  the  real  intentions  of  the  Colombian 
Government.  Other  diplomats  at  Bogota,  who  were  taken 
more  fully  into  the  Acting-President's  confidence,  were  bet- 


ANXIETY  IN  PARIS  145 

ter  informed.  The  German  Minister  is  said  to  have  told  his 
friends  at  an  earlier  date  than  this  that  the  treaty  was 
absolutely  sure  to  be  rejected. 

A  little  later  Mr.  Beaupr^  began  to  see  the  light.  He 
reported  on  July  2  that  a  majority  of  the  Colombian  Senate 
had  expressed  hostility  to  the  treaty,  and  ten  days  later  he 
added  that  the  Colombian  Government  had  informed  him 
that  the  treaty  would  not  be  ratified  unless  the  canal  com- 
pany would  pay  Colombia  $10,000,000  and  the  United  States 
would  pay  |15,000,000  instead  of  |10,000,000  as  its  bonus. 
Thus  were  the  intimations  of  the  notice  served  by  President 
Marroquin  upon  the  canal  company  being  fulfilled.  Secre- 
tary Hay  replied,  of  course,  that  such  conditions  were 
entirely  unacceptable  to  the  United  States. 

Meantime,  great  anxiety  prevailed  in  Paris.  The  French 
company  was  little  short  of  desperate.  It  knew  its  sale  of 
its  properties  to  the  United  States  was  contingent  upon  this 
country's  making  a  satisfactory  treaty  with  the  sovereign 
of  the  Isthmus.  It  assumed,  also,  and  with  reason,  that  if 
it  did  not  effect  such  a  sale  before  October,  1904,  its  fran- 
chise would  lapse  and  all  its  possessions  would  be  forfeited. 
As  time  passed  without  Colombian  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
and  as  the  prospects  of  such  ratification  waned,  the  company 
felt  itself  to  be  confronted  by  ruin.  Naturally,  therefore,  it 
began  to  lend  an  eager  ear  to  all  suggestions  of  escape  from 
its  plight,  even  to  other  offers  of  purchase.  If  it  could  not 
sell  to  the  United  States  for  $40,000,000,  it  would  be  better 
to  sell  for  a  smaller  sum,  to  Germany,  to  Colombia,  or  to 
any  purchaser,  than  to  lose  all.  The  situation  was  much 
intensified  on  August  12,  when  the  Colombian  Senate,  in 
fulfilment  of  Mr.  Beaupr^'s  prognostications,  rejected  the 
treaty.  There  was  still,  of  course,  a  possibility  of  reconsid- 
eration of  that  action,  for  there  was  yet  a  month,  until  Sep- 
tember 12,  before  the  treaty  would  expire  by  time  limitation, 
but  that  possibility  was  little  more  than  infinitesimal. 
Again  and  again  the  United  States  reminded  Colombia 
that   under   the    Spooner   law   the    President    could    wait 


146  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

only  "a  reasonable  time"  for  the  conclusion  of  satisfac- 
tory arrangements  with  Colombia,  and  would  then  be 
bound  to  turn  to  Nicaragua,  but  these  warnings  were 
unheeded. 

At  the  same  time  offers  of  purchase  of  the  canal  by  other 
parties  were  renewed  with  redoubled  zeal,  and  the  pressure 
upon  the  unhappy  company  to  accept  one  of  them  became 
almost  irresistible.  The  American  counsel  for  the  company, 
William  Nelson  Cromwell,  who  had  been  most  active  and 
efficient  in  promoting  negotiations  thus  far,  was  put  almost 
at  his  wits'  ends  to  restrain  his  clients  from  such  action. 
The  Atlantic  cables  were  kept  busy  with  appeals,  arguments, 
remonstrances,  and  what  not,  and  finally  a  hurried  trip 
was  made  to  Paris,  with  successful  results.  The  company 
was  persuaded  to  be  patient  and  to  expect,  through  some 
means,  the  consummation  of  its  bargain  with  the  United 
States.  In  pursuing  this  course  it  was  justified  by  the  event. 
What  certain  prescience  of  the  coming  event  Mr.  Crom- 
well had,  is  matter  for  conjecture.  There  is  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  he  had  no  part  in  the  revolution  which  so  soon 
thereafter  occurred.  Indeed,  he  is  said  on  at  least  one 
occasion  to  have  discouraged  and  opposed  it.  But  he  nat- 
urally shared  the  knowledge  which  many  had,  in  New  York, 
in  Washington,  at  Panama,  and  at  Bogota,  of  the  movement 
then  in  progress  and  of  the  warnings  which  had  already 
been  given  to  the  Colombian  Government  of  the  inevitable 
result  of  its  rejection  of  the  treaty.  So  the  company 
declined  all  other  offers  for  its  property,  and  patiently, 
though  anxiously,  awaited  the  result  of  the  American  nego- 
tiations with  Colombia. 

The  Colombian  Government  persisted  in  its  fatuous 
course.  In  accordance  with  its  policy  of  delay,  it  proposed 
to  the  United  States  further  negotiations,  for  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  treaty,  on  the  lines  of  the  extortionate  demands 
made  by  it  and  reported  by  Mr.  Beaupre  on  July  12.  As 
Secretary  Hay  had  already  with  the  utmost  positiveness 
declared  those  conditions  entirely  inadmissible,  he  naturally 


KILLING  THE  TKEATY  147 

declined  this  proposal.  Strenuous  warnings  to  Colombia 
were  repeated.  On  August  5,  Mr.  Beaupre  told  the  Colom- 
bian Foreign  Minister  that  occurrences  which  had  already 
taken  place  with  respect  to  the  canal  treaty  had  been  of  such 
a  character  as  fully  to  warrant  the  United  States  in  consid- 
ering any  modification  of  the  conditions  stipulated  in  the 
treaty  a  violation  of  the  compact  between  the  two  govern- 
ments, which  would  produce  most  serious  complications  in 
the  friendly  relations  which  had  thitherto  existed  between 
the  United  States  and  Colombia. 

The  only  reply  to  this  and  other  like  utterances  was  a 
declaration  that  Colombia  had  a  right  to  do  as  she  pleased 
in  the  matter.  Then,  on  September  8,  1903,  the  Colombian 
Government  "confidentially"  informed  the  Washington  State 
Department  that,  despite  its  rejection  of  the  proposal  for 
further  negotiations,  it  intended  to  propose  a  reopening  of 
negotiations,  upon  bases  which  it  judged  would  be  accepta- 
ble "to  the  Congress  of  next  July."  That  is  to  say,  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  was  to  be  killed,  and  then  Colombia  would 
ask  for  the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty  which  would  be 
acceptable  to  a  new  Congress  the  next  year!  This  charac- 
teristic bit  of  jugglery  did  not  meet  with  favour  at 
Washington. 

A  few  days  later,  on  September  12,  the  treaty  automatic- 
ally lapsed,  through  the  expiration  of  the  time  allotted  for 
ratification.  Still,  a  single,  solitary,  infinitesimal  hope 
remained.  The  Colombian  Congress  was  still  in  session,  and 
it  might  yet  reconsider  its  unfavourable  action  and  ratify 
the  treaty,  and  then  request  the  United  States  Government 
to  accept  it,  though  ratified  at  technically  too  late  a  date. 
Whether  the  United  States  would  or  could  have  done  so  is 
an  open  question.  But  what  is  certain  is  that  the  Colombian 
Government  had  no  thought  of  taking  such  action.  On  the 
contrary,  it  emphasised  its  intention  of  killing  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty,  and  of  blocking  the  whole  canal  scheme  until 
it  could  command  success  in  its  extortionate  demands.  On 
October  14  a  committee  of  the  Colombian  Senate  reported 


148  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  COLOMBIA 

to  the  Senate  a  recommendation  that  Colombia  should  not 
negotiate  an^^  canal  treaty  with  the  United  States  until 
after  the  time  granted  in  the  concession  to  the  French  Com- 
pany had  expired  and  its  franchise  had  lapsed.  The  object 
of  this  was  obvious,  and  was  two-fold.  It  would  enable 
Colombia  to  secure  the  whole  price  paid  by  the  United 
States,  since  she  would  then  have  confiscated  the  company's 
property,  and  it  would  enable  Colombia  to  insist  upon  less 
favourable  terms  in  her  new  concession  to  the  United  States 
than  she  had  granted  to  the  original  De  Lesseps  Company. 
This  recommendation  was  not  acted  upon  by  the  Colombian 
Senate,  but  neither  did  that  body  direct  or  authorise  the 
government  to  seek  the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty.  A  show 
was  made  of  generosity  to  the  French  company,  in  a  proposal 
to  ratify  the  prolongation  of  the  time  of  its  concession  from 
1904  to  1910.  This  proposal  is  said  to  have  met  with  the 
unanimous  approval  of  the  Senate  when  it  was  first  pre- 
sented. It  was  then,  however,  deftly  inserted  into  a  con- 
venient pigeon-hole  and  was  never  heard  of  again  and,  of 
course,  was  never  acted  upon. 

In  the  face  of  these  things,  the  inexorable  predetermina- 
tion of  President  Marroquin's  government  to  kill  the  treaty 
of  its  own  making,  unless  extortionate  and  oppressive  con- 
ditions were  adopted,  seems  beyond  question,  and  it  is 
evident  that  there  never  was  any  real  hope  that  the  Hay- 
Herran  treaty  would  become  operative.  The  United  States 
Government,  however,  was  patient.  The  President  inter- 
preted the  "reasonable  time"  provision  of  the  Spooner  law  as 
permitting  him  to  wait  a  little  while,  even  after  the  time 
allowed  for  ratification  had  expired,  before  abandoning 
negotiations  with  Colombia  for  a  canal  at  Panama  and 
going  to  Nicaragua.  So  he  waited  patiently  until  the  end 
of  the  Congressional  session  at  Bogotd.  That  came  on  Octo- 
ber 31.  On  that  day  the  Colombian  Congress  adjourned 
without  any  favourable  action  upon  the  treaty,  and  the 
American  Minister  at  Bogota  received  a  leave  of  absence, 
though  he  remained  at  Bogotd,  or  at  least  in  Colombia,  until 


THE  END  AT  BOGOTA  149 

November  24  following.  On  October  31,  therefore,  our  rela- 
tions with  Colombia,  in  connection  with  an  Isthmian  canal, 
ceased.  There  was  apparently  nothing  to  do  but  to  turn  to 
Nicaragua.  But  before  that  could  be  done,  there  came  a 
revolution. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

The  Colombian  Congress  adjourned  on  October  31.  On 
November  3,  occurred  the  Panama  Revolution.  It  was  by  no 
means  unexpected.  As  I  have  said  m  the  preceding  chapter, 
the  menace  of  it  and  the  preparations  for  it  had  been  known 
for  months  in  New  York,  at  Washington,  at  Panama,  and 
at  Bogotd.  In  order,  however,  to  understand  its  causes  and 
its  justification  perfectly,  we  must  turn  back  to  the  time  of 
Bolivar  himself.  Colombia,  or  New  Granada,  was  one  of 
the  first  Spanish  provinces  of  South  America  to  establish 
its  independence  from  Spain,  in  1819.  At  the  same  time  it 
showed  itself  one  of  the  least  worthy  of  such  a  state.  In 
the  words  of  Quijano  Otero,  a  historian  of  that  time,  "Colom- 
bia had  lived  so  fast  in  her  years  of  glory  and  great  deeds 
that,  though  still  a  child,  she  was  already  entering  a  pre- 
mature decrepitude."  It  was  actually  proposed  to  establish 
a  monarchy,  and  the  plans  to  that  end  were  so  strongly 
pushed  that  Bolivar  was  moved  to  seek  for  aid  in  preventing 
their  consummation.  With  the  monarchical  scheme  and 
with  the  general  turbulence  and  lack  of  progress,  the  more 
orderly  and  enterprising  people  of  Panama  were  disgusted. 
While  Colombia,  or,  rather,  the  provinces  of  New  Granada, 
Venezuela,  and  Quito,  or  Ecuador,  became  independent  in 
1819,  it  was  not  until  November  28,  1821,  that  the  two  Isth- 
mian provinces  of  Panama  and  Veraguas  made  their  Decla- 
ration of  Independence.  Thereupon  they  voluntarily  allied 
themselves  with  New  Granada.  But  in  a  few  years  much 
dissatisfaction  arose,  and  in  1830  many  of  the  foremost 
Isthmians  regarded  the  union  as  a  grievous  mistake  and 
began  agitating  for  its  repeal. 

150 


ISTHMIAN  DISCONTENT  151 

It  was  in  1819  that  Bolivar  overthrew  the  Spanish  power 
and,  at  the  Congress  of  Angostura,  established  under  its 
first  Constitution  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  consisting  of 
the  three  provinces  of  Venezuela,  Quito  (now  Ecuador), 
and  New  Granada,  the  last  named  corresponding  with 
the  Colombia  of  later  years.  In  1821,  that  Constitution, 
with  some  changes,  was  reenacted  by  the  Colombian 
Constitutional  Congress  at  Cucuta,  and  it  was  maintained 
until  1830.  In  that  year  the  Republic  was  broken  up 
into  three  parts,  Venezuela,  Ecuador,  and  New  Granada, 
each  becoming  an  independent  state,  and  a  Constitu- 
tional convention  at  Bogota  enacted  and  proclaimed  a 
"fundamental  law"  for  "the  State  of  New  Granada." 
This  instrument  was  not  fully  sanctioned  until  1832, 
wherefore  it  is  known  historically  as  the  Constitution 
of  1832.  Meantime,  as  we  have  said,  discontent  arose  in 
Panama,  and  in  1830  a  great  mass  meeting  was  held,  pre- 
sided over  by  the  Governor  of  Panama,  General  J.  D. 
Espinar,  a  distinguished  veteran  of  the  War  of  Independence, 
at  which  resolutions  were  adopted  calling  for  "separation 
from  the  rest  of  the  Republic,  and  especially  from  the  gov- 
ernment of  Bogota."  It  was  proposed  to  establish  an  inde- 
pendent republic,  and  even,  according  to  Otero,  to  seek  the 
protection  of,  or  annexation  to.  Great  Britain,  if  freedom 
from  Bogotan  oppression  and  misgovernment  could  in  no 
other  way  be  assured.  In  the  end,  however,  as  a  mark  of 
personal  deference  to  Bolivar,  these  plans  were  laid  aside 
and  Panama  remained  a  member  of  the  New  Granadan 
federation,  though  against  the  better  judgment  of  a  large 
part  of  the  Isthmian  people. 

Ten  years  later,  the  provocation  being  not  alleviated  but 
aggravated,  Panama  arose  in  determined  revolt.  On  Novem^ 
ber  18,  1840,  under  the  leadership  of  the  famous  Colonel 
Tomas  Herrera,  its  independence  was  proclaimed  and 
actually  established,  and  on  March  18,  1841,  a  fundamental 
law,  preliminary  to  a  Constitution,  was  adopted,  which  read 
in  part  as  follows : 


152  THE  PANAMA  EEYOLUTION 

"Article  I. — The  Cantons  of  the  former  provinces  of  Pan- 
ama and  Veraguas  shall  compose  a  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent State,  which  shall  be  constituted  under  the  title 
of  State  of  the  Isthmus. 

"Article  II. — Should  the  government  of  New  Granada  be 
organised  according  to  the  federal  system  and  convenient  to 
the  interests  of  the  Isthmus,  the  latter  shall  form  a  State  of 
the  Confederation. 

^^Special. — In  no  case  shall  the  Isthmus  be  incorporated 
with  the  Republic  of  New  Granada  under  the  system  of  Cen- 
tral Government." 

It  is  interesting  to  recall,  by  the  way,  that  this  funda- 
mental law  was  signed  by  Jose  de  Obaldia,  President;  by 
Mariano  Arosemena,  Vice-President,  and  by  Antonio  Ama- 
dor, a  Deputy  of  the  convention — family  names  which  are 
to-day  honourably  conspicuous  in  the  public  life  of  Panama. 
It  was  also  countersigned  by  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
provisional  government,  Jose  Agustin  Arango,  whose  son, 
Jose  Agustin  Arango,  Jr.,  was  one  of  the  foremost  leaders 
in  establishing  the  present  Republic  of  Panama  in  1903. 
Tomas  Herrera  was  unanimously  chosen  "Chief  of  State." 

Thus  Panama  became  an  independent  republic  in  name 
and  in  fact.  Presently  Carthagena  followed  the  example 
and  declared  its  independence.  But  the  government  at 
Bogotd,  alarmed  at  this  result  of  its  own  evil  doings,  and 
unable  by  force  to  undo  the  revolution,  sent  General  Tomas 
C.  de  Mosquera  to  Panama  to  negotiate  a  return  of  the 
Isthmian  State  to  the  New  Granadan  federation.  He  made 
many  promises,  which  were  doubtless  sincere  so  far  as  he 
was  personally  concerned,  of  decentralisation,  reforms,  and 
better  times  for  all  members  of  the  federation,  with  the 
result  that  in  1842-3  Panama  was  induced  to  rejoin  New 
Granada.  Immediately  thereafter,  however,  and  unques- 
tionably as  a  result  of  the  action  of  Panama,  Veraguas,  and 
Carthagena,  in  1843,  a  new  Constitution  was  adopted  at 
Bogota,  practically  repudiating  the  promises  which  had 
been  made  by  Mosquera,  and  making  the  government  even 
more  centralised  than  before.     Under  it  the  country  was 


"THE  STATE  OF  PANAMA"  153 

called  the  ^'Republic  of  New  Granada"  instead  of  "State  of 
New  Granada,"  and  was  divided  into  provinces,  the  prov- 
inces into  cantons,  and  the  cantons  into  parishes.  Every- 
thing was  subordinated  to  centralised  power,  and  the 
attempt  to  secede  or  to  withdraw  from  the  union,  as  Panama 
had  done  in  1840,  was  made  a  penal  offence  against  the 
common  criminal  law. 

Against  this  constitution  Panama  protested  vigorously, 
amid  the  various  civil  wars  which  followed,  with  the  result 
that  on  May  28,  1853,  the  "Constitution  of  1853"  was  pro- 
mulgated in  place  of  that  of  1843.  Under  it  a  federal 
system  was  established,  giving  the  various  provinces  a  con- 
siderable measure  of  autonomy.  This  was  not,  however, 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  just  demands  of  the  Isthmians,  and 
agitation  was  accordingly  continued  until,  on  February  27, 
1855,  the  Congress  at  Bogotd  enacted  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution,  specifically  erecting  "the  territory  which  com- 
prises the  provinces  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  to  wit, 
Panama,  Azuero,  Veraguas,  and  Chiriqui" — the  present 
Republic  of  Panama — into  "a  sovereign  federal  state,  inte- 
gral part  of  New  Granada,  under  the  name  of  the  State  of 
Panama."  In  addition,  power  was  given  to  the  other  prov- 
inces to  become  such  states  also.  This  amendment  was 
unanimously  adopted.  For  six  years  then  following  peace 
and  prosperity  prevailed  in  Panama,  under  the  presidential 
administration  of  Justo  Arosemena,  Francisco  de  Fabrega, 
Bartholome  Calvo,  Ramon  Gamboa,  Rafael  Nunez,  and  Jos6 
de  Obaldia.  In  1856  Antioquia  also  became  a  state.  In 
1857  the  other  provinces  were  all  made  states,  and  in  1858 
the  federal  system  was  extended  throughout  the  whole  of 
New  Granada,  which  again  changed  its  name  and  became 
known  as  the  "Granadine  Confederation." 

The  next  year,  however,  a  packed  Congress  enacted  an 
election  law  and  other  measures  greatly  infringing  upon  the 
sovereignty  of  the  states  and  aiming  at  the  perpetuation  of 
the  power  of  the  conservative  party  under  President  Ospina. 
Thereupon  the  State  of  Cauca  rebelled,  under  the  lead  of 


154  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

General  Mosquera,  and  declared  its  independence  of  Bogota, 
and  was  followed  by  the  States  of  Bolivar,  Santander, 
Boyaca,  and  Magdalena,  and  a  part  of  Cundinamarca, 
which  last  became  known  as  the  State  of  Tolima.  These 
leagued  themselves  into  "the  United  States  of  New  Gra- 
nada." A  general  civil  war  ensued,  which  ended  with  General 
Mosquera's  triumphal  entry  into  Bogotd.  In  this  war 
Panama  was  not  involved,  but  it  manifested  in  the  strongest 
way  its  disapproval  of  the  unconstitutional  legislation  of 
1859,  its  opposition  to  the  Bogotd  Government,  and  its 
sympathy  with  General  Mosquera's  revolution.  Before  the 
overthrow  of  the  Bogota  Government  by  General  Mosquera, 
indeed,  the  President  of  Panama,  Jose  de  Obaldia,  issued  a 
proclamation  advising  the  final  and  complete  separation  of 
the  Isthmus  from  the  Granadine  Confederation,  on  the 
ground  that  the  latter  was  hopelessly  unworthy  of  further 
confidence.  This  was  enthusiastically  received  by  the  people, 
and  steps  were  taken  to  fulfil  the  proposition,  appealing,  if 
necessary,  to  the  United  States  of  America  for  protection. 

Before  the  thing  could  be  completed,  however.  President 
Obaldia  retired  from  office  and  was  succeeded  by  Santiago 
de  la  Guardia.  To  him  General  Mosquera,  who  had  become 
provisional  President  of  the  United  States  of  New  Granada, 
wrote  on  August  3,  18G1,  urging  him  to  reconsider  the 
matter  and  to  use  his  influence  to  have  Panama  remain  with 
the  confederation,  hinting  that  if  it  did  so,  the  city  of  Pan- 
ama would  become  probably  the  political  capital  and 
certainly  the  metropolis  of  the  whole  country.  After  due 
consideration  of  the  matter,  Senor  de  la  Guardia  signed  an 
agreement  with  Dr.  Manuel  Murillo,  the  envoy  of  General 
Mosquera,  making  "the  sovereign  State  of  Panama"  one  of 
the  federated  members  of  the  United  States  of  New  Granada. 
"But,"  it  was  added,  "the  State,  in  use  of  its  sovereignty, 
reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  veto  the  new  agreement  and 
the  constitution  from  which  it  receives  authority,  whenever, 
in  its  judgment,  the  principles  embodied  in  the  treaty  of 
Carthagena  are  violated  in  detriment  to  the  self-government 


"UNITED  STATES  OF  COLOMBIA'^  155 

of  the  States."  Other  stipulations  emphasised  the  fact  that 
Panama  was  to  remain  practically  independent.  There  were 
to  be  no  public  officials  in  Panama  appointed  from  Bogota, 
but  only  those  "created  by  the  laws  of  the  State."  The  courts 
of  Panama  were  to  be  supreme  and  not  subject  to  review  by 
the  courts  of  Bogotd.  The  federal  government  at  Bogota 
was  not  to  send  troops  into  Panama  without  the  special 
permission  of  the  Isthmian  Government.  This  agreement 
was  signed  on  September  6,  1861,  and  was  ratified  by  the 
Panama  legislature  on  October  15  following.  On  September 
20,  1861,  the  name  of  the  country  was  changed  to  "United 
States  of  Colombia,"  as  it  has  ever  since  remained.  In  1862, 
Mosquera's  revolution  was  triumphant  throughout  every 
state. 

Plenipotentiaries  from  the  various  states  held  a  National 
Convention  at  Rio  Negro,  in  the  State  of  Antioquia,  in  1863, 
the  object  of  which  was  the  reorganisation  of  the  federal 
system.  It  repudiated  and  ignored  the  agreement  under 
which  Panama  had  reentered  the  federation,  and  adopted  a 
constitution  of  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  creating  what 
has  been  graphically  and  not  inaccurately  described  as  "or- 
ganised anarchy."  The  states  were  made  constitutionally 
independent,  with  absolute  and  unqualified  sovereignty.  The 
majority  of  them  could  nullify  any  act  of  the  federal  con- 
gress, and  even  defeat  the  acts  of  the  general  government  in 
foreign  relationships.  Any  state  was  free  to  indulge  in 
revolutions  ad  libitum,  the  general  government  being  forbid- 
den to  interfere  and  obliged  to  recognise  any  de  facto 
government  that  might  be  established  by  force  or  fraud.  A 
worse  system  was  probably  never  devised.  To  counteract  the 
powers  of  the  states,  the  federal  government  promptly 
resorted  to  all  sorts  of  extreme  and  violent  measures.  There 
was  a  series  of  insurrections,  revolutions,  and  public  scan- 
dals, provoked  by  the  action  of  the  Bogotd  Government,  in 
trying  to  control  by  military  force  the  elections  in  the  vari- 
ous States.  Panama  would  have  been  justified  in  withdraw- 
ing from  the  confederation,  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement 


156  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

of  1861,  but  did  not,  hoping  that  better  counsels  would  in 
time  prevail  at  Bogota. 

A  crisis  came  in  October,  1875.  At  that  time  General 
Sergius  Camergo,  commander  of  the  Colombian  troops  which 
had  invaded  Panama  unconstitutionally,  forcibly  deposed 
and  imprisoned  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena,  the  constitutional 
President  of  the  State  of  Panama,  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  he  would  not  give  his  support  to  the  electoral  plans  of 
the  President  of  the  Confederation.  Against  this  act  of 
oppression  Dr.  Arosemena  vigorously  protested,  and  the 
Panama  legislature  adopted  scathing  resolutions  of  protest 
and  suspended  its  session  to  mark  its  denunciation  of 
Bogotan  tyranny.  Thereafter  Panama,  never  ceasing  to 
protest,  but  in  vain,  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  centralised 
government  at  Bogota,  and  its  interests  were  sacrificed  to 
those  of  a  sordid  coterie  of  politicians  who  were  practically 
as  alien  to  the  Isthmus  as  though  they  were  natives  of 
Kamchatka.  Panama  was  made  "the  milch  cow  of  the  con- 
federation," the  profits  accruing  from  its  fortunate  situation 
being  diverted  to  the  treasury  at  Bogota  In  1885  conditions 
became  intolerable  and  a  desperate  but  fruitless  insurrection 
occurred  in  Panama,  Boyaca,  Magdalena,  Cundinamarca, 
and  Santander.  Immediately  upon  the  suppression  of  these, 
in  September,  1885,  came  a  coup-d'etat. 

Dr.  Rafael  Nunez  had  been  elected  President  in  1884  for  a 
term  of  two  years.  Under  the  Constitution  he  would  be 
ineligible  for  a  second  term.  But  what  was  a  little  thing 
like  the  Constitution  between  a  strenuous  statesman  and  his 
ambitions?  He  simply  issued  a  presidential  decree,  indefi- 
nitely suspending  the  Constitution.  Then  he  appointed  a 
new  Governor,  of  his  own  arbitrary  choice,  for  each  state 
and  instructed  them  each  to  appoint  two  delegates  to  a 
national  convention  "to  reform  the  Constitution."  This 
precious  body  met  at  Bogota  on  November  11,  1885,  to  regis- 
ter its  creator's  will.  Dr.  Nuiiez  addressed  to  it  a  senten- 
tious and  dictatorial  message,  containing  many  "resounding 
and  glittering  generalities"  about  freedom,  justice,  and  prog- 


COLOMBIAN  DICTATORSHIP  157 

ress.  The  gist  of  it  was,  however,  a  denunciation  of  the 
federal  system  as  the  source  of  all  evils  and  the  sum  of  all 
villainies,  and  a  practical  command  for  the  establishment  of 
a  strongly  centralised  government.  The  dictator  also  sug- 
gested the  establishment  of  a  large  standing  army,  sug- 
gestively saying  that  "the  State  of  Panama  alone  requires  a 
numerous  and  well-paid  garrison.'^  The  convention  obeyed 
orders  promptly.  By  the  end  of  the  month  it  had  completed 
its  task,  and  on  December  1,  Dr.  Nuiiez  appended  his  approv- 
ing signature  to  the  new  Constitution.  That  instrument  was, 
by  its  own  terms,  to  be  ratified  by  the  Colombian  people 
before  it  should  become  effective,  but  the  President  was 
empowered  to  determine  the  manner  of  such  ratification. 
He  decided  to  have  it  done  not  by  popular  vote,  but  by  vote 
of  the  various  municipal  Boards  of  Aldermen !  In  this  way, 
of  course,  ratification  was  promptly  secured,  and  in  due  time 
under  the  new  Constitution  Dr.  Nunez  was  re-elected  Presi- 
dent. It  was  provided,  by  way  of  guarding  against  any 
undoing  of  this  work,  that  no  amendment  could  be  made  to 
the  Constitution  unless  it  was  asked  for  by  a  majority  of 
the  state  legislatures  and  was  unanimously  voted  by  them 
all.  Mr.  King,  the  United  States  Minister  to  Colombia, 
appropriately  described  this  Constitution  as  "an  embodi- 
ment of  precepts  enjoining  the  obedience  and  submission  of 
the  former  sovereigns  to  the  will  of  their  central  agents,  and 
bestowing  all  the  prerogatives  of  Government  upon  an 
oligarchy  of  select  individuals."  This  Constitution  was  rat- 
ified in  1886,  and  is  consequently  known  in  history  by  the 
name  of  that  year. 

The  general  quality  of  President  Nuiiez  and  his  govern- 
ment may  be  appreciated  when  we  remember  that  one  of  his 
first  acts  as  dictator  was  to  repudiate  the  foreign  debt  of 
the  country,  on  the  ground,  as  he  himself  expressed  it,  that 
"any  one  who  pays  a  debt,  unless  he  is  forced  to  do  so  under 
pain  of  being  hanged,  is  an  imbecile."  Under  the  delightful 
system  thus  established  Panama,  instead  of  enjoying  the 
special  favours  it  had  formerly  possessed,  was  made  the 


158  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

object  of  most  invidious  discrimination.  For  the  whole 
country  an  avowedly  and  intensely  centralised  system  was 
adopted  in  place  of  federation,  but  under  Article  201  of  the 
Constitution  Panama  Wias  deprived  of  even  such  remnants  of 
local  self-government  as  the  other  states  were  permitted  to 
retain,  and  was  "placed  under  the  direct  authority  of  the 
central  government,  to  be  ruled  according  to  special  laws.'' 
In  brief,  the  once  independent  sovereign  state  was  made  a 
crown  colony  under  the  autocracy  of  Bogota.  Nor  was  this 
discrimination  merely  nominal.  It  was  actual.  That  op- 
pressive provision  of  the  Constitution  was  enforced  to  the 
letter.  Practically,  the  Isthmus  had  no  rights  which  the 
politicians  at  Bogota  were  bound  to  respect. 

The  two  delegates  from  Panama  to  the  Bogota  Congress 
were  Miguel  A.  Caro  and  Felipe  F.  Paul.  They  voted  for 
this  arbitrary  and  tainted  Constitution,  of  course,  since  they 
had  been  appointed  at  the  dictation  of  President  Nunez, 
for  that  purpose.  More  noteworthy  was  the  manner  of  rat- 
ification of  the  Constitution  by  the  Cabildo  or  Council  of  the 
District  of  Panama  in  the  "Department"  (formerly  State) 
of  Panama.  The  Council  met  for  the  purpose  on  February 
20,  1886.  The  Governor  of  the  District  was  present,  together 
with  seven  delegates.  Two  other  delegates,  Henry  Ehrman 
and  Ignacio  Fuerth,  were  excused  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  foreigners.  The  new  Constitution  was  read,  and  a  vote 
was  taken  upon  the  question  of  ratification.  According  to 
the  Official  Gazette,  of  Panama,  there  were  three  votes 
given  for  ratification:  namely,  those  of  Francisco  de  la 
Guardia,  Nicanor  de  Obarrio,  and  Jose  Maria  Vives  Leon, 
the  last  named  being  the  Secretary  of  the  Council;  and 
three  votes  against  ratification:  namely,  those  of  Pablo 
Arosemena,  Mateo  Iturralde,  and  Pedro  J.  Sosa.  There- 
upon the  deciding  vote  was  cast  in  favour  of  ratification  by 
the  Chairman,  Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero.  The  act  of 
ratification,  thus  adopted  by  the  narrow  margin  of  a  single 
vote,  was  then  signed  by  the  Governor  and  by  all  the  dele- 
gates excepting  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena.    It  is  to  be  noted  that 


BABK  VIEWS  OP  COLOMBIA  159 

Dr.  Amador  Guerrero,  who  cast  the  deciding  vote  for  ratifi- 
cation, and  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena,  who  alone  refused  to  sign 
the  act,  afterward  became  respectively  the  first  President 
and  First  Designate  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

This  ratification  did  not  mean  that  Panama  was  satisfied 
with  the  new  system,  but  merely  that  it  considered  itself 
unable  at  that  time  to  offer  effective  resistance.  Protest 
against  discrimination  and  demands  for  at  least  equal  rights 
with  the  other  departments  were  vigorously  continued,  with 
the  result  that  at  length,  on  September  3,  1892,  the  Bogota 
Government  enacted  a  law  nominally  amending  the  Con- 
stitution by  the  elimination  of  the  objectionable  Article  201, 
and  ordering  Panama  to  be  comprehended  in  the  general 
legislation  of  the  Republic.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it 
practically  confirmed  the  offensive  system  by  providing  that 
"in  fiscal  matters,  special  legislative  and  executive  ordi- 
nances may  be  enacted  for  the  Department  of  Panama." 
Thus  the  discriminations  against  Panama  were  to  be 
removed,  excepting  in  respect  to  the  most  important  of  all 
matters,  and  in  that  respect  they  were  to  be  retained.  To 
what  a  deplorable  condition  the  policies  and  practices  of 
the  Bogotd  Government  reduced  Panama,  and  indeed  the 
whole  country,  may  be  estimated  from  the  official  declaration 
of  Dr.  Jose  Marroquin,  in  his  inaugural  address  on  becom- 
ing Vice-President  at  Bogota,  in  August,  1898.    He  said : 

"Hatred,  envy,  and  ambition  are  elements  of  discord;  in 
the  political  arena  the  battle  rages  fiercely,  not  so  much  with 
the  idea  of  securing  the  triumph  of  principles  as  with  that  of 
humbling  and  elevating  persons  and  parties;  public  tran- 
quillity, indispensable  to  every  citizen  for  the  free  enjoyment 
of  what  he  possesses  either  by  luck  or  as  the  fruit  of  his 
labour,  is  gradually  getting  unknown;  we  live  in  a  sickly 
atmosphere;  crisis  is  our  normal  state;  commerce  and  all 
other  industries  are  in  urgent  need  of  perfect  calmness  for 
their  development  and  progress ;  poverty  invades  every  home. 
The  notion  of  mother  country  is  mistaken  or  obliterated, 
owing  to  our  political  disturbances.  The  conception  of 
mother  country  is  so  intimately  associated  with  that  of 


160  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

political  disorders  and  with  the  afflictions  and  distrust 
which  they  engender  that  it  is  not  unusual  to  hear  from  one 
of  our  countrymen  what  could  not  be  heard  from  a  native 
of  any  other  country:  'I  wish  I  had  been  born  somewhere 
else.'  Could  many  be  found  among  us  who  would  feel  proud 
when  exclaiming,  ^I  am  a  Colombian/  in  the  same  way  as  a 
Frenchman  does  when  exclaiming,  'I  am  a  Frenchman'?" 

It  thus  came  naturally  to  pass  that  while  the  Colombian 
Government  at  Bogotd  chose  to  play  fast  and  loose  with  the 
American  Canal  proposition,  and  was  willing  to  delay  it 
indefinitely  and  even  to  threaten  it  with  ultimate  defeat, 
the  people  of  Panama  felt  an  intense  interest  in  it  and  much 
eagerness  to  have. the  great  work  begun.  The  prosperity  of 
the  Isthmus,  and  its  peace  and  order,  depended  upon  it.  The 
contemplation  of  the  possibility  of  an  abandonment  of  the 
Panama  route  and  of  the  building  of  the  canal  at  Nicaragua 
was  regarded  with  consternation  and  dismay,  for  such  a  turn 
of  affairs  would  be  an  irremediable  catastrophe.  It  would 
mean  utter  ruin.  When,  therefore,  the  Panamans  saw  the 
dilatory  conduct  of  the  Bogota  Government,  and  understood 
its  purport  and  its  possible  if  not  its  probable  result,  they 
became  desperate,  and  the  resolution  began  to  arise  among 
the  foremost  men  to  take  things  into  their  own  hands  for 
the  promotion  of  their  own  welfare.  Too  long  already  the 
independence  of  Panama  had  been  subverted  and  the  state 
had  been  misgoverned  and  spoliated  for  the  sordid  gain  of 
Bogotd.  For  Colombia  now  to  deny  Panama  the  oppor- 
tunity of  securing  the  long  desired  canal  under  the  best 
possible  auspices,  would  be  more  than  the  Isthmians  could 
endure. 

They  gave  Colombia  fair  warning.  Early  in  1903  they 
explicitly  told  the  authorities  at  Bogota  that  failure  to  ratify 
the  canal  treaty  with  the  United  States  would  be  followed  on 
the  Isthmus  by  the  most  serious  consequence.  The  Colom- 
bian Congress,  which  would  pass  upon  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty  and  either  ratify  or  reject  it,  was  to  meet  at  Bogota 
on  June  20.    Long  before  that  date,  indeed  before  the  mem- 


FAIR  WARNING  GIVEN  161 

bers  of  that  Congress  were  elected  or  ^  even  nominated,  a 
significant  step  was  taken.  Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero 
had  been,  as  already  noted,  chairman  of  the  Council  which 
ratified  the  Constitution  of  1885,  and  had  himself  cast  a 
deciding  vote  in  favour  of  that  instrument.  He  was  there- 
fore loyally  affected  toward  the  Colombian  Government.  He 
was  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  most  eminent  citizens  of 
Panama,  a  physician  of  distinguished  repute,  a  veteran 
statesman,  a  man  of  unblemished  character,  of  large  prop- 
erty interests,  and  of  social  leadership.  There  was  probably 
no  one  on  the  Isthmus  who  could  with  better  grace  or  with 
more  authority  have  taken  the  step  which  he  took.  He  wrote 
to  the  acting  President  of  Colombia,  Dr.  Marroquin,  who 
was  his  personal  friend  and  former  political  associate  and 
colleague,  urging  him  for  the  sake  of  their  common  country 
to  use  his  best  efforts  to  secure  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
and  warning  him  that  the  consequence  of  failure  to  ratify  it 
would  be  most  serious. 

To  the  surprise  and  consternation  not  only  of  Dr.  Amador, 
but  of  all  Panamans,  the  reply  came  in  the  form  of  a  Con- 
gressional nomination.  F.  Mutis  Duran,  who  was  then 
Governor  of  Panama,  under  appointment  of  the  Bogota 
Government,  nominated,  as  the  government  candidate  for 
member  of  Congress  from  Panama,  Senor  Perez  y  Soto,  one  of 
the  most  implacable  and  outspoken  opponents  of  the  canal 
scheme,  and  a  bitter  enemy  of  the  United  States.  There 
was  only  too  good  reason  to  suspect  that  this  nomination 
was  made  in  fulfilment  of  Dr.  Marroquin's  orders,  and  was 
practically  his  reply  to  the  representations  of  Panama.  It 
was  obvious  what  the  election  of  this  candidate  would  mean. 
If  this  representative  of  Panama  in  Congress  should  lead — • 
as  he  doubtless  would — the  opposition  to  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty,  that  convention  would  have  no  chance  of  ratification. 
There  was  an  outburst  of  indignation,  remonstrance,  and 
protest,  which  availed  nothing.  Senor  Perez  y  Soto  was 
declared  elected.  J.  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  a  distinguished 
citizen  of  Panama,  of  eminent  public  service,  and  unques- 


162  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

tioned  loyalty  to  Colombia,  hastened  to  Bogota  to  remon- 
strate in  person  and  to  plead  with  Congress  in  favour  of 
the  treaty.  He  was  received  with  so  little  courtesy,  and 
the  intent  of  Congress  to  disregard  the  sentiment  and  inter- 
ests of  Panama,  and  to  kill  the  treaty,  was  so  evident,  that 
he  soon  left  Bogota  in  disgust,  not  pacified  nor  mollified, 
even  by  the  appointment  as  Governor  of  Panama  which  Dr. 
Marroquin  bestowed  upon  him — in  September,  to  succeed  F. 
Mutis  Duran — in  hope  of  placating  him  and  confirming  his 
allegiance. 

One  of  the  foremost  leaders,  if  not  indeed  the  foremost,  in 
the  practical  organisation  of  the  separatist  movement  in 
Panama  was  Jos6  Agustin  Arango,  son  of  the  distinguished 
patriot  of  the  same  name  who  has  already  been  mentioned 
as  Secretary  of  the  Provisional  Government  of  1841.  He  was 
in  1903  a  Senator  from  Panama  to  the  Colombian  Congress 
at  Bogotd,  and  was  strongly  in  favour  of  ratification  of  the 
Hay-Herran  canal  treaty.  When  he  perceived  that  the 
Colombian  Government  intended  to  defeat  that  measure,  he 
revolted  against  what  he  justly  deemed  a  sacrifice  of  Isth- 
mian interests,  and  began  to  plot  some  means  of  averting 
the  ruin  which  seemed  to  threaten  Panama.  While  medi- 
tating upon  this  subject,  he  chanced  to  come  into  conference 
with  Captain  J.  R.  Beers,  the  freight  agent  of  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company,  and  in  the  course  of  their  conversation 
the  suggestion  arose  that  Panama  might  become  independent 
of  Colombia  again,  and  then  make  for  itself  a  treaty  with 
the  United  States.  Seilor  Arango  became  convinced  that 
this  was  the  only  hope  of  Panama,  and  he  requested  Captain 
Beers,  during  a  visit  to  the  United  States  which  he  was 
about  to  make,  to  ascertain  the  sentiment  of  various 
representative  men  in  this  country  upon  the  subject  and  to 
ascertain  how  such  a  movement  would  be  regarded  here. 
Meantime  he  proceeded  with  the  enlistment  of  a  working 
force  of  revolutionary  propagandists.  First  of  all  he  took 
into  his  confidence  his  own  sons,  Ricardo  Manuel,  Belisario, 
and    Jose    Agustin,    and    his    sons-in-law,    Samuel    Lewis, 


ORGANISING  FOR  INDEPENDENCE  163 

Raoul  Orillac,  and  Ernest  T.  Lefevre,  and  his  close  friend, 
Carlos  Constantino  Arosemena. 

The  next  man  to  enter  the  conspiracy  was  the  one  destined 
to  become  the  leader  of  it.  This  was  Dr.  Manuel  Amador 
Guerrero,  of  whom  I  have  already  spoken,  and  who  had 
already  taken  strong  ground  against  the  Colombian  design 
to  burke  the  canal  treaty.  He  and  Seiior  Arango,  who  were 
old  and  confidential  friends,  chanced  to  meet  one  day  at 
the  office  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  the  conversation 
naturally  turned  upon  the  subject  which  was  then  heaviest 
upon  their  hearts  and  upon  the  hearts  of  the  people  of  Pan- 
ama. Seiior  Arango  expressed  to  Dr.  Amador  his  gloomy 
forebodings  of  the  action  of  the  Bogotd  Government  and  its 
effect  upon  Panama,  and  his  patriotic  resentment  thereat, 
and  finally  revealed  to  him  the  separatist  plan  which  he  had 
been  cherishing  and  the  mission  to  the  United  States  which 
Captain  Beers  had  undertaken.  To  his  profound  gratifica- 
tion. Dr.  Amador  not  only  sympathised  with  him  in  every 
detail,  but  also  approved  heartily  the  separatist  plan  and 
committed  himself  to  it  with  enthusiasm.  Captain  Beers 
soon  returned  from  the  United  States  and  made  on  the 
whole  an  encouraging  report.  It  does  not  appear  that  he 
even  attempted  any  negotiations  with  the  United  States 
Government,  or  any  "sounding"  of  it,  and  he  certainly  made 
to  the  Panama  revolutionists  no  promises  in  its  behalf.  But 
he  reported  truly,  what  every  observant  man  in  America 
knew  at  that  time,  that  both  popular  and  official  sentiment 
in  America  was  overwhelmingly  in  favour  of  the  canal,  was 
outraged  at  the  tactics  of  Colombia,  and  would  be  inclined 
toward  close  relations  with  Panama  if  the  latter  should 
secure  its  independence. 

Upon  the  strength  of  this,  Senor  Arango  and  Dr.  Amador 
proceeded  with  the  organisation  of  the  revolution.  They 
two  and  C.  C.  Arosemena  constituted  themselves  into  a 
Junta,  which  should  assume  both  direction  of  and  responsi- 
bility for  the  movement.  Senor  Arango's  sons  and  sons-in- 
law  remained  loyal  to  and  active  in  the  cause,  but  were  left 


164  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

a  little  in  the  background  in  order  that  the  revolution  might 
not  look  too  much  like  a  family  affair,  and  a  goodly  com- 
pany of  influential  and  representative  Panamans  were  dis- 
creetly introduced  into  the  conspiracy.  Among  these  were 
Nicanor  A.  de  Obarrio,  who  had  been  born  in  New  York  City 
but  was  the  head  of  an  old  Panaman  family  and  was  prom- 
inently identified  with  the  Isthmus;  Federico  Boyd,  a 
Panaman  banker,  son  of  that  American  of  Irish  parentage, 
James  Boyd,  who  was  the  founder  of  the  Panama  Star  and 
Herald;  Tomas  Arias,  formerly  Minister  of  Finance,  and 
his  brother  Kicardo  Arias,  members  of  a  family  that  had 
been  settled  in  Panama  since  Balboa's  time;  and  Manuel 
Espinosa  B.,  a  brother-in-law  of  Dr.  Amador  and  one  of  the 
foremost  men  of  the  city  of  Panama.  These  men  met  occa- 
sionally at  Senor  Boyd's  house,  but  oftener  at  the  electric 
lighting  works  of  the  city  of  Panama,  the  latter  place — and 
the  hour  of  midnight — being  chosen  for  the  sake  of  secrecy 
and  security. 

Other  additions  were  rapidly  made  to  the  company, 
through  the  discreet  invitation  of  trustworthy  friends. 
Carlos  A.  Mendoza  and  Juan  Antonio  Henriquez  joined  the 
conspiracy,  and  undertook  the  task  of  preparing  a  formal 
declaration  of  independence  and  other  documents  which 
might  be  needed  at  a  fitting  time,  in  which  work  they  were 
aided  by  Eusebio  A.  Morales.  Gerardo  Ortega,  living  on  the 
Island  of  Taboga,  was  an  enthusiastic  and  valuable  recruit, 
as  was  Carlos  Clement.  Eduardo  Ycaza  not  only  joined  the 
company  but  also  undertook  to  bring  into  it  General  Do- 
mingo Diaz  and  Pedro  A.  Diaz.  Ramon  Valdez  Lopez  was 
commissioned  to  proceed  to  the  interior  of  the  country  and 
organise  the  revolution  there.  Pastor  Jimenez  and  Carlos  R. 
Zachrisson  V.  undertook  successfully  to  bring  into  line  their 
)  friend  General  Esteban  Huertas.  Fernando  Arango,  nephew 
of  J.  A.  Arango,  was  Chief  of  Police,  but  for  sufiScient 
reasons  did  not  join  the  conspiracy  and  so,  on  the  initiative 
of  Tomas  Arias,  the  manipulation  of  the  police  force  in 
harmony  with  the  revolution  was  intrusted  to  the  deputy 


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PLANS  OF  THE  REVOLUTIONISTS  165 

chief,  Captain  Felix  Alvarez.  Others  who  entered  the  move 
ment  and  did  important  work  for  it,  at  Colon  and  elsewhere, 
were  Hector  Valdez,  General  H.  O.  Jeffries,  Porfirio  Melen 
dez,  the  Alcalde  of  Colon ;  General  Ortiz,  Chief  of  Police  at 
Colon;  Captain  Achurra,  Orondaste  Martinez,  and  J.  E. 
Lefevre.  I  recall  all  these  names,  partly  in  order  to  give 
them  the  historical  credit  due  to  them  for  their  part  in  the 
revolution,  and  partly  in  order  to  show  how  largely — almost 
exclusively — the  revolution  was  a  native  Panaman  move 
ment  in  inception,  development,  and  execution,  and  how 
baseless  is  the  imputation  that  it  was  an  American  con- 
spiracy. 

The  sentiment  of  these  men  was  practically  unanimous  in 
favour  of  a  revolution  which  should  restore  Panama  to  its 
rightful  place  as  an  independent  sovereign  state — in  case 
Colombia  should  fulfil  its  purpose  of  killing  the  canal  treaty. 
To  insure  the  success  of  such  a  revolution,  however,  two 
things  were  necessary.  One  was  some  fuller  assurance  con 
cerning  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  and  its  subsequent 
policy  toward  the  new  Republic,  and  the  other,  a  certain 
amount  of  cash  to  serve  as  the  "sinews  of  war."  It  was 
presently  agreed  that  Dr.  Amador  and  Ricardo  Arias  should 
visit  the  United  States  to  secure,  if  possible,  those  ends. 
Domestic  reasons  at  the  last  moment  prevented  Senor 
Arias  from  undertaking  this  mission,  and  Dr.  Amador  ac- 
cordingly set  out  upon  it  alone.  He  sailed  directly  for  New 
York.  His  only  concealment  of  purpose  was  at  the  moment 
of  leaving  Panama.  Knowing  that  he  was  watched  by  Gov- 
ernment agents,  and  would  probably  be  stopped  if  he 
attempted  to  leave  the  Isthmus  without  some  urgent  but 
non-political  pretext,  he  caused  the  impression  to  be  created 
that  his  son  was  seriously  ill  in  New  York  and  that  he  had 
been  hastily  summoned  to  see  him.  By  that  means  he  got 
away  from  Panama  without  interference.  He  was  suspected, 
however,  of  having  some  revolutionary  business  in  mind,  and 
was  therefore  closely  followed  and  watched  by  agents  of  the 
Colombian  administration.     At  the  same  time,  in  view  of 


166  THE  PANAMA  KE VOLUTION 

his  absence,  the  Junta  was  reorganised  so  as  to  consist  of 
Federico  Bojd,  Nicanor  A.  de  Obarrio,  Ricardo  Arias, 
Tomas  Arias,  and  Manuel  Espinosa  B. 

On  reaching  New  York,  Dr.  Amador  first  called  upon 
William  Nelson  Cromwell,  the  Counsel  for  the  Panama  Rail- 
road Company,  and  for  the  French  Panama  Canal  Company, 
who,  of  course,  was  deeply  interested  in  securing  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty.  To  him  he  broached  the  plans  of  the 
revolutionists,  and  of  him  solicited  aid.  Mr.  Cromwell, 
despite  his  earnest  desire  to  see  the  United  States  secure  the 
canal  route  and  enter  upon  the  undertaking,  was  strongly 
disinclined  toward  anything  like  a  forcible  revolution.  He 
told  Dr.  Amador  frankly  that  he  could  not  and  would  not 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  scheme,  and  warned  him  that, 
in  his  opinion,  the  United  States  would  not  countenance  any- 
thing of  the  sort.  Nor  was  that  the  only  discouragement 
with  which  Dr.  Amador  met.  A  zealous  Panaman  friend  of 
the  Bogota  Government  had  followed  him  from  the  Isthmus 
to  America,  to  see  what  he  was  doing  here,  and,  seeing  him 
enter  Mr.  Cromwell's  office,  concluded  that  some  revolution- 
ary conspiracy  was  afoot,  and  hastened  to  Washington,  to 
tell  the  Secretary  of  State  what  was  going  on,  or  what  he 
imagined  was  going  on.  Mr.  Hay  properly  replied  that  the 
United  States  Government  was  not  concerned  in  it,  that  it 
could  not  deal  with  private  conferences  but  only  with  overt 
acts  against  the  neutrality  laws,  that  it  had  no  information 
of  any  such  acts,  and  that  he  could  not  regard  it  as  profita- 
ble to  hear  anything  on  the  strength  of  mere  hearsay  and 
conjecture. 

Then  this  Panaman  went  to  Dr.  Herran,  the  Colombian 
charge  d'affaires,  and  had  a  protracted  conference  with  him, 
the  character  of  w^hich  must  be  left  to  imagination.  The 
quick  sequel,  however,  was  the  sending  of  a  long  cable  des 
patch  from  Dr.  Herran  to  President  Marroquin,  and  the 
engagement  of  a  detective  by  Dr.  Herran  to  observe  and 
report  upon  all  Dr.  Amador's  doings.  When,  soon  after,  it 
was  reported  that  Dr.  Amador  had  again  visited  Mr.  Crom- 


DK.  AMADOE'S  MISSION  167 

well,  another  despatch  was  sent  to  President  Marroquin,  and 
immediately  thereafter  a  despatch  came  from  the  Colombian 
President  to  Mr.  Cromwell,  warning  him  that  if  he  engaged 
in  any  conspiracy  against  the  Colombian  Government,  or 
maintained  any  relations  with  revolutionists,  the  property 
of  the  railroad  and  canal  companies,  for  which  he  was 
counsel,  would  under  the  law  be  subject  to  forfeiture.  The 
result  was  a  discontinuance  of  Dr.  Amador's  visits  to  his 
office,  while  Mr.  Cromwell  went  to  Paris,  to  look  after  the 
interests  of  the  French  Canal  Company  there,  and  did  not 
return  to  America  until  the  middle  of  November,  some  time 
after  the  Panama  revolution  had  become  an  accomplished 
fact. 

Thus  disappointed,  Dr.  Amador  was  upon  the  verge  of 
despair,  and  he  cabled  to  his  friends  in  Panama  the  one 
word  ^^Desanimado'^ — "disappointed."  He  was  still  intent 
upon  organising  a  revolution,  but  to  his  mind  a  revolution, 
of  the  old-fashioned  kind,  was  impossible  without  material 
aid.  It  would  be  necessary  not  only  to  organise  an  army, 
but  also  to  create  a  Panaman  navy,  by  the  purchase  of  sev- 
eral vessels  capable  of  service  as  gunboats,  and  to  such  ends 
it  would  be  necessary  to  secure  funds.  More  for  the  sake  of 
consolation  in  sympathetic  talk  than  in  the  hope  of  material 
advantage,  he  went,  immediately  after  his  last  call  at  Mr. 
Cromwell's,  to  the  office  of  a  Panaman  friend  and  sympa- 
thiser,— Joshua  Lindo,  of  the  firm  of  Piza,  Nephews  &  Co.,  in 
New  York.  To  him  he  related  the  failure  of  his  errand 
and  bewailed  the  apparent  hopelessness  of  the  Panaman 
cause. 

"There  is  one  man  would  help  us,  I  am  sure,"  he  said,  "and 
that  is  Bunau-Varilla.  But  he  is  in  Paris,  and  I  cannot  go 
thither  and  see  him  in  time  to  do  anything.  It  would  then 
be  too  late." 

His  reference  was  to  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla,  the  distin- 
guished French  engineer  who  had  long  been  identified  with 
the  canal  scheme,  who  had  been  chief  engineer  for  the  French 
Canal  Company,  who  was  a  capitalist  as  well  as  an  engineer, 


168  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

and  who  was  devoted,  with  all  the  strength  of  his  ardent 
nature,  to  the  promotion  of  the  enterprise.  (It  is  of  agree- 
able interest  to  recall,  also,  though  it  is  not  pertinent  to 
the  present  subject,  that  M.  Bunau-Varilla  had  been  in  youth 
a  fellow-student  with  Alfred  Dreyfus,  and  had  later  played 
a  leading  part  in  securing  justice  for  that  much-wronged 
man.  It  was  he,  more,  perhaps,  than  any  other  one  man, 
who  fixed  responsibility  for  the  forgery  of  the  ^^hordereau" 
upon  the  infamous  Esterhazy,  and  thus  led  the  way  to  the 
vindication  of  Captain  Dreyfus.)  While  the  two  were  speak- 
ing of  him  and  deploring  his  absence  from  America  at  that 
critical  time,  the  telephone  in  the  office  rang.  Senor  Lindo 
answered  the  call ;  and  then  uttered  an  ejaculation  of  amaze- 
ment and  delight. 

"Santa  Maria !  Amador !"  he  cried,  turning  to  his  guest, 
"it's  Bunau-Yarilla,  now!" 

It  was  quite  true.  The  French  engineer  had  just  arrived 
in  New  York  from  Paris,  and  had  telephoned  down  to  the 
office  from  his  hotel  to  ask  what  had  been  happening  at 
Panama  and  at  Washington  while  he  was  on  shipboard. 
Dr.  Amador  sprang  to  the  telephone : 

"Is  that  really  you,  Bunau-Varilla?  For  Heaven's  sake, 
wait  right  there  until  I  come  up !" 

Within  half  an  hour  they  were  closeted  together,  and  M. 
Bunau-Varilla  was  committing  himself  to  the  revolutionary 
cause — should  such  a  step  be  made  necessary  by  the  Colom- 
bian Government's  rejection  of  the  canal  treaty — and  was 
pledging  to  it  the  financial  support  which  it  might  need. 
The  Frenchman — he  was  a  French  citizen  and  not  a  Pana- 
man  or  Colombian — gave  himself  zealously  to  the  enterprise, 
asking  in  return  for  whatever  he  might  do  only  one  thing 
by  way  of  recompense:  namely,  that  as  soon  as  the  inde- 
pendence of  Panama  was  established,  he  should  be  appointed 
its  Minister  to  the  United  States  just  long  enough  to  nego- 
tiate with  this  country  a  treaty  for  the  construction  of  the 
canal.  This  was  promised  him  by  Dr.  Amador,  and,  as  we 
shall  see,  the  promise  was  fulfilled. 


THE  AMEKICAN  ATTITUDE  169 

Raised  from  despair  to  exultant  confidence  by  his  inter- 
view with  M.  Bunau-Varilla,  Dr.  Amador  cabled  to  the  Junta 
at  Panama  the  one  word  '^Esperanzas" — "hopes."  He  then 
presently  revisited  Washington,  and  sought  a  conference 
with  the  Secretary  of  State,  which  had  been  suggested  by  his 
fellow  conspirators  at  the  electric  light  works.  His  aim  was 
to  learn  what  the  United  States  Government  would  do,  in 
case  of  a  revolution  on  the  Isthmus.  Would  it  give  the  new 
Republic  aid?  Would  it  recognise  its  independence?  Would 
it  make  with  it  a  treaty  for  the  construction  of  the  canal? 
This  last  point  was  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all,  for 
the  whole  matter  hinged  upon  it.  There  would  be  no  use 
in  a  revolution,  unless  the  United  States  would  then  proceed 
with  the  canal  enterprise.  There  was,  however,  really  no 
need  of  asking  these  questions,  for  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  was  already  well  established  and  known  to  the  world, 
and  from  its  record  it  was  quite  easy  to  forecast  the  action 
of  this  Government  in  any  given  circumstances.  The  replies 
given  by  Mr.  Hay  were  diplomatically  discreet  and  guarded. 
He  told  Dr.  Amador  that,  however  much  the  United  States 
might  sympathise  with  Panaman  aspirations  for  liberty  and 
independence,  and  however  much  it  might  regret  or  even 
resent  Colombia's  rejection  of  the  canal  treaty,  it  would  be 
manifestly  impossible  for  this  Government  to  give  any  aid 
to  a  revolutionary  enterprise,  or  to  commit  itself  with  any 
promises  in  advance.  It  would  scrupulously  fulfil  its  duties 
as  a  neutral,  and  would  inflexibly  maintain  its  rights  and 
privileges  under  the  Treaty  of  1846  with  New  Granada. 
Those  rights  and  privileges  included  the  protection  of  free 
neutral  transit  across  the  Isthmus,  and  the  guarantee  of 
the  sovereignty  of  land  against  alien  aggression,  though,  of 
course,  it  did  not  guarantee  Colombian  possession  of  the 
Isthmus  against  local  and  domestic  revolution.  But  the 
United  States  could  give  no  promises  to,  and  make  no  trea- 
ties with,  a  government  which  was  not  yet  in  existence. 

Dr.  Amador  made  only  a  few  calls  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment.   He  was  then  told,  kindly  but  firmly  and  plainly,  that 


110  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

as  he  was  confessedly  and  notoriously  the  would-be  organiser 
of  a  revolution  against  a  power  with  which  the  United  States 
was  at  peace,  any  further  visits  to  that  office  would  not  be 
proper.  At  that,  he  gracefully  took  his  leave,  with  the 
proverbial  "mingled  emotions."  He  had  received  no  direct 
encouragement  or  promise  of  aid,  but  on  the  other  hand  he 
had  been  assured  of  the  benevolent  neutrality  of  the  United 
States,  and  that,  he  thought,  would  be  sufficient  for  the  pur- 
pose. It  also  dawned  upon  him  that,  as  the  United  States 
was  bound  by  the  Treaty  of  1846  to  guarantee  the  Isthmus 
against  alien  attack,  and  as  the  United  States  was  concerned 
only  with  the  existing  local  government  and  not  with  any 
domestic  revolutions  or  rivalries  in  Colombia,  if  Panama 
should  actually  win  its  independence,  Colombia  would  ipso 
facto  become  an  alien  power,  and  the  United  States  might, 
therefore,  feel  itself  called  upon  to  guarantee  and  maintain 
Panaman  independence  against  Colombian  attack.  He  also 
felt  assured  that  the  United  States  would  negotiate  a  canal 
treaty  with  Panama,  should  the  latter's  independence  be 
achieved.  He  further  realised  that  two  things  were  emi- 
nently desirable,  if  not  absolutely  necessary,  for  the  success 
of  the  revolution.  One  was,  that  the  revolution  should  be 
effected  quickly  and,  if  possible,  without  bloodshed  or 
violence,  since  fighting  would  excite  unpleasant  and  unfa- 
vourable sentiments  in  America.  The  other  was,  'that  a  pro- 
visional government  should  be  fully  organised  in  advance, 
so  as  to  become  the  de  facto  government  and  begin  the  dis- 
charge of  its  administrative  duties  the  moment  the  Colom- 
bian Government  on  the  Isthmus  was  overthrown. 

He  at  once  returned  to  Panama,  to  complete  preparations 
for  the  revolution,  and  to  report  to  his  associates  the  result 
of  his  mission.  (He  had  not  been  able  to  communicate  with 
them  while  in  America  beyond  those  two  messages  of  one 
word  each,  because  of  the  strict  censorship  and  surveillance 
which  the  Colombian  Government  maintained  over  the  mails 
and  telegraphs.)  The  other  revolutionists  were  at  first 
inclined  to  be  skeptical,   doubting  the  intentions  of  the 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  171 

United  States,  and  fearing  this  country  would  use  them 
merely  as  tools,  with  which  to  force  Colombia  to  revivify  and 
ratify  the  treaty.  It  was  not  until  the  United  States  gun- 
boat Nashville  appeared  off  Colon,  on  November  2,  that  they 
were  sufficiently  reassured  to  proceed  with  the  revolution. 
The  reason  for  the  Nashville's  arrival  at  that  time  was 
simple  and  sufficient.  Talk  of  revolution  was  in  the  air.  It 
was  common  talk,  at  Panama  and  elsewhere,  that  a  revolu- 
tion had  been  planned  and  would  be  put  into  effect  as  soon 
as  all  hope  of  Colombian  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  dead. 
November  4  had  been  openly  proclaimed  as  the  day  on  which 
the  blow  would  be  struck.  The  general  public  knew  these 
things,  and  of  course  the  Washington  Government  was  not 
ignorant  of  them. 

Moreover,  experience  had  taught  the  United  States  that  an 
Isthmian  revolution  or  insurrection  was  practically  certain 
to  imperil  American  lives  and  property,  and  also  to  menace 
that  free  transit  across  the  Isthmus  which  the  United  States, 
under  the  Treaty  of  1846,  was  bound  to  maintain.  On  more 
than  one  former  occasion,  the  latest  just  a  year  before, 
United  States  vessels  had  been  sent  to  Colon  or  Panama,  and 
United  States  troops  had  been  landed,  to  protect  the  railroad 
line  and  the  lives  and  property  of  Americans,  and  this  had 
been  done  sometimes  at  the  request  of,  and  sometimes  against 
the  protest  of,  the  Colombian  authorities.  The  principle  had 
been  established  that  the  United  States  might  thus  intervene 
at  its  own  discretion.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  it  became  evi- 
dent that  another  revolt  was  impending,  the  Nashville  was 
ordered  to  the  scene  so  that  intervention  could  be  promptly 
effected  if  it  should  appear  necessary.  Indeed,  in  view  of 
the  warnings  of  impending  revolt  which  it  had  received,  the 
United  States  Government  would  have  been  neglectful  of  its 
obligations  under  the  Treaty  of  1846  and  of  its  duties 
to  its  own  citizens,  if  it  had  not  taken  precisely  such  a 
precaution. 

November  4  had  been  appointed  by  the  revolutionists  for 
the  uprising  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Colombian  Govern- 


112  THE  PANAMA  KE VOLUTION 

ment  from  the  Isthmus.  General  Huertas  was  to  command 
the  Panaman  troops,  and  the  signal  for  action  was  to  be  the 
blowing  of  bugles  by  the  firemen.  But  the  crisis  was  precip- 
itated a  day  sooner  than  had  been  expected,  by  the  Colom- 
bians themselves.  Alarmed  by  reports  of  what  the  Pana- 
mans  were  doing,  the  Bogota  Government,  after  extraor- 
dinary delay,  sent  an  "army"  of  about  450  men  to  Colon. 
This  force,  under  command  of  General  Tovar,  reached  Colon 
on  the  steamer  Carthagena,  on  the  morning  of  November  3, 
and  was  promptly  landed,  without  any  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  Nashville.  General  Tovar,  accompanied  by  Gen- 
erals Castro,  Alban,  and  Amaya,  at  once  took  train  for 
Panama,  leaving  word  for  the  soldiers  to  follow  as  soon  as 
a  special  train  could  be  prepared  for  them,  Colonel  Torres 
remaining  in  charge  of  them,  and  the  soldiers,  many  of  them 
accompanied  by  their  wives,  "camping  out"  on  the  street  cor- 
ners of  Colon.  Colonel  J.  R.  Shaler,  the  General  Manager  of 
the  Panama  Railroad,  and  his  deputy,  H.  G.  Prescott,  imme- 
diately telephoned  to  Panama  the  news  of  the  arrival  and 
landing  of  the  troops  and  the  coming  of  the  oflScers  to 
Panama,  and  this  quickly  convinced  Dr.  Amador  and  his 
associates  that  the  blow  for  independence  must  be  struck  at 
once,  without  waiting  for  the  time  appointed. 

It  was  nearly  ten  o'clock  when  Dr.  Amador  received  the 
news,  and  the  Colombian  ofiicers  would  reach  Panama  by 
eleven  o'clock.  If  they  were  permitted  to  enter  the  city 
and  visit  the  barracks,  they  might  secure  the  support  of 
some  of  the  troops,  and  then  some  fighting  might  be  neces- 
sary. This  prospect  struck  Dr.  Amador  and  the  others  with 
consternation.  Some  of  the  leaders  are  said  to  have  hidden 
themselves  in  fear,  and  to  have  renounced  the  whole  project. 
Even  Dr.  Amador  and  the  most  resolute  of  his  comrades 
were  much  perplexed.  It  was  not  that  they  doubted  the  out- 
come, in  case  of  a  trial  of  strength.  General  Huertas  had 
enough  loyal  Panamans  at  his  command  to  deal  with  all 
the  recreant  ones  and  with  the  soldiers  at  Colon  to  boot. 
The  commanders  of  the  three  Colombian  gunboats  in  the 


APPROACHING  THE  CRISIS  173 

harbour  of  Panama  were  also  supposed  to  have  been  won  over 
to  the  revolution,  or  at  least  to  non-resistance — though  that 
supposition  was  ill-founded,  as  soon  appeared.  But  what 
Dr.  Amador  had  learned  in  the  United  States  had  convinced 
him  that  any  fighting  and  bloodshed  would  seriously  alienate 
the  sympathies  of  Americans. 

For  an  hour  there  was  some  quick  thinking  done,  and 
various  plans  of  action  were  proposed.  One  scheme,  which 
seems  to  have  been  suggested  in  all  seriousness,  though  it 
was  not  carried  out,  was  to  receive  the  officers  with  all 
possible  honour,  and  entertain  them  at  luncheon.  There 
their  wine  was  to  be  drugged  with  "knockout  drops"  so  as 
to  render  them  insensible,  when  they  could  be  locked  up 
without  resistance !  Waiving  this  and  other  more  fantastic 
schemeg.  Dr.  Amador  finally  went  to  the  military  headquar- 
ters, on  the  Plaza  Chiriqui,  to  confer  with  General  Huertas. 
That  officer  had  just  started,  with  his  staff,  resplendent  in 
full-dress  uniform,  to  the  railroad  station,  to  meet  the  com- 
ing Generals,  and  Dr.  Amador  had  no  opportunity  for  a 
word  with  him.  There  was  nothing  to  do,  apparently,  but 
to  await  the  progress  of  events. 

The  train  arrived  at  eleven  o'clock,  bearing  the  four 
Generals  and  their  staffs,  fifteen  men  in  all,  glittering  in 
elaborate  uniforms  and  bristling  with  all  the  arms  it  was 
permissible  for  officers  to  bear.  General  Huertas  greeted 
them  with  courtesy,  and  escorted  them  to  the  headquarters, 
while  the  leaders  of  the  revolutionary  conspiracy  looked  on 
from  a  distance,  wondering  what  would  happen  next.  Arrived 
at  headquarters.  General  Tovar  asked  General  Huertas  to 
conduct  him  and  the  other  Colombians  to  the  fortifications  of 
the  city,  and  especially  to  the  sea  wall.  Now  from  the  sea 
wall  it  would  be  easy  to  signal  to  the  Colombian  gunboats 
in  the  harbour.  Moreover,  there  were  mounted  upon  that  wall 
several  modern  rapid-fire  guns,  commanding  the  whole  city. 
A  small  body  of  resolute  men,  even  these  fifteen,  armed  to 
the  teeth,  might  make  much  trouble  if  they  got  possession  of 
those  guns.     So  the  wily  General  Huertas  determined  not 


1V4  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

to  gratify  their  desire.  He  put  them  off  in  characteristic 
Spanish-American  fashion.  He  reminded  them  that  it  was 
already  the  hour  of  the  siesta,  when  men  should  rest  and 
not  exert  themselves.  Moreover,  he  and  they  were  dressed 
in  their  most  elaborate  uniforms,  hot,  closely  buttoned,  and 
blazing  with  medals.  Surely,  it  would  be  wise  to  wait  until 
the  hour  of  the  siesta  was  past  and  the  day  was  a  little 
cooler,  and  they  had  all  had  time  to  exchange  full  dress 
for  more  comfortable  fatigue  uniforms.  Then  he  would  with 
extreme  pleasure  conduct  them  to  the  sea  wall,  and  facili- 
tate any  disposition  they  might  desire  to  make  of  their 
gallant  soldiers,  who  would  doubtless  by  that  time  have 
arrived  from  Colon. 

Thus  entreated,  the  Colombians  yielded.  They  were  enter- 
tained at  lunch,  and  in  one  way  or  another  their  suspicions 
were  lulled  and  inaction  was  maintained  until  late  in  the 
afternoon.  Then  the  non-arrival  of  their  troops  alarmed 
them,  and  it  is  said  that  in  some  way  an  intimation  was 
imparted  to  them  that  the  troops  were  being  detained  at 
Colon  and  that  they  themselves  were  in  danger  of  falling 
victims  to  a  revolutionary  plot.  At  any  rate  they  suddenly 
demanded  that  without  further  delay  the  local  troops  be 
mustered  and  placed  at  their  disposal,  and  that  they  be  con- 
ducted to  the  batteries  on  the  sea  wall. 

To  this  General  Huertas  assented.  On  some  plausible 
pretext,  however,  he  slipped  from  the  room  for  a  moment, 
and  found  Dr.  Amador  waiting,  just  outside  the  door,  all 
anxiety  and  impatience.  The  contrast  between  these  two 
men  was  most  striking.  The  one  was  advanced  in  years, 
venerable  and  stately  in  aspect,  and  yet  impetuous  as  youth. 
The  other  was  only  a  boy  in  stature  and  scarcely  more  than 
a  boy  in  years,  yet  at  the  time  deliberate  and  dilatory.  The 
latter,  however,  quickly  responded  to  the  zealous  initiative 
of  the  former. 

"Do  it !"  exhorted  Dr.  Amador,  in  an  impassioned  whisper. 
"Do  it  now !" 

The   little   General   needed   no   further   incitement.     He 


ARRESTING  THE  GENERALS  ^6 

ordered  out  his  faithful  soldiers,  under  arms  and  with  rifles 
loaded,  as  if  to  escort  the  Colombian  officers  and  man  for 
them  the  fortifications  of  Panama.  Then,  as  the  Colombians 
approached,  he  ordered  the  troops  to  level  their  rifles  upon 
them,  and  announced  to  the  astounded  officers  that  they  were 
his  prisoners!  Appeal  and  protest  and  menace  were  all  in 
vain.  At  the  muzzles  of  a  hundred  rifles  the  Colombians 
yielded,  and  were  promptly  disarmed  and  marched  off  to 
police  headquarters  and  locked  up  for  safe-keeping!  At  the 
same  moment,  Commandant  Antonio  A.  Valdez  and  Colonel 
J.  A.  Arango  J.  arrested  Senor  Obaldia,  the  Governor  of 
Panama,  and  conducted  him  to  prison.  He  was  immediately 
released,  in  their  nominal  custody,  but  was  in  fact  set  at 
entire  liberty.  His  arrest  was  a  mere  matter  of  form,  in 
which  he  acquiesced,  for  he  was,  and  was  well  known  to  be, 
in  full  sympathy  with  the  revolution;  but  it  was  deemed 
desirable  to  go  through  the  form  of  deposing  him  as  an 
appointee  of  the  Bogota  Government. 

A  prearranged  signal  was  now  given  to  the  three  gunboats, 
that  the  revolution  was  effected,  the  expectation  being  that 
they  would  at  once  give  their  allegiance  to  the  new  govern- 
ment. That  expectation  was  disappointed.  Two  of  the 
vessels,  the  Padilla  and  Chucuito,  remained  silent  and  im- 
passive. As  for  the  third,  the  Bogota,  her  commander,  Man 
uel  Martinez,  at  eight  o'clock  sent  word  to  the  city  that  if 
the  Colombian  Generals  were  not  released  by  ten  o'clock  he 
would  bombard  the  city.  To  this  threat  no  answer  was 
made,  and  of  course  the  Generals  were  not  released.  Accord- 
ingly, at  about  ten  o'clock,  the  Bogota  fired  three  shells  into 
the  city.  One  of  them  hit  and  killed  a  Chinese  coolie  near 
the  military  barracks,  and  that  was  the  only  blood  shed  in 
the  revolution.  The  Bogota  then  steamed  away  toward 
Buenaventura. 

The  next  morning,  November  4,  the  gunboat  Padilla,  also 
known  as  the  Twenty-First  of  December,  steamed  in  to  a 
station  under  the  guns  of  the  sea  wall,  anchored,  and  raised 
the  Panaman  flag  in  place  of  the  Colombian.     A  report 


176  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

became  current  that  the  Bogota  was  returning,  whereupon 
the  consular  corps  of  the  city,  representing  America,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Holland,  Ecuador, 
Guatemala,  Salvador,  Denmark,  Belgium,  Cuba,  Mexico, 
Brazil,  Honduras,  and  Peru,  under  the  lead  of  the  American 
Vice-Consul-General,  united  in  a  letter  to  her  commander, 
protesting  that  the  bombardment  of  a  defenceless  city,  with- 
out notice  to  the  consular  corps,  was  contrary  to  the  rights 
and  practices  of  civilised  nations.  This  letter  was  not 
delivered,  however,  as  the  Bogota  did  not  return  to  the 
harbour. 

Dr.  Amador  had  been  strongly  urged,  when  in  the  United 
States,  to  have  the  Provisional  Government  of  the  revolu- 
tionists so  completely  organised  that  it  would  be  ready  to 
take  charge  of  the  actual  work  of  Government  and  be  a  de 
facto  government  without  a  moment's  delay  after  the  expul- 
sion or  deposition  of  the  Colombian  officers.  This  was  done. 
The  Municipal  Council  of  the  City  of  Panama  met,  of  its  own 
right,  on  November  4.  There  were  present  the  President  of 
the  Council,  Demetrio  H.  Brid,  and  Rafael  Aizpuru,  Ricardo 
M.  Arango,  F.  Agustin  Arias,  Fabio  Arosemena,  R.  Jos6 
Maria  Chiari,  P.  Cucalon,  J.  Manuel,  Alcides  Dominguez, 
Samuel  Lewis,  Enrique  Linares,  Oscar  M.  McKay,  Manuel 
Maria  Mendez,  and  Dario  Vallarino.  There  was  a  free  dis- 
cussion of  the  existing  crisis  and  of  the  train  of  historic  inci- 
dents and  circumstances  which  had  led  to  it,  after  which  it 
was  unanimously  voted  that  Panama  should  be  declared  a 
free  and  independent  Republic,  and  that  pending  the  organ- 
isation of  a  permanent  government,  all  affairs  should  be 
placed  in  the  hands  of  an  Executive  Board  of  three,  consist- 
ing of  Jose  Agustin  Arango,  Federico  Boyd,  and  Tomas 
Arias,  together  with  the  following  Ministers:  Eusebio  A. 
Morales,  Secretary  of  State;  Manuel  Amador,  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury;  C.  A.  Mendoza,  Minister  of  Justice;  F.  V.  de 
la  Espriella,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs;  and  Nicanor  A. 
de  Obarrio,  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Navy.  This  resolution 
was  signed  by  the  members  of  the  Municipal  Council,  and 


"HOLDING  UP"  AN  AEMY  111 

then,  at  the  call  of  the  Council,  it  was  ratified  by  a  mass 
meeting  of  the  people  of  Panama,  held  that  afternoon  in  the 
Cathedral  Plaza.  The  Junta  at  the  same  time  issued  a  for 
mal  manifesto,  constituting  a  declaration  of  independence 
and  a  vindication  of  the  revolution.     (See  Appendix  V.) 

Meantime,  what  was  happening  at  Colon,  and  where  were 
the  450  Colombian  soldiers  who  had  come  to  prevent  the 
revolution,  and  whom  we  left  camping  out  upon  the  streets  ? 
Left  in  charge  of  the  troops  on  the  morning  of  November  3, 
Colonel  Torres  demanded  that  a  special  train  should  imme- 
diately be  provided,  to  convey  them  to  Panama.  Certainly, 
replied  the  Superintendent  of  the  railroad ;  a  train  would  be 
provided  as  soon  as  possible.  In  the  meantime,  he  respect- 
fully called  attention  to  the  invariable  rule  of  the  company, 
which  he  had  no  authority  to  waive,  that  all  transportation 
of  passengers  must  be  paid  for  in  advance.  He  assumed  that 
the  Colonel  in  command  would  attend  to  that?  The  Colonel 
was  nonplussed.  The  railroad  fare  for  450  men  would 
amount  to  nearly  |2,000  in  gold,  and  to  twice  as  much  in 
Colombian  silver — depreciated  stuff  called  in  derision 
"monkey  money"  and  "tin  money."  He  had  no  such  amount 
at  command,  nor  any  means  of  getting  it.  He  at  first  tried 
to  insist  that  the  soldiers  must  be  carried  free,  on  govern- 
ment business,  or  at  least  on  credit.  But  the  railroad 
officials  were  resolute  and  inflexible.  No  money,  no  trans- 
portation; and  that  was  all  there  was  about  it.  In  which 
unhappy  circumstances,  Colonel  Torres  and  his  warriors 
had  no  recourse  but  to  remain  bivouacked  on  the  hospitable 
streets  of  Colon.  Efforts  to  communicate  with  the  officers 
who  had  gone  on  before  to  Panama  were  vain.  Telegraph 
and  telephone  wires  refused  to  serve  them,  for  reasons  under- 
stood by  the  revolutionists. 

The  next  day,  November  4,  announcement  was  made  that 
the  revolution  had  occurred  at  Panama,  and  was  successful, 
and  that  General  Tovar  and  his  comrades  were  in  jail !  At 
this  some  of  the  Colombian  troops  began  to  grow  ugly  and 
threatened  to  begin  fighting  and  to  seize  the  railroad  by 


178  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

force  and  go  to  Panama.  Colonel  Torres  was  also  said  to 
have  threatened  to  kill  every  American  in  Colon  unless  the 
Generals  were  promptly  released.  It  has  since  been  denied 
that  such  a  threat  was  made.  The  Colombian  General 
Ospina,  who  afterwards  accompanied  General  Rafael  Reyes 
to  Panama  on  a  futile  mission  of  reunion,  declared  in  a  let- 
ter to  the  New  York  Evening  Post  (January  6,  1904)  that 
he  had  heard  a  prominent  Panaman  statesman  confess  that 
the  story  of  that  threat  was  invented  by  the  Prefect  of  Colon, 
and  was  reported  to  the  Commander  of  the  Nashville  in 
order  to  move  him  to  intervene  in  aid  of  the  revolutionists. 
However  that  may  be,  there  is  no  question  that  the  Ameri- 
cans in  Colon  believed  the  threat  had  been  made,  and  it  is 
indisputable  that  the  Colombians  did  threaten  to  seize  the 
railroad.  Thereupon  the  railroad  oflScers  made  appeal  to 
the  captain  of  the  Nashville,  Commander  John  Hubbard,  for 
protection,  and  he  promptly  landed  fifty  bluejackets,  to  serve 
as  guardians  of  the  peace.  Their  presence  on  shore  effect- 
ually restrained  the  martial  ardour  of  the  Colombians,  and 
no  disturbance  occurred.  At  the  same  time  Commander 
Hubbard  wrote  to  the  Alcalde  of  Colon  and  to  the  Chief  of 
Police  the  substance  of  an  official  order  which  he  had 
received  from  Washington,  to  this  effect:  that  affairs  at 
Colon  were  in  such  a  condition  that  the  movement  of  the 
Colombian  troops  from  Colon  to  Panama  would  precipitate 
a  conflict  which  would  interfere  with  that  free  and  unin- 
terrupted transit  of  the  Isthmus  which  the  United  States 
was  pledged  to  maintain,  and  that,  therefore,  he  had  directed 
the  Superintendent  of  the  Railroad  not  to  transport  the 
troops  of  either  party.  This  was  in  exact  accord  with  and 
continuation  of  the  order  already  quoted,  as  given  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Moody,  in  September,  1902,  for- 
bidding ^^any  transportation  of  troops  which  might  contra- 
vene provisions  of  treaty." 

So  Colonel  Torres  and  his  men  remained  stranded  on  the 
streets  of  Colon.  It  was  impossible  to  march  across  the 
Isthmus,  the  railroad  would  not  carry  them,  and  the  ship 


THE  AEMY  SENT  HOME  179 

which  had  brought  them  thither,  the  Garthagena,  steamed 
away  at  full  speed  that  very  day,  for  home! 

That  same  day  the  British  consul  at  Colon  suggested  that 
if  there  were  need  of  a  stronger  police  force,  British  blue- 
jackets might  be  landed  from  the  cruiser  Amphion,  which 
lay  at  Panama.  The  suggestion  was  well  meant,  but  was 
not  accepted.  The  United  States  saw  no  need  of  any  other 
intervention  than  its  own,  and  was  determined  there  should 
be  none.  Already,  on  November  3,  the  troop-ship  Dixie  had 
been  ordered  to  join  the  Nashville  at  Colon,  and  the  cruiser 
Boston  had  been  ordered  to  Panama,  and  they  arrived  at 
those  ports  on  November  5  and  7  respectively.  Other  vessels 
were  promptly  despatched  to  join  them,  and  within  ten  days 
the  cruiser  Atlanta^  the  battleship  Maine,  and  the  yacht 
Mayflower  were  at  Colon,  and  the  cruiser  Marhleheadf  the 
gunboat  Concord,  and  the  monitor  Wyoming  were  by  the 
side  of  the  Boston  at  Panama.  Thus  the  United  States  had 
the  whole  situation  perfectly  in  hand.  It  was  announced  on 
November  4  that  the  United  States  would  allow  no  forces 
hostile  to  Panama  to  land  within  fifty  miles  of  Panama,  or 
anywhere  on  the  Caribbean  coast  of  the  Isthmus,  and  on 
November  6  the  NasJwllle  set  out  from  Colon  for  a  cruise 
to  Porto  Bello  and  along  the  coast  to  prevent  any  such, 
landing. 

It  was  also  desirable  to  get  the  450  Colombian  soldiers  out 
of  Colon  and  out  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  as  well  as  to 
keep  others  from  getting  in,  and  this  consummation  was 
expedited  and  facilitated  by  the  commander  of  those  troops. 
He  offered  to  take  the  men  away,  by  the  first  available  ship, 
and  in  peace,  if  the  Panama  Government  would  "make  it 
an  object  to  him."  Now  there  was  at  that  time  about  $140,- 
000  in  debased  Colombian  currency  in  the  Panama  treasury, 
worth  about  |56,000  in  gold.  The  Panamans  concluded  that 
it  would  be  a  cheap  and  easy  way  of  getting  rid  of  the 
Colombians,  to  accept  his  offer.  So  they  gave  him  |8,000  in 
gold,  and  he  loyally  kept  his  word.  On  November  5,  the  men . 
and  their  wives  were  hurried  aboard  the  Roval  Mail  steam- 


180  THE  PANAMA  EE VOLUTION 

ship  Orinoco,  and  Colon  knew  them  no  more.  The  oflScer  did 
not,  of  course,  mean  to  go  back  to  Colombia  with  them. 
That  would  have  been  inconvenient  and  probably  dangerous 
for  him,  seeing  the  compact  he  had  made  with  the  Panamans. 
His  scheme  was  to  go  to  Jamaica,  and  enjoy  his  |8,000  in 
that  loveliest  of  the  Antilles.  But,  alas  for  him!  His 
precious  soldiers  found  out  what  a  bargain  he  had  made,  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  money  belonged  to  them  as 
much  as  to  him,  seeing  that  it  was  the  price  of  their  depart- 
ure from  the  Isthmus.  So  they  rose  against  him  and  took  it 
from  him,  to  the  uttermost  peso;  and  what  became  of  him 
thereafter,  deponent  saith  not ! 

Just  as  the  Orinoco  left  Colon,  the  Dixie  steamed  into 
the  roadstead.  At  the  same  time  there  arrived  at  the  Colon 
station  a  special  train  from  Panama,  bearing  General  Tovar 
and  his  comrades,  who  had  been  released  on  condition  that 
they  would  immediately  leave  the  country,  a  condition  they 
were  glad  enough  to  fulfil.  They  were  too  late  to  go  on  the 
Orinoco y  so  they  had  to  wait  at  Colon  until  November  12, 
when  they  got  away  on  the  Spanish  steamer  Leon  XIII. 

Thereafter  there  were  no  military  operations  of  signifi- 
cance. The  United  States  authorities  on  November  9  for- 
mally announced  that  no  landing  of  Colombian  or  any  other 
alien  troops  would  be  permitted  in  any  part  of  the  territory 
of  Panama.  Three  days  later  Esteban  Huertas  was  made 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Panaman  army,  but  the  functions 
of  himself  and  his  miniature  army  were  chiefly  ornamental. 

There  arose  some  rumors  that  a  naval  expedition  was 
approaching  Panama  from  Buenaventura,  and  the  American 
ships  in  the  Pacific  were  instructed  to  look  out  for  it,  but 
the  rumors  were  baseless.  Also  there  were  tales  of  a  great 
Colombian  army  being  marched  to  Panama  by  land,  which 
provoked  only  derision  from  those  acquainted  with  the  char- 
acter of  the  country  which  such  an  army  would  have  to 
traverse — the  land  of  the  San  Bias  Indians,  which  consists, 
as  is  supposed,  chiefly  of  alternating  mountains  and  mo- 
rasses, but  which  in  fact  has  never  yet  been  fully  surveyed 


NEW  GOVEKNMENT  ESTABLISHED  181 

or  explored  by  white  meD.  The  object  of  such  reports  was, 
however,  obvious.  It  was  to  create  the  impression  that 
Colombia  was  sincerely  and  energetically  striving  to  reduce 
the  seceding  State  to  subjection  again,  and  was  prevented 
from  so  doing  only  by  the  superior  force  of  the  United 
States.  The  truth  was  that  Colombia  made  no  serious  effort 
in  that  direction,  and  was  in  no  condition  to  make  one,  and 
that  she  would,  in  all  probability,  have  failed  to  reconquer 
Panama  even  had  the  United  States  refrained  from  giving 
the  latter  any  protection. 

In  the  absence  of  military  operations,  political  activities 
were  abundant.  The  Provisional  Government  of  Panama 
assumed  the  work  of  actual  administration  so  promptly, 
energetically,  and  efficiently,  that  on  November  7  it  secured 
official  recognition  from  the  United  States  as  the  de  facto 
government  of  the  Isthmus.  This  recognition  was  conveyed 
to  the  Junta  by  Felix  Ehrman,  the  American  Vice-Consul- 
General  at  Panama.  The  Junta  had  informed  him  on 
November  4  of  the  act  of  secession  and  the  formation  of  the 
Provisional  Government,  and  he  had  replied  on  November  5 
simply  acknowledging  receipt  of  their  communication.  He, 
of  course,  made  full  reports  to  the  government  at  Washing- 
ton and  in  consequence  presently  received  this  note  of 
instructions: 

"The  people  of  Panama  have,  by  apparently  unanimous 
movement,  dissolved  their  political  connection  with  the 
Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  independence. 
When  you  are  satisfied  that  a  de  facto  government,  republi- 
can in  form  and  without  substantial  opposition  from  its  own 
people,  has  been  established  in  the  State  of  Panama,  you  will 
enter  into  relations  with  it  as  the  responsible  government 
of  the  territory,  and  look  to  it  for  all  due  action  to  protect 
the  persons  and  property  of  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
and  to  keep  open  the  Isthmian  transit,  in  accordance  with 
the  obligations  of  existing  treaties  governing  the  relations 
of  the  United  States  to  that  territory.'^ 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions  on  November  7, 
Mr.  Ehrman  wrote  to  the  Junta  as  follows: 


182  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 

*'As  it  appears  that  the  people  of  Panama  have,  by  unani- 
mous movement,  dissolved  their  political  connection  with 
the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  Resumed  their  independence, 
and  as  there  is  no  opposition  to  the  Provisional  Government 
in  the  State  of  Panama,  I  have  to  inform  you  that  the  Pro- 
visional Government  will  be  held  responsible  for  the  pro 
tection  of  the  persons  and  property  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  to  keep  the  Isthmian  transit  free,  in 
accordance  with  obligations  of  existing  treaties  relative  to 
the  Isthmian  territory." 

To  this  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Senor  de  la 
Espriella,  replied  cordially  on  November  8,  declaring  that 
the  Republic  of  Panama  accepted  fully  the  responsibility 
imposed  upon  it,  and  would  regard  it  as  a  sacred  and  pleas- 
ant duty  to  fulfil  all  the  duties  required  by  the  existing 
treaties  which  had  been  made  by  Colombia  relative  to  the 
Isthmian  territory.  Meantime,  on  November  7,  M.  Bunau- 
Varilla  was  appointed  Minister  of  Panama  to  the  United 
States,  in  accordance  with  his  request  and  the  promise  of 
Dr.  Amador,  and  a  Commission,  consisting  of  Dr.  Amador 
and  Senors  Boyd  and  C.  C.  Arosemena,  was  constituted  to 
cooperate  with  him  in  framing  and  negotiating  a  canal 
treaty  with  the  United  States.  The  Commissioners  set  out 
on  November  10  for  the  United  States,  the  Minister  being 
already  here.  Three  days  later  M.  Bunau-Varilla  was  for- 
mally received  by  President  Roosevelt,  and  thus  the  new 
Republic  was  diplomatically  recognised  and  received  into 
the  community  of  nations.  The  canal  treaty  was  speedily  ne- 
gotiated, and  on  November  18  was  signed  at  Washington  by 
Secretary  Hay  and  M.  Bunau-Varilla.     (See  Appendix  VI.) 

Colombia  also  was  busy  with  politics  and  diplomacy.  The 
Bogota  Government  was  promptly  informed  of  the  attitude 
and  intentions  of  the  United  States  through  the  following 
despatch  from  our  Government  to  Mr.  Beaupre,  who  still 
remained  at  the  Colombian  capital : 

"The  people  of  Panama  having,  by  an  apparently  unani- 
mous movement  dissolved  their  political  connection  with 


COLOMBIAN  PROTESTS  183 

the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their  independence, 
and  having  adopted  a  government  of  their  own,  republican 
in  form,  with  which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  has  entered  into  relations,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  in  accordance  with  the  ties  of  friendship 
which  have  so  long  and  so  happily  existed  between  the 
respective  nations,  most  earnestly  commends  to  the  govern 
ments  of  Colombia  and  of  Panama  the  peaceful  and  equita- 
ble settlement  of  all  questions  at  issue  between  them.  He 
holds  that  he  is  bound  not  merely  by  treaty  obligations,  but 
by  the  interests  of  civilisation,  to  see  that  the  peaceful  traf- 
fic of  the  world  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  shall  not 
longer  be  disturbed  by  a  constant  succession  of  unnecessary 
and  wasteful  civil  wars." 


In  reply  the  Bogota  Government  on  November  8  formally 
but  vainly  protested  against  American  recognition  of  Pan- 
aman  independence,  and  appointed  General  Rafael  Reyes — 
one  of  the  ablest  and  highest-minded  statesmen  in  that 
Republic — a  special  commissioner  to  proceed  to  Panama  and 
negotiate  a  return  of  that  State  to  its  former  union  with 
Colombia.  Before  he  could  get  to  the  Isthmus,  however,  a 
company  of  five  self-appointed  commissioners  from  the 
Colombian  state  of  Bolivar  arrived  at  Colon  on  the  Ham- 
burg-American steamer  Scotia^  on  a  similar  errand.  They 
were  not  permitted  to  land,  but  were  met  on  shipboard  by  a 
Panaman  commission  composed  of  Seiiors  Arias,  Espinosa, 
Morales,  and  Arosemena.  A  temperate  and  amicable  inter- 
view ensued,  but  was  entirely  fruitless.  That  was  on 
November  16.  On  the  same  day  President  Marroquin,  of 
Colombia,  took  the  extraordinary  and  most  irregular  step 
of  cabling  directly  to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  an 
elaborate  and  vehement  protest  against  American  recogni- 
tion of  Panama.  Both  the  Senate  and  the  President  and 
his  Secretary  of  State  would  have  been  justified  in  resent- 
ing this  performance,  which  can  hardly  have  been  inadvert- 
ent but  must  surely  have  been  intended  by  Dr.  Marroquin 
as  a  deliberate  slight  to  the  American  Executive,  but  it  was 
generously  and  good-naturedly  decided  to  overlook  it.    Of 


184  THE  PANAMA  KE VOLUTION 

course  the  protest  had  no  effect  whatever  at  Washington, 
though  it  is  possible  it  had  and  was  intended  to  have  some 
effect  at  home  in  Colombia,  where  the  Government  was  in 
desperate  straits  to  keep  the  states  of  Cauca  and  Antioquia 
from  following  the  example  of  Panama  and  seceding. 

General  Reyes,  accompanied  by  Generals  Ospina,  Holguin, 
and  others,  arrived  at  Colon  on  November  19,  on  the  French 
steamer  Canada.  Like  their  predecessors  from  Bolivar,  they 
were  not  permitted  to  go  ashore,  but  they  had  a  conference 
with  the  Panaman  commissioners  on  shipboard.  It,  too, 
was  without  practical  result,  unless  to  demonstrate  further 
the  irrevocable  nature  of  the  step  which  Panama  had  taken. 
At  its  termination.  General  Reyes  came  on  to  the  United 
States,  having  been  commissioned  to  do  so  as  a  special  envoy 
with  extraordinary  powers.  He  reached  Washington  on 
November  28,  and  was  received  with  the  courtesy  and  con- 
sideration to  which  his  character  and  attainments,  as  well 
as  the  nature  of  his  errand,  entitled  him.  He  pleaded,  or 
argued,  the  cause  of  Colombia  with  consummate  ability,  and 
with  frank  integrity ;  and  with  the  zeal  of  a  double  interest, 
for  he  was  ijot  only  a  loyal  and  patriotic  representative  of 
President  Marroquin,  but  also,  as  he  and  all  men  then  real- 
ised, he  was  practically  designated  to  be  President  Marro- 
quin's  successor  as  the  Chief  of  the  Colombian  State.  He 
went  so  far  as  substantially  to  offer,  if  the  United  States 
would  only  compel  the  return  of  Panama  to  Colombian 
allegiance,  to  have  the  defunct  Hay-Herran  treaty  resur- 
rected, revivified,  and  ratified,  with  an  amendment  waiving 
the  110,000,000  bonus  and  giving  the  United  States  the  right 
of  way  across  the  Isthmus  gratis.  It  does  not  appear  to  have 
occurred  to  him,  though  it  should  have  done  so,  as  it  did  to 
others,  that  this  offer  was  a  practical  confirmation  of  the 
charges  that  the  Marroquin  government  could  have  had  the 
treaty  ratified  if  it  had  wished,  and  that  it  deliberately 
strangled  and  killed  that  thing  of  its  own  creation. 

This  extraordinary  proposition  appears  to  have  originated 
at  Bogotd  and  to  have  been  considered  and  approved  by  Dr. 


AN  AMAZING  PROPOSITION  185 

Marroquin,  according  to  an  authentic  despatch  from  that 
capital  quoted  as  follows  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  7,  1903 : 

"Knowing  that  revolution  has  already  commenced  in  Pan- 
ama (an  eminent  Colombian)  says  that  if  the  government 
of  the  United  States  will  land  troops  to  preserve  Colombian 
sovereignty,  and  the  transit,  if  requested  by  Colombian 
charge  d'affaires,  this  government  will  declare  martial  law; 
and,  by  virtue  of  vested  constitutional  authority,  when  public 
order  is  disturbed,  will  approve  by  decree  the  ratification  of 
the  canal  treaty  as  signed;  or,  if  the  government  of  the 
United  States  prefers,  will  call  extra  session  of  the  Congress 
— with  new  and  friendly  members — next  May  to  approve  the 
treaty.  (An  eminent  Colombian)  has  the  perfect  confidence 
of  Vice-President,  he  says,  and  if  it  became  necessary  will  go 
to  the  isthmus  or  send  representative  there  to  adjust  mat- 
ters along  above  lines  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people 
there." 

"This  despatch,"  said  President  Roosevelt  in  that  mes- 
sage, "is  noteworthy  from  two  standpoints.  Its  offer  of 
immediately  guaranteeing  the  treaty  to  us  is  in  sharp  con- 
trast with  the  positive  and  contemptuous  refusal  of  the 
Congress  which  had  just  closed  its  sessions  to  consider  fa- 
vourably such  a  treaty ;  it  shows  that  the  government  which 
made  the  treaty  really  had  absolute  control  over  the  situa- 
tion, but  did  not  choose  to  exercise  this  control.  The  des- 
patch further  calls  on  us  to  restore  order  and  secure 
Colombian  supremacy  in  the  Isthmus,  from  which  the  Colom- 
bian Government  has  just  by  its  action  decided  to  bar  us  by 
preventing  the  construction  of  the  canal." 

The  identity  of  "an  eminent  Colombian"  will,  of  course, 
be  obvious  to  the  reader  of  the  narrative.  President  Roose- 
velt was  by  oflScial  propriety  and  courtesy  constrained  thus 
to  designate  him  with  the  bracketed  phrase,  but  there  was 
no  secret  and  no  doubt  as  to  who  he  was. 

The  mission  of  General  Re^es  thus  came  to  naught,  and 
the  American  recognition  and  protection  of  Panama  were 
properly  maintained.    In  rapid  succession  many  other  gov- 


186  THE  PANAMA  KEVOLUTION 


ernments  also  recognised  the  new  Republic,  until  all  had 
done  so  save  Colombia  itself.  The  dates  of  official  recog- 
nition— which  in  most  cases  were  delayed  long  after  practi- 
cal but  informal  recognition — were  as  follows :  United  States, 
November  7;  France,  November  16;  China,  November  22; 
Austria-Hungary,  November  27;  Germany,  November  30; 
Russia,  December  7;  Denmark,  December  8;  Belgium, 
December  9;  Peru,  December  21;  Sweden  and  Norway, 
December  22 ;  Cuba,  December  23 ;  Great  Britain,  December 
26 ;  Switzerland,  Japan,  and  Italy,  December  28 ;  Costa  Rica, 
December  29 ;  Nicaragua,  January  1,  1904 ;  Persia,  January 
11;  Portugal,  February  16;  Corea,  February  23;  Mexico, 
Brazil,  and  Argentina,  March  3;  Siam,  March  4;  Ecuador, 
September  21.  The  long  delay  of  Ecuador  was  doubtless  due 
to  the  close  and  sympathetic  relations  between  that  country 
and  Colombia.  For  a  time  Colombia  refused  to  recognise 
Panama  in  any  way,  even  to  the  extent  of  honouring  Pana- 
man  postage  stamps  in  the  mails.  After  the  accession  of 
President  Reyes  at  Bogota,  however,  a  more  reasonable 
spirit  began  to  be  developed,  in  1905  actual  recognition  of 
postal  service  between  the  two  countries  was  effected,  and 
the  way  to  an  ultimate  establishment  of  amicable  relations 
was  opened. 

Meantime  the  Provisional  Government  took  prompt  steps 
toward  placing  the  Republic  upon  a  permanent  constitu- 
tional basis,  and  on  December  13  it  issued  a  call  for  a  gen- 
eral election,  to  be  held  on  January  15,  1904,  for  members  of 
a  National  Constitutional  Convention,  by  which  the  organic 
and  fundamental  law  of  the  Republic  would  be  formulated 
and  decreed.  • 


CHAPTER  XI 

AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

The  policy  of  the  American  Government  toward  the  Pan- 
ama revolution  was  severely  criticised  in  two  quarters:  to 
wit,  by  Colombians,  and  by  a  certain  class  of  partisan  oppo- 
nents of  the  administration  in  the  United  States.  By  the 
world  at  large  it  was  generally  approved.  That  such 
approval  was  deserved  should  be  evident  to  all  who  regard 
the  matter  impartially,  logically,  and  with  a  proper  his- 
torical perspective.  The  major  part  of  criticism  has  been 
directed  against  the  orders  to  our  naval  forces,  which  have 
been  said  to  have  prevented,  and  to  have  been  intended  to 
prevent,  the  Colombian  Government  from  suppressing  rebel- 
lion. (The  charge  that  the  revolution  was  conceived  and 
planned  in  this  country,  "in  the  shadow  of  the  Capitol  at 
Washington,"  with  the  connivance  of  our  Government,  is  too 
absurdly  false  to  require  attention.  The  indisputable  facts 
of  the  record  completely  disprove  it,  and  show  it  to  have 
had  its  origin  in  nothing  better  than  either  ignorance  or 
malignance.)  The  orders  in  question  were,  however,  based 
upon  long-established  treaty  rights  and  duties,  and  were 
consistent  with  the  policy  and  practice  of  our  Government 
for  more  than  a  half  century  before.  I  have  already  indi- 
cated that  the  sending  of  the  Nashville  to  Colon  on  November 
2  was  a  mere  repetition  of  what  had  been  done  before  several 
times,  whenever  there  seemed  to  be  need  of  protection  to 
American  interests  there.  It  was  perfectly  well  known,  not 
only  to  the  Government  but  to  the  general  public,  that  a 
revolution  was  imminent  on  the  Isthmus,  and  that  Colombian 
troops  were  on  their  way  thither  to  suppress  it.  In  such  a 
case,  the  lives  and  property  of  Americans  were  sure  to  be 

187 


188  AMEKICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

endangered,  and  free  transit  on  the  railroad  to  be  inter- 
rupted. Certainly  it  was  incumbent  upon  the  Government 
to  take  prompt  steps  to  prevent  such  wrongs,  rather  than  to 
wait  until  they  were  committed  and  then  vainly  try  to 
undo  or  savagely  to  avenge  them.  What  was  the  order  to 
the  commander  of  the  Nashville?  It  was  identical  with  that 
sent  on  the  same  day,  November  2,  to  the  commanders  of 
the  Boston  and  the  Dixie,  and  ran  as  follows: 

"Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interruption 
threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  line  of  railroad.  Pre- 
vent landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hostile  intent,  either 
Government  or  insurgent,  either  at  Colon,  Porto  Bello,  or 
other  point." 

That  amounted  simply  to  an  order  to  maintain  our  treaty 
rights  and  to  fulfil  our  treaty  obligations,  concerning  transit 
on  the  Isthmus,  and  it  was  directed  against  the  Panaman 
revolutionists  as  much  as  against  the  Colombians.  Neither 
party  was  to  be  permitted  to  interfere  with  the  free  working 
of  the  railroad.  Neither  was  to  be  permitted  to  land  armed 
forces  with  hostile  intent  at  the  terminals  of  the  railroad, 
where  they  would  certainly  convert  the  road  into  a  theatre 
of  hostilities,  or  at  any  other  point — such  as  Porto  Bello — 
from  which  their  sole  purpose  would  be  to  march  against 
the  railroad  and  interrupt  traffic.  On  the  same  day  this 
order  was  sent  to  Rear-Admiral  Glass  at  Acapulco,  directing 
him  to  proceed  at  once  to  Panama  with  all  available  forces. 

"Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  interrup- 
tion threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  line.  Prevent  land- 
ing of  any  armed  force  either  government  or  insurgent,  at 
any  point  within  fifty  miles  of  Panama.  If  doubtful  as  to 
the  intent  of  any  armed  force,  occupy  Ancon  Hill  strongly 
with  artillery.  Government  force  reported  approaching  the 
isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their  landing,  if  in  your  judg- 
ment landing  would  precipitate  a  conflict." 

As  before,  the  object  was  to  maintain  our  treaty  rights 
and  fulfil  our  treaty  obligations     It  is  true,  the  order  was 


MAINTAINING  TREATY  RIGHTS  180 

calculated  to  prevent  Colombia  from  sending  troops  to  sup 
press  the  insurrection.  But  if  Colombia  had  exercised  rea 
sonable  prudence,  she  would  have  sent  an  army  thither  many 
weeks  before,  when  the  revolution  was  first  openly  threat- 
ened. Then  she  would  have  had  it  on  the  ground,  for  ready 
use.  But  since  she  did  not  do  so,  but  deliberately  elected 
to  wait  until  the  revolution  was  an  accomplished  fact,  the 
United  States  was  not  required  to  let  her  violate  our  treaty 
rights  for  the  vindication  of  her  own  neglected  and  practi- 
cally abandoned  authority.  Again,  on  November  4,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Nashville  was  ordered  to  send  a  battery 
across  to  Panama,  to  compel  the  Colombian  gunboat  to  stop 
bombarding  that  city — an  order  which  was  perfectly  proper, 
since  such  bombardment  would  have  interrupted  free  transit 
of  the  Isthmus,  but  which  it  was  not  necessary  to  execute, 
since  the  Bogota  did  not  resume  the  bombardment  after  the 
firing  of  three  shells  the  evening  before.  I  have  already 
mentioned  the  order  not  to  permit  the  railroad  to  be  used 
for  military  purposes.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  proper 
than  that,  for  it  was  obvious  that  if  either  party  were  per- 
mitted to  make  such  use  of  the  road,  the  other  party  would 
have  a  right  to  attack  it,  and  the  free  use  of  the  road  for 
peaceful  transit,  guaranteed  by  the  United  States  in  the 
Treaty  of  1846,  would  have  been  interrupted.  On  November 
9  this  order  was  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  Boston  at 
Panama : 

^^Sufficient  force  must  be  sent  to  watch  movements  closely 
of  the  British  steamers  seized  at  Buenaventura,  and  to  pre- 
vent the  landing  of  men  with  hostile  intent  within  limits  of 
the  State  of  Panama." 

At  that  time  the  Panaman  revolution  had  been  fully 
accomplished.  The  Provisional  Government  was  at  work, 
efficiently  performing  its  functions,  and  had  been  recognised 
by  the  United  States.  Colombia  had  become  a  foreign  power. 
Under  the  Treaty  of  1846  the  United  States  was  bound  to 
guarantee  the  Isthmus  against  oppression  by  any  foreign 


190  AMEEICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

Power.  Therefore  it  ordered  the  protection  of  the  Isthmus 
against  Colombian  invasion.  It  may  be  said — it  has  been 
said — that  such  construction  of  treaty  obligations  was 
strained  and  unreasonable,  and  that  in  forbidding  Colombia 
to  attempt  the  reconquest  of  Panama  this  country  was  act- 
ing without  warrant  in  international  law.  That  is  not  to  be 
conceded.  But  even  if,  for  sake  of  argument,  it  were  to  be 
conceded,  what  would  it  prove?  Nations  do  not  wait  for 
warrants  in  international  law  when  their  own  welfare  is 
jeoparded.  Self-preservation  or  self-defence  is  proverbially 
declared  to  be  "nature's  first  law."  It  is  that,  for  states 
as  well  as  for  individuals.  There  was  no  "warrant  in  inter- 
national law"  for  our  Declaration  of  Independence.  There 
was  none  for  the  conduct  of  Jay,  Adams,  and  Franklin  in 
1783,  in  making  a  treaty  in  direct  violation  of  the  instruc- 
tions under  which  they  were  commissioned.  There  was  none 
for  Jefferson's  dictum,  that  if  France  would  not  sell  Lou- 
isiana to  us,  we  must  take  it  from  her  by  force;  or  for 
Monroe's  similar  policy  toward  Spain  in  Florida.  There  was 
none  for  our  long-maintained  policy  forbidding  Spain  to 
do  as  she  pleased  with  Cuba.  There  was  none  for  John 
Quincy  Adams's  warning  to  the  Russian  Government  to 
relinquish  its  holdings  upon  this  continent,  or  for  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  which  logically  followed.  There  was  no  legal 
sanction  for  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  in  warning 
Great  Britain  and  France  to  quit  Hawaii  and  in  ordering 
France  out  of  Mexico.  It  may  be,  of  course,  that  the  United 
States  sinned  in  all  these  things.  If  so,  then  it  kept  on 
sinning  in  the  same  way  in  Panama.  But  if  it  did  not  sin 
in  them,  neither  did  it  when  it  pursued  the  same  policy  in 
Panama. 

The  question  of  our  Government's  policy  in  Panama  is,  as 
the  term  implies,  a  question  of  policy.  It  is  not  a  question 
of  executive  details,  because  there  were  no  such  details  con- 
cerning which,  per  se,  any  material  question  could  be  raised. 
There  was  no  waging  of  war.  There  was  no  slaughter. 
There  were  no  torturings  nor  imprisonments.    There  was  no 


THE  LAW  FOE  THE  CANAL  191 

arbitrary  overthrowing  of  an  established  government.  All 
that  was  done  was  to  exercise  the  moral  influence  of  a 
definite  and  peaceful  policy. 

Our  policy  was  justified,  and  indeed  made  necessary,  by 
domestic  obligations.  Congress  had  directed  the  President 
to  construct  a  canal  at  Panama,  rather  than  at  any  other 
point.  We  need  not  stop  to  consider  why  Panama  was 
chosen.  That  was  a  matter  of  congressional  enactment,  not 
of  administrative  policy.  The  question  of  route  had  been 
discussed,  with  .  a  wealth  of  investigation  and  detail,  for 
many  years.  Whether  wisely  or  not,  and  whether  for  ade- 
quate or  inadequate  reasons.  Congress  finally  declared, 
explicitly  and  unequivocally,  in  favour  of  Panama.  The 
President  had  to  obey  that  mandate.  There  was  no  alter- 
native, save  in  case  of  his  inability  to  make  satisfactory 
terms  within  a  reasonable  time.  The  President  promptly 
proceeded  to  do  the  work  prescribed  by  Congress.  He  made 
terms,  which  the  Senate  accepted  as  satisfactory,  for  the 
construction  and  control  of  the  canal.  He  was  himself  the 
sole  judge  of  what  was  a  "reasonable  time"  in  which  to  make 
such  terms.  That  time  proved  to  be  something  less  than  a 
year  and  a  half,  and  it  was  approved  as  "reasonable"  by 
the  Senate.  Thus  far,  then,  the  President  scrupulously 
obeyed  the  law. 

But  it  is  said  that  the  law  directed  him  to  make  his  terms 
with  the  Colombian  Government,  and  that,  instead,  he  made 
them  with  Panama.  It  is  true  that  Congress  mentioned  the 
Colombian  Government  as  the  one  with  which  he  was  to 
negotiate.  Obviously,  that  was  because  it  was  at  that  time 
the  sovereign  of  Panama.  But  it  is  equally  obvious  that 
Congress  meant  not  that  government,  per  se,  but  whatever 
lawful  government  the  President  might  find  in  possession  of 
the  Isthmus.  That  is  because  (a)  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  could  not  guarantee  that  President  Marroquin's  or 
any  special  Colombian  Government  would  remain  in  power 
at  Panama,  nor  give  the  President  any  assurance  of  what 
government  he  would  find  there  when  he  made  the  treaty; 


192  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

and  because  (b)  it  did  not  say  that  if  a  change  of  govern- 
ment should  occur  upon  the  Isthmus  before  a  treaty  could 
be  made,  he  should  abandon  Panama  and  go  elsewhere.  The 
prescription  had  reference  to  the  place,  rather  than  to  the 
power.  It  was  geographical  rather  than  political.  As  the 
President  himself  wrote  in  his  annual  message  of  December 
7,  1903: 

"When  the  Congress  directed  that  we  should  take  the 
Panama  route  under  treaty  with  Colombia,  the  essence  of 
the  condition,  of  course,  referred  not  to  the  government 
which  controlled  that  route,  but  to  the  route  itself;  to  the 
territory  across  which  the  route  lay,  not  to  the  name  which 
for  the  moment  the  territory  bore  on  the  map.  The  purpose 
of  the  law  was  to  authorise  the  President  to  make  a  treaty 
with  the  power  in  actual  control  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
This  purpose  has  been  fulfilled." 

The  President  then  made  satisfactory  terms,  within  a 
reasonable  time,  and  he  made  them  with  the  actual  govern- 
ment of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  He  obeyed  the  law  of 
Congress  in  letter  and  in  spirit.  So  far  as  domestic  obliga- 
tions were  concerned,  his  policy  was  just  and  equitable. 

Our  policy  was  also  justified  by  our  legal  obligations  to 
Colombia.  Our  Treaty  of  1846  with  New  Granada  guaran- 
teed to  New  Granada  (or  Colombia)  "the  perfect  neutrality" 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  "with  the  view  that  the  free 
transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be  inter- 
rupted or  embarrassed,"  and  also  guaranteed  "the  rights  of 
sovereignty  and  property  which  New  Granada  has  and  pos- 
sesses over  the  said  territory."  It  was  perfectly  understood, 
and  was  specifically  and  repeatedly  declared,  that  this  guar- 
antee was  solely  against  alien  aggression,  and  was  not  to 
be  interpreted  as  promising  protection  against  domestic 
revolution  or  as  assuring  the  perpetuity  of  the  same  domes- 
tic system  of  government  that  then  existed.  "The  purpose 
of  the  stipulation,"  wrote  Mr.  Secretary  Seward  on  Novem- 
ber 9,  1865,  "was  to  guarantee  the  Isthmus  against  seizure 
or  invasion  by  a  foreign  Power  only.     It  could  not  have 


COLOMBIAN  REVOLUTIONS  193 

been  contemplated  that  we  are  to  become  a  party  to  any 
civil  war  in  that  country  by  defending  the  Isthmus  against 
another  party."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  several 
revolutions  in  Colombia  after  the  making  of  that  treaty,  to 
none  of  which  w^as  the  United  States  a  party,  and  none  of 
which  in  any  way  affected  the  force  of  the  treaty. 

An  impressive  presentment  of  this  phase  of  the  case  was 
made  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his  annual  message  of 
December  7,  1903.  Writing  of  the  Panama  revolution  and 
its  incidents  and  the  conduct  of  the  United  States,  he  said : 

^'When  these  events  happened,  fifty-seven  years  had 
elapsed  since  the  United  States  had  entered  into  its  treaty 
with  New  Granada.  During  that  time  the  governments  of 
New  Granada  and  of  its  successor,  Colombia,  have  been  in 
a  constant  state  of  flux.  The  following  is  a  partial  list  of 
the  disturbances  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  during  the 
period  in  question  as  reported  to  us  by  our  consuls.  It  is  not 
possible  to  give  a  complete  list,  and  some  of  the  reports 
that  speak  of  ^revolutions^  must  mean  unsuccessful  revo- 
lutions : 

^'May  22,  1850 — Outbreak;  two  Americans  killed;  war 
vessel  demanded  to  quell  outbreak. 

^'October,  1850 — Revolutionary  plot  to  bring  about  inde- 
pendence of  the  isthmus. 

"July  22,  1851 — Revolution  in  four  southern  provinces. 

"November  14,  1851 — Outbreak  at  Chagres.  Man-of-war 
requested  for  Chagres. 

"June  27,  1853 — Insurrection  at  Bogotd,  and  consequent 
disturbance  on  isthmus.    War  vessel  demanded. 

"May  23,  1854 — Political  disturbances;  war  vessel  re- 
quested. 

"June  28, 1854 — Attempted  revolution. 

"October  24,  1854 — Independence  of  isthmus  demanded  by 
provincial  legislature. 

"April,  1856 — Riot,  and  massacre  of  Americans. 

"May  4,  1856— Riot. 

"May  18,  1856— Riot. 

"October  2,  1856 — Conflict  between  two  native  parties. 
United  States  forces  landed. 

"December  18,  1858 — Attempted  secession  of  Panama. 

"April,  1859— Riots. 


194  AMEBIC AK  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

^'September,  1860— Outbreak. 

"October  4,  1860 — Landing  of  United  States  forces  in  con- 
sequence. 

"May  23,  1861— Intervention  of  the  United  States  forces 
required  by  Intendente. 

"October  2,  1861 — Insurrection  and  civil  war. 

"April  4,  1862 — Measures  to  prevent  rebels  crossing 
isthmus. 

"June  13,  1862 — Mosquera's  troops  refused  admittance  to 
Panama. 

"March,  1865 — Revolution  and  United  States  troops 
landed. 

"August,  1865 — Riots;  unsuccessful  attempt  to  invade 
Panama. 

"March,  1866 — Unsuccessful  revolution. 

"April,  1867 — Attempt  to  overthrow  the  government. 

"August,  1867 — Attempt  at  revolution. 

"July  5,  1868 — Revolution;  provisional  government  in- 
augurated. 

"August  29,  1868 — Revolution;  provisional  government 
overthrown. 

"April,  1871 — Revolution ;  followed  apparently  by  counter- 
revolution. 

"April,  1873 — Revolution  and  civil  war  which  lasted  to 
October,  1875. 

"August,  1876— Civil  war  which  lasted  until  April,  1877. 

"Julv,  1878— Rebellion. 

"December,  1878— Revolt. 

"April,  1879— Revolution. 

"June,  1879 — Revolution. 

"March,  1883— Riot. 

"May,  1883— Riot. 

"June,  1884 — Revolutionary  attempt. 

"December,  1884 — Revolutionary  attempt. 

"January,  1885 — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

"March,  1885— Revolution. 

"April,  1887 — Disturbances  on  Panama  Railroad. 

"November,  1887 — Disturbance  on  line  of  canal. 

"January,  1889— Riot. 

"January,  1895 — Revolution  which  lasted  until  ApriL 

"March,  1895 — Incendiarv  attempt. 

"October,  1899.— Revolution. 

"February,  1900,  to  July,  1900— Revolution. 

"January,  1901 — Revolution. 


PROTECTION  OF  ISTHMIAN  TRANSIT  195 

"July,  1901 — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

"September,  1901 — City  of  Colon  taken  by  rebels. 

"March,  1902 — Revolutionary  disturbances. 

"July,  1902— Revolution. 

"The  above  is  only  a  partial  list  of  the  revolutions,  rebel- 
lions, insurrections,  riots,  and  other  outbreaks  that  have 
occurred  during  the  period  in  question;  yet  they  number 
fifty-three  for  the  fifty-seven  years.  It  will  be  noted  that 
one  of  them  lasted  for  nearly  three  years  before  it  was 
quelled ;  another  for  nearly  a  year.  In  short,  the  experience 
of  over  half  a  century  has  shown  Colombia  to  be  utterly 
incapable  of  keeping  order  on  the  isthmus.  Only  the  active 
interference  of  the  United  States  has  enabled  her  to  pre- 
serve so  much  as  a  semblance  of  sovereignty.  Had  it  not 
been  for  the  exercise  by  the  United  States  of  the  police 
power  in  her  interest,  her  connection  with  the  isthmus 
would  have  been  sundered  long  ago.  In  1856,  in  1860,  in 
1873,  in  1885,  in  1901,  and  again  in  1902,  sailors  and  marines 
from  United  States  warships  were  forced  to  land  in  order 
to  patrol  the  isthmus,  to  protect  life  and  property  and  to 
see  that  the  transit  across  the  isthmus  was  kept  open.  In 
1861,  in  1862,  in  1885,  and  in  1900  the  Colombian  govern- 
ment asked  that  the  United  States  Government  would  land 
troops  to  protect  its  interests  and  maintain  order  on  the 
isthmus." 


The  United  States  held  strictly  aloof  from  all  of  these 
proceedings,  so  far  as  politics  were  concerned.  The  Treaty 
of  1846,  however,  gave  this  country  the  right  to  preserve 
peace  and  freedom  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus,  and  was 
consistently  interpreted  and  understood  as  giving  us  that 
right,  even  to  the  extent  of  intervening  in  local  Colombian 
affairs  and  preventing  either  party  in  a  domestic  war  from 
making  belligerent  use  of  the  line  of  transit.  Thus,  to  quote 
Mr.  Seward  again,  while  the  United  States  would  take  no 
interest  in  any  internal  revolution  in  the  State  of  Panama, 
it  would  hold  itseif  ready  "to  protect  the  transit  trade 
across  the  Isthmus  against  either  foreign  or  domestic  dis- 
turbance of  the  peace  of  the  State  of  Panama.''  Note  that 
it  was  not  the  sovereignty  of  the  Bogota  Government,  but 
"the  transit  trade  across  the   Isthmus,"   that  the  United 


196  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

States  was  ready  to  protect  against  domestic  disturbance; 
leaving  it  to  the  people  of  Colombia  and  Panama  to  deter- 
mine whether  Panama  should  be  governed  at  Panama  or  at 
Bogota. 

Note  also  that  the  United  States  was  to  protect  that 
transit  trade  "against  domestic  disturbance  of  the  peace." 
How  would  it  have  been  possible  to  do  that  if  either  of  the 
domestic  belligerents  had  been  permitted  to  use  the  railroad 
as  a  base  of  military  operations  and  thus  to  involve  it  in 
acts  of  war?  The  only  effective  fulfilment  of  the  treaty  was 
in  protection  of  the  road  from  attack,  or  even  belligerent 
use,  by  either  faction.  Such  protection  was  repeatedly  given, 
to  the  extent  of  forbidding  either  the  Colombian  Government 
or  the  insurgents  to  use  the  railroad  as  an  engine  of  war. 
That  was  what  was  done  in  November,  1903.  The  President 
protected  the  transit  trade  of  the  Isthmus  against  "domestic 
disturbance  of  the  peace  of  the  State  of  Panama,"  regardless 
of  whether  the  menace  of  disturbance  proceeded  from  Colon 
or  from  Bogotd. 

It  cannot  justly  be  charged  that  the  United  States,  while 
insisting  upon  free  transit  across  the  Isthmus  for  itself, 
prevented  Colombia  from  enjoying  it.  The  United  States 
never  but  once— and  that  was  not  in  November,  1903 — for- 
bade the  Colombian  Government  to  make  non-belligerent  use 
of  the  railroad,  and  it  did  so  only  through  a  subordinate 
functionary,  who  was  promptly  overruled  by  the  Washing- 
ton Government.  All  that  it  did  prohibit  was  such  con- 
version of  the  railroad  into  an  engine  of  war  as  would  inter- 
rupt free  transit  across  the  Isthmus  and  subject  the  road 
itself  to  destruction.  That  the  intention  of  the  Treaty  of 
1846  was  to  exempt  the  road  from  such  belligerent  use  seems 
obvious  and  indisputable. 

Mr.  Secretary  Hay  set  forth  this  phase  of  the  case  with 
epigrammatic  force  when  he  described  the  treaty  as  a  cov- 
enant which  "ran  with  the  land."  The  application  of  the 
treaty  was  geographical  rather  than  political.  The  United 
States  had  no  right  to  say  what  government  there  should  be 


COLOMBIA'S  LIMITED  POWER  197 

in  Colombia,  save  that  the  domestic  government  should  not 
be  oppressed  or  overthrown  by  a  foreign  power.  But  it  had 
the  right  to  say  that  whatever  government  there  was  should 
fulfil  its  treaty  obligations  in  the  maintenance  of  free 
transit  across  the  Isthmus.  It  had  the  right  to  say  that  such 
freedom  of  transit  should  not  be  interrupted  by  rebellion 
arising  at  Panama  or  Colon,  and  equally  that  it  should  not 
be  interrupted  by  government  coercion  from  Bogota.  It 
had,  finally,  the  right  to  say,  as  it  did  say,  that  after  she  had 
practically  relinquished  Panama  to  the  control  of  its  own 
people  and  they  had  restored  peace  and  established  an 
orderly  government  of  their  own,  Colombia  should  not  rein- 
vade  that  state  for  the  purpose  of  waging  war  and  inter- 
rupting commerce. 

If  it  be  said  that  this  barred  Colombia  from  using  her 
sovereign  power  and  resources  for  the  performance  of  some 
of  the  supreme  functions  of  government:  to  wit,  the  sup- 
pression of  rebellion  and  the  maintenance  of  national  integ- 
rity, the  answer  is  that  she  should  have  thought  of  that 
before  she  made  the  treaty.  Unquestionably  she  did,  in 
making  that  treaty,  to  a  certain  extent  abrogate  and  relin- 
quish her  sovereignty  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  She  did 
so  in  return  for  a  qiiid  pro  quo,  which  then  seemed  to  her 
adequate,  and  which,  in  the  event,  proved  for  many  years 
not  only  to  be  adequate,  but  to  put  the  balance  of  advantage 
upon  her  side  of  the  account.  Having  thus  enjoyed  the 
benefits  of  the  treaty  for  half  a  century,  it  was  not  lawful 
for  her  to  evade  its  obligations  or  to  repudiate  its  penal- 
ties. The  United  States,  having  fulfilled  its  duties  toward 
her,  in  protecting  her  from  alien  oppression,  was  amply  jus- 
tified, legally,  in  exacting  from  her  its  full  privileges.  That 
was  what  our  Government  did  at  the  beginning  of  November, 
1903. 

The  United  States  was  right,  of  course,  in  rejecting  the 
Colombian  proposal,  that  it  should,  in  return  for  a  canal 
concession,  suppress  for  Colombia  the  already  successful 
revolution  in  Panama,  and  restore  that  state  to  Colombian 


198  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

authority.  The  United  States  has  never  hired  itself  out 
as  a  mercenary,  either  for  cash  or  for  canal  concessions. 
Equally  right  was  it  in  recognising  the  de  facto  government 
at  Panama.  It  is  always  lawful,  and  generally  imperative, 
to  recognise  facts,  and  it  was  a  fact  that  that  was  the  only 
existing  government  on  the  Isthmus.  The  Colombian  Gov- 
ernment there  had  ceased  to  exist.  It  had  been  expelled.  It 
had  departed.  The  Colombian  troops  had  not  been  driven 
out  by  us.  They  had  gone  because  they  found  themselves 
alone  and  helpless  amid  a  universally  hostile  population. 
They  recognised  the  accomplished  fact.  The  Panama  Gov- 
ernment was  in  entire  and  undisputed  authority,  and  was 
ready  to  fulfil  and  was  fulfilling  the  actual  functions  of 
government.  The  only  possible  procedure  for  the  United 
States  was  to  recognise  that  fact. 

Nor  is  the  rightfulness  of  our  later  recognition  of  the  de 
jure  independence  of  Panama  to  be  impugned.  It  was  done 
promi^tly  a  few  days  after  the  Panaman  Declaration  of 
Independence.  There  seems,  however,  to  be  no  ground  for 
the  characterisation  of  "indecent  haste"  which  has  been 
apijlied  to  it.  There  is  no  more  generally  accepted  principle 
in  international  law  than  that  every  nation  is  its  own  judge 
of  the  time  when  it  is  fitting  to  recognise  the  independence 
of  another.  In  our  own  revolution,  France  recognised  our 
independence  years  before  it  was  actually  established,  while 
Russia  refused  to  recognise  it  until  years  after  it  had  been 
established  and  had  been  rcognised  by  the  very  Power  from 
which  we  had  won  it.  Both  acted  well  within  their  legal 
rights.  The  United  States  recognised  the  revolutionary 
Republic  in  Brazil,  in  1889,  more  promptly  than  it  did  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  although  there  was  much  less  assur- 
ance of  its  stability.  The  long  delay  in  recognising  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  South  American  republics  in  the  early  part 
of  the  last  century  has  been  cited  as  a  precedent  which 
should  have  been  regarded  in  the  case  of  Panama.  There 
was  little,  if  any,  analogy  between  the  cases.  The  contrast 
between  South  America  then  and  Panama  now  is  enormous. 


EQUITY  TO  COLOMBIA  199 

Considering  the  difference  in  speed  of  communication,  and 
in  extent  and  completeness  of  our  knowledge  of  the  coun- 
tries concerned,  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  a  day 
gives  as  ample  time  for  deliberation  now  as  a  year  did  three- 
quarters  of  a  century  ago. 

In  recognising  the  independence  of  Panama  we  were  law- 
fully recognising  an  accomplished  fact.  If  it  be  said  it  was 
a  fact  made  possible  only  by  our  own  conduct  and  attitude, 
the  same  may  be  said  of  other  republics,  which  exist  only 
because  of  our  protection.  Colombia  herself  would  probably 
not  have  maintained  her  independence  had  it  not  been  for 
the  policy  of  the  United  States,  especially  as  set  forth 
and  endowed  with  concrete  force  in  the  Treaty  of  1846.  In 
the  act  of  recognition,  then,  as  in  that  of  intervention,  the 
United  States  fully  observed  its  legal  obligations  to  the 
Republic  of  Colombia. 

Our  policy  was  justified,  moreover,  on  the  ground  of 
equity  to  Colombia.  We  must  remember,  what  is  too  often 
overlooked,  that  while  law  is  positive,  equity  is  relative. 
We  must  fulfil  legal  obligations  strictly  and  impartially,, 
even  toward  the  least  deserving  and  least  worthy.  But  we 
are  privileged  to  consider  the  character,  the  conduct,  and 
the  deserts  of  the  applicant  for  equity.  He  who  seeks 
equity  must  deal  equitably.  The  very  word  itself  implies 
that.  It  is  an  elementary  justice,  based  not  on  legal  pre- 
scription, but  upon  the  mutual  merits  of  the  parties  to  the 
controversy.  What,  then,  were  Colombia's  deserts?  So  far 
as  Panama  was  concerned,  they  were  slight  indeed.  She  had 
treated  Panama  most  inequitably.  She  had  forcibly  abro- 
gated the  Constitution  of  1863,  and  had  subverted  Panama's 
undoubted  rights  thereunder  without  Panama's  consent — 
just  as  though  forty-four  of  our  forty-five  States  should  com- 
bine to  deprive  the  forty-fifth  of  its  equal  representation  in 
the  Federal  Senate  without  its  consent.  She  had  not  only 
done  that  and  persisted  in  it,  but  for  many  years  she  had 
systematically  oppressed  and  plundered  Panama,  making  the 
Isthmus  the  "milch  cow  of  Colombia,"  as  it  used  to  be  said 


200  AMEEICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

Cuba  was  of  Spain.  Upon  dispassionate  and  impartial 
review  of  the  record,  it  was  impossible  to  withhold  sym- 
pathy from  Panama  in  her  controversy  with  the  Bogota 
Government. 

If,  however,  we  were  to  go  by  on  the  other  side,  saying 
that  such  matters  were  none  of  our  business,  we  could  not 
ignore  the  fact  that  Colombia  had  treated  the  United  States 
badly  in  more  than  one  important  respect.  In  1880  this 
Government  found  it  necessary  to  warn  Colombia  against 
making  the  concessions  which  she  then  proposed  to  make  to 
France,  as — to  quote  Mr.  Secretary  Evarts,  on  July  31,  1880 
— "introducing  interests  not  compatible  with  the  treaty 
relations  which  we  maintain  with  Colombia."  Colombia 
then  proposed — I  quote  from  President  Arthur's  message 
of  1881 — "to  the  European  powers  to  join  in  a  guarantee 
which  would  be  in  direct  contravention  of  our  obligation 
as  the  sole  guarantor  of  the  integrity  of  Colombian  terri- 
tory." In  other  words,  while  enjoying,  at  her  own  request, 
our  protection,  Colombia  was  intriguing  against  our  inter- 
ests with  the  very  Powers  against  which  she  had  sought  and 
was  enjoying  our  protection. 

We  may  justly  complain  also  that  she  acted  inequitably 
toward  us  in  rejecting  the  canal  treaty  which  her  minister 
negotiated  with  us  in  1902-3.  Mark  that  she  had  a  legal 
right  to  reject  it.  That  is  indisputable.  Her  legal  right  to 
reject  it  was  as  absolute  as  our  right  to  reject  other  treaties 
which  our  Government  has  negotiated,  but  which  have  not 
met  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate.  She  had,  let  us  say, 
the  same  right  to  reject  it  that  we  had  to  negotiate  it,  or 
that  we  had  afterward  to  make  another  treaty  with  Panama. 
Her  rejection  was  legal,  but  it  was  not  equitable ;  or,  at  any 
rate,  it  was  no  more  equitable  than  our  subsequent  recog- 
nition of,  and  negotiation  with,  Panama.  If  she  stood  upon 
her  strict  legal  rights  in  rejecting  the  treaty,  we  had  as 
good  a  title  to  stand  upon  our  strict  legal  rights  in  recog- 
nising Panama. 

But  we  may  go  beyond  that,  and  say  that  her  rejection 


COLOMBIAN  INEQUITY  201 

of  the  treaty  was  positively  inequitous — if  I  may  coin  that 
useful  word,  to  express  a  slightly  different  shade  of  meaning 
from  "iniquitous,"  though  indeed  "iniquitous"  might  serve 
as  well.  Two  facts  of  record  are  sufficient  to  prove  the 
indictment.  One  is  the  explicit  and  repeated  offer  made  by 
General  Reyes  in  behalf  of  the  Bogota  Government,  of  which 
he  was  the  prospective  next  chief,  to  resurrect  and  ratify  the 
dead  canal  treaty,  by  martial  law  or  dictatorship,  in  return 
for  our  resubjugation  of  Panama  to  the  Colombian  yoke. 
The  other  is  the  confessed,  deliberate  plan  of  the  Bogota 
Government  to  repudiate  the  concession  lawfully  given  to 
the  French  Panama  Canal  Company  and  to  confiscate  that 
company's  property,  which  it  would  then  sell  to  the  United 
States  for  a  round  sum. 

Now  the  bearing  of  all  that  upon  the  question  of  our 
policy  is  simply  to  show  upon  how  little  ground  Colombia 
could  plead  for  better  treatment  as  a  matter  of  equity. 
Colombia,  wearing  the  brand  of  a  would-be  spoliator,  could 
not  well  come  into  court  with  a  complaint  that  she  had  been 
despoiled.  Upon  the  ground  of  equity  she  had  nothing  more 
to  claim.  She  had  been  treated  as  well  as  she  deserved,  and 
better.  Her  only  valid  claim  must  be  for  legal  justice,  and 
in  the  making  of  that  claim  it  might  be  well  for  her  to  take 
heed  lest  the  court  of  civilisation  should  declare  to  her: 
"Thou  Shalt  have  justice,  more  than  thou  desirest."  It  will 
not  serve  to  say  we  would  not  have  treated  a  great,  strong 
nation  thus.  I  am  not  sure  of  that.  The  record  of  our 
dealings  with  some  of  the  greatest  Powers  of  the  world  sug- 
gests that  we  have  been  no  less  independent  in  our  bearing 
toward  them  than  toward  the  lesser  ones.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  might  equally  well  ask  if  Colombia  would  have 
acted  thus  toward  a  nation  that  was  not  rich,  that  was 
not  urgently  desirous  of  building  the  canal,  or  that  was  a 
little  more  in  the  habit  of  using  the  "mailed  fist."  We  must, 
it  is  said,  have  one  law  alike  for  all  nations,  great  and  small. 
That  is  quite  true. 

What,  then,  would  we  have  done  had  England  recognised 


202  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

the  independence  of  the  Confederacy  in  1862?  The  cases  are 
not  analogous.  The  Confederacy  was  never,  either  phys- 
ically or  legally,  in  as  strong  a  position  as  Panama.  I  say 
that  advisedly.  The  United  States  never  scuttled  out  of  the 
Southern  States  and  abandoned  them  to  secession,  as  Co- 
lombia did  out  of  Panama,  but  from  the  yerj  beginning 
exerted  its  fullest  possible  power  to  suppress  the  rebellion 
and  to  restore  and  preserve  the  Union.  The  Confederate 
States  had  no  such  constitutional  defence  of  secession  as 
that  which  Panama  had  in  the  fact  of  former  independence 
forcibly  destroyed  without  her  consent.  The  European 
Powers  did  promptly  recognise  the  Confederate  States  as 
belligerents.  In  that  they  were  simply  recognising  a  fact, 
and,  however  distasteful  it  was  to  us,  we  had  no  cause  for 
complaint. 

There  is  another  point  which  those  who  seek  to  raise  this 
argument  from  analogy  invariably  overlook.  It  is  this: 
that  the  United  States  had  never,  by  treaty  or  otherwise, 
recognised  international  interests  in  the  Southern  States  as 
Colombia  had  in  Panama.  In  the  Treaty  of  1846,  Colombia 
specifically  recognised  the  fact  that  other  nations,  above  all 
the  United  States,  had  natural  and  lawful  interests  in  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  which  might  in  certain  contingencies  be 
paramount  to  Colombia's  own  interests  there.  Those  inter- 
ests were  peculiar  to  the  Isthmus,  and  did  not  extend  to 
the  rest  of  Colombia.  For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
provisions  of  that  treaty,  including  our  rights  of  interven- 
tion and  our  duty  of  protection  and  guarantee,  did  not  apply 
to  the  whole  of  Colombia,  but  only  to  the  State — that  is, 
the  Isthmus — of  Panama.  "The  guarantee  extends  only  to 
the  Isthmus,"  wrote  Mr.  Bidlack,  our  Charge  d'Affaires  who 
negotiated  the  treaty,  to  Mr.  Secretary  Buchanan  in  1846. 
In  that  circumstance  the  separate  status  of  Panama,  as  con- 
trasted with  the  rest  of  Colombia,  was  recognised,  and  so 
were  recognised  the  peculiar  and  even  paramount  interests 
of  other  countries  in  that  territory.  I  quote  from  President 
Polk's  message  transmitting  that  treaty  to  the  Senate  for 


DUTIES  TO  OTHER  NATIONS  203 

ratification:  "The  treaty  does  not  propose  to  guarantee  a 
territory  to  a  foreign  nation  in  which  the  United  States 
will  have  no  common  interest  with  that  nation.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  more  deeply  and  directly  interested  in  the 
subject  of  this  guarantee  than  New  Granada  herself,  or  any 
other  country." 

Let  us  suppose,  to  make  an  analogy  which  does  not  now 
exist  between  our  Civil  War  and  the  Panama  revolution, 
that  at  some  date  prior  to  1861  the  United  States  had  stipu- 
lated by  treaty  with  England  that  the  cotton  trade  from  our 
Southern  ports  should  never  be  interrupted  or  embarrassed, 
and  that  England  should  have  the  right  to  intervene  when- 
ever necessary  to  keep  that  trade  free  and  open.  In  such 
case  it  seems  to  me  that  England  w^ould  have  had  a  legal 
and  moral  right  to  intervene  in  1861-62,  to  break  the  block- 
ade of  our  Southern  ports  and  to  prevent  the  United  States 
from  reestablishing  it.  The  United  States  never  made  such 
a  treaty.  It  would  never  have  made  one.  But  Colombia  did 
make  the  Treaty  of  1846.  There  is  the  radical  difference 
between  the  two  cases. 

It  is  said  that  the  application  of  the  lex  talionis  does  not 
indicate  the  loftiest  motives.  Granted.  But  there  were 
other  motives  for  our  policy  which  were  high  and  noble 
enough  to  satisfy  the  most  exalted  doctrinaire.  At  the 
present  moment  the  argument  is  simply  this,  that  neither 
law  nor  equity  requires  a  nation  to  go  out  of  its  way  to  be 
generous  to  an  unworthy  object,  even  though  that  object 
be  a  weaker  nation.  Weakness  gives  no  immunity,  and  is 
not  a  charter  to  license  any  more  than  strength  is  a  charter 
to  oppression.  A  strong  nation  should  use  its  strength 
nobly.  A  weak  nation  should  use  its  weakness  no  less 
nobly,  seeking  in  morals  the  strength  it  lacks  in  material 
resources. 

Our  policy  was  justified,  finally,  under  both  law  and  equity 
to  other  nations.  Our  Government  violated  no  item  of  inter- 
national law.  It  invaded  no  rights  of  other  countries  or  of 
their  citizens.     It  dealt  fairly,  lawfully,  even  generously, 


204  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

with  the  French  Canal  Company.  It  patiently  awaited 
and  accepted  the  adjudication  of  the  French  courts  in  what- 
ever legal  controversies  arose  over  the  transfer  of  the  com- 
pany's property.  It  showed  a  scrupulous  regard  for  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  international  law,  and  for  international 
equities.  It  moreover  fulfilled  the  implied  duties  which 
rested  upon  it  as  a  result  of  its  traditional  policy.  Under 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  this  country  would  not  let  other 
nations  meddle  in  American  affairs.  It  thus  incurred  a 
moral  responsibility  for  those  affairs.  Thus  it  would  not 
let  European  Powers  guarantee  neutrality  and  peace  upon 
the  Isthmus,  and  freedom  of  transit  over  that  important 
route.  Therefore  it  was  morally  bound  itself  to  make  such  a 
guarantee,  and  to  make  it  effective.  It  did  so.  It  would  not 
permit  any  other  nation  to  construct  a  canal  across  the 
Isthmus.  Therefore  it  incurred  itself  the  moral  obligation 
to  construct  one.  It  is  now  proceeding  to  do  so.  The  United 
States  thus  shows  itself  to  be  no  dog-in-the-manger,  but  a 
Power  that  is  as  ready  itself  to  do  as  to  forbid  others  to  do. 

Nor  was  it  a  new  thing  for  the  United  States  to  forbid,  or 
to  threaten  to  forbid,  Colombia  to  play  the  part  of  the  dog- 
in-the-manger.  It  did  so  long  ago,  in  a  formal  declaration 
made  by  Lewis  Cass,  Secretary  of  State,  in  1858 : 


"The  progress  of  events  has  rendered  the  interoceanic 
route  across  the  narrow  portion  of  Central  America  vastly 
important  to  the  commercial  world  and  especially  to  the 
United  States.  .  .  .  While  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the 
States  occupying  this  region  should  always  be  respected,  we 
shall  expect  that  these  rights  be  exercised  in  a  spirit  befit- 
ting the  occasion  and  the  wants  and  circumstances  that  have 
arisen.  Sovereignty  has  its  duties  as  well  as  its  rights,  and 
none  of  these  local  governments,  even  if  administered  with 
more  regard  to  the  just  demands  of  other  nations  than  they 
have  been,  would  be  permitted  in  a  spirit  of  Eastern  isola- 
tion to  close  the  gates  of  intercourse  to  the  great  highways 
of  the  world  and  justify  the  act  by  the  pretension  that  these 
avenues  of  trade  and  travel  belong  to  them  and  that  they 
choose  to  shut  them,  or,  what  is  almost  equivalent,  to  encum- 


EMINENT  DOMAIN  205 

ber  them  with  such  unjust  relations  as  would  prevent  their 
general  use." 

This  principle  of  "international  eminent  domain"  has  been 
adverted  to  many  times  in  discussions  of  the  Panama  case. 
It  is  perhaps  not  altogether  pertinent,  for  the  reason  that 
the  United  States  was  not  compelled  to  resort  to  the  appli- 
cation of  such  a  principle.  It  is  not  to  be  denied,  however, 
that  such  a  principle  exists,  and  that  it  has  more  than  once 
been  practically  applied  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Every 
"concert  of  the  Powers"  for  the  coercion  of  one  or  more 
nations  involves  its  application.  It  was  under  that  princi- 
ple that  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  Crete  and  Samos,  and 
The  Lebanon,  were  removed  from  unbridled  Turkish  rule.  It 
was  upon  the  same  principle  that  the  joint  control  and  the 
international  tribunals  were  established  in  Egypt.  It  would 
scarcely  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  same  principle 
was  involved  in  the  opening  of  The  Sound  to  free  navigation. 
There  need  be  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  if  there  had  been 
no  other  way  to  secure  the  Panama  Canal,  the  Powers  of 
the  world,  or  the  United  States  alone,  would  have  been  amply 
justified  in  proceeding  under  that  principle.  But  the  princi- 
ple is  so  delicate  a  one,  and  so  easily  liable  to  perversion  and 
misuse,  that  there  is  cause  for  gratitude  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  world's  desire  at  Panama  without  resort  to  it. 
If  that  principle,  or  the  contemplation  of  it  as  a  possibility, 
did  to  any  degree  enter  into  the  case  in  confirming  the 
United  States  in  its  policy  or  in  affording  justification  for 
that  policy,  then  instead  of  condemning  our  Government,  the 
world  must  give  it  commendation  for  having  to  that  extent 
made  use  of  so  delicate  and  even  perilous  a  principle 
with  so  much  discretion,  and  with  results  so  invariably 
beneficent. 

For  what  is,  after  all,  most  clear  in  the  whole  business  is 
this,  that  the  United  States  acted  unselfishly  and  for  the 
good  of  the  world.  It  acted  unselfishly,  because  it  sought  no 
self-aggrandisement,  no  conquests,  no  acquisition  of  terri- 


206  AMEEICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

tory,  no  extension  of  sovereignty.  It  sought,  and  secured, 
nothing  but  the  privilege  and  power  of  constructing  a  canal 
which  will  be  for  the  equal  use  and  benefit  of  all  nations.  If 
it  in  doing  so  exacted  a  grant  of  perpetual  control  over  a 
part  of  the  territory  of  another  state,  it  thus  did  only  what 
was  necessary  for  the  safeguarding  of  the  canal.  It  is  incon- 
ceivable that  any  other  nation  on  earth  would  have  under- 
taken the  construction  of  the  canal  and  its  protection  and 
neutral  maintenance  on  any  basis  of  less  authority.  It  also 
acted  for  the  good  of  the  world,  because  it  assured  fulfil- 
ment of  the  world's  legitimate  desire  in  the  only  way  in 
which  it  could  be  satisfactorily  fulfilled;  because  it  assured 
the  speedy  opening  of  what  will  be  one  of  the  greatest  high- 
ways of  peaceful  and  beneficent  commerce;  and  because  it 
established  a  paramount  influence  for  peace  and  justice  in  a 
land  that  for  a  century  had  known  little  of  either  peace  or 
justice. 

The  sum  of  the  matter  was  clearly  and  correctly  set  forth 
by  President  Koosevelt,  in  the  message  of  December  7,  1903, 
from  which  I  have  already  made  several  quotations.  The 
simple  recital  of  facts,  he  said,  established  beyond  question : 

"First — That  the  United  States  has  for  over  half  a  century 
patiently  and  in  good  faith  carried  out  its  obligations  under 
the  Treaty  of  1846. 

"Second — That  when  for  the  first  time  it  became  possible 
for  Colombia  to  do  anything  in  requital  of  the  services 
thus  repeatedly  rendered  to  it  for  fifty-seven  years  by  the 
United  States,  the  Colombian  Government  peremptorily  and 
oftensively  refused  to  do  its  part,  even  though  to  do  so  would 
have  been  to  its  advantage  and  immeasurably  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  State  of  Panama,  at  that  time  under  its  juris- 
diction. 

"Third — That  throughout  this  period  revolutions,  riots, 
and  factional  disturbances  of  every  kind  have  occurred  one 
after  the  other  in  almost  uninterrupted  succession,  some  of 
them  lasting  for  months  and  even  for  years,  while  the  central 
government  was  unable  to  put  them  down  or  to  make  peace 
with  the  rebels. 

"Fourth — That  these  disturbances,  instead  of  showing  any 


POLICY  DICTATED  BY  NECESSITY  207 

sign  of  abating,  have  tended  to  grow  more  numerous  and 
more  serious  in  the  immediate  past. 

"Fifth — That  the  control  of  Colombia  over  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  could  not  be  maintained  without  the  armed  inter- 
vention and  assistance  of  the  United  States. 

"In  other  words,  the  government  of  Colombia,  though 
wholly  unable  to  maintain  order  on  the  Isthmus,  has  never- 
theless declined  to  ratify  a  treaty  the  conclusion  of  which 
opened  the  only  chance  to  secure  its  own  stability  and  to 
guarantee  permanent  peace  on  and  the  construction  of  a 
canal  across  the  Isthmus. 

"Under  such  circumstances  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  would  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  weakness 
amounting  in  their  sum  to  a  crime  against  the  nation  had  it 
acted  otherwise  than  it  did  when  the  revolution  of  Novem- 
ber 3  last  took  place  in  Panama.  This  great  enterprise  of 
building  the  interoceanic  canal  cannot  be  held  up  to  gratify 
the  whims,  or  out  of  respect  to  the  government  impotence, 
or  to  the  even  more  sinister  and  evil  political  peculiarities, 
of  people,  who,  though  they  dwell  afar  off,  yet,  against  the 
wish  of  the  actual  dwellers  on  the  Isthmus,  assert  an  unreal 
supremacy  over  the  territory.  The  possession  of  a  territory 
fraught  with  such  peculiar  capacities  as  the  Isthmus  in 
question  carries  with  it  obligations  to  mankind.  The  course 
of  events  has  shown  that  this  canal  cannot  be  built  by  pri- 
vate enterprise,  or  by  any  other  nation  than  our  own,  there- 
fore it  must  be  built  by  the  United  States. 

"Every  effort  has  been  made  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  persuade  Colombia  to  follow  a  course  which 
was  essentially  not  only  to  our  interests  and  to  the  interests 
of  the  world,  but  to  the  interests  of  Colombia  itself.  These 
efforts  have  failed,  and  Colombia,  by  her  persistence  in 
repulsing  the  advances  that  have  been  made,  has  forced  us, 
for  the  sake  of  our  own  honour,  and  of  the  interest  and  well- 
being,  not  merely  of  our  own  people,  but  of  the  people  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  and  the  people  of  the  civilised  countries 
of  the  world,  to  take  decisive  steps  to  bring  to  an  end  a  con- 
dition of  affairs  which  had  become  intolerable.  The  new 
Republic  of  Panama  immediately  offered  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  us.  By  it  our  interests  are  better  safeguarded 
than  in  the  treaty  with  Colombia,  which  was  ratified  by 
the  Senate  at  its  last  session.  It  is  better  in  its  terms  than 
the  treaties  offered  to  us  by  the  republics  of  Nicaragua  and 
Costa  Rica.    At  last  the  right  to  begin  this  great  undertaking 


208  AMEEICAN  POLICY  IN  PANAMA 

is  made  available.  Panama  has  done  her  part.  All  that 
remains  is  for  the  American  Congress  to  do  its  part,  and 
forthwith  this  Republic  will  enter  upon  the  execution  of  a 
project  colossal  in  its  size  and  of  well-nigh  incalculable 
possibilities  for  the  good  of  this  country  and  the  nations  of 
mankind." 


Scherer,  Photo. 


MANUEL  AMADOR  GUERRERO, 
First  President  op  Panama. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

Panama  promptly  passed  from  the  revolutionary  stage 
into  the  status  of  a  Constitutional  Republic.  Its  Constitu- 
tion was  adopted  by  a  National  Constitutional  Convention, 
which  was  elected  on  December  28,  and  met  in  the  city  of 
Panama  on  January  15,  1904,  and  practically  completed  its 
labours  on  February  13,  following.  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena, 
formerly  President  or  Governor  of  the  State  under  the  Co- 
lombian Government,  and  first  First  Designate  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  was  President  of  the  Convention  and  a 
Deputy  from  the  Province  of  Panama.  Other  deputies  were 
Manuel  Quintero  V.,  Nicolas  Victoria  J.,  and  Demetrio  H. 
Brid.  The  completed  instrument  was  signed  by  the  thirty- 
two  deputies;  by  the  Secretary,  Juan  Brin;  by  the  Provi- 
sional Board,  J.  A.  Arango,  Federico  Boyd,  and  Tomas 
Arias;  and  by  the  Minister  of  Government,  Eusebio  A.  Mo- 
rales ;  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  F.  V.  de  la  Espri- 
ella ;  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Carlos  A.  Mendoza ;  the  Minis- 
ter of  the  Treasury,  Manuel  E.  Amador ;  the  Minister  of  War 
and  Marine,  Nicanor  A.  de  Obarrio;  and  the  Minister  of 
Public  Instruction,  Julio  J.  Fabrega;  and  it  was  published 
and  enforced  on  February  15,  1904. 

This  Constitution  is  an  elaborate  instrument,  generally 
accordant  with  that  of  the  United  States  and  other  republi- 
can constitutions  in  its  guarantee  of  personal  and  popular 
rights,  and  its  general  guarantee  of  a  free  democratic  gov- 
ernment. Sofme  of  its  provisions  are  exceptional  if  not 
unique.  Thus  it  is  provided  that  (Art.  14)  citizenship  may 
be  suspended  for  habitual  intoxication;  that  (Art.  19)  there 
shall  be  no  slaves  in  Panama,  but  any  slave  who  may  step 

209 


210  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

upon  the  territory  of  the  Republic  shall  in  that  act  become 
free;  that  (Art.  23)  there  shall  be  no  arrest  or  imprison- 
ment for  debt  or  other  purely  civil  obligations;  that  (Art. 
25)  no  one  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  in  a  criminal  pro- 
ceeding against  any  member  of  his  or  her  family,  "within 
the  fourth  grade  of  consanguinity  or  the  second  of  affinity ;" 
that  (Art.  29)  any  person  may  practise  any  profession  or 
trade  without  the  necessity  of  belonging  to  an  association; 
that  (Art.  37)  games  of  chance  shall  not  be  permitted  in  the 
territory  of  the  Republic;  that  (Art.  68)  the  National 
Assembly  shall  not  pass  votes  of  censure  or  approval  relating 
to  official  acts;  that  (Art.  83)  the  President  cannot  be 
elected  to  succeed  himself,  nor  can  any  relation  of  his  within 
the  fourth  grade  of  consanguinity  or  the  second  of  affinity 
be  elected  to  succeed  him;  that  (Art.  117)  there  can  be  no 
obligatory  circulation  of  paper  money;  and  that  (Art.  127) 
the  government  alone  can-  import  or  manufacture  arms  or 
implements  of  war. 

The  government  of  Panama  is  purely  democratic  in  form, 
and  is  divided  into  three  parts,  the  Legislative,  the  Execu- 
tive, and  the  Judicial.  The  Legislative  power  is  exercised  by 
^the  National  Assembly,  consisting  of  a  single  chamber, 
elected  by  popular  vote  for  a  term  of  four  years,  and  meets 
on  September  1,  of  every  second  year.  The  session  lasts 
ninety  days,  but  in  any  case  of  necessity  it  may  be  extended 
thirty  days  more.  Special  sessions  for  special  purposes  may 
be  called  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Deputies  are 
elected  from  districts  at  a  ratio  of  one  to  every  10,000  inhab- 
itants, or  residue  of  not  less  than  5,000.  The  Deputies  must 
be  citizens  at  least  twenty-five  years  of  age.  The  Executive 
and  the  Judicial  officers  are  ineligible  for  election  as  Depu- 
ties during  their  terms  of  office,  and  for  six  months 
thereafter.  The  Assembly  has  the  customary  legislative 
functions,  including  the  trial  of  charges  against  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic,  the  Attorney-General,  the  Secretaries 
of  State,  and  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court ;  the  election 
of  three  Designates  or  Vice-Presidents  of  the  Republic  for  a 


THE  EXECUTIVE  211 

term  of  two  years;  the  election  of  the  Judges  of  the  Ex- 
chequer; and  the  granting  of  leave  of  absence  to  the  Presi- 
dent. There  is  also  an  equal  number  of  Substitute  Deputies, 
to  take  the  place  of  the  Deputies  on  the  inability  of  any  of 
the  latter  to  serve. 

The  Executive  power  is  exercised  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic.  He  must  be  a  Panaman  by  birth,  and  thirty-five 
years  of  age.  He  is  elected  by  popular  vote  for  a  term  of  four 
years,  beginning  on  the  first  of  October  following  his  elec- 
tion. He  appoints  the  Secretaries  of  State  or  members  of 
his  Cabinet,  the  Governors  of  the  Provinces,  the  Attorney- 
General,  the  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  some  other 
officers.  Every  act  of  the  President  must  be  countersigned 
by  that  Secretary  of  State  to  whose  department  it  properly 
appertains.  In  temporary  or  permanent  absence  his  place  is 
filled  by  one  of  the  three  Designates  or  Vice-Presidents, 
whose  qualifications  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  President. 
The  Secretaries  of  State  have  the  same  qualifications  as  the 
Deputies ;  they  are  the  only  regular  mediums  of  communica- 
tion between  the  Executive  and  the  Legislative  body,  and 
they  are  permitted  to  propose  laws  and  to  take  part  in 
debates  in  the  National  Assembly. 

The  Judicial  power  is  exercised  by  a  Supreme  Court, 
inferior  courts,  and  justices  of  the  peace.  The  Supreme 
Court  consists  of  five  magistrates,  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent for  a  term  of  four  years.  Five  substitutes  are  also 
appointed  to  take  the  place  of  the  Justices  in  case  of  absence 
or  disability  of  the  latter.  The  Justices  or  their  substi- 
tutes must  be  thirty  years  of  age,  and  must  have  been  resi- 
dents of  Panama  for  fifteen  years,  and  practising  lawyers  for 
ten  years.  The  same  qualifications  are  required  of  the  jus- 
tices of  the  inferior  courts. 

A  law  to  be  valid  must  be  approved  by  the  National 
Assembly  by  an  absolute  majority  after  three  debates  on 
three  separate  days,  and  must  also  be  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic.  The  second  debate  on  a  law  cannot  be 
closed,  nor  can  a  final  vote  be  taken  at  the  end  of  the  third 


212  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

debate,  without  the  attendance  of  an  absolute  majority  of 
the  Assembly.  The  President  before  signing  a  law  may  con- 
sider it  for  from  six  to  fifteen  days,  according  to  the  number 
of  articles  it  contains.  If  he  does  not  within  this  time  either 
approve  it  or  return  it  unsigned,  with  a  statement  of  his 
objections,  his  approval  of  it  then  becomes  compulsory. 
When  he  returns  the  measure  with  objections,  it  may  be 
passed  over  his  objections  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  a  quorum, 
whereupon  he  must  sign  it.  If  his  objections  are  on  the 
ground  of  alleged  unconstitutionality,  the  measure  may  be 
sent  by  the  Assembly  to  the  Supreme  Court  for  its  decision, 
which  must  be  rendered  within  six  days,  and  if  it  is  favour- 
able to  the  measure,  it  is  made  compulsory  upon  the  Presi- 
dent to  sign  it. 

The  Republic  is  divided  into  seven  provinces:  namely, 
Boca  del  Toro,  Code,  Colon,  Chiriqui,  Los  Santos,  Panama, 
and  Veraguas.  Each  province  has  a  Governor,  appointed  by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  and  subject  to  removal  by 
him.  The  provinces  are  divided  into  municipal  districts,  in 
each  of  which  is  a  Municipal  Council,  elected  by  the  people. 
There  is  also  a  Mayor  appointed  or  elected  according  to  law. 
Each  municipality  has  almost  unlimited  powers  of  local  self- 
government,  but  cannot  contract  any  indebtedness  without 
the  consent  of  the  National  Assembly.  The  administration 
of  justice  is  free  in  all  parts  of  the  Republic.  Public  in- 
struction is  free,  and  in  primary  grades  is  compulsory. 
There  iS  freedom  of  religion,  but  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
is  recognised  as  that  of  the  majority  of  the  people  and 
therefore  receives  a  state  subsidy.  All  property  used  for 
religious  purposes  is  exempt  from  taxation,  and  all  ministers 
of  all  religious  creeds  are  excluded  from  public  oflQce.  The 
Constitution  may  be  amended  by  the  National  Assembly  by 
a  two-thirds  vote. 

Upon  the  completion  of  its  work  in  framing  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  Convention  resolved  itself  into  a  National  Assem- 
bly (the  first  regularly  elected  National  Assembly  was  not 
to  be  chosen  until  July  1906,  and  was  not  to  meet  until 


THE  FIRST  ADMINISTRATION  213 

September,  1906),  and  it  elected  Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guer- 
rero to  be  President  of  the  Republic,  and  Pablo  Arosemena,  J. 
Domingo  de  Obaldia,  and  Carlos  Mendoza  to  be  respectively 
first,  second,  and  third  Designates.  These  gentlemen  were 
chosen  alternately  from  the  two  political  parties.  Dr. 
Amador  and  Senor  Obaldia  being  Conservatives  and  Dr. 
Arosemena  and  Senor  Mendoza  being  Liberals.  The  inaugu- 
ration of  President  Amador  occurred  on  February  20,  1904, 
and  on  that  day  a  Cabinet  was  also  appointed,  consisting  of 
Tomas  Arias,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  War;  F. 
V.  de  la  Espriella,  Minister  of  Finance;  Julio  Fabrega  (soon 
succeeded  by  Nicolas  Victoria),  Minister  of  Justice  and 
Public  Instruction;  and  Manuel  Quintero  V.,  Minister  of 
Public  Works.  These  Cabinet  Ministers  were  also  equally 
divided  between  the  two  parties.  The  harmonious  coopera- 
tion of  the  two  political  parties  was  further  indicated  in  the 
design  of  the  National  Flag,  which  was  made  to  consist  of 
four  equal  fields — one  blue,  representing  the  Conservatives; 
one  red,  representing  the  Liberals;  and  two  white,  emblem- 
atic of  peace,  with  a  blue  star  in  one  white  field,  and  a  red 
star  in  the  other. 

Steps  were  promptly  taken  to  rid  Panama  of  the  debased 
currency  of  Colombia.  For  a  time  it  was  necessary  to  use 
Colombian  silver, — "tin,"  "monkey,"  or  "spicketty"  money, 
as  it  was  contemptuously  called  by  the  Panamans, — though 
even  then  American  coin  and  paper  money  was  much  pre- 
ferred. As  soon  as  possible  several  millions  of  Panaman 
gold  and  silver  were  coined,  and  thus  a  currency  comparable 
with  the  best  in  the  world  was  established.  The  monetary 
standard  is  the  Balboa,  a  gold  coin  exactly  equivalent  to  an 
American  dollar.  The  silver  coins  are  of  50,  25,  10,  5,  and  2 
1-2  cents'  value,  and,  being  exactly  twice  the  size  and  weight 
of  American  silver  coins  of  the  same  denominations,  are 
worth  their  face  value  in  gold.  No  paper  money  is  used 
by  the  Republic. 

In  one  important  respect  the  Republic  of  Panama  began 
its  career  in  a  unique  fashion.    Instead  of  having  a  national 


214         THE  REPUBLIC  OE  PANAMA 

debt,  it  had  a  national  endowment.  This  latter  was  pro- 
vided by  the  bonus  of  |10,000,000,  which  the  United  States 
paid  to  it  for  the  right  of  way  for  the  canal  and  for  the 
lease  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  Isthmian  statesmen  disposed 
of  this  sum  with  prudence.  Nearly  one-third  was  appor- 
tioned among  the  provinces  for  much-needed  public  works, , 
as  follows:  to  the  Province  of  Panama,  |1,000,000;  to  Chi- 
riqui  and  Boca  del  Toro,  |450,000  each ;  to  Code,  Los  Santos, 
and  Veraguas,  |350,000  each ;  and  to  Colon,  |300,000.  The 
major  part  of  the  whole,  |6,000,000,  was  judiciously  and 
profitably  invested  in  real  estate  mortgages  and  similar 
securities  in  New  York  City ;  and  the  balance,  |750,000,  was 
kept  in  hand  as  working  capital. 

Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  prompt  negotiation 
of  a  canal  treaty  between  the. United  States  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama.  That  instrument,  known  as  the  Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla  Treaty,  was  tersely  but  comprehensively  summarised 
by  President  Roosevelt  in  his  message  of  December  7,  1903, 
as  follows: 

"The  United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the 
independence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  There  is  granted 
to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity  the  use,  occupation,  and 
control  of  a  strip  ten  miles  wide  and  extending  three  nauti- 
cal miles  into  the  sea  at  either  terminal,  with  all  lands  lying 
outside  of  the  zone  necessary  for  the  construction  of  the 
canal  or  for  its  auxiliary  works,  and  with  the  islands  in 
the  Bay  of  Panama.  The  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  are 
not  embraced  in  the  canal  zone,  but  the  United  States 
assumes  their  sanitation  and,  in  case  of  need,  the  main- 
tenance of  order  therein;  the  United  States  enjoys  within 
the  granted  limits  all  the  rights,  power,  and  authority  which 
it  would  possess  were  it  the  sovereign  of  the  territory  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  exercise  of  sovereign  rights  by  the 
Republic.  All  railway  and  canal  property  rights  belonging 
to  Panama  and  needed  for  the  canal  pass  to  the  United 
States,  including  any  property  of  the  respective  companies 
in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon;  the  works,  property,  and 
personnel  of  the  canal  and  railways  are  exempted  from  tax- 
ation as  well  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  as  in  the 


DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  215 

canal  zone  and  its  dependencies.  Free  immigration  of  the 
personnel  and  importation  of  supplies  for  the  construction 
and  operation  of  the  canal  are  granted.  Provision  is  made 
for  the  use  of  military  force  and  the  building  of  fortifica- 
tions by  the  United  States  for  the  protection  of  the  transit. 
In  other  details,  particularly  as  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
interests  of  the  new  Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  Pan- 
ama Railway  by  the  United  States,  and  the  condemnation  of 
private  property  for  the  uses  of  the  canal,  the  stipulations  of 
the  Hay-Herran  treaty  are  closely  followed,  while  the  com- 
pensation to  be  given  for  these  enlarged  grants  remains  the 
same,  being  |1 0,000,000,  payable  on  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions, and,  beginning  nine  years  from  that  date,  an  annual 
payment  of  |250,000  during  the  life  of  the  convention." 

Diplomatic  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Pan- 
ama were  fully  established  by  the  appointment  of  a  Minister 
from  each  to  the  other.  The  first  Panainan  Minister  to  the 
United  States,  as  already  noted,  was  the  distinguished 
French  engineer,  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla,  who  was  sent 
hither  by  the  Junta  immediately  after  the  revolution.  Soon 
after  negotiating  the  canal  treaty  he  retired,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  J.  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  who  had  been  Governor  of 
Panama,  under  the  Colombian  Government,  at  the  time  of 
the  revolution,  and  who  was  the  Second  Designate  and 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  statesmen  of  the  Isthmus. 
The  United  States  on  its  part  appointed  William  I.  Buchanan 
as  Minister  to  Panama,  on  December  12,  1903,  and  he  was 
received  at  Panama  on  December  25.  He  was  succeeded  in 
March,  1904,  by  John  Barrett,  who  served — as  we  shall  see 
presently — during  a  peculiarly  trying  period  and  rendered 
some  invaluable  services  to  both  the  United  States  and  Pan- 
ama, and  who  was  in  turn  succeeded,  in  April,  1905,  by 
Charles  E.  Magoon,  who  served  until  September,  1906. 

The  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  lies  well  within 
the  area  bounded  by  the  seventh  and  tenth  parallels  of  lati- 
tude north  of  the  equator,  and  the  seventy-seventh  and 
eighty-fourth  meridians  of  longitude  west  from  Greenwich. 
It  is  thus  in  the  longitude  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 


216  THE  EEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

and  in  the  wholly  tropical  latitude  of  Sierra  Leone,  Ashan- 
tee,  the  Bahr-el-Ghazel,  Somaliland,  Ceylon,  Lower  Siam, 
and  Mindanao.  Its  extreme  length,  from  east  to  west,  is  425 
miles,  and  its  width  from  north  to  south  varies  from  31  to  118 
miles,  the  average  being  about  70  miles.  Its  area  is  between 
32,000  and  33,000  square  miles.  At  the  east  it  abuts  upon 
Colombia,  and  at  the  west  upon  Costa  Rica,  with  a  frontage 
in  each  case  of  about  175  miles,  so  that  its  total  of  land 
frontiers  is  only  about  350  miles,  against  a  sea  frontage 
of  1,250  miles,  of  which  480  is  on  the  Caribbean  at  the  north, 
and  770  on  the  Pacific  at  the  south.  It  is  thus  about  the 
size  of  the  State  of  Maine,  smaller  than  Portugal,  larger 
than  Scotland  or  Ireland,  nearly  four  times  as  large  as 
Massachusetts,  nearly  three  times  the  size  of  Belgium,  and 
more  than  twice  the  size  of  Holland  or  Switzerland.  It  is 
sparsely  settled,  much  of  it  being  practically  uninhabited, 
and  the  total  population  is  less  than  350,000. 

While  it  belonged  to  Colombia,  Panama  was  considered 
a  part  of  South  America.  It  really  belongs,  geographically, 
however,  to  Central  America,  and  is  now  thus  to  be  reck- 
oned. The  territory  is  traversed  from  end  to  end,  with  a 
pretty  complete  break  between  Panama  and  Colon,  by  the 
Cordillera  de  Bando,  which  forms  a  connecting  link  between 
the  Rocky  Mountains  of  North  America  and  the  Andes  of 
South  America.  This  range  is  nowhere — in  Panama — 
Alpine  in  elevation,  and  is  seldom  truly  mountainous.  The 
highest  peaks  are  at  the  extreme  west,  and  comprise  several 
extinct  volcanoes.  Among  these  are  Cerro  Picacho,  7,054 
feet,  the  highest  in  the  Republic;  Pico  Robaldo,  7,012  feet; 
Volcan  de  Chiriqui,  6,480  feet;  Cerro  Santiago,  6,234  feet; 
and  Cerro  Horqueta,  6,234  feet.  The  mountains  of  San 
Bias,  at  the  east,  nowhere  exceed  3,250  feet  in  height,  and 
average  not  more  than  2,000.  In  the  central  regions  the 
hills  are  only  from  500  to  1,000  feet  high,  and  on  the  route 
of  the  canal  the  extreme  elevation  above  tidewater,  at 
Culebra,  was  only  290  feet,  before  the  engineers  began  cut- 
ting it  down. 

I 


5^- 


WATERCOUKSES  217 

In  this  narrow  territory  there  are  no  lakes  worthy  of 
the  name,  but  along  the  coasts  there  are  several  extensive 
lagoons,  or  nearly  landlocked  sounds,  of  considerable  extent. 
The  rivers  are  necessarily  short,  but  they  are  almost  in- 
numerable, traversing  every  part  of  the  Republic.  Most  of 
them  abound  in  rapids,  and  are  not  well  adapted  to  naviga- 
tion, the  descent  from  the  hills  to  the  coast  being  sudden. 
Moreover,  they  are  largely  subject  to  great  and  rapid  changes 
of  volume,  sometimes  being  transformed  from  brooks  of  a 
few  inches  in  depth  to  torrents  of  several  feet,  in  the  course 
of  a  few  hours,  under  the  stress  of  tropical  rains.  The 
largest  of  the  rivers  is  the  Tuyra,  in  the  southeastern  part  of 
the  Republic.  It  is  navigable  by  schooners  and  small 
steamers  for  about  100  miles,  and  has  a  large  and  also  navi- 
gable tributary,  called  the  Chucunaque.  The  famous  and 
dreaded  Chagres  is  in  the  north  central  part  of  the  Republic, 
and  flows  into  the  Caribbean  near  Colon,  after  a  course  of 
100  miles,  more  than  half  of  which  is  navigable  in  the  rainy 
season.  Of  all  the  considerable  streams,  it  is  subject  to  the 
most  violent  fluctuations,  sometimes  rising  thirty  feet  in 
twenty  hours.  The  Chepo,  or  Bayamo,  is  in  the  south  central 
region,  reaching  the  Pacific  east  of  the  city  of  Panama,  and 
is  140  miles  long  and  navigable  by  small  craft  for  more  than 
half  its  length.  The  Cocl6,  Calabebora,  Tarire,  and  Los 
Indios  rivers  all  flow  into  the  Caribbean,  are  from  35  to 
65  miles  long,  and  are  navigable  for  half  their  length.  The 
San  Pedro,  Cambuta,  Golfito,  Chiriqui,  Santiago,  Fonseca, 
San  Pablo,  Santa  Maria,  Chiman,  and  Sambu,  flow  into  the 
Pacific,  and  are  navigable  for  some  distance  by  small  craft. 
The  lack  of  good  roads  on  land,  and  the  great  difficulty  of 
constructing  and  maintaining  them  through  the  jungles, 
cause  the  rivers  to  be  used  as  highways  wherever  possible. 
The  Rio  Grande,  a  comparatively  small  stream,  flowing  into 
the  Pacific  near  Panama,  is  notable  as  the  source  of  the 
excellent  water  supply  of  that  city. 

The  great  extent  of  the  coasts  of  Panama,  proportionately 
to  the  area  of  its  territory,  makes  a  survey  of  them  perhaps 


218  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

the  most  instructive  and  essential  of  all  conspectuses  of  the 
material  republic.  If  we  begin  at  the  northwestern  corner, 
we  find  Carreta  Point  marking  the  boundary  between  Costa 
Rica  and  Panama.  A  little  to  the  eastward  is  the  Tarire 
River,  and  then  comes  the  first  great  feature  of  the  littoral, 
in  Almirante  Bay.  This  landlocked  lagoon  is  about  thirteen 
miles  in  east  to  west  extent,  and  almost  as  long  from  north 
to  south,  but  its  shores  are  most  irregular  in  contour,  and  it 
contains  a  number  of  extensive  islands,  dividing  it  into  a 
groups  of  sounds  and  harbours  rather  than  a  single  sheet  of 
water.  The  water  is  deep  enough  for  the  largest  ships,  and 
in  many  places  these  can  approach  close  to  the  shore,  so 
abrupt  are  the  submerged  banks.  Much  of  the  southern 
and  western  or  mainland  shore  is  a  table-land,  from  500  to 
700  feet  in  elevation,  gradually  sloping  upward  to  a  height 
of  from  1,500  to  2,000  feet  at  a  distance  of  a  couple  of  miles 
from  the  bay.  This  elevation  makes  the  adjacent  country 
agreeable  for  residence.  Unfortunately  it  also  makes  the 
rivers  which  flow  into  the  bay  too  rapid  for  navigation.  At 
the  north  and  east  the  Bay  is  shut  in  from  the  Caribbean  by 
two  large  islands,  Columbus  Island,  formerly  called  Isla  del 
Drago,  and  Provision  Island,  or  Isla  de  Bastimentos.  The 
former  lies  at  the  northwest,  and  is  about  seven  miles  by 
four  in  extent,  low  and  flat,  and  densely  wooded.  At  the 
west  it  is  separated  from  Terraba  Point,  on  the  mainland, 
by  a  strait  three-fourths  of  a  mile  wide,  known  as  Boca  del 
Drago,  or  the  Dragon's  Mouth,  which  forms  the  western- 
most entrance  into  Almirante  Bay.  This  strait  is  nine 
fathoms  deep,  but  tortuous  and  dangerous  for  navigation. 
Cauro  Point  and  Lime  Point  are  the  principal  headlands  of 
the  island  on  this  strait,  and  at  the  latter  there  is  a  con- 
siderable settlement. 

The  chief  settlement  on  Columbus  Island,  however,  is  Boca 
del  Toro,  at  the  southeastern  extremity,  fronting  upon  the 
strait  of  the  same  name  (literally  Bull's  Mouth)  which  sep- 
arates Columbus  Island  from  Provision  Island  and  which 
forms  the  central  and  chief  entrance  into  Almirante  Bay. 


BOCA  DEL  TOKO  219 

The  town  of  Boca  del  Toro  has  about  6,000  inhabitants,  and 
is  the  capital  of  the  province  of  the  same  name.  It  is  one 
of  the  chief  fruit-shipping  ports  of  the  whole  coast,  from 
five  to  seven  steamships  and  many  sailing  craft  leaving  it 
daily  during  the  fruit  season.  The  trade  is  chiefly  with 
American  ports.  There  are  coal  mines  near  at  hand  produc- 
ing coal  of  good  quality,  and  the  possibilities  of  an  extensive 
and  profitable  trade  in  lumber  and  fish  as  well  as  in  fruit  are 
enormous.  The  strait  of  Boca  del  Toro  is  about  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  wide,  and  is  much  preferable  for  naviga- 
tion to  Boca  del  Drago.  At  the  east  and  south  lies  Provision 
Island,  eight  miles  long  but  very  irregular  in  shape.  It 
consists  chiefly  of  low  land,  well  wooded,  and  enormously 
productive  of  tropical  fruits,  whence  the  name  of  the  island. 
There  are  several  small  settlements  on  the  island,  but  most 
of  the  commerce  is  conducted  by  way  of  Boca  del  Toro.  At 
the  south  of  Provision  Island  is  Crawl  Cay  Channel,  an 
eighth  of  a  mile  wide  and  dangerous  for  navigation,  beyond 
which  lies  Popa  Island,  six  miles  long,  rich  in  timber  and 
containing  some  coal,  and  surmounted  by  Mount  Popa,  an 
isolated  peak  with  a  rounded  summit  rising  1,300  feet  above 
the  sea.  At  the  southwest  Popa  Island  is  separated  from 
the  mainland  by  a  narrow  channel  studded  with  islets,  thus 
completing  the  chain  which  landlocks  Almirante  Bay. 

Immediately  south  and  east  of  Almirante  Bay  and  sep- 
arated from  it  by  a  long  peninsula  and  by  Popa  Island,  lies 
the  great  and  well-known  Chiriqui  Lagoon.  This  body  of 
water,  its  expanse  quite  unbroken  by  islands  or  reefs,  is 
thirty-two  miles  long  from  east  to  west,  and  twelve  miles 
in  its  greatest  central  width  from  north  to  south,  and  is 
almost  everywhere  deep  and  safe  for  navigation.  It  is  well 
landlocked,  mainland  peninsulas  embracing  it  at  the  north- 
east and  northwest,  and  Popa  Island  and  Water  Cay  filling 
much  of  the  space  between  their  extremities.  Water  Cay 
is  several  miles  in  extent,  low,  flat,  and  heavily  wooded. 
Between  it  and  Popa  Island  is  a  narrow,  rock-studded  chan 
nel,  difficult  and  dangerous  for  navigation,  but  at  the  east  of 


220  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

it,  between  it  and  the  mainland  (Valiente  Peninsula),  is  a 
broad,  fine  channel  known  as  Boca  de  Chiriqui  or  Tiger 
Channel,  forming  the  chief  entrance  into  the  lagoon.  Nu- 
merous rivers  and  creeks  flow  into  the  lagoon,  some  of  which 
are  navigable  by  small  vessels  for  a  distance,  and  at  their 
mouths  are  villages  which  do  a  considerable  trade  in  fruit, 
lumber,  turtles,  fish,  etc.  Chief  among  these  are  Chirica 
Mola  and  Frenchman's  Creek,  on  streams  of  the  same  names. 
From  Frenchman's  Creek  a  road  runs  overland  to  the  city 
of  David,  near  the  Pacific  coast,  on  which  there  is  much 
travel,  chiefly  in  connection  with  the  trade  in  cattle  and 
hides.  At  the  northeast  Chiriqui  Lagoon  is  inclosed  by  the 
Valiente  Peninsula,  a  crooked  arm  about  twelve  miles  long 
and  two  miles  wide,  with  Valiente  Peak,  722  feet  high,  as  a 
landmark  near  its  extremity.  The  peninsula  is  largely 
rugged  and  hilly,  and  its  outer  shore  is  fringed  with  islets 
and  rocks  and  coral  reefs,  making  approach  by  sea  danger- 
ous. It  has  a  beach  of  pure  white  sand,  the  only  such  beach 
between  Colon  and  Greytown  (Nicaragua),  all  the  rest  of 
the  coast  being  lined  with  brown  or  reddish-black  iron- 
bearing  sand.  Although  the  fluctuation  of  the  tide  here  is 
only  a  foot,  there  is  generally  a  furious  surf  breaking  along 
this  coast,  under  the  stress  of  the  trade  winds  and  "north- 
ers." A  few  miles  to  the  northeast  of  the  peninsula  lies 
the  island  of  Escudo  de  Veraguas,  which  is  about  a  mile  wide 
and  two  and  a  half  miles  long,  densely  wooded.  Its  shores 
consist  largely  of  cliffs  forty  or  fifty  feet  high,  cut  by  the 
waves  into  caves  and  archways  of  the  most  fantastic  design. 
The  seaward  coast  of  the  Valiente  Peninsula  runs  toward 
the  southeast,  and  that  general  direction  is  continued  for 
many  miles  by  a  coast  devoid  of  striking  features,  though 
with  many  river  mouths  and  a  few  scattered  towns.  From 
the  Province  of  Boca  del  Toro  we  pass  to  that  of  Chiriqui, 
and  thence,  at  the  Cana  River,  to  that  of  Veraguas.  From 
the  Cana  River  there  are  many  miles  of  low,  sandy  shore, 
until  Buppan  Bluff  is  reached,  a  promontory  bearing  several 
peaks  700  or  800  feet  high.    A  little  beyond  are  the  Pedro 


CHAGKES  221 

and  Chiriqui  rivers,  and  a  few  miles  beyond  the  latter  a  great 
spur  of  the  Cordilleras,  known  as  Tiger's  Head,  nearly  4,000 
feet  high,  abuts  upon  the  coast.  The  mouth  of  the  Catalina 
River,  just  west  of  Coaita  Point  and  at  the  foot  of  the  Cata- 
lina Hills,  is  the  southernmost  point  on  the  Caribbean  coast. 
Thence  the  shore  of  Panama  runs  in  almost  a  straight  line 
about  a  hundred  miles  east  by  north,  to  Provision  Point 
(Punta  de  Bastimentos)  beyond  Porto  Bello.  This  stretch 
of  coast  is  marked  with  the  mouths  of  innumerable  rivers 
and  creeks.  It  is  chiefly  wooded,  and  much  of  the  way  is 
lined  with  dark-coloured  cliffs.  Perhaps  its  most  striking 
landmark  is  Castle  Choco,  a  square,  flat-topped  mountain, 
rising  to  the  height  of  6,342  feet,  which  at  times  is  clearly 
visible  from  the  Castle  of  San  Lorenzo,  at  Chagres,  67  miles 
away.  Eastward  from  Castle  Choco  the  mountains — the 
Cordilleras  of  Veraguas — come  down  almost  to  the  coast 
for  a  distance  of  more  than  thirty  miles.  Rincon  Point  is 
a  rocky  headland  more  than  500  feet  high,  and  beyond  it  is 
the  Code  River,  overshadowed  by  the  Code  Hills,  nearly 
1,500  feet  high.  The  small  Mangalee  River  marks  the  bound- 
ary between  the  provinces  of  Veraguas  and  Panama,  and 
near  it  is  the  Pilon  de  Miguel  de  la  Borda,  an  isolated  peak 
nearly  1,700  feet  high,  standing  fourteen  miles  inland  but 
clearly  visible  from  the  sea.  Fourteen  miles  eastward  from 
the  Mangalee  is  the  Indios  River,  and  about  the  same  dis- 
tance further  on,  the  mouth  of  the  Chagres  is  reached. 

The  Chagres  enters  the  sea  between  a  low,  dark-coloured 
sandy  beach  at  the  southwest  side  and  a  steep  bluff  and 
table-land  at  the  northeast,  the  former  marked  with  the 
ruins  of  the  ancient  Castle  of  San  Lorenzo.  The  town  of 
Chagres  is  at  the  east,  near  the  castle,  and  is  a  poor  place 
of  about  2,500  fishermen  and  their  families.  The  entrance  to 
the  river  is  rendered  difficult  by  a  number  of  shifting  sand- 
bars and  by  some  rocky  ledges  and  reefs.  The  depth  of 
water  is,  however,  not  less  than  eleven  feet  even  in  the  dry 
season.  Inside  the  bars  there  is  a  depth  of  twenty  feet,  with 
good  anchorage.    From  the  Chagres  the  coast  is  steep  and 


222  THE  EEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

rocky  for  three  miles  to  Brujas  Point,  a  bold,  wooded  head- 
land; thence  for  two  miles  lower  and  sandy  to  Toro  Point, 
which  marks  the  western  side  of  Limon  Bay  and  which  is  a 
wooded  hill  400  feet  high,  bearing  a  lighthouse,  the  flashing 
white  light  of  which  is  visible  for  sixteen  miles.  Limon 
Bay,  also  known  as  Colon  Bay  and  Navy  Bay,  is  about  three 
miles  wide  and  three  and  a  half  miles  deep  from  north  to 
south.  It  is  from  three  to  seven  fathoms  deep,  but  seems  to 
be  steadily  growing  more  shallow.  This  process  is  easily 
explained,  when  we  remember  that  it  is  not  landlocked  but 
is  an  open  roadstead,  fully  exposed  to  the  trade  winds  and  to 
the  furious  "northers"  which  sweep  into  it  with  tremen- 
dous force,  doubtless  driving  into  it  a  certain  amount 
of  detritus  from  the  bottom  of  the  Caribbean,  while  the 
torrential  rains  wash  into  it  much  matter  from  the  shore. 
At  the  east  side  of  the  bay  is  the  low,  flat  Manzanillo  Island, 
a  mile  long  and  three-fourths  of  a  mile  broad,  on  which  is 
the  city  of  Colon.  This  was  formerly  known  as  Aspinwall, 
and  was  created  as  the  Caribbean  terminus  of  the  Panama 
Railroad.  As  such  it  supplanted  the  once  flourishing  town  of 
Chagres  and  reduced  the  latter  to  its  present  inferior  estate. 
On  the  northern  point  of  the  island  is  a  lighthouse  with 
a  fixed  white  light  visible  for  ten  miles.  Colon  has  a  popula- 
tion of  about  6,000  and  is  the  most  important  shipping  port 
of  the  Republic,  being  visited  by  steamships  from  all  parts 
of  the  world.  The  entrance  to  the  Panama  Canal  is  just 
west  of  Colon.  Inland  from  Colon  a  couple  of  miles  are  the 
Mountains  of  Quebrancha.  Northeast  of  Manzanillo  Island 
is  the  small  Bay  of  Manzanillo. 

Thence  the  shore  proceeds  to  the  northeast,  much  broken 
with  capes  and  bays  and  river  mouths,  to  the  ancient  town 
of  Porto  Bello,  where  Columbus  landed  in  1502,  which  was 
the  scene  of  one  of  the  most  hideous  tragedies  of  Morgan 
the  Buccaneer.  It  is  one  of  the  best  harbours  on  the  coast, 
being  partly  landlocked  and  reasonably  safe,  but  the  hills 
which  inclose  it  shut  off  the  breezes  and  it  is  hot  and  un- 
healthy.   Once  the  chief  Isthmian  port,  it  has  never  recov- 


THE  SAN  BLAS  KEGIOH  223 

ered  from  the  injury  inflicted  by  Morgan,  and  is  now  an 
unimportant  place  of  less  than  3,000  inhabitants  and  little 
commerce.  The  irregular  coast  thence  runs  on  to  Basti- 
mentos  Point,  beyond  which  lies  Manzanillo  Island  (not  to 
be  confounded  with  Colon's  island  of  the  same  name),  the 
northern  extremity  of  which,  Manzanillo  Point,  is  the  north- 
ernmost land  of  Panama.  Beyond  this  lies  San  Cristoval 
Bay,  into  which  flows  the  Nombre  de  Dios  Eiver,  and  here 
was  the  old  city  of  Nombre  de  Dios,  famous  in  the  days  of 
the  Spanish  conquistadors,  and  of  Francis  Drake.  The  next 
striking  coast  feature  is  the  Point  of  San  Bias,  partly  inclos- 
ing the  Gulf  of  San  Bias,  an  extensive  sheet  of  water  afford- 
ing some  good  harbourage.  It  lies,  however,  within  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  San  Bias  Indians,  who,  though  amiable  enough 
to  well-disposed  visitors,  do  not  encourage  intercourse,  and 
permit  no  white  man  to  remain  on  shore  at  night.  A  short 
distance  off  the  entrance  to  this  gulf  lie  the  Mulatas  Islands, 
an  archipelago  of  islets  and  rocks,  among  which  there  is  fine 
fishing,  and  where  many  large  edible  turtles  are  captured. 
Escoces  Point,  Escoces  Harbour,  Caledonian  Bay,  and  Pater- 
son's  Hill,  many  miles  further  down  the  coast  to  the  south- 
east, are  reminiscent  of  the  ill-fated  attempt  to  plant  a 
Scotch  colony  on  the  Isthmus  and  thus  win  "the  keys  of 
the  universe"  for  Great  Britain.  At  Cape  Tiburon,  a  high, 
rocky  point,  we  reach  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Darien, 
and  the  boundary  between  Panama  and  Colombia. 

Turning  now  to  the  Pacific  coast,  and  again  beginning  at 
the  west,  the  Costa  Kican  boundary  is  marked  by  Burica 
Point,  a  long  and  conspicuous  cape  jutting  to  the  southward. 
From  the  point  of  the  cape,  the  coast  runs  northward  and 
then  sweeps  around  in  a  third  of  a  circle,  to  Boca  San  Pedro, 
one  of  the  chief  entrances  to  the  delta  of  the  David  River, 
upon  which,  a  few  miles  inland,  lies  the  important  city  of 
David.  This  delta  comprises  an  extensive  group  of  islands, 
reaching  along  the  coast  for  nearly  twenty  miles.  The 
southernmost  of  them  is  Parida  Island,  which  is  about  four 
miles  by  two  in  extent  and  is  well  provided  with  wood  and 


224  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

fresh  water.  Venado  Island  is  the  easternmost  of  the  group, 
and  thence  a  clean  coast  runs  eastward  and  a  little  south- 
ward to  a  similar  but  smaller  archipelago  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Santiago  River.  Thence  the  coast  trends  sharply  south- 
ward, to  Bahia  Honda,  off  which  lies  Coiba  or  Quibo  Island, 
the  largest  of  all  the  islands  of  Panama.  Coiba  is  about 
twelve  by  twenty-one  miles  in  extent,  of  moderate  elevation, 
well  wooded  and  watered,  and  with  extensive  fertile  plains. 
This  island  was  visited  by  Lord  Anson,  in  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  and  was  then  said  to  be  infested 
with  flying  serpents.  Several  smaller  islands  lie  near  Coiba, 
the  chief  of  them  being  Jicaron,  four  miles  to  the  southward. 
It  is  three  and  a  half  miles  across,  and  has  hills  rising  to 
a  height  of  1,400  feet. 

Twenty  miles  east  of  Bahia  Honda  is  Brava  Point,  at  the 
western  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Montijo.  This  gulf  is  a  fine, 
almost  landlocked  sheet  of  water,  nine  by  fourteen  miles  in 
extent,  with  Cebaco  and  Gobernador  Islands  screening  its 
entrance.  Within  the  gulf,  near  its  head,  is  the  Island  of 
Leones,  three  miles  across.  Cebaco  Island,  which  serves  as 
a  breakwater  across  the  entrance  to  the  gulf,  is  nearly  four- 
teen miles  long,  but  only  from  one  to  two  miles  wide.  Gober- 
nador Island  is  only  a  mile  or  two  in  extent.  The  San  Pablo 
and  several  other  considerable  rivers  flow  into  this  gulf. 
At  the  eastern  side  of  the  entrance  is  Duartis  Point,  and 
thence  the  coast  runs  south  and  a  little  east,  with  marked 
irregularities,  nearly  twenty  miles,  to  Mariato  Point,  the 
southernmost  land  of  Panama.  Thence  the  coast  line  turns 
at  a  right  angle,  and  runs,  with  some  irregularities,  little 
north  of  east,  twenty-seven  miles  to  Morro  Puercos,  or 
Puercos  Point;  thence  it  curves  in  a  large  bight  northeast- 
ward to  Guanico  Point,  about  seven  miles,  and  thence  in  a 
larger  bight  in  the  same  direction  ten  miles  to  Raia  Point. 
Near  Raia  Point  is  the  mouth  of  the  Juera  River,  a  stream 
navigable  for  a  mile  or  two  by  the  largest  vessels,  its  depth 
being  more  than  fifty  feet.  Twelve  miles  to  the  east  and  a 
little  north  is  Cape  Mala,  the  western  side  of  the  entrance  to 


THE  BAY  OF  PANAMA  226 

the  vast  Bay  of  Panama.  Here  the  coast  turns  sharply,  at 
something  less  than  a  right  angle,  and  runs  in  an  almost 
straight  line  northwest  by  north  about  fifty-five  miles  to 
Point  Lisa,  at  the  southern  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  Bay 
of  Parita,  an  indentation  at  the  extreme  west  of  the  Bay 
of  Panama.  The  cities  of  Parita  and  Los  Santos — in  the 
province  of  Los  Santos — are  near  the  shore  of  the  Bay  of 
Parita,  on  rivers  which  are  navigable  for  several  miles.  At 
the  northeast  side  of  the  bay  is  Anton  Point,  whence  the 
coast  extends  in  an  almost  straight  line  northeast  to  Point 
Chame,  forty  miles.  At  Point  Chame  the  line  curves  north- 
west and  thence  around  to  northeast  in  a  semicircular  bight 
about  seventeen  miles,  to  Batele  Point.  This  bight  is  shal- 
low and  is  not  readily  navigable.  The  Chorrera  River,  a 
considerable  stream,  enters  it  and  is  navigable  for  a  couple 
of  miles,  as  far  as  the  city  of  Chorrera,  an  important  place 
of  about  6,000  inhabitants.  Across  the  entrance  to  the  bight 
lies  a  long  chain  of  islands,  extending  from  north  to  south 
for  a  distance  of  more  than  twenty  miles.  At  the  northern 
end  of  the  chain  are  Naos,  Perico,  Flamingo,  and  Culebra 
islands,  mere  islets,  a  mile  or  two  from  the  city  of  Panama. 
A  few  miles  south  of  them  lies  the  beautiful  Taboga  Island, 
nearly  two  miles  in  extent  and  rising  to  a  height  of  935 
feet.  Upon  it  is  a  large  and  attractive  village,  and  the 
island  is  a  favourite  place  of  residence  and  resort  for  health 
and  pleasure.  Near  by  are  the  much  smaller  islands  of 
Taboguilla,  or  Little  Taboga,  and  Urava,  and  a  number  of 
rocky  islets,  all  rising  sheer  and  high  above  the  water  like 
abrupt  mountain  peaks.  Still  further  south  are  the  islets 
of  Cham6  and  Valladolid,  and  at  the  southern  end  of  the 
series  are  Otoque,  Bona,  and  Estiva. 

Passing  Point  Batel6  and  Changarni  Island,  the  harbour 
of  Panama  is  reached,  the  city  itself  being  about  five  miles 
north  by  east  from  Batele.  Panama  occupies  a  peninsula 
between  two  bays,  that  at  the  west  being  formed  by  the 
estuary  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  little  Rio  San  Juan,  and 
that  at  the  east,  more  than  a  mile  wide  from  Panama  to 


226  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

Point  Paitillo,  being  a  mere  indentation  in  the  coast.  The 
view  of  Panama  from  the  sea,  as  it  stands  upon  its  terraces 
of  volcanic  rock,  with  the  huge  mass  of  Ancon  Hill,  630  feet 
high,  rising  as  a  background  behind  it,  is  one  of  rare  and 
memorable  beauty.  Just  west  of  the  city  is  the  Pacific 
terminal  of  the  canal,  known  as  La  Boca,  at  which  is  a  great 
wharf  for  ocean  steamships.  The  anchorage  off  Panama  is 
excellent,  and  although  the  harbour  is  open  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  calm  weather  almost  constantly  prevails,  so  that 
vessels  are  secure  without  any  breakwater.  The  Bay  of 
Panama  was  indeed  once  known  as  the  Bay  of  Calms,  and 
one  serious  disadvantage  to  commerce  is  that  sailing  vessels 
often  have  to  be  towed  out  of  port  for  a  hundred  miles  before 
they  can  find  wind  to  fill  their  sails.  There  are  numerous 
focks  and  reefs  off  the  Panama  waterfront,  and  the  fluctua- 
tion of  the  tide  is  about  twenty  feet,  so  that  navigation  has 
to  be  conducted  with  much  care.  Five  miles  east  of  Pan- 
ama is  the  site  of  the  original  city  of  Panama,  now  marked 
by  nothing  but  a  single  ruined  tower,  visible  for  miles. 
Thence  the  coast  runs  almost  due  east,  for  twenty  miles,  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Bayamo  or  Chepo  River,  a  large  and  navi- 
gable stream,  the  lower  twelve  miles  of  which  it  was  proposed 
to  use  as  a  part  of  the  projected  canal  at  the  San  Bias 
route.  The  lovely  Chepillo  Island  lies  off  the  mouth  of  this 
river. 

Thirty  miles  southeast  from  the  Chepo,  the  mouth  of  the 
Chiman  River  is  reached,  with  Pelado  Island  near  it.  The 
village  of  Chiman,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  is  the  point 
from  which  Pizarro  sailed  for  Peru  in  1525  for  the  conquest 
of  that  empire.  Directly  southwest  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Chiman,  at  a  distance  of  more  than  twenty  miles,  lie  the 
famous  Pearl  Islands,  a  large  and  numerous  archipelago 
thirty  miles  in  extent  from  north  to  south  and  twenty  miles 
in  width  from  east  to  west.  These  exquisite  islands  have 
also  been  called  Islands  of  the  King,  Islands  of  the  Isthmus, 
and  Islands  of  Colombia.  There  are  sixteen  of  them,  beside  a 
score  or  more  of  mere  rocks.     Isla  del  Rey  is  by  far  the 


THE  PEARL  ISLANDS  22V 

largest,  being  more  than  ten  miles  long,  and  having  an  area 
greater  than  that  of  all  the  rest  put  together.  It  has  also 
been  called  the  Island  of  St.  Michael  (San  Miguel).  San 
Jose  and  Pedro  Gonzalez  are  also  considerable  islands. 
Bayoneta,  Casaya,  Saboga,  Pacheca,  and  Contadora  are 
much  smaller,  though  Saboga  has  a  large  village  and  per- 
haps the  best  anchorage  in  the  group.  Nearly  all  the  islands 
are  hilly,  some  of  them  rising  600  feet  above  the  water.  They 
are  well  wooded  and  watered,  and  fertile,  and  present  a 
singularly  beautiful  panorama  of  mingled  landscape  and 
seascape. 

Returning  to  the  Chiman  River  and  going  south  by  east 
twenty  miles,  Brava  Point  is  reached,  at  the  northern  side 
of  the  entrance  to  the  great  gulf  of  San  Miguel,  or  Darien  del 
Sur,  Point  Garachine,  twelve  miles  south,  marking  the  other 
side.  This  gulf  is  very  irregular  in  shape  and  is  dotted  with 
small  islands.  It  extends  inland  about  fifteen  miles,  where  it 
is  reached  and  entered  by  the  huge  estuary  of  the  Tuyra  and 
Sabana  rivers,  the  former  the  largest  in  the  republic  and  a 
part  of  several  of  the  Darien  canal  routes.  The  large  Sambu 
River  also  flows  into  this  gulf  near  its  southern  extremity. 
From  Point  Garachine  the  coast  runs  generally  about  south- 
southeast  for  fifty  miles  to  the  Colombian  border,  without 
noteworthy  features.  A  high  mountain  range  rises  almost 
directly  from  the  shore,  and  there  are  no  rivers  or  towns 
of  importance  in  that  region. 

Of  the  city  of  Panama  I  shall  speak  in  detail  in  another 
place.  It  remains  to  mention  briefly  the  other  cities  and 
towns  of  importance.  Colon,  already  mentioned,  dates  from 
1849  only,  and  is  essentially  a  modern  commercial  city. 
Everything  in  it  is  subordinated  to  the  railroad  and  steam- 
ships. It  is  largely  built  of  wood  and  sheet  iron,  and  is 
periodically  ravaged  by  extensive  conflagrations.  Elevated 
only  a  few  feet  above  tide  level,  adequate  sewerage  is  im- 
possible. The  sanitary  conditions  have  accordingly  been 
bad,  and  the  task  of  improving  them  is  proving  most  diflS- 
cult.    Exposed  to  the  trade  winds,  however,  Colon  is  some- 


228  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

what  cooler  than  Panama,  and  has  thus  been  regarded  by 
some  as  a  more  desirable  place  of  residence.  Such  judgment 
seems  strange,  to  one  who  has  contrasted  the  dripping,  reek- 
ing climate  of  swamp-girt  Colon,  and  the  turbid,  yellow 
waves  of  Limon  Bay,  with  the  vastly  dryer  climate  and 
crj^stalline  air  of  rock-founded  Panama,  fronted  with  the 
fathomless  azure  of  the  Pacific.  There  has  been  talk  of 
establishing  the  Caribbean  terminus  of  the  canal  at  a  dis- 
tance of  some  miles  from  Colon,  and  removing  that  city 
to  the  new  site.  "'Tis  a  consummation  devoutly  to  be 
wished."  Wherever  the  new  site,  it  must  be  better  than  the 
old. 

Boca  del  Toro,  with  its  great  fruit  trade  and  its  up-to-date 
wireless  telegraphy,  I  have  already  mentioned ;  and  also  Porto 
Bello,  with  its  record  of  being  sacked  and  burned  five  times. 
Chagres,  too,  has  been  described,  as  having  fallen  from  the 
estate  of  a  walled  and  castled  city  to  that  of  a  fishing  vil- 
lage of  thatched  huts.  Agua  Dulce,  on  the  Bay  of  Parita, 
provides  the  whole  Republic  with  salt,  and  is  a  great  centre 
of  grain  and  cattle  growing.  David,  the  capital  of  the  prov- 
ince of  Chiriqui,  is  the  largest  of  the  inland  cities,  having 
about  8,000  inhabitants,  and  being  the  chief  grain  and  cattle 
market  of  the  Republic.  It  has  also  some  gold  mines.  Its 
trade  is  conducted  by  way  of  both  the  Pacific  and  the  Car- 
ibbean. Los  Santos,  the  capital  of  the  province  of  that  name, 
has  7,500  inhabitants,  and  is  beautiful  for  situation. 
Santiago,  capital  of  the  province  of  Veraguas,  has  7,000 
inhabitants,  and  is  the  seat  of  iron  and  steel,  sugar, 
cotton,  and  woollen  factories,  and  has  gold,  silver,  and 
copper  mines. 

The  visitor  to  the  Isthmus  from  the  United  States  lands, 
of  course,  at  Colon.  In  the  outskirts  of  that  city  the  train 
passes  the  unspeakably  squalid  settlement  of  Cristobal, 
founded  by  the  French  in  1880,  and  Monkey  Hill,  with  its 
cemetery.  Beyond  several  miles  of  swamp  Mindi,  an  insig- 
nificant place,  is  reached,  and  beyond  it  is  Gatun,  a  village 
of  900  inhabitants,  the  first  station  of  importance  after  leav- 


j£;j{fc33iAs*i»i 


ALONG  THE  EAILROAD  229 

ing  Colon,  and  about  seven  miles  from  the  latter.  Gatun 
stands  on  the  banks  of  the  Chagres  River,  which  is  naviga- 
ble to  that  point  by  steamers,  and  is  the  proposed  site  of  a 
dam  for  the  control  of  that  stream.  Three  miles  further  on, 
across  the  swamps  bordering  the  Quebrancha  River  (a  tribu- 
tary of  the  Chagres),  the  negro  village  of  Lion  Hill,  or  Tiger 
Hill,  is  reached,  a  poor  place,  with  about  200  inhabitants. 
Five  miles  further,  after  passing  the  insignificant  hamlets 
of  Ahorca  Lagarto,  Carmen  Messias,  and  Santana,  the  negro 
and  Chinese  village  of  Bohio  Soldado  is  reached,  where  it 
has  been  proposed  to  construct  the  gigantic  Bohio  Dam,  to 
transform  the  valley  of  the  Chagres  for  miles  into  a  lake, 
for  a  high-level  canal.  The  village  has  fewer  than  500 
inhabitants.  A  little  beyond  is  Buena  Vista,  and  three  and 
a  half  miles  from  Bohio  is  Frijoles,  where  the  French  built 
important  machine  shops  and  storehouses.  Tavernilla,  with 
200  inhabitants,  is  three  miles  further  on,  Mamei  is  five  miles 
beyond  it,  and  two  miles  beyond  Mamei  is  Gorgona,  a  town 
of  more  than  3,000  people.  Matachin,  two  and  a  half  miles 
from  Gorgona,  is  the  site  of  machine  shops  and  warehouses. 
Under  the  French  company,  in  1887,  it  was  the  scene  of  an 
outbreak  of  yellow  fever,  which  killed  more  than  2,000 
Chinamen.  Its  present  population  is  less  than  1,000,  chiefly 
negroes  and  Chinese.  Obispo,  a  mile  beyond,  is  a  village  of 
250  inhabitants.  It  is  close  to  Gamboa,  the  site  of  another 
proposed  dam  for  the  control  of  the  Chagres.  Las  Cas- 
cades, two  miles  further  on,  has  400  black  and  yellow 
inhabitants. 

The  important  station  of  Emperador,  or  Empire,  comes 
next,  two  miles  beyond  Las  Cascades.  It  has  more  than 
4,000  population,  and  is  attractively  situated.  Just  east  of 
the  railroad  station  is  a  hill,  250  feet  high,  which  was  forti- 
fied and  used  with  effect  in  more  than  one  of  the  Isthmian 
wars,  and  is  now  occupied  by  the  barracks  of  the  United 
States  troops  which  guard  the  Canal  Zone.  That  sightly 
and  breezy  hilltop  is  a  comfortable  and  most  attractive  place 
of  residence,  commanding  one  of  the  finest  panoramas  to  be 


230  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

seen  on  the  Isthmus.  A  mile  and  a  half  from  Empire  is 
the  village  of  Culebra,  on  the  "continental  divide,"  and  near 
the  great  Culebra  Cut,  the  crux  of  the  canal  construction. 
Paraiso  comes  next,  only  eight  miles  from  Panama,  with 
three  hundred  negro  and  Chinese  inhabitants;  a  mile  and 
a  half  beyond  is  Pedro  Miguel ;  a  mile  beyond  that  is  Mira- 
flores,  on  the  Rio  Grande  River,  whence  Panama  draws  its 
water  supply ;  the  insignificant  hamlet  of  Rio  Grande  is  just 
beyond;  and  finally  comes  Corozal,  on  the  edge  of  a  man- 
grove swamp,  three  miles  outside  of  the  city  of  Panama.  A 
short  distance  before  reaching  the  Panama  terminal  of  the 
railroad,  a  spur  branches  off  and  runs  around  the  city  to 
the  great  steamship  wharf  at  La  Boca,  at  the  other  side. 

The  Isthmus  of  Panama  is  the  only  part  of  the  American 
continents  where  there  is  a  distinct  break  in  and  indeed 
an  abandonment  of  the  mighty  continental  backbone  of 
mountains  which  extend  from  Alaska  to  Patagonia.  There 
that  chain,  known  variously  as  the  Rocky  Mountains,  the 
Cordilleras,  and  the  Andes,  gives  place  for  some  miles  to 
irregular  scattered  hills,  solitary  or  grouped,  of  no  consider- 
able height.  Few  rise  as  high  as  1,500  feet,  and  many  no 
higher  than  500  or  600  feet.  Along  the  line  chosen  for  the 
canal  there  is  no  elevation  as  great  as  300  feet,  and  most  of 
the  route  is  much  lower.  Upon  the  interesting  and  plausible 
theory  that  at  one  time  there  was  a  gap  in  the  Isthmus,  and 
an  open  waterway  between  the  two  seas,  which  has  been 
filled  up  by  volcanic  action,  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  dwell. 
But  it  seems  quite  inconceivable  that  any  intelligent  ob- 
server can  personally  inspect  and  examine  the  Panama  route 
without  being  quickly  convinced  that  it  is  peculiarly  and 
preeminently  fitted  by  nature  for  the  purpose  of  canal  con- 
struction, and  of  a  canal  at  tide  level. 

Beginning  at  the  flat,  swampy  coast  near  Colon,  the  route 
of  the  canal  proceeds  practically  at  tide  level  through  an 
alluvial  plain,  for  a  distance  of  six  miles,  to  Gatun,  where 
the  first  hills  are  reached,  and  where  there  have  been  pro- 
posals to  construct  a  dam — provided  any  one  is  willing  to 


THE  CHAGRES  VALLEY  231 

go  two  hundred  feet  below  sea  level  for  a  bed-rock  founda- 
tion. Passing  through  a  gap  in  the  hills,  scarcely  elevated 
above  the  sea,  the  line  follows  the  valley  of  the  Chagres 
River  for  nine  miles  more,  with  a  scarcely  perceptible  ascent, 
to  Bohio.  At  this  point  the  valley  of  the  Ohagres  is  narrow, 
and  to  the  superficial  observer  the  place  seems  well  fitted  for 
the  building  of  a  dam,  to  impound  the  waters  of  the  Chagres 
in  what  has  been  called  in  advance  "Lake  Bohio" — an 
essential  feature  of  the  high-level  canal  scheme.  But  on 
careful  examination  it  is  found  that  the  bed  rock  is  nearly  as 
far  below  sea  level  as  at  Gatun,  a  circumstance  which  has 
caused  many  engineers  to  regard  the  plan  for  a  dam  there  as 
problematic.  Beyond  Bohio  lies  the  extensive  Plain  of 
Tavernilla,  which  rises  gradually  and  slightly  toward  Obis- 
po, thirteen  miles  further  on.  The  proposed  dam  at  Bohio 
would  transform  that  entire  plain,  from  Bohio  to  Obispo, 
into  a  lake. 

At  Obispo  the  "continental  divide"  is  reached,  the  ridge 
of  earth  and  rock  which  in  diminutive  fashion  corresponds 
with  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  the  Andes  as  the  watershed 
between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  As  the  vast  width 
of  the  North  American  Continent  is  to  the  narrow  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  so  are  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  little  hill  of 
Culebra,  south  of  Obispo,  through  which  the  famous  and 
dreaded  Culebra  cut  is  being  made.  At  its  extreme  summit, 
before  the  French  engineers  removed  a  spadeful  of  earth, 
it  was  less  than  300  feet  above  tide  level.  The  length  of  this 
cut,  from  Obispo  to  Pedro  Miguel,  is  less  than  eight  miles, 
and,  of  course,  it  is  not  all  as  deep  as  at  the  centre.  At 
Pedro  Miguel  the  foot  of  the  hill  is  reached,  and  thence  there 
is  a  very  slight  descent  along  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  eight  miles  away,  at  La  Boca,  or  "The 
Mouth,"  just  west  of  the  city  of  Panama.  There  it  will  be 
necessary  to  dredge  a  channel  for  the  canal  for  three  miles 
in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  out  to  the  island  of  Naos. 

Most  of  the  way  this  route  runs  through  a  tropical  wilder- 
ness of  profuse  vegetation.     The  geology  of  the  region  is 


232  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

peculiar.  Bed  rock  lies  generally  far  below  the  surface,  so 
far  below  that  it  need  not  be  touched  in  canal  cutting,  until 
the  city  of  Panama  itself  is  reached,  which  stands  upon  a 
terrace  of  volcanic  rock.  The  cuttings  at  Culebra  and  else- 
where are  chiefly  through  red  clay,  a  greenish  marl-like 
deposit,  and  various  rocks  abounding  in  quartz  which  when 
dry  are  hard  as  granite  but  when  saturated  with  water — 
which  they  take  in  as  does  a  sponge — are  as  easily  disinte- 
grated as  so  much  loaf  sugar.  I  remember  that  on  my  first 
visit  to  the  Culebra  cut  I  saw  innumerable  masses  of  glit- 
tering quartz  crystal  from  the  size  of  a  walnut  to  that  of  a 
barrel,  apparently  as  strong  as  New  England  granite,  and 
reminding  me  of  masses  of  Herkimer  County  rock  crystals 
of  exaggerated  size.  My  first  thought  was  that  it  would  be 
difficult  for  me  to  break  off  such  specimens  as  I  might  want 
to  carry  away.  But  when  I  made  the  attempt  I  found  that 
my  real  difficulty  was  to  keep  the  pieces  which  I  gathered 
from  crumbling  into  atoms  in  my  hand  or  in  my  pocket. 
The  rain  of  the  night  before  had  saturated  the  rock,  and 
had  made  it  as  friable  and  perishable  as  so  much  confection- 
ery. This  peculiarity  of  the  rock,  of  course,  greatly  facili- 
tates excavation. 

A  less  agreeable  peculiarity  is  possessed  by  the  red  clay 
and  other  earths  at  Culebra :  to  wit,  the  property  or  tendency 
of  slipping  and  sliding  and  refusing  to  "stay  put."  These 
earths  are  in  horizontal  or  nearly  horizontal  strata,  among 
w^hich  there  is  little  or  no  cohesion.  Our  French  predeces- 
sors were  much  troubled  by  the  frequent  landslides  which 
brought  the  sides  of  the  cuts  tumbling  and  bulging  in  upon 
them  and  filling  up  the  space  which  had  been  excavated. 
This  trouble  they  themselves  aggravated,  as  I  have  told  in  a 
former  chapter,  by  the  ill-advised  system  of  piling  up  the  ex- 
cavated material  at  the  sides  of  the  cuttings  and  thus  adding 
to  the  pressure  upon  the  lower  strata  of  the  banks.  Our 
own  engineers  have  more  wisely  decided  to  remove  all 
material  to  a  greater  distance,  and  also  to  make  the  cuttings 
wider  and  the  slope  of  the  sides  at  a  much  lower  angle.    Thus 


EAKTHQUAKES  233 

that  trouble  will  be  avoided.  It  may  be  that  torrential  rains 
will  wash  some  earth  down  the  banks  into  the  canal,  though 
it  is  probable  that  in  a  short  time  the  banks  will  be  so  cov- 
ered with  masses  of  vegetation  as  to  prevent  any  serious 
erosion.  If  not,  it  may  be  necessary  to  cover  the  slopes 
with  rip-rap. 

The  volcanic  character  of  the  Isthmus  has  already  been 
mentioned.  The  region  is  not  now  altogether  free  from 
slight  earthquake  shocks,  but  there  are  no  active  volcanoes, 
and  severe  shocks  have  been  unknown  for  centuries.  Such 
seismic  disturbances  as  do  occur  must  now  be  regarded  as 
nothing  more  than  the  results  of  more  severe  shocks  in  far- 
distant  places.  The  fact  that  the  lofty  tower  of  the  cathe- 
dral of  Old  Panama  is  still  standing,  intact,  indicates  that 
there  has  been  no  destructive  tremor  of  the  earth  for  the 
best  part  of  four  centuries.  Careful  records  are  made  at 
Panama,  with  the  most  sensitive  and  accurate  seismometers 
and  seismographs,  from  which  I  noted  that  in  the  three 
years  1901-1903,  there  was  not  one  real  shock,  and  there  were 
only  eight  tremors,  of  which  probably  not  more  than  one  was 
perceptible  save  to  the  delicate  instruments.  In  the  same 
years  at  San  Jos6,  in  Costa  Rica,  there  were  about  150 
shocks,  more  than  thirty  of  them  being  very  strong.  We 
may,  therefore,  dismiss  all  fears  of  city-destroying  earth- 
quakes at  Panama,  though,  of  course,  there  is  always  a  pos- 
sibility that  a  comparatively  slight  shock  might  gravely 
damage  the  masonry  locks  of  a  high-level  canal,  while  it 
would  do  no  harm  to  one  at  sea-level. 

The  climate  of  Panama  is  strongly  affected  by  several  cir- 
cumstances. One  is  that  the  Isthmus  lies  about  nine  degrees 
north  of  the  equator,  and  scarcely  one  degree  north  of  the 
thermal  equator.  Another  is  that  the  Isthmus  is  so  narrow 
a  strip  of  land  between  two  oceans.  These  circumstances 
give  Panama  a  particularly  moist  climate.  Another  feature 
of  the  climate,  especially  at  Colon  and  along  the  northern 
shore,  is  the  prevalence  of  the  Caribbean  trade  winds,  and 
this,  with  the  altitude  of  the  sun,  conduces  to  remarkable 


234  THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

uniformity  of  temperature.  From  April  13  to  August  29 
the  sun  at  noon  is  north  of  the  zenith,  on  June  21  being 
only  75  deg.  41  min.  above  the  northern  horizon,  while  on 
December  21  it  is  57  deg.  24  min.  above  the  southern  hori- 
zon. There  is  thus  an  extreme  variation  of  46  deg.  55  min. 
Generally  speaking,  55  per  cent,  of  the  time  the  wind  at 
Colon  is  blowing  from  northerly  quarters :  that  is,  from  some 
point  between  northeast  and  northwest;  35  per  cent,  of  the 
time  it  is  from  the  corresponding  southerly  quarters;  nine 
per  cent,  of  the  time  it  is  from  easterly  or  westerly  quarters ; 
and  one  per  cent,  of  the  time  there  is  a  dead  calm.  These 
percentages  vary  with  the  seasons,  of  which  there  are  two — 
the  dry  season,  comprising  January,  February,  March,  and 
April,  and  the  wet  season,  including  all  the  rest  of  the  year. 
During  the  dry  season  more  than  90  per  cent,  of  the  wind  is 
from  between  north  and  northeast,  and  during  the  rainy 
season  more  than  50  per  cent,  is  from  southerly  quarters. 
As  these  winds  blow  from  the  sea  upon  the  land,  the  tem- 
perature of  the  water  is  an  important  factor  in  climatic 
problems.  The  temperature  of  the  Caribbean  has  a  yearly 
average  of  79.3  deg.,  Fahrenheit,  ranging  from  75.8  in  Feb- 
ruary to  81.9  in  September.  The  temperature  of  the  Pacific, 
or  of  the  Bay  of  Panama,  has  a  yearly  average  of  only  76.1, 
ranging  from  67.8  in  February  to  80.0  in  October.  Thus  the 
Pacific  is  3.2  degrees  cooler  than  the  Caribbean,  and  has 
just  twice  as  great  a  range  of  variation  as  the  latter.  At 
this  point  I  may  perhaps  appropriately  mention  the  tides, 
though  they  have  probably  no  bearing  upon  the  climate.  At 
Colon  the  total  range  from  low  to  high  water  is  from  7.44 
to  24.84  inches,  the  average  being  17.208  inches.  At  Panama 
the  range  is  from  16.40  to  20.93  feet,  the  average  being  18.75 
feet,  or  more  than  thirteen  times  as  great  in  the  Pacific  as  in 
the  Caribbean. 

The  uniformity  of  the  climate  of  Panama  is  most  notable, 
when  we  observe  the  temperature  of  the  air  and  its  slight 
variations.  At  Panama  the  hottest  time  of  the  day  is  from 
two  to  four  o'clock  p.  m.,  when  the  average  temperature 


TEMPERATURE  236 

ranges  from  81.6,  Fahrenheit,  in  November,  to  86.1  in  March. 
The  coolest  hour  is  from  six  to  seven  o'clock  a.  m.,  when 
the  average  temperature  ranges  from  74.0  in  January  to 
76.6  in  June.  The  general  average  of  highest  temperature  is 
84.0,  and  of  lowest,  75.1.  The  average  daily  temperature 
ranges  from  77.9  in  November  to  81.1  in  April,  the  yearly 
average  being  79.6.  Thus  the  variation  of  monthly  averages 
during  the  year  is  at  most  only  3.2  degrees.  I  know  of  no 
other  place  where  it  is  so  slight,  and  where,  therefore,  the 
temperature  is  so  uniform.  At  Barbados  there  is  a  variation 
in  monthly  averages  of  3.5  degrees ;  at  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico, 
of  5.8 ;  at  Kingston,  Jamaica— that  land  of  comfort  and  of 
beauty— of  6.5 ;  at  Havana,  Cuba,  of  12.1 ;  at  New  Orleans, 
of  29.1 ;  and  at  Washington,  D.  C,  of  43.7.  The  first  four 
of  the  places  named  have  a  yearly  average  from  a  fraction 
of  a  degree  to  4.1  degrees  cooler  than  Panama.  But  King- 
ston, San  Juan,  and  Havana  all  have  hotter  weather  as  well 
as  cooler  weather  than  Panama,  and  on  the  whole  the  tem- 
perature of  the  Isthmus  is  more  agreeable  than  theirs.  It 
Is  an  impressive  fact  that  there  is  no  record  of  the  ther- 
mometer's ever  having  risen  as  high  as  100  deg.,  Fahrenheit, 
at  Panama.  It  has  been  observed  at  101  at  Havana  and  at 
San  Juan,  and  at  104  in  Washington. 

So  much  for  the  dry  bulb  thermometer.  I  am  sorry  to  say 
that  the  record  concerning  humidity  is  less  f avourable  •  at 
Panama  than  elsewhere.  I  do  not  think  the  Isthmians  ever 
suffer  as  much  from  excessive  humidity  as  we  do  at  times  in 
New  York,  in  August,  but  they  suffer  from  it  for  a  much 
longer  time.  Even  in  the  dry  season,  from  January  to  April, 
there  is  an  average  humidity  of  about  80  degrees,  and  in 
the  rainy  season  this  rises  to  about  87.7.  Probably  85  deg. 
would  be  a  fair  average  for  the  year.  That  is  a  record  which 
speaks  for  itself.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  defend  it  or  to 
extenuate  it.  I  should  add,  however,  in  passing,  that  up  at 
Empire  and  other  places  on  the  highlands,  at  an  elevation  of 
only  from  100  to  500  feet,  the  humidity  is  much  less  than 
at  Panama,  while  the  range  of  variation. of  temperature  is 


236  THE  REPUBLIC  OE  PANAMA 

greater,  the  maximum  of  heat  being  higher  and  the  minimum 
lower  than  on  the  coast.  The  wind  at  Colon  blows  almost 
incessantly,  at  an  average  velocity  of  from  five  to  eight  miles 
an  hour,  seldom  rising  above  twenty  miles,  save  in  the 
destructive  "northers." 

The  rainfall  on  the  Isthmus  is  heavy,  but  varies  much 
according  to  place.  At  Colon  it  is  heaviest,  averaging  about 
140  inches  a  year.  At  Matachin  and  Empire,  on  the  "di- 
vide," it  is  from  90  to  95  inches.  In  the  city  of  Panama 
it  is  not  more  than  60  inches.  The  average  number  of  rainy 
days  in  a  year  is  246  at  Bohio,  196  at  Colon,  and  141  at 
Panama.  At  Bohio  there  is  not  nearly  as  much  contrast 
between  the  wet  and  dry  seasons  as  at  Panama,  the  four  dry 
months  at  Bohio  having  an  average  of  twelve  rainy  days 
each,  while  at  Panama  they  have  less  than  five  each.  At 
Panama  the  rainy  season  is  by  no  means  a  time  of  incessant 
downpour.  When  it  does  rain,  it  rains  hard,  as  hard  as  we 
ever  see  it  in  the  north  in  the  most  torrential  summer  thun- 
derstorms and  "cloudbursts."  But  at  least  one  day  in  three 
is  fine,  and  generally  one  day,  in  two.  The  rainiest  month 
is  October,  in  which  there  is  an  average  of  twenty  rainy  days 
and  eleven  fine  ones.  In  November  the  average  is  eighteen 
rainy,  in  August  and  September  seventeen  each,  in  July 
fifteen,  in  June  thirteen,  in  May  twelve,  and  in  December 
eleven  rainy  days.  In  the  dry  season  the  average  number 
of  rainy  days  is  seven  in  April,  six  in  January,  four  in 
March,  and  one  in  February. 

It  is  not  my  purpose,  however,  to  attempt  a  technical 
scientific  treatise  upon  climatic  or  other  conditions  in  the 
Isthmian  Republic,  but  to  give  the  general  impression  which 
the  country  makes  upon  the  observant  layman  who  visits  it, 
not  in  quest  of  special  facts  to  bolster  up  some  long- 
cherished  prejudice,  but  with  an  open  mind  in  quest  of  truth. 
To  such,  Panama  must  seem  a  land  where  tropical  conditions 
present  their  best  phases,  and  where  their  evil  phases  are 
minimised.  It  is  a  land  which  is  not  only  tolerable  but  even 
comfortable  and  enjoyable  to  those  who  have  been  accus- 


GENEEAL  CHAEACTEKISTICS  237 

tomed  to  the  capricious,  uncertain,  and  intemperate  regions 
which  we  contradictorily  call  temperate,  and  it  is  one  whose 
political  constitution,  whose  geographical  position,  and 
whose  topography,  geology,  meteorology,  and  all  other 
natural  conditions,  not  only  permit  but  favour  and  facilitate 
the  development  of  a  high  civilisation  and  great  prosperity 
for  a  numerous  population  of  the  Caucasian  race. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

AN  ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY  EPISODE 

The  Republic  of  Panama  was  scarcely  a  year  old  when 
it  was  first  called  upon  to  determine  the  fundamental  ques- 
tion whether  it  should  have  a  stable  and  constitutional  civil 
government,  or  should,  after  the  fashion  of  some  neighbour- 
ing states,  be  subject  to  military  revolutions.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Republic's  life  the  former  choice  was  made. 
Instead  of  forming  a  military  government,  a  government  of 
civilians  was  organised.  For  President  was  chosen  not  a 
general  of  the  army,  but  the  leading  physician  of  Panama; 
for  First  Designate  the  foremost  lawyer  and  jurist;  and  so 
on  all  through  the  Cabinet.  It  was,  in  a  measure,  a  coalition 
government,  comprising  men  of  all  parties.  But  in  time,  as 
already  related,  party  antagonisms  were  developed,  both  in 
and  out  of  the  government.  The  Liberals  believed  themselves 
to  be  in  the  majority  in  the  country  at  large,  but  were  in 
the  minority  in  the  government.  Agitation  therefore  arose, 
in  public  prints  and  speeches  and  in  addresses  to  the  Presi- 
dent, for  a  reorganisation  of  the  government,  and  especially 
for  the  removal  from  the  Cabinet  of  Tomas  Arias,  the  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs  and  War,  and  of  Nicolas  Victoria,  the 
Minister  of  Public  Instruction  and  Justice.  At  last,  failing 
to  effect  their  end  by  other  means,  the  opposition  leaders — 
largely  the  friends  and  partisans  of  Belisario  Porras,  of 
whom  I  shall  speak  more  at  length,  in  another  chapter — 
sought  and  secured  the  cooperation  of  Esteban  Huertas,  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army.  Now,  General  Huertas 
was  the  idol  of  the  army.  He  was  highly  esteemed  by  the 
general  public  for  his  very  important  services  in  the  revolu- 
tion of  November  3,  1903.  He  was,  moreover,  a  man  of 
decided  ability,  and  of  peculiarly  attractive  and  engaging 

238 


ESTEBAN  HUERTAS  239 

personality.  I  trust  I  shall  not  offend,  however,  in  saying 
that  he  was  too  much  flattered  by  not  altogether  disinter- 
ested friends.  It  is  not  good  to  tell  a  man,  and  especially 
a  young  man,  that  henceforth  Washington  and  Napoleon 
must  be  ranked  second  to  him. 

Matters  approached  a  crisis  on  October  29,  when,  under 
date  of  the  preceding  day.  General  Huertas  sent  to  President 
i^mador  a  letter  couched  in  the  most  extraordinary  terms, 
commingling  almost  inconceivable  egotism,  extravagant 
affection  for  the  President  whom  he  was  trying  to  bully,  and 
bitter  hatred  of  the  two  Ministers  already  mentioned.  As 
a  curiosity  of  correspondence  I  must  quote  the  letter  in  full, 
with  a  few  italicised  passages  of  my  own  marking.  Here 
it  is: 


"Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero, 
(Confidential.) 

Esteemed  Companion  and  Friend: — 

I  have  thought  much  and  deeply  before  sending  you 
the  present  lines.  They  do  not,  then,  embody  an  accusation, 
but  an  explanation  and  a  sane  statement  of  what  it  has 
become  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  if  we  do  not  wish  that 
History  should  set  a  stigma  upon  our  acts  and  on  our  names. 

You  and  I,  joined  by  indissoluble  bonds  of  honest  methods, 
together  formed  the  Isthmian  Fatherland.  Now  it  remains 
for  us  to  maintain  and  improve  it.  Even  at  the  risk  of  our 
lives  must  we  uphold  it.  Do  not  let  us  separate,  Doctor; 
let  us  continue  united  in  the  same  work  which  we  have  taken 
up.  My  acts  may  be  separate  from  all  your  civil  authority, 
but  your  civil  authority  will  be  always  upheld  by  the  un- 
questionable loyalty  of  the  Army.  We  are  in  truth  the 
fathers  of  the  Isthmian  people.  Let  us  show  by  our  acts 
our  wisdom  and  probity.  Let  us  give  heed  to  the  errors 
which  are  pointed  out  to  us  by  the  opposition;  correct  the 
vices  and  support  the  Administrative  Edifice  with  an  hon- 
ourable personnel,  which  will  shed  lustre  upon  the  country, 
which  notwithstanding  its  youth,  suffers  tortures  already 
from  a  choking  iron  collar. 

Neither  you  nor  I  are  disliked  by  the  people.  I  have 
sounded  all  hearts,  and  I  can  assure  you  that  none  contains 
rancour;  that  which  they  hold  is  sentiment  and  the  desire  to 


240  AN  ANTI-EEVOLUTIONAKY  EPISODE 

see  affairs  move  forward  in  a  clear  way.  And  this  is  most 
natural.  A  great  portion  of  the  people,  among  whom  exist 
brave  elements  which  can  apportion  splendour  and  wealth 
to  this  beloved  Fatherland,  because  it  possesses  vast  re- 
sources, find  themselves  removed  from  the  direction  of  Pub- 
lic Affairs  in  order  that  rapacious  spirits,  which  gobble  up 
everything,  may  be  sustained  in  office  to  the  disgrace  of  the 
National  dignity  and  to  your  disgrace  as  Chief  Magistrate 
and  to  my  disgrace  as  faithful  Executor  of  the  Divine  Will 
cooperating  with  you  in  the  formation  of  our  Nation.  We 
must  find  sane  elements,  Doctor,  we  must  not  surround  our- 
selves with  enemies.  We  must  consider  that  the  interests 
of  all  are  more  precious  than  the  interests  of  those  favoured 
ones  who,  fully  counted,  do  not  number  Three. 

It  matters  not  what  those  two  may  suffer  so  that  the 
Nation  may  save  itself  from  the  sorrowful  road  upon  which 
it  moves. 

Let  us  mutually  work  together  to  restore  order,  dignity, 
and  honour  in  all  that  relates  to  our  nation  and  to  our  life. 
Let  us  make  a  holocaust  if  possible  of  all  that  is  most 
precious  to  us,  in  order  to  make  sure,  when  God  wills,  the 
happiness  of  this  land  for  its  children.  Let  us  cast  away 
from  us  the  impure  rubbish  which  surrounds  us.  May  our 
acts  of  morality  shine  with  splendour  from  our  period  of  life 
and  power.  In  fact.  Doctor,  I  am  resolved  that  when  His- 
tory analyses  my  deeds,  it  will  be  said  without  circumlocu- 
tion or  illusion,  that  notwithstanding  my  immense  sum  of 
power  I  was  a  Good  man  and  that  I  worked  tenaciously  to 
gain  such  a  name.  In  the  name,  then,  of  these  sentiments, 
springing  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart,  I  beg  of  you,  my 
friend,  to  be  good,  as  I  intend  to  be. 

Observe,  Doctor,  that  all  delay  in  excusing  the  evil  which 
to-day  affects  the  country  will  only  diminish  our  honour  and 
affect  above  all  the  moral  and  material  honour  with  which 
God  and  man  have  invested  us. 

You  are,  I  judge,  an  honourable  man,  and,  with  a  well- 
founded  reputation  as  a  great  reasoner,  I  am  confident  that 
you  will  stand  by  me  to  make  great  the  Nation  which  we 
have  formed,  so  I  infer  that  you  will  not  wish  that  I  alone, 
with  my  weak  soldiers,  shall  take  up  the  labour  alone.  But, 
if  it  'be  necessary  that  the  step  shall  fee  taken  hy  my  deficient 
force,  I  shall  do  so  without  hesitation^  or  die  in  the  attempt. 

So,  then.  Companion  and  Friend,  let  us  work  together,  let 
us  clear  the  way  of  all  obstruction  and  confide  in  God  and 


AN  AMAZING  LETTER  241 

in  this  people,  who,  with  reason,  show  themselves  cold ;  with 
our  firm  propositions  of  grandeur  and  prosperity  let  us  offer 
them  our  help. 

In  virtue  of  the  above  I  reiterate  to  you,  that  which  I 
said  at  night,  viva  voce,  and  that  which  I  said  in  the  confer- 
ence we  had  to-day. 

In  order  that  you  may  better  meditate  upon  it  I  have 
written  these  lines,  a  genuine  exposition  of  my  way  of  think- 
ing, so  that  if  the  necessity  which  they  set  forth  arises,  you 
can  judge  me  impartially. 

I  possess  copious  testimony  which  I  do  not  care  to  publish, 
of  what  has  been  plotted  against  me  during  my  absence; 
but  as  it  concerns  me,  only,  personally,  I  cross  my  arms  and 
let  them  do  what  they  wish,  when  they  wish. 

To-day  it  is  different ;  the  future  of  our  country  is  involved 
and  I  cannot  see,  with  indifference,  its  ruin  without  raising 
a  preventing  hand.  Therefore  I  recommend  and  I  demand 
the  removal  of  Don  Tomas  Arias  and  Don  Nicolas  Victofia 
J.,  who  by  their  methods  are  affecting  the  country's  inter- 
ests; lessening  your  authority  and  mine,  and  accumulating 
the  hate  of  the  people  upon  us,  with  grave  detriment  to  our 
National  and  personal  dignity. 

By  right,  by  reason,  and  in  justice,  all  cannot  be  sacri- 
ficed to  a  part.  Let  it  be,  then,  that  the  guidance  of  the  Ship 
of  State  be  intrusted  to  those  who  will  direct  its  course 
along  a  true  course  of  light,  of  progress,  and  of  civilisa- 
tion; indispensable  factors  to  a  safe  arrival  at  the  Port  of 
Safety. 

From  to-day  forward,  all  my  forces  and  abilities  shall  be 
devoted  to  this  end. 

In  the  name,  then,  of  the  friendship  which  unites  us,  of 
the  Morals  and  the  Future  of  this  country,  it  is  demanded, 
Doctor,  that  the  reorganisation  of  existing  conditions  shall 
be  undertaken. 

Where  can  there  be  happiness  for  us  if  the  country  is  not 
happy? 

I  have  a  soul.  Doctor,  which  knows  how  to  feel,  and  there- 
fore I  preoccupy  myself  with  the  conditions  of  others. 

It  is  not  enough  for  me  to  live  well,  knowing  that  those 
whom  we  have  liberated  are  longing  for  the  benefits  not 
accorded  them. 

The  ambition  of  my  soul  will  be  fulfilled  if  only,  with  your 
consent,  there  is  brought  into  existence  a  relative  happy 
selection  of  your  Associates,  and  this  is  not  possible,  while 


242  AN  ANTI-EEVOLUTIONAEY  EPISODE 

certain  posts  are  occupied  by  individuals  of  the  moral  com- 
plexion of  Arias  and  Victoria. 

My  heart  embraces  you  because  I  want  you. 

Your  affectionate  friend  and  companion, 

E.  HUERTAS." 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  insubordinate  than  the 
sentence,  "I  demand  the  removal  of  Don  Tomas  Arias  and 
Don  Nicolas  Victoria  J."  The  significance  of  this  demand 
was  made  clear  by  the  additional  intimation  that  if  the 
President  did  not  comply  with  it  General  Huertas  would 
undertake  the  enforcement  of  it  with  his  army :  "I  infer  that 
you  will  not  wish  that  I,  with  my  weak  soldiers,  shall  take 
up  the  labour  alone.  But,  if  it  be  necessary  that  the  step 
shall  be  taken  by  my  deficient  force,  I  shall  do  so  without 
hesitation,  or  die  in  the  attempt."  That  was  a  plain  threat 
of  insurrection.  President  Amador  made  known  the  con- 
tents of  this  letter  to  his  colleagues,  whereupon  the  two 
Ministers  named,  desiring  to  free  him  from  all  embarrass- 
ment, offered  their  resignations.  In  addition,  the  President 
conferred  promptly  with  Joseph  Lee,  the  Secretary  of  the 
American  Legation  and  Charge  d' Affaires  in  the  absence  of 
the  Minister. 

Mr.  Lee,  with  admirable  discretion,  reminded  him  of  his 
proper  authority  as  President,  and  pointed  out  that  it  would 
be  deplorable — indeed,  disastrous  to  the  good  name  of  Pan- 
ama— to  have  the  approaching  first  anniversary  of  the 
Republic,  on  November  3,  marred  with  a  revolution,  marking 
the  lapse  of  the  young  Republic  into  the  evil  conditions  from 
which  it  had  freed  itself  and  from  which  the  world  hoped 
it  would  remain  free.  President  Amador  thereupon  bent  his 
energies  toward  keeping  the  peace  until  the  national  festival 
should  have  been  celebrated,  and  two  days  later  two  of  the 
foremost  Liberal  leaders — one  of  them  was  Belisario  Porras 
— called  upon  Mr.  Lee  with  the  assurance  that  there  would 
be  no  disturbance  or  untoward  demonstration  during  the 
celebrations  of  November  3;  adding,  however,  that  Presi- 
dent Amador  would  be  expected  to  accept  the  resignations 


Scherer,  Photo. 
JOSEPH  LEE, 
Secretary  of  American  Legation.  Panama,  in  1904-5. 


AMERICAN  WARNINGS  243 

of  the  two  Ministers  as  soon  as  the  anniversary  was 
past. 

The  American  Charge  d' Affaires  received  this  information 
discreetly,  but  plainly  perceived  that  their  real  purpose  in 
visiting  him  was  to  ascertain  if  possible,  without  asking 
him  directly,  what  would  be  the  attitude  and  action  of  the 
United  States  in  case  of  a  forcible  attempt  at  revolution. 
He,  therefore,  took  occasion  in  the  course  of  the  ensuing  con- 
versation to  point  out  very  clearly  the  bearing  of  Article  136 
of  the  Panaman  Constitution  upon  the  matter.  That  article 
provides  that  "the  government  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica can  intervene  in  any  part  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  the  public  peace  and  constitu- 
tional order  in  event  of  the  same  having  been  disturbed."  It 
was  also  brought  to  mind  that  Article  7  of  the  American 
treaty  with  Panama  declares  that  "in  case  the  government 
of  Panama  is  unable  or  fails  in  its  duty  to  enforce  com- 
pliance by  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  with  the  sanitary 
ordinances  of  the  United  States,  the  Republic  of  Panama 
grants  to  the  United  States  the  right  and  authority  to 
enforce  the  same.  The  same  right  and  authority  are  granted 
to  the  United  States  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order  in 
the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  territories  and  har- 
bours adjacent  thereto,  in  case  the  Republic  of  Panama  should 
not  be,  in  the  judgment  of  the  United  States,  able  to  main- 
tain such  order."  This  reminder  produced  a  profound  im- 
pression upon  the  Panaman  Liberal  leaders,  and  doubtless 
had  much  to  do  toward  determining  the  subsequent  progress 
of  affairs. 

That  was  on  October  31.  The  next  day  Santiago  de  la 
Guardia  was  named  as  the  successor  of  Senor  Arias  as  For- 
eign Minister.  Senor  Guardia  was  at  that  time  in  Costa 
Rica,  where  he  was  Panaman  Minister.  Although  a  native 
of  Panama,  he  had  spent  most  of  his  life  in  Costa  Rica,  and 
had  at  one  time  been  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  of  that  coun- 
try. In  Panaman  politics  he  was  a  Conservative,  and  his 
high  character,  great  ability,  and  wide  experience  added 


244  AN  ANTI-KEVOLUTIONARY  EPISODE 

materially  to  the  strength  of  the  Panaman  Government. 
Two  days  later  the  festival  of  Panaman  independence  began, 
and  lasted  four  days.  The  whole  city  was  given  up  to 
rejoicings  and  merrymaking,  and  the  utmost  good-feeling 
seemed  to  prevail  on  all  hands.  On  November  3  there  was  a 
solemn  Te  Deum  in  the  great  cathedral,  attended  by  Presi- 
dent Amador  and  his  Cabinet,  the  diplomatic  and  consular 
corps,  the  Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army.  General  Huertas,  and  his  staff.  On 
that  day  also  General  Huertas  issued  "to  the  Isthmian  army 
and  people"  a  most  flamboyant  proclamation,  in  the  form  of 
an  "Order  of  the  Day,"  which  is  worthy  of  reproduction  in 
full,  as  a  sequel  to  the  letter  to  President  Amador,  already 
quoted.    The  italics  are  mine : 

"Official  Order: 

by  General  Estebaa  Huertas,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  to  the  Isthmian  Army  and 
people  on  the  Great  Day  of  the  Fatherland; 

Compatriots  : 

To-day  is  the  first  Anniversary  of  our  glorious  Emancipa- 
tion !  The  Fatherland  figures  with  refulgent  brightness  on 
the  Roll  of  free  and  civilised  Nations.  The  ominous  yoke, 
which  oppressed  our  rights  with  its  heavy  weight,  was  cast 
off  in  a  second  by  the  sovereign  grandeur  of  the  Isthmian 
people,  impelled  to  proclaim  their  liberty! 

The  Isthmian  Ship  of  State,  well-nigh  wrecked  in  a  bitter 
sea  of  trouble,  required  the  hand  of  an  expert  Pilot  in  order 
that  she  should  not  be  swallowed  up  in  the  frightful  waves 
eager  to  devour  her! 

Where  was  such  a  one  to  be  found? 

Bolivar  exists  no  more;  no  more  does  Washington  live. 
The  memories  of  these  men  of  genius  is  implanted  in  the 
hearts  of  their  fellow  citizens.  The  Ship  of  State  then 
seemed  bound  to  certain  disaster  and  with  her  ruin  would 
go  our  last  hope  of  salvation.  But  God  was  with  us  and 
those  who  are  true  to  Him  enjoy  His  infinite  Mercy! 

Behold  the  key  of  all  great  success! 

The  tablet  of  Fame  is  inscribed  with  all  the  most  notable 
deeds  of  History,  but  it  is  not  enough  to  be  wise  nor  to  be 


HUERTAS'S  ORDER  OF  THE  DAY       245 

powerful,  it  is  always  necessary  to  count  upon  the  protec- 
tion of  God. 

And  it  was  the  protection  of  God  which  spread  snowy 
wings  over  the  Isthmus  and  gave  it  life  and  being  and  the 
greatness  which  clothes  it  to-day,  and  the  just  praises  which 
are  heard  in  its  honour. 

All  this  without  lamentable  sacrifice  and  cruel  disgraces! 
The  high  designs  of  Providence  are  inscrutable.  The  mathe- 
matical precision  with  which  they  are  fulfilled,  as  well  as 
the  greatness  of  their  accomplishment,  are  the  unquestion- 
able signs  of  His  omnipotence,  either  to  reward  us  or  to 
punish  us  according  to  our  merits  or  faults. 

Hence  the  admirable  portents  which  cause  admiration 
and  are  the  foundation  of  mundane  results. 

Hence  it  was,  that  I,  a  tvcak  bit  of  chaff  in  the  desert  of 
life,  possessed,  at  the  moment  of  our  emancipation,  the 
efficiency  indispensable  to  the  solution  of  the  great  problem 
so  necessary  to  the  Isthmian  Family ! 

Completely  in  ignorance  of  the  high  mission  which  I 
should  have  to  fulfil,  I  occupied  myself  solely  with  the  dis- 
charge of  my  duties,  which  has  been,  from  my  tenderest 
infancy,  the  unique  ambition  of  my  whole  life.  Indefatigable 
in  the  fulfilment  of  my  obligations,  I  devoted  myself  to  them 
alone;  all  else  that  went  on  around  me  appeared  to  me  to 
be  foreign  and  apart. 

80y  step  by  step,  confident  ever  of  the  goodness  of  the 
Supreme  Being,  I  have  risen  in  the  glorious  career  of  Arms, 
hy  a  rigorous  path,  until  my  career  is  crowned  with  the 
grade  of  General  after  so  many  fatigues  and  setbacks. 

What  merits  I  possessed  in  the  eyes  of  God  in  order  to 
be  chosen  to  bring  about  the  wished  for  fruition  and  to 
be  the  instrument  of  the  Most  High  to  redeem  a  people,  I 
cannot  and  do  not  want  to  know. 

It  is  enough  for  me  to  know  that  the  mission  fulfilled  by 
me  was  in  obedience  to  the  Divine  Impulse  of  the  Omnipo- 
tent Will. 

But  if  neither  my  right  nor  my  illustriousness  is  enough 
to  explain  to  me  the  portentous  result  achieved  by  me  and 
the  Army  with  the  decisive  consent  of  the  Isthmian  people, 
however,  I  succeeded  in  comprehending  the  high  moral  and 
material  responsibility  which  has  fallen  to  my  lot,  so  as  to 
know  how  to  preserve  that  which  the  Maker  has  given  to  us, 
and  to  that  end  were  directed  all  my  forces,  in  the  hope  that 
those  who  collaborated  in  the  beginning  would  know  how  to 


246  AN  ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY  EPISODE 

sacrifice  themselves  upon  the  altars  of  the  most  exalted 
Patriotism  in  order  that  our  beloved  Country  should  never 
run  the  risk  of  being  involved  in  the  indignity  of  bastard 
ambitions  nor  vile  and  ruinous  methods. 

And  as  the  formation  of  our  Republic  owes  itself  to  the 
concord  and  amity  between  the  people  and  the  Army,  for- 
getting misunderstandings  and  resentments,  which  to-day 
seem  to  have  disappeared,  I  exhort  All  on  the  solemn  day  of 
the  first  Anniversary  of  our  Republican  existence,  that 
everything  may  be  in  harmony  with  this  great  day,  and 
let  us  all  rejoice  together  in  the  celebration  of  this  glorious 
event. 

Let  us  not  forget  that  we  have  worked  together  and  have 
crowned  our  efforts  with  success,  and  that  we  should  still 
work  together  to  the  end  that  no  parties  may  be  established 
in  the  Isthmian  Family  to  the  detriment  of  some  and  the 
benefit  of  others. 

May  it  be,  however,  for  the  present  generation,  entirely 
sacred  how  much  and  how  firmly  is  established  the  love  of 
country,  and  united  together  let  us  raise  our  voices  in  Unison 
in  the  magnificent  cry  of: 

Viva  the  Republic  of  Panama, 

Viva  the  3d  of  November,  1903. 

Viva  Isthmian  Brotherhood, 

Viva  the  Army  and  the  valiant  Isthmian  people ! 

The  Commander-in-Chief, 

ESTEBAN    HUERTAS.^^ 

Such  expressions  might  more  easily  be  pardoned  on  the 
ground  of  temperament,  were  it  not  that  they  indicated  an 
exaggerated  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the  military 
power  and  an  inclination  to  make  it  paramount  to  the  civil 
authority.  Precisely  that  mistake  was  made  a  few  years 
ago  in  France,  in  connection  with  the  Dreyfus  case,  when 
army  officers  of  undoubted  patriotism  were  inclined  to  exalt 
the  army  above  the  state.  Such  a  misconception  would,  of 
course,  have  been  all  the  more  dangerous  in  Panama,  because 
of  the  inclination  of  South  and  Central  American  states 
toward  military  despotisms.  Granted,  for  sake  of  argument, 
that  a  change  of  Ministry  was  desirable,  it  would  have  been 
deplorable  to  have  it  effected  by  means  of  military  pressure. 


KEEPING  THE  PEACE  247 

It  was,  moreover,  an  obvious  impropriety,  if  nothing  more, 
for  the  commanding  general  to  address  an  order  of  the  day 
not  merely  to  the  army  but  to  the  whole  nation,  as  if  he 
were  dictator  and  superior  to  the  civil  government. 

Happily,  thanks  to  President  Amador's  tactful  disposi- 
tion and  to  Mr.  Lee's  judicious  warning  that  a  revolution 
would  not  be  countenanced  by  the  United  States,  trouble 
was  averted  at  that  time.  Nearly  all  the  army  remained 
within  the  barracks  during  the  four  days'  fiesta,  and  the 
peace  of  Panama  remained  unbroken.  A  few  days  later 
came  the  news  of  President  Roosevelt's  reelection  in  the 
United  States,  which  caused  general  rejoicing  in  Panama, 
and  which  also  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  Isthmian  Gov- 
ernment by  assuring  it  of  a  continuance  of  the  policy  which 
Mr.  Lee  had  indicated  through  his  reasonable  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Panaman  Constitution  and  the  canal  treaty.  The 
announcement  that  Secretary  Taft  was  about  to  visit  the 
Isthmus  also  had  a  salutary  effect. 

But  the  roused  spirit  of  military  revolution  would  not 
down.  The  fiesta  closed  on  November  6  with  the  promise  of 
peace  unbroken.  Just  a  week  later,  however,  General  Huer- 
tas  addressed  another  letter  to  President  Amador,  more 
amazing  in  terms  than  that  which  I  have  already  quoted. 
He  was  not  satisfied  with  the  appointment  of  Seiior  Guardia, 
a  Conservative,  to  succeed  Seuor  Arias.  Still  more  was  he 
displeased  that  Senor  Victoria's  resignation  had  not  been 
accepted.  In  this  second  letter  he  literally  railed  against 
Senor  Victoria,  whom  he  denounced  as  "a  stranger  to  all 
dignity  and  honour ;  a  stranger  to  gratefulness  and  decency 
.  .  .  Senor  Victoria  is  a  fraud.  Hypocrisy  and  perfidy  can 
be  clearly  seen  in  his  jaundiced  features."  Astounding 
language,  surely,  to  be  addressed  by  the  commanding  general 
of  the  army  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  concerning  a 
member  of  the  latter's  Cabinet !  We  need  not  wonder  that 
a  few  hours  after  its  utterance  there  was  disclosed  a  plot, 
led  by  General  Huertas,  forcibly  to  seize  President  Amador 
and  Secretary  Guardia  when  they  should  attend  the  military 


248  AN  ANTI-KEVOLUTIONAKY  EPISODE 

review  in  honour  of  Senor  Guardia  early  the  next  morning; 
at  which  review,  by  the  way,  General  Huertas  in  his  letter 
peremptorily  demanded  President  Amador  should  be  pres- 
ent. Naturally,  President  Amador  turned  again  to  the 
American  Charge  d' Affaires  for  counsel.  At  midnight  Mr. 
Lee  was  visited  by  the  Alcalde  of  Panama  and  Raoul  A. 
Amador,  son  of  the  President,  who  told  him  of  the  plot 
organised  by  General  Huertas  and  Belisario  Porras.  Mr. 
Lee  advised  that  President  Amador  should  ignore  the  sum- 
mons of  General  Huertas,  and  should  not  attend  the  review. 
This  counsel  was  accepted  and  acted  upon,  though  with 
some  misgivings  lest  General  Huertas  should  send  and  seize 
the  President  by  force.  At  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  Mr. 
Lee  was  again  approached  by  the  President's  private  secre- 
tary, with  a  request  that  he  would  summon  a  force  of  United 
States  marines  from  the  camp  at  Empire.  This  request  Mr. 
Lee  refused,  but  he  sent  a  very  plain  warning  to  General 
Huertas,  or  his  partisans,  that  the  United  States  was  ready 
to  enforce  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  and  Article  7  of 
the  treaty,  and  that  it  was  high  time  for  all  revolutionary 
tactics  to  cease.  So  the  review  of  the  troops  that  morning 
passed  off  quietly.  Secretary  Guardia  attending  it  alone  and 
without  molestation,  and  that  day  the  American  warships 
'New  York,  Boston,  and  Bennington,  commanded  by  Rear- 
Admiral  Goodrich,  arrived  in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  an  inci- 
dent of  salutary  moral  effect. 

Two  days  later  the  American  Minister,  John  Barrett, 
arrived  in  Panama,  and  learned  what  had  happened  and  was 
happening.  He  at  once  went  to  the  Government  House  to 
pay  his  respects  to  President  Amador,  and  naturally  the 
existing  crisis  in  Panaman  affairs  formed  the  topic  of  some 
conversation.  It  was  evident  to  both  Dr.  Amador  and  Mr. 
Barrett  that  if  the  Panaman  Government  was  to  be  main- 
tained and  was  to  vindicate  its  authority.  General  Huertas 
must  be  got  rid  of  by  resignation  or  retirement,  and  it 
seemed  advisable  that  the  army,  or  the  bulk  of  it,  should  also 
be  disposed  of.    In  the  end,  President  Amador  and  his  Cab- 


Chandler,  Photo. 
JOHN  BARRETT, 
American  Minister  to  Panama  in  1904-5. 


KESIGNATION  OF  HUEETAS  249 

inet  decided  to  require  the  resignation  of  General  Huertas 
and  the  disbandment  and  abolition  of  the  army,  excepting 
a  handful  of  officers  and  men  just  sufficient  to  meet  the 
statutory  requirements  of  a  standing  army.  The  army  con- 
sisted of  only  250  men,  anyway ;  just  enough  to  cause  trouble 
but  not  enough  to  do  any  real  good.  It  was  felt  that  the 
police  force  and  the  American  marines  at  Empire  would  be 
sufficient  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  protection  of 
the  Republic.  An  earnest  request  was  also  made  that  at  least 
one  of  the  American  warships  should  remain  in  the  harbour 
until  the  crisis  was  past. 

Accordingly,  the  next  day,  November  17,  President  Ama- 
dor called  for  General  Huertas's  resignation,  warning  him 
that  if  he  refused  to  give  it  or  resisted  the  civil  authority, 
the  American  marines  would  support  the  government.  In 
this  course  President  Amador  was  encouraged  by  Mr.  Bar- 
rett and  Rear-Admiral  Goodrich,  who  called  upon  him  and 
assured  him  that  at  least  one  American  ship  would  stay 
there  as  long  as  he  considered  it  desirable,  and  that  the 
marines  from  Empire  would  be  ready  for  service  if  needed. 
Under  Rear-Admiral  Goodrich's  order.  Major  Le  Jeune 
brought  one  company  of  marines  down  from  Empire  to 
Ancon  Hill,  just  outside  the  city  of  Panama. 

That  afternoon  General  Huertas  called  upon  the  Presi- 
dent, protested  against  the  demand  for  his  resignation  and 
the  impending  disbandment  of  the  army,  "my  poor  soldiers," 
but  promised  to  obey  the  mandate.  A  further  hint  from  Mr. 
Barrett  to  General  Huertas,  through  the  medium  of  a 
mutual  friend,  Seiior  Obarrio,  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment hoped  no  indiscretion  would  be  committed,  but  that 
the  Constitution  of  Panama  would  be  respected,  doubtless 
went  far  toward  assuring  the  fulfilment  of  this  promise. 
That  night  some  of  his  friends  tried  to  persuade  General 
Huertas  not  to  resign,  but  to  fight  the  matter  out,  but  the  gen- 
eral's own  better  judgment  prevailed.  He  had  been  too  deeply 
impressed  by  the  hint  conveyed  from  Mr.  Barrett  by  Senor 
Obarrio.  The  next  day  he  resigned,  in  a  long  letter  addressed 


250  AN  ANTI-REVOLUTIONAKY  EPISODE 

to  President  Amador.  This  letter  was  entitled  "Irrevocable 
Resignation/'  and  was  written  in  the  flamboyant  style  of 
his  former  utterances.  After  denouncing  the  government's 
action  as  dictated  by  "foreign  and  interested  designs,"  and 
declaring  his  own  ability  and  natural  inclination  to  oppose 
it  with  force,  he  said  he  would  abstain  from  such  procedure, 
and  would  bow  to  the  government's  will,  for  two  reasons : 

"First,  because  as  I  have  not  learned  to  be  dazed  by 
exaltation,  preserving  at  all  times  my  inherent  modesty  or 
humility;  neither  do  I,  in  misfortune,  desire  to  sound  the 
discordant  or  comic  note  which  will  dash  to  pieces  in  a 
moment  all  that  honest  endeavour  on  my  part  has  created; 
and  second,  my  goodness  of  heart  forbids  me  to  sacrifice  the 
lives  of  my  poor  soldiers,  true  republican  soldiers,  after  by 
their  efforts,  and  those  of  this  noble  people,  we  obtained  our 
independence;  for  they  suffer  fully  enough,  and  will  con- 
tinue to  suffer  in  the  destitution  in  which  they  will  be  left, 
notwithstanding  that  the  allowance  of  one  additional 
month's  salary  will  alleviate  their  necessities  for  a  few  days. 

"It,  therefore,  being  impossible,  from  what  I  have  stated, 
that  myself,  my  chiefs,  officers,  and  soldiers  should  remain  at 
the  front  of  a  Government  whose  want  of  confidence  in  us  is 
notoriously  visible,  I  present  to  you  in  my  own  name,  and 
in  that  of  the  entire  army,  the  irrevocable  resignation  of  our 
positions,  in  the  certainty  that  not  a  single  member  desires 
to  tarnish  his  glorious  career  as  a  warrior  by  accepting  the 
same  position  that  through  and  for  them,  and  for  compan- 
ionship, their  commander-in-chief  resigns,  considering  him- 
self offended. 

"I  swear  before  God  and  to  History,  that  all  my  actions 
have  been  governed  by  patriotism,  that  my  love  for  this  soil, 
and  respect  for  the  legitimate  government,  have  always  been 
sincere;  and  that  this  step  has  been  caused  by  this  same 
patriotism,  which  no  one  nor  anything  can  belittle." 

The  resignation,  thus  tendered  in  terms  at  once  amazing 
and  amusing,  w^as  accepted  and  publicly  announced  in  a 
government  decree,  and  General  Huertas  was  placed  upon 
the  retired  list  of  the  army,  on  a  salary,  or  pension,  of  five 
hundred  dollars  a  month.  At  the  same  time  President  Ama- 
dor wrote  him  a  cordial  personal  letter,  saying: 


DECLINING  A  SALARY  251 

"I  was  informed  by  a  friend  that  on  resigning  the  position 
of  commander-in-chief  your  only  wish  was  that  your  honour 
should  remain  unharmed.  I  have  not  entertained  any  inten- 
tions to  the  contrary,  and  as  a  proof  of  this,  you  can  see  that 
the  decree  accepting  your  resignation  could  not  be  more 
honorary.  This  letter  is  further  testimony  of  what  you 
desire;  but  you  must  comprehend  that,  notwithstanding  the 
affection  which  I  have  for  you,  of  which  I  have  given  and 
shall  give  you  proofs,  your  retirement  is  indispensable  so 
that  my  Government  may  exist  with  all  the  independence 
that  the  Constitution  and  the  Law  concede  it,  and  that  it 
cannot  be  subject  to  the  control  of  the  military  hierarchy, 
no  matter  how  much  I  may  esteem  and  like  you  personally." 


The  decree  granting  him  a  salary,  in  retirement,  of  |500  a 
month,  provoked  from  General  Huertas  another  character- 
istic outburst,  in  the  guise  of  a  very  formal  letter  to  the 
new  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  he  scornfully  declined  the 
pension,  and  insisted  that  his  resignation  involved  also 
the  resignation  of  the  entire  army ;  adding  a  threat  of  a  vio- 
lent demonstration  if  it  was  not  thus  accepted.    He  wrote: 

"Deeply  grateful  for  the  liberality  of  His  Excellency  the 
President  of  the  Republic  and  for  the  great  honour  done  to 
me  by  assigning  a  salary  of  five  hundred  dollars  monthly  as 
a  recompense  for  the  services  lent  by  me  to  the  cause  of 
independence,  I  beg  to  decline  such  distinguished  honour,  not 
accepting  same,  as  the  enormous  weight  which  would  rest 
on  my  dignity  would  be  an  indelible  stigma.  My  profound 
patriotism,  and  my  love  for  this  country,  contributed  to  the 
glorious  event  of  the  Third  of  November,  1903.  I  cannot 
accept  a  salary  which  I  do  not  earn;  my  honour  scorns  it. 
When  I  earned  it,  I  had  a  right  to  it ;  to-day  when  I  do  not, 
I  have  not. 

"In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  state  to  His  Excellency,  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic,  through  the  worthy  conduct  of  Your 
Excellency,  that  my  resignation  is  solidary  with  that  of  the 
Army,  which  fact  should  have  been  taken  into  consideration, 
not  supposing  that  I  take  upon  myself  unwarranted  facul- 
ties; because  in  this  case,  and  as  a  proof  of  my  assertion,  if 
it  be  desired,  I  shall  go  in  conjunction  with  my  army  to 
solicit  same,  with  the  object  of  leaving  no  doubt." 


262  AN  ANTI-EEVOLUTIONAKY  EPISODE 

The  Secretary  of  War,  Senor  Guardia,  fortunately  was 
quite  competent  to  deal  with  so  extraordinary  a  communica- 
tion. He  was  now  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  having 
been  made  so  by  the  same  decree  which  accepted  General 
Huertas's  resignation.  He  accordingly  wrote  to  General 
Huertas  on  that  same  day,  November  18,  as  follows: 

"The  Government,  at  present,  does  not  intend  to  disband 
the  army.  The  chiefs  and  officers  that  may  not  be  satisfied 
with  the  new  state  of  affairs  may  retire  through  the  chan- 
nels indicated  by  the  law,  but  under  no  circumstances  by 
insubordination,  nor  by  conjointly  making  any  demonstra- 
tions, and  much  less  under  your  orders,  as  you  are  no  longer 
their  commanding  officer. 

"The  troops  have  no  voice  in  their  resignation,  and  you 
should  be  aware  of  this  better  than  anybody  else,  since  you 
are  a  veteran  military  man  and  a  man  of  honour. 

"With  regard  to  your  salary,  you  have  wrongly  interpreted 
an  act  of  justice  and  magnanimity  on  the  part  of  the  Gov- 
ernment.   The  decree  continues  in  force  in  all  its  parts." 

To  this  the  retired  commander  made  no  reply.  He  quietly 
accepted  the  salary  which  he  had  declined,  and  retired  to 
his  hacienda  at  Agua  Dulce,  on  the  western  part  of  the 
Pacific  coast  of  the  republic,  remote  from  the  capital,  there 
ostensibly  to  devote  his  attention  entirely  to  cattle-raising. 
There  were  those,  however,  who  doubted  that  he  would  per- 
manently refrain  from  further  revolutionary  efforts,  and 
some  who  even  questioned  whether  he  had  ever  really  left 
the  city  of  Panama.  In  fact  he  did  go  to  Agua  Dulce,  but 
there  is  reason  to  suspect  that  he  kept  in  close  touch  with 
some  dissatisfied  politicians  at  the  capital.  In  the  follow- 
ing spring,  of  1905,  there  were  threats  of  a  mutiny  among 
the  Panama  police,  which  happily  came  to  nothing.  Gen- 
eral Huertas  was  believed  to  be  responsible  for  the  attempt 
at  revolution,  however,  and  it  was  doubtless  on  that  account 
that  the  Panaman  Secretary  of  War  made  a  visit  to  Agua 
Dulce  at  that  time.  On  that  occasion  the  United  States 
marines  were  moved  from  their  usual  camp  at  Empire  down 
to  Ancon,  just  outside  the  city  of  Panama,  and  a  guard  for 


DISMISSING  THE  ABMY  263 

the  Canal  Commission's  oflQces  was  taken  into  the  city ;  with 
most  salutary  effect. 

To  return,  however,  to  the  incidents  of  November,  1904. 
There  was  the  army  to  be  disposed  of.  General  Huertas  had 
written  to  the  President  that  the  soldiers  were  unwilling  to 
serve  after  his  retirement,  and  Dr.  Amador  naturally  wel- 
comed the  statement  as  suggesting  a  good  opportunity  for 
getting  rid  of  the  army.  He,  therefore,  announced  that  the 
army  would  be  disbanded,  the  soldiers  receiving  sixty  days' 
pay  as  a  bonus.  This  would  be  paid  to  them — I  think  on 
Mr.  Barrett's  very  judicious  suggestion — one  half  down  upon 
disbandment  and  the  remainder  at  the  end  of  a  week.  This 
was  to  insure  their  good  behaviour,  and,  with  the  same  end 
in  view,  it  was  ordered  that  all  barrooms  be  closed  for  the 
three  days  after  their  disbandment.  To  fulfil  this  plan  the 
army  was  ordered  to  assemble  at  the  Government  House,  at 
one  o'clock  on  Saturday  afternoon,  November  19,  to  be  mus- 
tered out  and  paid  off.  Now,  one  o'clock  is  the  hour  of  the 
siesta,  when  even  revolutionists  must  rest!  So  at  that  time 
not  a  soldier  appeared.  Two  o'clock  came,  and  not  one 
arrived.  President  Amador  was  uneasy,  fearing  the  army 
had  decided  to  resist  his  order,  but  after  a  conference  with 
Mr.  Barrett  he  determined  to  wait  a  little  longer.  (Imagine 
a  "hustling"  Yankee  advising  a  Panaman  to  wait!)  At  2.30 
o'clock,  just  as  Seiior  Guardia  and  Mr.  Lee  were  on  the  point 
of  going  to  the  barracks  to  see  what  the  delay  was  about, 
fifty  soldiers  came  to  the  scratch,  followed  by  a  great  mass 
of  the  populace.  They  had  left  their  weapons  at  the  bar- 
racks, but  they  sent  in  word  to  the  President  that  they 
wanted  their  whole  sixty  days'  pay  in  a  lump,  at  once.  Pres- 
ident Amador,  conferring  with  the  American  Minister, 
refused  their  demand.  It  is  probable  that,  mindful  of  the 
slipshod  methods  of  the  old  Colombian  Government,  they 
doubted  whether  they  would  ever  get  the  deferred  half  of 
the  bonus  if  they  agreed  to  the  postponement,  and  held  with 
the  Texas  philosopher  that  "a  bird  in  the  hand  is  the  noblest 
work  of  God." 


264  AK  ANTI-KEVOLUTIONARY  EPISODE 

The  deadlock  was  ended,  however,  when  Mr.  Barrett, 
accompanied  by  Secretary  Guardia  as  his  interpreter,  went 
down  to  the  sidewalk,  addressed  the  soldiers,  assured  them 
that  they  would  be  fully  paid,  and  warned  them  that 
the  American  Government  would  fully  sustain  President 
Amador,  and  that  if  they  were  insubordinate  they  would  be 
dealt  with  sternly  by  the  American  marines.  Upon  this 
the  soldiers  promptly  agreed  to  the  government's  terms. 
Within  two  hours  the  entire  army  presented  itself  at  the 
Government  House,  received  thirty  days'  pay  and  was  dis- 
banded, all  excepting  three  men  and  twenty  officers,  who 
were  entirely  loyal  to  the  civil  government,  and  who  were 
retained  as  a  nominal  force  to  meet  the  technical  require- 
ments of  the  Constitution.  That  night  there  were  some  slight 
popular  demonstrations  of  sympathy  with  the  soldiers,  but 
these  amounted  to  little.  A  week  later  the  second  thirty 
days'  pay  was  given  to  the  soldiers  in  full,  as  promised,  and 
thus  the  episode  was  ended. 

There  were  other  details  of  the  affair,  more  picturesque 
than  important.  The  gist  of  it  was  this:  That  it  was  a 
struggle  to  determine  whether  changes  of  administration 
should  be  effected  only  by  peaceful  and  constitutional  means 
or  by  military  force;  that  it  was  decided  in  favour  of  the 
former,  very  largely  through  and  because  of  the  benevolent 
offices  of  the  United  States,  exercised  or  at  least  offered  in 
strict  accordance  with  the  Panaman  Constitution  and  the 
Panaman-American  treaty ;  and  that  it  was  thus  decided  not 
only  for  the  time  being  but,  as  there  is  ground  for  belief,  for 
a  long  time,  if  not  for  all  time.  It  may  be  that  some  fea- 
tures of  the  case  will  cause  amusement — the  small  size  of  the 
Panaman  army  as  it  was,  and  the  practical  absence  of  any 
army  at  all  at  the  present  time.  It  will  not  be  well,  however, 
to  scoff  at  our  sister  republic  on  such  grounds.  There  are 
sovereign  states  in  Europe  which  are  smaller  than  Panama 
and  as  destitute  of  military  force;  yet  their  independence  is 
respected,  and  any  attempt  to  override  it  might  provoke  a 
Continental  war.     Neither  is  the  attitude  of  the  United 


A  PROTECTED  STATE  255 

States,  as  a  practical  protector  of  Panama,  to  be  unfavour- 
ably criticised.  There  is  more  than  one  ^^guaranteed"  state 
in  Europe.  Moreover,  such  guarantees  in  Europe  are  largely 
for  selfish  purposes  and  for  the  maintenance  of  a  "balance  of 
power,"  while  ours  over  Panama  is  made  with  the  disinter- 
ested design  of  maintaining  peace  and  order  and  of  facil- 
itating the  commerce  of  the  world.  If,  in  the  episode  I  have 
described,  the  United  States  exercised  a  strong,  perhaps  a 
paramount,  influence  in  the  affairs  of  another  sovereign 
state,  at  least  it  did  so  with  the  fullest  regard  for  the  liber- 
ties and  the  susceptibilities  of  the  people  of  that  country, 
and  for  the  rights  and  interests  of  all  nations. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

A  MISSION  OP  READJUSTMENT 

Close  upon  the  heels  of  General  Huertas's  vain  attempt 
at  revolution  came  another  important  episode.  This  was  the 
visit  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  United  States,  William 
H.  Taft,  to  Panama,  upon  what  may  be  called  a  mission  of 
readjustment.  Dissatisfaction  had  arisen  in  Panama,  not 
with  the  Hay-Bunau-Varilla  Treaty  but  with  some  features 
of  the  American  construction  and  application  of  it,  espe- 
cially concerning  the  tariff  and  the  postal  service.  For  such 
dissatisfaction  there  was  ample  ground.  In  response  to  an 
unthinking  demand  in  the  United  States,  the  full  tariff  rates 
of  the  United  States  were  by  executive  order  (see  Appendix 
VIII.)  on  June  24,  1904,  applied  to  the  Canal  Zone,  not  only 
against  all  foreign  countries  but  also  against  Panama  itself, 
and  two  collection  districts  were  established.  A  Canal  Zone 
port  was  also  established  at  Ancon,  adjoining  the  city  of 
Panama.  This  resulted  in  little  or  no  gain  to  the  United 
States,  but  in  a  great  hardship  to  Panama,  depriving  it  of 
an  all  but  indispensable  market  and  also  of  a  large  part  of 
its  import  trade.  Again,  the  domestic  postal  rate  of  two 
cents  was  established  between  the  Canal  Zone  and  the 
United  States,  and  nine  United  States  post  offices  were 
opened  in  the  Zone,  while  the  old  five-cent  rate  was  main- 
tained between  Panama  and  the  United  States.  The  result 
was  that  the  business  men  of  Panama  carried  all  their  mail 
over  into  the  Zone  and  deposited  it  in  the  American  post 
office  there,  thus  depriving  the  Panama  post  office  of  the  bulk 
of  its  business.  In  doing  this  they  not  only  got  the  sixty  per 
cent,  lower  rates  of  postage,  but  also  got  far  more  trust- 
worthy service.  For  the  Panama  post  office  had  not  yet  been 
redeemed  from  the  old  Colombian  methods,  under  which  it 

256 


SECRETARY  TAFT'S  PARTY  25V 

was  necessary  to  mail  a  letter  two  or  three  days  in  advance 
to  make  sure  of  its  being  despatched  by  a  certain  steamer,  and 
even  then  there  was  no  assurance  that  the  postmaster  would 
not  tear  off  the  stamp,  to  resell  to  some  one  else,  and  throw 
the  letter  into  the  waste-paper  basket.  It  used  to  be  notori- 
ous that  there  was  no  use  in  inquiring  for  letters  at  a  post 
office  if  you  found  the  postmaster  sitting  down,  for  he  would 
not  get  up  to  see  if  there  were  any  for  you,  but  would  declare 
there  were  none,  and  remain  seated ! 

In  order  to  adjust  these  and  some  other  minor  matters, 
which  had  been  for  some  time  the  subject  of  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence (see  Appendix  IX),  President  Roosevelt  de- 
cided to  send  Secretary  Taft  to  Panama,  as  his  personal 
representative.  This  mission  set  out  from  the  ancient  port 
of  Pensacola,  Florida,  on  November  22,  1904,  for  Colon.  It 
was  conveyed  in  impressive  state  by  the  two  cruisers  Colum- 
Ma  and  Dolphin^  of  the  United  States  Navy,  and  its  mem- 
bers and  their  companions  included  Secretary  Taft  and  Mrs. 
Taft;  Rear-Admiral  Walker,  U.  S.  N.,  the  chairman  of  the 
Canal  Commission ;  Charles  E.  Magoon,  the  legal  adviser  of 
the  Commission;  William  Nelson  Cromwell,  the  legal  ad- 
viser of  the  old  Canal  Company  and  railroad  company,  and 
of  the  Panama  Government;  and  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  the 
Panaman  Minister  to  the  United  States. 

Pensacola  was  an  appropriate  starting  point  for  the  mis- 
sion. It  would  have  been  such  had  the  errand  been  one 
of  war,  of  aggresion,  of  militant  expansion.  Above  all  places 
in  the  United  States  that  quaint  old  Spanish  city,  the  very 
names  of  its  streets  still  echoing  the  voices  of  Leon  and  Cas- 
tile, is  reminiscent  of  the  strenuous  forward  movement  of  the 
American  nation.  It  was  there  that  an  American  army  first 
invaded  alien  soil.  From  the  Perdido  to  the  Escambia  is  a 
short  distance,  but  in  marching  it,  ninety-odd  years  ago,  a 
distinguished  Democratic  expansionist  set  for  all  time  a 
most  important  precedent.  In  maintaining  ^'the  immutable 
principle  of  self-defence" — the  self-defence  of  the  republic — 
Jackson  marched  an  American  army  for  warlike  purposes 


268  A  MISSION  OF  KEADJUSTMENT 

into  the  territory  of  a  foreign  Power  with  which  America 
was  at  peace.  Approved  at  the  time  by  the  "fathers  of  the 
Constitution,"  and  confirmed  by  the  experience  and  practice 
of  four  score  and  ten  succeeding  years,  that  epoch-marking 
precedent  returns  vividly  to  mind  to-day,  as  the  sanctioning 
authority  of  more  than  one  subsequent  act  which  the  forget- 
ful have  in  late  years  all  too  heedlessly  challenged. 

Not  now,  however,  was  it  necessary  to  follow  that  prece- 
dent, with  force  and  arms.  Though  led  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  transported  in  ships  of  war,  this  errand  to  and 
from  Pensacola  was  one  of  peace.  It  was,  no  less  than  Jack- 
son's, meant  for  the  self-defence  of  the  Republic ;  but  it  sought 
that  end  by  means  of  conciliation  and  good  will.  It  was  to 
maintain  "the  immutable  principle  of  self-defence,"  not  only 
against  foreign  intrigues  and  whatever  might  to  any  extent 
menace  the  achievement  of  the  great  work  of  "an  American 
canal  under  American  control,"  but  also  against  the  insidi- 
ous peril  of  misunderstandings  between  the  United  States 
and  a  sister  republic,  and  against  the  possibility  of  reproach 
for  having  dealt  ungenerously  with  a  weaker  and  half- 
dependent  nation.  Nor  was  the  port  of  departure  less  fitting 
in  that  view  of  the  case.  Peace  and  good  will  mean  social 
and  commercial  intercourse ;  and  the  superb  harbour  of  Pen- 
sacola may  well  become  the  great  gateway  of  the  Eastern 
Gulf  and  South  Atlantic  States  opening  upon  the  Gulf  and 
Caribbean  Sea,  and  leading  to  that  world's  gateway  of  com- 
merce and  travel  at  Panama.  It  was  auspicious  and  appro- 
priate, too,  that  the  departure  of  the  mission  should  have 
been  effected  under  a  sunny  sky  and  upon  a  smooth  sea, 
and  that  similar  conditions,  to  an  extent  seldom  experienced 
in  these  capricious  regions,  should  have  accompanied  it  all 
the  way.  The  "stormy  Caribbean"  was,  to  the  Columbia  and 
the  Dolphin,  as  calm  and  placid  as  the  devotions  of  a  uni- 
versal peace  congress. 

The  reception  of  Secretary  Taft  and  his  party  at  Panama 
by  the  Panaman  Government  and  people  was  unmistakably 
marked  with  cordiality  and  friendly  expectation.     There 


PANAMAN  EXPECTATIONS  259 

seemed  to  be  none  of  the  extravagant  illusion  which  had  been 
cherished ;  or  which  the  Panamans  had  been  reported  to  cher- 
ish. The  Panamans  were  not  looking  for  any  radical 
reversal  of  American  policy.  Indeed,  some  things  had  re- 
cently happened  which  were  well  calculated  to  dispel  such 
visions,  if  they  had  ever  been  cherished.  General  Huertas 
had  made,  only  a  short  time  before,  his  fatuous  attempt  at 
what  would  have  been  a  revolution,  and  had  been  effectively 
suppressed  through  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States ;  and 
that  episode  had  given  much  food  for  thought  for  all  thought- 
ful men  in  Panama.  More  than  anything  else,  since  the 
revolution  of  a  year  before,  it  revealed  with  convincing 
emphasis  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to  stand  firm  for 
both  its  rights  and  its  duties  under  the  existing  treaty,  to 
respect  and  to  maintain  the  independence  of  the  Isthmian 
republic,  but  equally  to  maintain,  whenever  necessary,  the 
constitutional  order  of  that  country.  The  conduct  of  the 
United  States  in  that  crisis  had,  on  the  one  hand,  reassured 
the  Panaman  Government  and  had  inspired  it  with  feelings 
of  confidence  and  gratitude,  and  had,  on  the  other  hand, 
given  a  stern  but  salutary  and  effective  lesson  of  warning 
to  whatever  discordant  and  revolutionary  elements  there 
might  be  in  the  community.  From  such  point  of  view  we 
might  almost  say  it  was  a  good  thing  that  the  abortive  con- 
spiracy had  occurred.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  because 
of  it  and  its  firm  suppression  the  fulfilment  of  Secretary 
Taft's  mission  was  materially  facilitated  through  the  for- 
mation in  the  minds  of  the  Panamans  of  a  more  just  and 
accurate  appreciation  of  the  United  States  and  of  its  rela- 
tions to  Isthmian  affairs. 

Secretary  Taft  did  not  delay  to  sound  what  we  may  call 
the  dual  keynote  of  his  mission :  to  wit,  that  justice  should 
be  done  to  Panama,  and  that,  in  return,  justice,  order,  and 
stability  would  be  required  of  Panama.  It  was  at  noon  of 
Sunday,  November  27,  that  he  reached  the  city  of  Panama, 
and  an  hour  or  two  later  he  was  received  by  President  Ama- 
dor at  the  Government  House.    In  his  address  to  the  Presi- 


260  A  MISSION  OF  EEADJUSTMENT 

dent,  the  Secretary  congratulated  him  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  upon  the  auspicious  beginning  of  a  long  and  pros- 
perous life,  and — most  significantly — upon  the  fact  that 
"this  life  is  to  be  a  peaceable  life,  to  be  a  life  of  government 
that  shall  know  no  changes,  except  those  according  to  the 
rules  of  law  and  the  Constitution."  There  should  have  been 
no  uncertainty  or  mistake  as  to  the  purport  of  those  words. 
There  was  none.  They  were  received  in  the  spirit  in  which 
they  were  uttered,  and  no  less  graciously  and  gratefully 
than  was  the  further  declaration  of  the  speaker,  that  the 
United  States  "has  no  intention,  in  being  on  this  Isthmus, 
to  do  other  than  to  build  a  canal,  and  no  desire  to  exercise 
any  power  except  that  which  it  deems  necessary  under  the 
treaty  to  insure  the  building,  maintenance,  and  protection  of 
the  canal."  That  brief  but  pregnant  speech  was  applauded 
with  equal  vigor  and  sincerity  by  Americans  and  Pana- 
mans,  and  was  a  happy  prelude  to  the  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions which  began  the  next  day  and  which  were  continued 
until  the  end  of  the  week. 

The  conferences  were  held  in  private,  as  was  fitting.  Town- 
meeting  diplomacy  is  never  admirable.  Least  of  all  would 
it  have  been  well  to  attempt  it  between  two  nations — such  as 
these — of  widely  different  temperaments.  Each  of  them  was 
proud  and  sensitive  in  its  own  peculiar  way,  and  when, 
as  in  this  case,  the  susceptibilities  of  each  were  directly  and 
deeply  involved,  it  was  essential  that  the  negotiations  should 
not,  during  their  progress,  be  the  theme  of  common  knowl- 
edge and  of  more  or  less  passionate  popular  discussion.  The 
public  was  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on,  lacking  even 
those  newspaper  surmises  and  rumours  which  would  have 
been  an  inevitable  accompaniment  of  such  conferences  in 
the  United  States.  There  was  also  a  marked  absence  of 
popular  speculation  upon  the  result.  That  was  not,  how- 
ever, because  of  any  lack  of  interest,  but  rather  because  of 
a  serene  confidence  in  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  the  confer- 
rees  and  an  assurance  that  in  the  end  a  satisfactory  arrange- 
ment would  be  reached.    As  day  after  day  passed  without 


A  VEKY  FKANK  TALK  261 

announcement  of  such  a  conclusion  there  was  no  anxiety  nor 
impatience  manifested.  Panamans  are  not  given  to  worry- 
ing or  hurrying.  The  end  might  come  on  the  morrow,  or 
not  until  the  next  week.  What  did  that  matter?  It  was 
sure  to  come  and  to  be  good  when  it  did  come. 

The  first  certain  intimation  that  it  was  near  at  hand  came 
from  Secretary  Taft  himself.  It  was  made  in  his  speech  at  a 
great  banquet  given  to  him  and  his  party  by  the  Panaman 
Government  at  the  Grand  Central  Hotel,  on  Thursday  even- 
ing, December  1 — a  banquet,  by  the  way,  which,  in  its 
appointments  and  general  conduct,  was  highly  enjoyable, 
and  would  have  been  creditable  to  a  city  of  greater  size 
and  more  opulent  resources  than  Panama.  There  was  much 
applause  when,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  speech,  he  said 
that  justice  had  not  been  done  to  the  people  and  to  the 
country  of  Panama,  and  again  when  he  referred  directly  to 
the  negotiations  as  having  led  to  a  point  at  which  there  was 
every  reason  to  expect  a  solution  of  all  difficulties  which 
would  be  honourable  to  both  countries  alike.  There  was  no 
hint  of  any  retrocession,  or  even  of  consideration  of  retro- 
cession, from  the  existing  treaty.  But  the  Panamans  greeted 
his  declaration  with  applause  which  bore  no  resemblance 
to  mere  perfunctoriness.  Nor  was  that  all.  Again  the  Sec- 
retary referred,  in  even  stronger  terms  than  before,  to  the 
imperative  necessity  of  ordered  and  stable  government  and 
to  cessation  from  revolutionary  movements.  ^'Stability  of 
government,"  he  said,  ''is  absolutely  impossible  unless  there 
is  implanted  in  the  breasts  of  all  your  people  who  take  part 
in  the  government  as  voters  a  profound  respect  for  the  laws 
and  constitution  which  you  yourselves  have  founded."  At 
that  there  was  again  applause.    The  Secretary  continued : 

"You  must  have  a  government  in  which  the  minority  shall 
enjoy  equal  rights  with  the  majority.  A  government  in 
which  the  minority,  upon  the  election  by  the  majority,  re- 
tires from  the  borders  of  the  country  in  exile,  only  to  await 
the  result  of  the  next  successful  revolution,  is  not  a  govern- 
ment at  all.    It  is  a  tyranny.    You  can  have  a  despotism  as 


262  A  MISSION  OF  READJUSTMENT 

complete  by  a  majority  of  the  people  as  by  one  man,  and 
unless  you  respect  the  rights  of  each  individual  in  your  com- 
munity you  will  have  no  government  v^orth  the  supporting." 

That  was  plain  talk.  I  do  no  injustice  to  Panama  when  I 
say — in  view  of  the  experience  of  neighbouring  South  and 
Central  American  states,  and  in  view  of  the  then  recent 
incident  in  Panama  itself — that  it  was  salutary  talk.  Best 
of  all,  it  was  not  unwelcome  talk,  but  it  was  applauded  and 
cheered  three  times  in  the  last  four  sentences  which  I  have 
quoted,  with  as  much  spontaneity  and  manifest  earnestness 
of  approval  as  were  shown  for  the  vehement  and  torrential 
eloquence  of  the  First  Designate,  Pablo  Arosemena,  which 
preceded  it,  or  to  the  rhetorical  periods  of  Belisario  Porras, 
the  opposition  leader,  which  followed  it.  Additional  and 
very  practical  emphasis  was  given  to  this  same  point  by 
William  Nelson  Cromwell — of  all  men  persona  gratissima  in 
Panama — when  in  his  tactful  speech  at  the  same  banquet  he 
referred  to  the  perfect  security  which  New  York  afforded  to 
the  16,000,000  which  Panama  had  invested  there,  and  then 
demanded  that  in  return  Panama  should  give  equal  security 
to  the  1300,000,000  which  the  United  States  proposed  to 
Invest  in  the  Isthmian  canal. 

It  will  be  worth  while  to  recall,  as  a  matter  of  record  and 
as  an  indication  of  the  spirit  of  the  Panamans,  a  part  of  the 
speech  of  Dr.  Arosemena,  already  referred  to;  bearing  in 
mind  that  while  he  was  First  Designate  of  the  Republic  he 
was  also  one  of  the  foremost  leaders  of  the  Liberal  party, 
in  opposition  to  the  government  of  President  Amador.  He 
said: 

"In  the  speech  delivered  by  our  distinguished  guest  when 
he  was  received  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  in  solemn 
audience,  he  stated  that  our  National  Life  had  to  be  pacific ; 
the  life  of  a  government  in  which  only  the  anticipated 
changes  in  the  Constitution  will  occur;  he  affirmed  that  in 
said  existence  we  should  have  the  aid  of  the  United  States 
and  that  the  Government  of  those  States  only  desired  to 
construct  an  interoceanic  canal  for  the  benefit  of  the  uni- 


PANAMAN  GOOD  INTENTIONS  263 

verse;  that  it  would  only  exercise  on  the  Isthmus  the 
authority  necessary  to  carry  the  work  to  an  end,  maintain, 
and  protect  it.  In  conclusion  he  manifested  that  he,  within 
a  short  time,  would  hold  conferences  with  the  President 
regarding  these  affairs,  and  hoped  to  arrive  at  honourable 
and  equitable  conclusions.  I  think  it  superfluous  to  say  that 
the  declarations  of  the  Secretary  of  War — frank  and  true — 
have  given  us  consummate  satisfaction.  He  is  an  ambassa- 
dor who  brings  in  the  folds  of  his  mantle  conciliation  with 
honour  and  equity. 

^'Referring  to  those  declarations,  I  affirm,  with  the  cer- 
tainty of  being  the  true  echo  of  the  Isthmian  people,  that 
in  the  Republic  of  Panama  only  those  changes  that  are 
determined  by  the  natural  course  of  events  shall  occur.  We 
have  definitely  closed  the  period  of  blood — so  prolonged  and 
so  distressing — and  opened  the  era  of  peace  that  requires 
the  consolidation  and  prosperity  of  the  Republic. 

"We  must  justify  the  achievement  of  independence — so 
grave  and  transcendental — and  that  end  can  only  be  reached 
by  basing  peace  on  law,  which  is  justice,  and  preserving 
order,  which  is  liberty  and  civilisation.  We  will  discuss, 
but  let  us  not  quarrel.  The  recourse  to  arms  so  costly  and 
fruitless  shall  not  be  made  by  either  party  of  the  young 
nation  which  came  into  existence  the  Third  of  November  of 
1903.  Instead  of  the  weapon  that  kills,  we  shall  employ  the 
word  that  enlivens;  instead  of  the  sword,  the  press,  the 
tribune,  and  suffrage.  We  shall  render  to  reason  the  efforts 
that  we  have  given  to  force,  and  we  shall  strive  to  win,  not 
the  victories  of  the  bloody  battle,  but  the  triumphs  of  peace, 
legitimate  and  fruitful,  that  do  not  leave  in  our  conscience 
the  thorn  of  remorse. 

"We  have  not,  it  is  true,  the  means  of  being  on  the  morrow 
rich  and  powerful ;  but  we  have  of  being  sound  and  honest, 
and  of  meriting  the  respect  and  esteem  of  other  peoples, 
practising  without  vacillations  the  policy  of  honesty,  which 
is  the  best  policy.  That  policy  is  condensed  in  these  words : 
— in  the  interior,  the  Constitution;  and  in  the  exterior, 
religious  respect  for  international  agreements." 

It  was  thus  made  known  at  this  memorable  banquet  that 
the  agreement  was  in  sight  and  was  practically  assured,  and 
that  it  was  an  honourable,  just,  and  mutually  satisfactory 
agreement.  On  Saturday  evening,  at  the  smaller  dinner 
given  to  Secretary  Taft  at  the  American  Legation,  it  was 


264  A  MISSION  OF  EEADJUSTMENT 

known  that  the  agreement  had  actually  been  concluded  and 
that  an  executive  order  putting  it  into  effect  had  been  issued. 
A  delightful  interlude  occurred  on  Sunday,  in  the  form  of 
an  excursion  to  the  Pearl  Islands,  given  by  the  Panaman 
Government  to  the  American  visitors  and  two  or  three  hun- 
dred representative  Panamans,  upon  which  there  was  little 
talk  of  anything  so  serious  as  politics  or  diplomacy,  though 
it  became  generally  known  that  the  business  of  the  mission 
was,  in  Yankee  parlance,  "all  over  except  the  shouting." 

We  returned  from  the  Pearl  Islands  on  Sunday  evening  to 
find  a  newspaper  "extra"  had  been  printed  for  gratuitous 
distribution,  giving  the  full  text  of  the  executive  order.  ( See 
Appendix  X.)  And  then  on  Monday  night,  December  5, 
came  the  shouting!  By  word  of  mouth  and  by  placards 
posted  all  over  the  city  the  people  of  Panama  were  sum- 
moned to  the  Cathedral  Plaza  to  pay  a  tribute  of  respect  to 
Secretary  Taft.  They  came.  Estimates  of  their  number 
vary.  But  they  filled  nearly  all  the  space  from  the  Canal 
Building,  at  the  one  end,  to  the  Bishop's  palace,  at  the 
other,  and  from  the  Grand  Central  Hotel,  on  the  one  side,  to 
the  Cathedral,  on  the  other.  The  aristocracy  and  the  rabble, 
rich  and  poor,  white  and  black,  Conservative  and  Liberal, 
were  all  there.  Upon  the  decorated  and  illuminated  balcony 
of  the  hotel  were  the  President  and  other  high  officials  of 
the  Republic,  Secretary  Taft  and  his  party,  and  various  repre- 
sentative men  and  women  of  Panama.  A  brief  introduction 
was  given  by  the  popular  Alcalde,  who  had  held  office  ten 
years  and  was  a  candidate  for  ten  years  more,  and  seemed 
likely  to  get  them.  Then  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena  roused  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  throng  with  another  of  his  passionate 
orations,  in  which  the  words  flowed  so  swiftly  that  even  the 
trained  Panaman  ear  was  taxed  to  catch  them  all. 

Finally  Secretary  Taft  arose,  his  stalwart  figure  dominat- 
ing the  whole  scene  and  his  resonant  voice  reaching  to  the 
farthest  confines  of  the  square.  It  was  his  last  speech  to 
the  people  of  Panama,  and  his  best.  Particularly  was  it  the 
most  forcible  of  all  upon  the  point  to  which  I  have  most 


THE  END  OF  THE  EPISODE  265 

referred,  the  necessity  for  orderly,  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  the  new  Republic.  Speaking  in  the  very  place  in 
which  the  revolutionary  junta  of  thirteen  months  before  had 
been  organised,  he  began  his  address  by  congratulating  the 
people  upon  the  facts  that  that  junta  did  not  establish  a  dic- 
tatorship, but  opened  the  way  to  a  constitutional  government, 
elected  by  the  people,  and  that  in  electing  that  government 
the  people  chose  not  soldiers  but  civilians  as  its  members. 
"In  a  republic,  and  in  a  peaceful  republic,"  he  said,  "the 
army  must  always  be  the  instrument  of  the  civil  power. 
.  .  .  and  you  have,  therefore,  indicated  that  you  do  not 
propose  that  this  community  shall  be  governed  by  the  sword, 
but  by  reason  and  by  law." 

I  know  not  whether  that  was  meant  to  be,  what  to  many 
it  seemed,  a  bold  reference  to  the  Huertas  episode.  I  have 
little  doubt  that  many,  if  not  all,  of  the  Panamans  regarded 
it  as  such,  and  there  had  been  rumours  earlier  in  the  day 
that  the  friends  of  General  Huertas  meant  to  disturb  the 
meeting  with  a  hostile  counter-demonstration.  What  I 
know  is  that  not  a  hand  nor  a  voice  was  raised  in  hostile 
demonstration,  but  the  words  I  have  quoted  were  acclaimed 
with  a  universal  frenzy  of  enthusiasm,  until  the  fronds  of 
the  towering  palms  and  the  gray  facade  of.  the  old  Cathedral 
seemed  to  vibrate  together  with  its  tumultuous  stress.  There 
was  a  like  outburst  of  applause  at  the  straightforward  and 
manly  acknowledgment  that  a  mistake  had  been  made — 
which  had  now  been  rectified — in  the  executive  order  apply- 
ing the  Dingley  tariff  to  the  Canal  Zone  against  the  rest  of 
the  territory  of  Panama,  a  mistake  for  which  the  speaker  did 
not  hesitate  to  assume  responsibility.  And,  finally,  for  the 
third  time,  "the  cheering  rose  with  a  mighty  swell"  to  a 
supreme  climax  of  enthusiasm  when  the  Secretary  ended 
his  speech  with  the  vibrant  cry  of  '^Yiva  la  Republica  de 
Panama  r 

That  was  the  end.  The  business  was  done,  and  even  the 
shouting  was  over.  If  it  be  asked  what  had  been  accom- 
plished, the  answer  is,  much.    The  new  agreement  was  not 


266  A  MISSION  OF  KEAD J  USTMENT 

a  treaty,  nor  a  revision  or  modification  of  the  Hay-Bunau- 
Varilla  Treaty,  which  remained  intact.  It  was  an  agreement 
relating  to  some  details  of  interpretation  of  the  treaty, 
chiefly  concerning  customs  and  postal  service,  put  into 
effect  by  an  executive  order  of  the  American  Government. 
But  there  was  something  more  important  than  even  that 
executive  order;  that  was,  the  impression  produced  upon 
the  government  and  people  of  Panama  and  the  sentiments 
and  relations  established  between  the  two  countries.  I  have 
said  Secretary  Taft  and  his  party  were  received  with  cordial- 
ity and  with  confidence,  and  that  is  quite  true.  It  is  equally 
true  that  before  he  was  commissioned  to  go  thither  there 
were  widespread  feelings  of  suspicion  of  American  motives 
and  purposes  and  a  discontent  with  American  relations. 
Those  feelings  were  doubtless  unfounded,  or  were  founded 
upon  misapprehension,  misunderstanding,  and  misrepresen- 
tation; the  last,  I  am  afraid,  too  often  wilful:  Men  in  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  in  Panama,  for  factional,  sordid, 
or  other  unworthy  motives,  had  maligned  the  American  Gov- 
ernment and  had  represented  it  as  seeking  not  merely  to 
construct  a  canal  but  to  plant  a  colony  and  to  achieve  a 
forcible  conquest.  Those  tales  were  false,  but  how  were  the 
Panamans  to  be  assured  of  the  truth? 

There  was  only  one  way,  and  it  was  wisely  and  oppor- 
tunely adopted  by  President  Roosevelt  in  sending  Secretary 
Taft  upon  this  mission  of  explanation  and  reassurance.  The 
mere  announcement  of  that  appointment  effected  a  marked 
change.  The  Panamans  were  quickly  convinced  that  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  was  one  of  reason  and  justice, 
and  not  of  arrogance  and  force.  This  conviction  was 
strengthened  by  the  attitude  of  the  American  authorities 
in  the  Huertas  episode,  for,  while  there  were  those  who 
wildly  declared  that  the  retirement  of  General  Huertas  and 
the  disbanding  of  the  Panaman  army  would  be  quickly  fol- 
lowed by  American  conquest  and  annexation,  and  that  the 
American  Government  was  intriguing  to  that  end,  most 
men  of  thought  and  discretion  realised  the  absurdity  of  such 


PANAMAN  SENTIMENTS  267 

views.  They  saw  that  if  the  United  States  were  bent  upon 
the  conquest  of  Panama,  General  Huertas  and  his  250  sol- 
diers would  be  scarcely  so  much  as  a  straw  in  the  way.  More 
than  that,  however,  they  saw  that  the  United  States  was 
aiming  at  the  support,  and  not  the  suppression,  of  Panaman 
independence,  and  they  presently  testified,  as  did  President 
Amador  himself,  that  American  intervention,  or  the  promise 
of  it,  was  not  the  spoliation  but  the  strengthening,  not  the 
destruction  but  the  salvation,  of  the  young  Republic. 

There  were,  I  remember,  some  reports  extant  in  the 
United  States  that  the  news  of  President  Roosevelt's 
reelection  had  not  produced  a  favourable  impression  in  Pan- 
ama. They  were  entirely  untrue.  The  fact  is  that  the  news 
of  the  result  of  the  election  was  received  there — not  only  by 
Americans  but  by  the  Panamans — with  enthusiastic  and 
practically  universal  rejoicing.  The  American  Legation  was 
literally  overwhelmed  by  the  multitude  who  thronged  thither 
to  express  in  person  their  congratulations  and  their  joy, 
while  the  city  was  given  up  to  music,  fireworks,  parades,  and 
speechmaking.  This  was  the  more  significant,  coming,  as  it 
did,  upon  the  very  heels  of  the  Huertas  incident.  Panamans 
saw  that  the  Roosevelt  administration  had  saved  their  repub- 
lic from  revolution  and  was  sending  a  distinguished  mission 
to  assure  it  of  justice.  Why  should  they  not  exult  in  the 
retention  of  that  administration  in  power?  Thus  favourably 
disposed  were  the  Panamans  toward  Secretary  Taft  upon  his 
arrival.  His  every  word  and  act  during  his  stay  confirmed 
them  in  that  disposition.  Finally,  the  terms  of  the  execu- 
tive order  issued  by  him  as  the  result  of  the  conferences 
between  him  and  President  Amador  vindicated  their  confi- 
dence and  satisfied  their  expectations.  Before  he  came  and 
before  that  order  was  issued  they  did  not  know  how  the 
United  States  would  execute  the  canal  treaty.  After  that, 
they  did  know,  and  they  were  well  pleased.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  90  per  cent,  of  the  intelligent  people  of 
Panama  were  not  only  satisfied,  but  profoundly  gratified 
with  the  result  of  Secretary  Taft's  mission. 


268  A  MISSION  OF  KEADJUSTMENT 

Thus  the  differences  between  the  United  States  and  Pan- 
ama were  settled.  Will  they  remain  settled?  Prophecies  are 
rash.  We  must  remember  the  temptations  and  the  oppor- 
tunities of  party  politics.  In  the  United  States  we  have,  in 
all  ages  of  the  Kepublic,  seen  men  unworthily  ready  and  eager 
to  compromise  oyr  foreign  relations  for  the  sake  of  factional 
advantages  in  domestic  affairs.  We  cannot  expect  Panamans 
to  be  better  in  that  respect  than  we.  The  relations  of  the 
Isthmian  republic  with  the  United  States  afford  an  easy 
issue  of  factional  dissension,  and  it  is  possible  that  they  will 
be  thus  used.  Time,  however,  is  on  our  side,  and  on  the 
side  of  the  existing  status.  Every  month  that  passes  will 
reveal  more  clearly  to  the  Panamans  the  hollowness  of  their 
fears  and  suspicions  and  the  substantial  reality  of  the  ben- 
efits arising  from  their  connections  with  the  United  States. 
It  has  been  said  of  some  communities  that  they  did  not  care 
for  and  did  not  appreciate  the  sanitary  and  other  improve- 
ments introduced  by  American  administrators.  That  must 
not  be  said  of  Panama.  The  people  realised  their  need  of  a 
water-supply,  of  a  sewer  system,  of  better  paved  and  cleaner 
streets,  and  of  the  other  works  which  American  administra- 
tors have  now  performed  or  upon  which  they  are  now  en- 
gaged. They  wanted  these  things.  They  appreciate  them, 
and  their  enjoyment  of  them  will  confirm  their  approval  of 
and  adherence  to  the  compact  under  which  they  have  been 
provided.  If  to  these  things  we  add  the  consideration  and 
the  sympathy  which  are  the  due  of  each  nation  to  and  from 
each  other,  if  we  keep  it  continually  clear  to  the  Panaman 
mind  that  we  are  building  a  canal  and  not  a  colony,  a  high- 
way of  commerce  and  not  a  wall  of  exclusion,  it  will  not  be 
difficult  to  maintain  the  relations  of  mutual  confidence  and 
mutual  benefit  which  so  happily  were  established. 


CHAPTER  XV 

ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

Although  auspiciously  begun,  the  career  of  the  Isthmian 
republic  was  not  destined  to  be  one  of  unmarred  harmony. 
Within  its  first  year  there  arose  the  two  serious  crises  in 
its  affairs  which  I  have  already  described;  one  of  them  an 
attempt  at  military  revolution  and  the  other  a  controversy 
with  the  United  States.  There  also  came  a  deplorable  rise 
or  revival  of  partisanship  and  factional  animosities  in  the 
Republic.  At  first  these  were  held  in  abeyance,  and  were 
vainly  supposed  by  some  to  have  been  extinguished.  The 
stress  of  the  revolution  and  the  fervour  of  patriotic  enthu- 
siasm moved  men  to  sink  all  party  differences,  and,  as  I  have 
said,  the  composition  of  the  government  and  the  design  of 
the  flag  indicated  a  union  of  hearts  and  minds.  That  era  of 
harmony  did  not  long  endure,  however;  nor  was  it  reasona- 
bly to  be  supposed  it  would.  ^'Coelum,  non  animum,  mutant, 
qui  trans  mare  curruntJ'  How  little  do  they  change  their 
minds,  then,  who  do  not  even  cross  the  sea  and  change  their 
scene,  but  merely  pull  down  one  flag  and  raise  another  in 
its  place!  The  people  of  Panama  had  for  years  been  sub- 
ject to  the  partisan  passions  which  were  so  marked  a  fea- 
ture of  Colombian  political  life.  It  was  simply  impossible 
that  they  should  be  intellectually,  morally,  and  spiritually 
transformed  by  the  act  of  establishing  their  independence. 
A  revolution  could  be  effected  in  a  day.  Complete  conver- 
sion of  national  character  would  be  a  matter  of  years  or 
generations,  if,  indeed,  it  were  ever  effected.  Nor  should 
we,  the  proud,  impute  to  them  the  fault.  Note  our  own 
experience.  Even  in  the  throes  of  our  Revolution,  partisan 
rivalries  and  animosities  were  implacable,  savage,  and  mis- 
chievous, and  with  the  return  of  peace  and  the  complete 


270  ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

establishment  of  independence  they  rose  and  raged  with  a 
fury  unsurpassed  in  the  history  of  hatreds. 

Special  reasons  for  this  were  not  lacking  in  Panama. 
There  was,  for  one,  the  customary  ambition  of  political 
leaders,  and  especially  of  those  who  at  first  had  made  the 
mistake  of  taking  the  wrong  side.  Let  me  mention  a  single 
example,  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous.  Dr.  Belisario  Por- 
ras,  of  whom  I  have  already  spoken,  was  a  native  of  the. 
Isthmus,  and  a  lawj^er  of  ability  and  standing,  who  had  long 
been  ambitious  of  political  distinction  and  had  been  identi- 
fied with  several  revolutionary  movements.  In  July,  1900, 
he  was  one  of  the  three  Liberals  who,  under  General  Herrera, 
led  the  revolutionary  forces  to  Panama,  besieged  that  city 
for  a  time,  and  inflicted  heavy  losses  upon  its  defenders. 
Soon  after  that  incident,  however,  the  Liberal  cause  col- 
lapsed, and  Dr.  Porras  thereafter  spent  much  of  his  time  out 
of  the  country.  At  the  occurrence  of  the  final  revolution  of 
1903  he  was  in  Central  America,  and  though  notified  of  what 
was  going  on,  and  strongly  urged  to  return  home  and  aid 
in  the  establishment  of  Panaman  independence,  he  refused 
to  do  so.  On  the  contrary,  he  opposed  the  revolution,  and 
denounced  the  separation  from  Colombia  as  a  violation  of 
''sacred  patriotism."  He  wrote  a  number  of  letters  to  the 
press  to  that  effect,  and  especially  showed  distrust  of  and 
animosity  against  the  United  States.  It  is  not  improbable, 
indeed,  that  his  opposition  to  the  revolution  was  based,  half 
upon  the  fact  that  the  new  republic  was  to  enter  into  close 
relations  with  the  United  States,  and  half  upon  the  prom- 
inence which  Dr.  Amador  and  other  Conservatives  had  in 
the  movement. 

In  time,  however.  Dr.  Porras  perceived  that  despite  his 
opposition  the  revolution  had  been  successfully  effected. 
Thereupon  he  accepted  the  accomplished  fact,  returned  to 
Panama,  and  became  one  of  the  chief  leaders  of  the  Liberal 
party.  In  that  capacity  he  showed  more  hostility  toward 
the  administration  of  President  Amador  than  did  any  of 
his  colleagues,  and  was  regarded  as  the  most  strenuous  spirit 


DR.  BELISAEIO  PORRAS  271 

in  the  whole  Opposition — for  despite  the  fact  that  the  gov- 
ernment was  formed  by  a  coalition  of  Conservatives  and 
Liberals,  the  more  extreme  Liberals  soon  formed  themselves 
into  what  was  virtually  an  opposition  party.  The  govern- 
ment seems  to  have  done  its  utmost  to  placate  Dr.  Porras. 
It  made  him  a  member  of  its  Law  Committee,  and  sanctioned 
his  election  as  President  of  the  Municipal  Council  of  Pan- 
ama. He  was,  however,  implacable  in  his  opposition  to 
Conservative  policies,  and  thus  became  more  and  more 
persona  non  grata  to  the  government.  Finally,  in  1905,  his 
citizenship  was  impeached.  It  was  pointed  out  that  under 
Article  7  of  the  Constitution  citizenship  in  Panama  was 
forfeited  by  "being  born  a  Panaman  and  not  accepting  the 
movement  for  independence  of  the  Nation,"  and  it  was 
argued  that  by  his  opposition  to  the  revolution  he  had  in- 
curred this  penalty.  True,  he  had  afterward  repented  of 
his  opposition  and  had  accepted  the  new  order  of  affairs,  and 
so  the  penalty  might  properly  be  remitted.  But  the  same 
article  of  the  Constitution  also  provided  that  "nationality 
can  only  be  regained  by  an  Act  of  the  National  Assembly." 
Therefore,  it  was  argued,  he  was  not  and  could  not  be  a  citi- 
zen until  his  citizenship  had  been  restored  to  him  by  legisla- 
tive enactment,  and  that,  of  course,  could  not  be  done  until 
the  National  Assembly  should  be  elected  in  July,  1906,  and 
should  meet  in  September  of  that  year. 

All  this  was  vigorously  contested  by  Dr.  Porras  and  his 
friends,  and  the  point  was  raised  with  some  logical  force 
that  by  accepting  him  as  a  member  of  its  Law  Committee 
and  as  President  of  the  Municipal  Council  of  Panama,  the 
government  had  virtually  recognised  him  as  a  citizen.  The 
case  was  finally  submitted  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
Republic,  and  it,  on  November  15,  1905,  rendered  its  decision 
against  Dr.  Porras,  the  conclusion  of  its  detailed  review  of 
the  case  being  as  follows: 

"In  view  of  all  hereinbefore  expressed  and  adjudicated, 
the  Court,  administering  justice  in  the  name  of  the  Republic 


272  ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

of  Panama  and  by  authority  of  the  law,  decides:  That  Doc- 
tor Belisario  Porras  has  forfeited  the  right  to  be  a  Pan- 
amanian citizen  which  is  conceded  by  Article  6  of  the  Con- 
stitution, in  virtue  of  the  provision  made  in  paragraph  three 
of  Article  7  of  the  same  document,  a  right  which  he  has 
not  recovered  by  not  having  solicited  rehabilitation  through 
the  National  Assembly." 

This  decision  was  fiercely  resented  by  Dr.  Porras  and  his 
friends,  and  some  deplorable  utterances  were  made  in  the 
press  and  at  public  meetings.  Not  only  was  the  action 
against  him  described  as  "malicious  persecution,"  but  the 
Courtis  decision  was  denounced  in  savage  terms.  Thus  the 
Diario  de  Panama — the  organ  of  the  Liberal  party,  con- 
trolled by  Dr.  Arosemena,  First  Designate  of  the  Republic, 
said: 

"To  the  lasting  disgrace  and  eternal  shame  of  this  new 
Republic,  and  the  absolute  discredit  of  its  institutions,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Justice,  composed  of  Judges  Fabrega, 
Guardia,  Lombardi,  and  Villareal — the  fifth  judge,  Benites, 
withholding  his  vote — has  finally  handed  down  the  infamous 
decision,  steeped  in  political  rancour  and  inspired  by  per- 
sonal hatred,  which  declares  Dr.  Belisario  Porras  an  alien  to 
his  native  soil." 

A  great  mass  meeting  of  the  Liberal  party  was  held  in 
Santa  Anna  Park,  in  Panama,  to  express  disapproval  of 
the  court's  decision  and  sympathy  with  Dr.  Porras,  at  which 
impassioned  addresses  were  made  by  Dr.  Arosemena  and  Dr. 
Mendoza,  the  First  and  Third  Designates  of  the  Republic, 
condemning  the  decision  of  the  court  and  the  action  of  the 
government  in  pressing  the  case  against  Dr.  Porras. 

The  reply  of  the  government  party  was,  logically,  that  the 
decision  of  the  Court  ought  to  be  respected,  and  that  relief 
should  be  sought  through  appeal  to  the  National  Assembly  to 
restore  Dr.  Porras  to  citizenship  as  provided  by  the  Con- 
stitution. The  Liberal  retort  was  to  express  lack  of  confi- 
dence in  the  National  Assembly  as  it  was  to  be  constituted, 
on  the  ground  that  the  government  was  preparing  to  carry 


APPEAL  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES  2V3 

the  elections,  which  would  occur  in  July,  1906,  by  force  or 
fraud.  So  strenuous  were  they  in  this  contention  that  they 
actually  made  appeal  to  the  United  States  Government  con- 
cerning it,  asking  whether  it  proposed  to  countenance  gov- 
ernment control  of  the  elections.  This  appeal  was  addressed 
to  William  H.  Taft,  the  United  States  Secretary  of  War,  on 
November  7, 1905,  at  which  time  he  was  visiting  the  Isthmus. 
On  that  day  Secretary  Taft  was  visited  by  Dr.  Arosemena, 
First  Designate  of  the  Republic ;  Belisario  Porras,  President 
of  the  Municipal  Council  of  the  city  of  Panama;  General 
Domingo  Diaz,  Eusebio  A.  Morales,  and  F.  Filos,  compos- 
ing the  National  Directorate  of  the  Liberal  party  of  Panama. 
They  laid  before  him  an  elaborate  document  signed  by  them- 
selves, which  reviewed  the  relations  of  the  United  States  to 
Panama  and  the  protectorate  of  the  former  over  the  latter; 
arraigned  the  Panaman  Government  for  all  manner  of  force 
and  fraud,  both  past  and  prospective ;  and  then  demanded  to 
know  what  the  United  States  proposed  to  do  about  it.  Their 
memorial  ran  in  part  as  follows : 

"The  Diplomatic  correspondence  which,  toward  the  end  of 
1903,  was  exchanged  in  Washington  between  Secretary  Hay 
and  General  Rafael  Reyes,  Envoy  Extraordinary  of  Colom- 
bia, on  account  of  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  with  regard  to  the  separation  of  the 
Department  of  Panama  and  its  transformation  into  an  inde- 
pendent republic,  demonstrates  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment considered  itself  bound  to  maintain  the  established 
order  of  things  and  to  prevent  that  interoceanic  traffic 
should  be  suspended  or  impeded  by  military  operations, 
which  might  convert  the  territory  of  the  Isthmus  into  a 
battlefield.    .    .    . 

"The  treaty,  celebrated  on  November  18  of  that  year 
[1903],  contains  the  above  doctrine,  although  in  a  more  con- 
crete form.  The  United  States  thereby  guarantee  the  sover- 
eignty and  independence  of  Panama.  This  treaty,  whose 
principal  object  is  to  facilitate  the  construction  of  a  canal 
across  the  Isthmus,  was  also  bound  to  make  provision  for 
the  preservation  of  public  order,  so  that  the  universal  traffic 
might  not  suffer  disturbances;  and,  in  fact,  this  faculty  was 


274  ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

not  allotted  to  the  United  States,  as  shown  in  the  latter 
part  of  Article  7  of  said  treaty.    .    .    . 

^'Public  order  in  a  country  is  the  harmonious  working  of 
its  institutions;  it  is  the  normal  state  which  results  from 
the  respect  shown  by  the  government  to  the  individual  rights 
of  the  people  and  from  the  submission  of  the  latter  to  the 
existing  laws.  A  government  which  violates  the  constitution 
or  the  laws,  which  attacks  or  ignores  the  rights  of  the  citi- 
zens, or  which,  in  any  manner,  directly  or  indirectly,  favours 
or  tolerates  such  violation  on  the  part  of  unscrupulous 
underlings,  is  not  within  the  bounds  of  constitutional  order. 
If,  therefore,  to-morrow,  it  should  happen  that  a  government 
should  violate  in  a  flagrant  manner  the  free  suffrage,  is  this, 
or  is  it  not,  an  act  which  constitutes  an  infraction  against 
lawful  and  constitutional  order?  Should,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  illustrious  Government  of  the  United  States,  the  viola- 
tion of  free  suffrage  on  the  part  of  the  Panama  Government 
not  be  considered  an  attempt  against  constitutional  order, 
what  remedy  remains  there  for  the  people  of  the  Isthmus  to 
protect  their  rights  and  to  prevent  usurpation  of  their 
sovereignty? 

''The  present  government  of  the  country  was  formed  most 
auspiciously,  with  a  Cabinet  composed  of  members  of  both 
political  parties,  but  since  then  the  Liberal  members  of  the 
Cabinet  have  joined  the  ranks  of  the  other  party,  so  that 
the  government  to-day  is  solely  in  the  hands  of  the  Conserva- 
tives. Following  Colombian  customs,  the  government  is  get- 
ting itself  in  readiness  to  take  a  hand  in  the  coming  elections 
for  Congressmen,  and  through  agents  and  its  own  employees 
it  is  circulating  in  the  towns  of  the  interior  the  threat  that 
it  will  stop  at  nothing  and  spare  no  means  in  order  to  gain 
the  elections;  that  it  has  the  support  of  the  United  States; 
and  that  it  will,  if  necessary,  use  high-handed  means  and 
force  in  order  to  attain  its  ends.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
also  given  notice  that  if  the  people  of  Panama  should  resist 
this  usurpation,  American  troops  will  come  to  maintain 
order  and  to  shoot  them  down  without  mercy. 

"Thus  the  government  wants  to  place  the  people  of  Pan- 
ama before  an  alternative:  Either  they  permit  the  coming 
elections  to  be  a  farce,  or  they  offer  resistance  and  thus  pro- 
voke the  intervention  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  order. 

"We  represent  the  Liberal  party,  which  has  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority  all  through  the  country,  and  as  its  leaders, 
we  deem  the  time  opportune  to  state  to  the  Government 


INFOKMATION  DESIKED  275 

which  your  excellency  represents  that  we  do  not  approve  of 
the  recourse  to  arms  as  a  remedy  for  political  wrongs;  but 
still  less  do  we  approve  of  that  system  of  violation  of  free 
suffrage  which  it  is  intended  to  impose  upon  us,  invoking 
the  support  of  the  great  American  nation  for  this  purpose. 

^^Already  in  the  last  elections,  held  on  December  16,  last, 
which  were  only  of  minor  importance,  we  realised  to  what 
lengths  the  agents  of  the  government  would  go.  There  are 
fifty-five  precincts  in  the  republic.  In  some  of  them  no  vote 
was  cast  because  the  mayors  (alcaldes)  prevented  the 
notices  of  the  appointment  of  election  judges  from  reaching 
their  destination;  in  others  the  Liberals  were  attacked,  and 
shot  at  to  prevent  them  from  casting  their  ballots ;  in  others 
the  lists  of  voters  were  altered  on  the  night  preceding  the 
elections,  and  the  names  of  the  Liberals  were  stricken  out 
therefrom;  in  others,  the  people  of  the  rural  districts  were 
intimidated  by  the  police  and  forced  to  cast  a  vote  contrary 
to  their  convictions.    .    .    . 

"If  the  agents  of  the  government  made  use  of  all  kinds 
of  artifices,  deceits,  violence,  and  frauds  in  order  to  triumph 
or  to  undo  our  triumph  in  municipal  elections  in  which  only 
minor  interests  were  at  stake,  what  would  they  not  be  capa- 
ble of  doing  when  it  comes  to  the  election  of  Congressmen 
to  the  National  Assembly — the  only  body  that  has  the  power 
to  pass  upon  the  acts  of  the  ruling  government?    .    .  . 

"The  several  questions  which  we  hereby  present  to  your 
excellency  may  be  summarised  as  follows: 

"First — Does  the  American  Government  guarantee  public 
order  and  constitutional  succession  in  office  in  this  republic? 

"Second — Is  a  government  which  violates  constitution  and 
laws,  and  attacks  the  first  right  of  the  citizen — the  right 
of  free  suffrage — within  the  pale  of  such  a  protection? 

"Third — Granted  the  possibility,  and  to  us  it  is  an  abso- 
lute certainty,  that  in  the  coming  elections  all  manner  of 
outrages  will  be  committed  against  the  people,  will  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  look  on  with  indifference  at 
the  spectacle  of  a  defenceless  people  being  cast  on  the 
mercy  of  those  who  trample  on  their  rights? 

"Fourth — Will  it  not  be  preferable  for  the  United  States 
to  adopt,  in  time,  such  a  course  as  would  prevent  their 
appearing  before  the  eyes  of  the  world  as  the  champions  of 
abuse  and  oppression? 

"The  directorate  of  the  Liberal  party  request  your  excel- 
lency to  favour  them  with  a  frank  answer  to  these  questions, 


276  ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

and  beg  respectfully  to  point  out  that  a  reply  expressing 
the  repugnance  of  the  United  States  to  meddle  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  a  friendly  nation  could  not  be  considered  by 
us  in  the  light  of  an  answer,  since  our  Constitution  confers 
upon  your  government  the  right  to  intervene  for  purposes  of 
maintaining  constitutional  order,  and  if  such  faculty  is 
given  to  avoid  the  evils  of  war  it  is  natural  that  it  also 
should  be  used  to  suppress  the  causes  which,  even  contrary 
to  our  wishes,  might  produce  them." 

The  casual  reader  of  this  manifesto  might  think  matters 
in  Panama  were  in  a  desperate  plight.  But  much  allowance 
must  be  made  for  two  things.  One  is,  the  heat  of  partisan 
passions,  which,  as  we  well  know,  even  in  the  United  States 
often  leads,  in  political  "campaign  documents,"  to  gross  ex- 
aggerations. To  "point  with  pride"  to  their  own  party,  and 
to  "view  with  alarm"  the  doings  of  the  other  party,  are  the 
stock-in-trade  of  political  "spellbinders"  and  platform-mak- 
ers, and  their  vision  is  often  monstrously  distorted,  and  is 
had  through  glasses  of  couleur  de  rose  or  of  jaundiced  yel- 
low. There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  the  politicians  of  Pan- 
ama were  or  are  exceptions  to  this  rule.  The  other  thing  to 
be  remembered  is,  that  the  Latin  races  everywhere,  and  most 
of  all  in  the  tropics,  are  given  to  a  vivacity  of  imagination 
and  to  a  florid  exuberance  of  speech  to  which  the  Anglo-Sax- 
ons and  Teutons  of  the  north  are  strangers.  The  extremes  of 
speech  in  this  memorial  must,  therefore,  be  largely  dis- 
counted. When  a  Spaniard  tells  you  that  his  house  and  all 
it  contains  are  yours,  he  means  no  more  than  an  American 
does  when  he  invites  you  to  come  in  and  make  yourself  at 
home.  So  this  memorial  really  indicated  nothing  more  than 
many  a  party  platform  in  the  United  States  has  meant,  and 
portrayed  a  situation  no  more  alarming. 

Concerning  the  complaint  made  by  the  Liberals,  that  the 
Government,  originally  representative  of  both  parties,  had 
become  exclusively  Conservative,  the  following  reply  was 
made  by  F.  V.  de  la  Espriella,  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  of 
President  Amador: 


A  GOVEKNMENT  REJOINDEK  277 

"The  waters  of  Lethe  have,  without  doubt,  bathed  the  brow 
of  Dr.  Arosemena,  when  he  fails  to  recall  the  fact,  that  the 
President  of  the  Republic  tendered  him  a  Legation  of  the 
first-class  in  Europe,  which  he  did  not  accept;  and  that, 
later,  he  was  offered  an  elevated  position  as  Attorney- 
General  in  the  Government,  which  he  also  refused;  that. 
Doctors  Patinq  and  Morales  were  offered  cabinet  positions 
and  both  declined  them,  and  that,  later,  Morales  was  made  a 
member  of  the  Fiscal  Commission  sent  to  the  United  States 
to  place  the  |6,000,000  gold  invested  by  Panama  in  different 
American  securities,  where  he  was  occupied  several  months, 
being  also  employed,  under  additional  salary,  as  Legal 
Adviser  of  the  Panama  Legation  at  Washington ;  and,  that, 
upon  his  return  here,  he  was  named  Attorney-General — a 
position  which  he  decorously  resigned  two  or  three  days 
after  he  had  accepted  it,  on  account  of  the  appearance  in  a 
local  paper  of  an  article  by  him  attacking  the  Judiciary. 
Also,  that  when  Dr.  Porras  returned  to  the  Isthmus,  he  was 
courteously  and  benevolently  received  in  official  circles  and 
tendered  an  appointment  to  codify  the  laws  of  the  Republic, 
at  a  salary  then  exceeding  that  received  by  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  and  which  he  afterwards  declined  for  reasons  until 
now  unknown  to  me.  As  to  General  Domingo  Diaz,  the 
President  assures  me  that,  when  assuming  office,  he  offered 
to  leave  him  in  the  same  place  that  he  held  at  that  time; 
but  Diaz  declined,  stating  that  while  Mr.  Tomas  Arias  was 
Secretary  of  Government  he  could  accept  nothing  from  the 
Administration.  Thus,  all  persons  prominent  in  the  Liberal 
Directorate  have  been  requested  to  cooperate  in  the  Govern- 
ment. If  they  have  refused  to  do  so,  it  is  not  the  fault  of 
the  Government.  Indeed,  even  the  Secretary  of  the  Director- 
ate, who  will  probably,  we  believe,  hesitate  to  abandon  his 
law  office  for  an  official  post  of  any  kind,  was  distinguished 
by  an  appointment  as  Second  Judge-Advocate-General  of 
the  Republic.  I  do  not  recall  at  this  moment  whether, 
besides  the  gentlemen  aforementioned,  there  exists  in  the 
opposition  Liberal  Party  another  personage  of  the  prom- 
inence of  Dr.  Carlos  A.  Mendoza,  who  was  appointed  a 
Magistrate  of  the  Supreme  Court,  but  declined  to  serve. 
The  foregoing  statement,  to  which  I  now  give  publicity, 
brings  out  absolute  facts — truths  that  cannot  be  questioned 
or  denied. 

"The  Government  has  no  other  means  within  its  reach  by 
which  to  demonstrate  its  impartial  character  and  concilia- 


278  ISTHMIAN  POLITICS 

tory  spirit  than  to  tender  positions  to  gentlemen  of  the  oppo- 
sition party.  If  these  reject  its  overtures  for  concord  why, 
then,  complain?" 

Secretary  Taft  received  the  Liberals'  memorial  with  his 
accustomed  suavity  and  discretion,  and  according  to  request, 
communicated  it  to  President  Amador  and,  on  his  return  to 
Washington,  to  President  Eoosevelt.  It  called  for  no  spe- 
cific action  by  our  Government,  and  was  followed  by  none; 
though  perhaps  it  led  to  an  added  manifestation  of  the 
desire  and  determination  of  the  United  States  that  the  Isth- 
mian Government  shall  be  conducted  in  a  just  and  orderly 
manner. 

Still  another  effort  was  made  by  the  Liberal  leaders  to 
secure  the  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  the  Panaman 
election.  Early  in  June,  1906,  four  of  them  visited  Wash- 
ington for  the  purpose  of  laying  their  case  before  the  Presi- 
dent in  person.  These  were  Dr.  Pablo  Arosemena,  Dr. 
Belisario  Porras,  General  Domingo  Diaz,  and  Senor  Euse- 
bio  A.  Morales.  They  were  courteously  received,  and  they 
discussed  the  Isthmian  situation  fully  with  Secretary  Taft 
and  Secretary  Root.  Their  first  proposition  was  that  the 
United  States  should  send  agents  to  supervise  the  Panaman 
elections.  This,  it  was  pointed  out  to  them,  the  United 
States  had  no  right  to  do,  unless  at  the  formal  request  of 
the  Panaman  Government.  As  an  alternative,  they  then 
suggested  that  a  confidential  agent  should  be  sent,  who 
should  carefully  observe  the  electoral  practices  of  the  Isth- 
mian Government  and  report  upon  them  to  Washington. 
To  this  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Root,  made  the  adroit 
and  conclusive  reply,  that  the  United  States  already  had  a 
particularly  competent  and  observant  confidential  agent  at 
Panama,  in  the  person  of  the  American  Minister,  Mr.  Ma- 
goon,  to  whose  reports  upon  the  election,  as  well  as  upon  all 
matters,  it  would  pay  attention,  and  who  would,  if  a  fitting 
opportunity  arose,  make  such  representations  to  the  Pana- 
man Government  as  would  comport  with  diplomatic  usage. 


KEEPING  THE  PEACE  279 

That  was  the  American  Government's  last  word  upon  the 
subject.  Mr.  Magoon  at  Panama,  however,  continued  to 
exert  his  very  considerable  personal  influence  in  favour  of 
justice  and  order  at  the  elections,  with  gratifying  results. 
On  June  24  municipal  elections  were  held  in  the  cities,  and 
save  for  one  or  two  drunken  brawls,  in  which  two  lives  were 
lost  and  several  men  were  injured,  order  prevailed.  A  week 
later,  on  July  1,  the  elections  for  members  of  the  National 
Assembly  were  held.  In  order  to  avoid  any  repetition  of  the 
affrays  of  the  week  before,  the  government  forbade  the  sale 
of  intoxicants  on  that  day.  Consequently,  profound  peace 
prevailed.  Moreover,  Mr.  Magoon  persuaded  the  two  rival 
parties  to  unite  in  the  province  of  Panama,  on  a  coalition 
ticket.  The  government  party  was  generally  successful, 
though  Pablo  Arosemena  and  Eusebio  A.  Morales  were 
elected  on  the  coalition  ticket,  and  the  result  was  accepted 
as  honestly  attained.  The  first  National  Assembly,  elected 
on  July  1,  met  on  September  1,  as  provided  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  elected  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  Federico  Boyd,  and 
Domingo  Diaz,  to  be  respectively  First,  Second,  and  Third 
Designates.  Thus  the  menaces  of  disorder  were  dispelled, 
and  the  Isthmian  republic  demonstrated  its  disposition  to 
conduct  its  elections  in  a  manner  befitting  a  free  and  en- 
lightened people. 


CHAPTER  XYI 
BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

The  canal,  after  all,  is  the  thing.  The  ancient  history,  the 
diplomacy,  the  politics,  and  what  not  of  the  Isthmus,  are  not 
void  of  interest,  but  interest  in  the  canal  is  paramount.  It 
was  for  a  canal  that  we  first  went  to  the  Isthmus,  genera- 
tions ago,  and  it  is  for  the  canal  that  we  are  there  at  the 
present  time.  It  is  to  the  canal  that  the  American  mind 
instinctively  turns  at  mention  of  Panama.  What  of  the 
canal?  Are  we  really  to  have  one  at  last?  What  kind  of  a 
canal  is  it  to  be?  What  hope  have  we  of  succeeding  where 
De  Lesseps  so  disastrously  failed?  What  is  actually  being 
done  upon  the  great  work  at  the  present  time  ?  These  and  a 
host  of  other  questions  naturally  arise.  There  are  many 
which  time  alone  can  answer.  But  there  are  some  funda- 
mental facts  concerning  the  canal  which  may  now  be  stated 
with  confidence,  and  which  those  who  have  personally  gone 
over  the  line  and  investigated  all  its  conditions  at  first  hand 
and  at  close  range  see  in  a  far  different  light  from  that  of 
those  who  look  upon  the  work  from  afar,  through  a  mist  of 
prejudice  and  more  or  less  fantastic  legends. 

We  are,  then,  to  have  a  canal.  That  is  assured  to  us,  and 
in  the  near  future,  as  much  as  any  great  human  achievement 
can  be  assured.  So  far  as  diplomacy  and  legislation  are 
concerned,  it  is  well  known  to  the  world  that  complete 
arrangements  have  been  made  for  the  canal.  The  statesman- 
ship of  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  John  Hay  has  compassed  the 
end  which  Columbus  and  Cortez  vainly  sought.  It  may  be 
added  that  upon  the  engineering  and  material  side  the  canal 
is  no  less  assured  to  us.  The  skill  and  energy  of  American 
engineers  are  moving  toward  success  where  Ferdinand  de 

280 


THE  "MOUNTAIN  WALL"  MYTH  281 

Lesseps  met  with  egregious  failure.  It  would  be  difficult 
for  any  one  to  visit  Panama  and  see  what  has  been  done, 
what  is  being  done,  and  what  can  be  done,  without  being 
converted  to  the  belief  that  it  is,  of  all  places,  the  place  for 
a  gateway  between  the  oceans.  We  used  to  hear  much  about 
the  great  Cordillera,  the  ^'mighty  mountain  wall  of  the 
Andes,"  the  "backbone  of  the  continent,"  which  must  be 
broken  through  or  passed  over.  De  Lesseps  once  talked  of 
a  ship  tunnel  through  the  mountain  as  a  feature  of  his 
proposed  sea-level  canal,  and  I  remember  seeing  seriously 
meant  sketches  of  a  tall-masted  ship  entering  a  huge  bore, 
with  a  cloudcapped  Andean  peak  towering  far  above.  Now, 
the  fact  is,  that  if  a  tunnel  were  made,  its  roof  would  be 
so  thin  that  we  should  have  to  put  in  rafters  to  hold  it  up ! 
I  went  one  day  to  the  top  of  the  highest  peak  on  the  whole 
line  of  the  canal,  climbing  thither  upon  the  back  of  one 
of  Uncle  Samuel's  little  army  ponies.  It  was  worth  while. 
The  outlook  was  extended  and  inspiring;  a  vast  amphithea- 
tre of  mountains  sweeping  almost  around  the  horizon.  Some 
one  in  the  party  murmured  a  reminiscence  of  Church's 
"Heart  of  the  Andes,"  which  was  not  altogether  inappro- 
priate, considering  the  vast  expanse  of  wilderness  before  us, 
and  imagining  the  ever-present  vultures  on  their  untiring 
wings  to  be  their  greater  cousins,  the  condors.  But  if  truth 
must  be  confessed,  the  Andean  peak  upon  which  we  stood, 
the  loftiest  elevation  between  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific, 
was  little  more  than  three  hundred  feet  above  sea  level!  I  f 
do  not  suppose  that  was  the  very  "peak  in  Darien"  upon  ^J^^nr  ^ 
which  stout  Cortez — or  Balboa — stood,  when  his  men 
"looked  at  each  other  with  a  wild  surmise."  It  could  not 
have  been,  for  Balboa  crossed  at  St.  Michael's  Gulf.  But 
I  doubt  if  their  amazement  could  have  been  more  marked  and 
grateful  than  that  of  those  who,  after  those  fairy  tales  of 
mountain  walls,  realised  that  this  was  all  there  was  of  it, 
and  that  a  ridge  of  soft  earth  and  friable  rock,  nowhere  as 
much  as  three  hundred  feet  high,  was  the  only  barrier  to  a 
sea-level  canal  between  the  oceans!     To  say  that  such  a 


282  BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

barrier   is  insuperable  would  be  to   discredit  engineering 
science. 

The  French  companies  failed,  it  is  true.    Why  they  failed 
I  have  already  tried  to  make  clear.    But  they  did  not  labour 
in  vain.    They  did  a  great  deal  of  work,  and  provided  a  great 
deal  of  material  which  can  now  be  used  in  our  completion  of 
the  canal.     Practically  all  their  excavation  work  can  thus 
be  utilised,  whether  in  the  great  cut  at  Culebra  or  on  the 
tidal  flats  where  the  canal  is  already  navigable.     No  less 
to  the  purpose  is  it  to  observe  that  much  of  the  machinery 
taken  thither  by  them,  even  by  the  original  De  Lesseps  com- 
pany, was  found  by  our  engineers,  on  taking  possession,  still 
-    in  serviceable  condition.    There  wer§j  of^course,  some  things 
\  which  could  not  be  used.  I  doubt  if  it  would  have  been  worth 
while  to  furbish  up  the  sectional  steamboats  which  were 
lying  around  on  the  hilltops,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  the 
consignments  of  snow-shovels  which  were  received  there  in 
the  days  of  De  Lesseps  will  never  be  needed.    But  in  pur- 
chasing the  title  and   plant  of  the   French   company   we 
secured  something  far  more  than  the  proverbial  '^right  of 
^     way  and  two  streaks  of  rust."    T\^e_secured  millions  of^ol- 
.     lars'  worth  of  useful  machinery  andjmaterials  and  of  work 
'     well  doneT"  ^ 

Under  the  authority  of  the  Spooner  bill,  as  the  law  for 
the  construction  of  the  canal  was  termed,  the  President 
went  forward  with  promptness  and  energy.  He  waited  for 
nothing  but  for  the  canal  treaty  with  Panama  to  be  ratified 
by  our  deliberate  Senate.  He  submitted  that  convention 
to  the  Senate  on  December  7,  1903.  It  was  not  ratified  until 
February  23,  1904.  Six  days  later,  on  February  29,  1904,  he 
appointed  an  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  seven  members, 
who  were  duly  confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  March  3.  The 
Commissioners  were  John  G.  Walker,  a  Rear-Admiral  of 
the  United  States  Navy,  on  the  retired  list,  who  had  been  at 
the  head  of  former  canal  commissions  for  the  purpose  of 
investigation  and  report ;  George  W.  Davis,  a  Major-General 
of  the  United  States  Army,  on  the  retired  list;  William  B. 


THE  CANAL  COMMISSION  283 

Parsons,  an  eminent  civil  engineer,  of  New  York;  William 
H.  Burr,  Professor  of  Civil  Engineering  in  Columbia  Uni- 
versity, New  York ;  Benjamin  M.  Harrod,  formerly  City  and 
State  Civil  Engineer,  of  New  Orleans,  Louisiana;  Carl  E. 
Grunsky,  civil  engineer,  of  San  Francisco,  California;  and 
Frank  T.  Hecker,  a  civil  engineer,  of  Detroit,  Michigan. 
Rear- Admiral  Walker  was  made  Chairman  of  the  Commis- 
sion and  General  Davis  was  appointed  Governor  of  the 
Canal  Zone.  Dominic  I.  Murphy,  of  Washington,  D.  C,  was 
engaged  as  Secretary  to  the  Commission,  and  Charles  E. 
Magoon,  an  eminent  jurist,  of  Lincoln,  Nebraska,  as  General 
Counsel. 

On  May  9,  1904,  the  President  issued  these  instructions  to 
the  Commission: 

"Subject  to  the  limitations  of  law  and  the  conditions 
herein  contained,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  are 
authorised  and  directed:  First — To  make  all  needful  rules 
and  regulations  for  the  government  of  the  Zone  and  for  the 
correct  administration  of  the  military,  civil,  and  judicial 
affairs  of  its  possessions  until  the  close  of  the  LVIIIth  ses- 
sion of  Congress.  Second — To  establish  a  civil  service  for 
the  government  of  the  strip  and  construction  of  the  canal, 
appointments  to  which  shall  be  secured  as  nearly  as  prac- 
ticable by  a  merit  system.  Third — To  make,  or  cause  to  be 
made,  all  needful  surveys,  borings,  designs,  plans,  and  speci- 
fications of  the  engineering,  hydraulic,  and  sanitary  works 
required,  and  to  supervise  the  execution  of  the  same.  Fourth 
— To  make,  and  cause  to  be  executed  after  due  advertise- 
ment, all  necessary  contracts  for  any  and  all  kinds  of 
engineering  and  construction  works.  Fifth — To  acquire  by 
purchase  or  through  proper  and  uniform  expropriation  pro- 
ceedings, to  be  prescribed  by  the  Commission,  any  private 
lands  or  other  real  property  whose  ownership  by  the  United 
States  is  essential  to  the  excavation  and  completion  of  the 
canal.  Sixth — To  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations 
respecting  an  economical  and  correct  disbursement  and  an 
accounting  for  all  funds  that  may  be  appropriated  by  Con- 
gress for  the  construction  of  the  canal,  its  auxiliary  works, 
and  the  government  of  the  Canal  Zone;  and  to  establish  a 
proper  and  comprehensive  system  of  bookkeeping  showing 


284  BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

the  state  of  the  work,  the  expenditures  by  classes,  and  the 
amounts  still  available.  Seventh — To  make  requisition 
on  the  Secretary  of  War  for  funds  needed  from  time  to 
time  in  the  proper  prosecution  of  the  work,  and  to  desig- 
nate the  disbursing  officers  authorised  to  receipt  for  the 
same. 

"The  inhabitants  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Zone  are  entitled 
to  security  in  their  persons,  property,  and  religion,  and  in  all 
their  private  rights  and  relations.  They  should  be  so  in- 
formed by  public  announcement.  The  people  should  be  dis- 
turbed as  little  as  possible  in  their  customs  and  avocations 
that  are  in  harmony  with  principles  of  well  ordered  and 
decent  living. 

"The  municipal  laws  of  the  Canal  Zone  are  to  be  adminis- 
tered by  the  ordinary  tribunals  substantially  as  they  were 
before  the  change.  Police  magistrates  and  justices  of  the 
peace  and  other  officers  discharging  duties  usually  devolving 
upon  these  officers  of  the  law  will  be  continued  in  office  if 
they  are  suitable  persons.  The  Governor  of  the  Zone,  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  Commission,  is  authorised  to 
appoint  temporarily  a  judge  for  the  Canal  Zone,  who  shall 
have  the  authority  equivalent  to  that  usually  exercised  in 
Latin  countries  by  a  judge  of  a  court  of  first  instance;  but 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  shall  fix  his  salary  and  may 
legislate  respecting  his  powers  and  authority,  increasing  or 
diminishing  them  in  their  discretion,  and  also  making  pro- 
vision for  additional  or  appellate  judges,  should  the  public 
interest  require. 

"The  laws  of  the  land  with  which  the  inhabitants  are 
familiar  and  which  were  in  force  on  February  26,  1904,  will 
continue  in  force  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  in  other  places  on 
the  Isthmus  over  which  the  United  States  has  jurisdiction, 
until  altered  or  annulled  by  the  Commission;  but  there  are 
certain  great  principles  of  government  which  have  been  made 
the  basis  of  our  existence  as  a  nation  which  we  deem  es- 
sential to  the  rule  of  law  and  the  maintenance  of  order,  and 
which  shall  have  force  in  said  Zone. 

"The  Commission  may  legislate  on  all  rightful  subjects  of 
legislation  not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the 
United  States  so  far  as  they  apply  to  said  zone  and  other 
places;  and  the  said  power  shall  include  the  enactment  of 
sanitary  ordinances  of  a  preventive  or  curative  character 
to  be  enforced  in  the  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama.  Such 
legislative  power  shall  also  include  the  power  to  raise  and 


OKGANISATION  285 

appropriate  revenues.  All  taxes,  judicial  fines,  custom 
duties,  and  other  revenues  levied  and  collected  in  said  zone 
by,  or  under  the  authority  of  the  Commission,  shall  be 
retained,  accounted  for,  and  disbursed  by  the  Commission 
for  its  proper  purposes.  All  laws,  rules,  and  regulations  of 
a  governmental  character  enacted  by  the  Commission  are  to 
be  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  for  approval.  Gam- 
bling is  prohibited  in  the  canal  strip." 

The  Commissioners  promptly  proceeded  to  organise  the 
great  enterprise  which  had  been  committed  to  them.  Gen- 
eral Davis  reached  Panama  on  May  17th  to  assume  the  duties 
of  the  Governorship,  and  two  days  later  was  formally  re- 
ceived by  President  Amador  with  much  ceremony.  He  made 
on  that  day  an  inaugural  proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Canal  Zone  (see  Appendix  VII.),  announcing  that  the 
United  States  had  taken  possession  of  it  and  outlining, 
according  to  the  President's  instructions  to  the  Commis- 
sion, the  governmental  and  administrative  policy  which 
would  be  pursued.  Announcement  was  also  made  of  the 
appointment  of  the  following  officers:  Secretary,  Ernest 
Lagarde,  Jr.;  Treasurer,  E.  C.  Tobey,  a  Paymaster  of  the 
United  States  Navy ;  Captain  of  Police,  G.  R.  Shanton ;  San- 
itary Officer,  Dr.  L.  W.  Sprattling,  U.  S.  N.  The  last  named 
was  presently  succeeded  by  Dr.  W.  C.  Gorgas,  a  Colonel  of 
the  United  States  Army.  The  work  of  delimiting  the  Zone, 
preparing  maps,  etc.,  was  pushed  to  completion  by  June  16, 
while  the  actual  transfer  of  the  archives  and  authority  of 
the  Zone  was  made  on  June  1. 

Four  engineering  parties  were  organised,  to  begin  work  on 
the  canal.  One,  under  the  lead  of  Charles  List,  was  to  sur- 
vey and  study  the  harbour  of  Colon,  or  the  roadstead  where 
a  harbour  was  to  be  created,  and  the  route  of  the  canal  as 
far  as  Gatun,  where  the  first  hills  were  reached  and  where 
it  was  proposed  to  construct  a  dam  and  locks.  The  second, 
under  A.  B.  Nichols,  was  to  give  its  attention  to  Gatun  and 
investigate  the  practicability  of  constructing  the  dam.  The 
third,  under  H.  F.  Dos6,  was  to  investigate  the  proposed 


286  BEGINNING  THE  WOEK 

dam  site  at  Bohio.  The  fourth,  under  Boyd  Ehle,  was  com- 
missioned to  examine  and  report  upon  the  proposed  dam 
sites  at  Gamboa  and  Alhajuela.  From  this  it  will  be  per- 
ceived that  the  Commission  at  that  time  took  it  for  granted 
that  a  high-level  canal,  with  locks,  was  to  be  constructed. 
Major  W.  M.  Black,  U.  S.  A.,  was  put  in  temporary  charge 
of  actual  excavation  work,  and  with  Lieutenant  Brooke,  U. 
S.  A.,  and  A.  C.  Harper,  maintained  a  small  showing  of 
activity  in  the  Culebra  cut,  where  such  excavation  would 
need  to  be  done,  no  matter  what  type  of  canal  was  finally 
adopted. 

These  various  companies  were  scarcely  at  work,  however, 
before  an  important  change  occurred  in  the  direction  of 
affairs.  On  June  1,  John  F.  Wallace,  an  eminent  civil 
engineer  of  Chicago,  Illinois,  was  appointed  Chief  Engineer 
of  the  whole  enterprise.  He  arrived  at  Panama  on  June  28, 
and  soon  suggested  to  the  Commission  a  new  programme  of 
work,  which  it  adopted.  He  did  not  accept  the  high-level 
plan  as  a  foregone  conclusion.  On  the  contrary,  he  was 
decidedly  in  favour  of  a  sea-level  canal,  if  it  were  found 
possible  to  make  one.  In  any  event,  the  first  thing  to  do, 
in  his  mind,  was  to  survey  carefully  the  whole  route,  wifh 
a  view  to  securing  perfectly  trustworthy  data  from  which 
the  practicability  and  comparative  desirability  of  the  various 
plans  of  construction  could  be  determined.  At  the  same 
time  he  proposed  to  proceed  with  the  work  of  actual  con- 
struction experimentally  at  Culebra;  with  the  work  of 
rehabilitating  the  existing  machinery,  supplies,  and  build- 
ings, and  of  securing  such  new  machinery  as  would  be 
needed ;  and  with  the  sanitation  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

How  much  need  there  was  of  such  work  and  how  untrust- 
worthy former  surveys  were  may  be  seen  from  my  promised 
recurrence  to  the  Bohio-Obispo  section  of  the  canal.  In  most 
discussions  of  the  high-level  canal  plan  the  great  Bohio  dam 
has  figured  as  the  crux  of  the  whole  situation.  In  surveying 
for  that  dam  the  French  engineers  chose  the  narrowest  part 
of  the  valley,  where  there  would  be  the  smallest  amount  of 


ENGINEERING  PLANS  ^Sl 

dam  to  build  above  the  surface  of  the  ground.  The  early 
American  surveyors — before  our  purchase  of  the  unfinished 
canal — chose  another  place,  where  the  valley  was  wider  but 
where,  as  they  thought,  the  bed  rock  was  nearest  to  the  sur- 
face of  the  ground  and  there  would  thus  have  to  be  the  least 
excavations  for  the  foundations.  Both  parties  did  their 
work  very  imperfectly.  They  had,  as  I  have  said  before,  no 
diamond  drills,  and  such  drills  as  they  had  were  put  down 
at  too  great  and  irregular  intervals.  They  would  strike  a 
bowlder  as  big  as  a  barrel,  and  exclaim  with  joy,  "Voilk  I  le 
bed  rock !"  Now  our  later  engineers,  after  our  purchase  of 
the  property,  sent  down  diamond  drills  which  did  not  stop 
at  bowlders,  and  they  sent  them  down  fifty  feet  apart  all 
the  way  across  the  valley.  The  result  was  that  the  bed  rock 
was  found  to  be  thirty-five  feet  or  more  below  the  former 
measurements  and  to  have  a  very  irregular  contour.  This 
one  example  indicates  the  imperative  necessity  of  doing  just 
what  was  done  as  soon  as  we  got  possession  of  the  canal 
route:  namely,  making  a  complete  and  accurate  survey  of 
the  whole  course  of  the  canal.  An  inch  on  the  end  of  a 
man's  nose,  we  are  told,  makes  a  great  difference.  So  does  an 
increase  of  thirty-five  feet  in  excavating  for  the  foundations 
of  a  dam,  especially  when  you  are  a  hundred  and  sixty-five 
feet  below  sea  level. 

In  the  pursuance  of  his  admirable  plans,  Mr.  Wallace 
reorganised  the  enterprise  on  a  more  elaborate  and  compre- 
hensive scale.  He  divided  it  into  seven  bureaus:  to  wit, 
Supplies ;  Personnel,  and  Quarters ;  Buildings  and  Architec- 
ture; Machinery;  Maps,  Printing,  and  Lithography;  Cli- 
matic Conditions  and  River  Hydraulics;  and  Communica- 
tions. The  titles  of  these  departments  indicate  sufiSciently 
the  character  of  the  work  committed  to  each.  Each  was 
essential  to  the  satisfactory  and  successful  conduct  of  so 
vast  and  varied  an  undertaking.  The  work  of  the  four  engi- 
neering parties  previously  mentioned  was  continued,  with  A. 
C.  Harper  in  charge  of  excavation  at  Culebra ;  W.  E.  Dauchy 
succeeding  him  as  resident  engineer  there  in  November,  1904. 


288  BEGINNING  THE  WOKK 

C.  F.  Bertoncini,  formerly  an  employee  of  the  French  Com- 
pany, was  put  in  charge  of  engineering  records  and  drafting. 
E.  C.  Tobey,  already  named  as  Treasurer  of  the  Zone, 
became  the  head  of  the  department  of  accounting  and  of 
materials  and  supplies.  Charles  J.  Strom,  a  mechanical 
engineer,  was  charged  with  the  task  of  examining  and  reha- 
bilitating the  machinery  and  supplies  left  by  the  French. 
M.  O.  Johnson  became  supervising  architect.  Carleton  E. 
Davis  was  chosen  to  direct  the  work  of  providing  the  cities 
with  water  and  sewers.  All  told,  there  were  about  1,000 
men  at  work  under  the  Commission  in  various  capacities, 
on  July  1,  1904. 

Mr.  Wallace  was  at  the  very  outset,  however,  confronted 
with  a  diflSculty,  or  with  a  dilemma,  which  proved  serious 
and  embarrassing.  The  first  necessities  of  the  situation  were 
to  ascertain  the  best  way  of  doing  the  work  and  to  make 
the  Zone  fit  for  men  to  live  in  while  doing  the  work — in 
brief,  surveys  and  sanitation.  But  the  Government  and 
people  of  the  United  States  were  in  a  hurry  to  "see  the  dirt 
fly"  in  the  construction  of  the  canal  itself.  It  was  evident 
that  if  work  was  begun  on  the  canal  on  a  great  scale  at 
once,  before  proper  preparations  were  made,  disaster  would 
result.  Yet,  if  at  least  a  great  showing  of  work  were  not 
made,  there  would  be  discontent  and  grumblings  at  the 
slowness  of  the  Commission  and  its  Chief  Engineer.  Con- 
fronted with  this  dilemma,  Mr.  Wallace  did  what  seemed  to 
him  the  best.  He  set  a  host  of  men  at  work  at  the  Culebra 
cut,  and  ordered  a  number  of  huge  steam  shovels,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  report  much  actual  excavation,  and  at  the  same 
time  he  essayed  the  work  of  sanitation. 

Colonel  Gorgas  went  to  Panama  with  Mr.  Wallace,  and 
assumed  charge  as  chief  sanitary  officer,  with  headquarters 
in  the  fine  hospital  built  by  the  French  at  Ancon,  just  out 
of  Panama,  and  began,  against  some  local  prejudice  and 
opposition,  and  with  a  melancholy  meagreness  and  slowness 
of  support  from  the  Commission,  the  tremendous  task  of 
extirpating  yellow  fever  and  at  least  of  keeping  malaria  in 


THE  PANAMA  WATER  WORKS  289 

check.  The  construction  of  water  supply  and  sewer  systems 
for  Panama  and  Colon  was  also  begun,  but  the  work  was 
much  delayed.  Water  was  to  be  provided  for  Panama  by 
damming  the  Rio  Grande  to  form  a  reservoir,  235  feet  above 
sea  level.  Thence  a  sixteen-inch  iron  conduit  was  to  convey 
the  water  to  a  high-level  distributing  reservoir  at  Ancon, 
from  which,  at  an  elevation  of  200  feet,  giving  ample  pres- 
sure, mains  would  conduct  it  to  all  parts  of  the  city.  The 
system  was  designed  to  give  a  supply  of  2,000,000  gallons  a 
day,  or  more  than  66  gallons  per  capita  of  the  population. 
The  plans  for  this  indispensable  and  most  urgent  work  were 
submitted  by  Mr.  Wallace  to  the  Commission  on  August  9, 

1904,  and  were  in  due  time  approved.  Much  energy  was 
displayed  in  building  the  dam  across  the  Rio  Grande,  and 
in  preparing  the  route  of  the  conduit  and  in  building  the 
reservoir  at  Ancon.  But  there  was  painful  and  apparently 
inexcusable  delay  in  shipping  the  iron  pipes  from  the  United 
States.  The  last  lot  of  them  was  not  sent  until  May,  1905, 
eight  months  after  they  had  been  asked  for!  Despite  this 
delay,  however,  water  was  turned  into  the  mains  and  was 
drawn  from  some  hydrants  in  the  city  of  Panama  on  July 
4,  1905.  Work  on  the  sewers  was  begun  in  the  fall  of  1904, 
and  the  system  was  nearly  completed  in  a  year.  The  repav- 
ing  of  the  streets  could  not,  of  course,  be  begun  until  the 
water  mains  and  sewers  were  laid,  and  so  had  to  be  post- 
poned until  late  in  1905,  when  it  was  pushed  with  much 
energy,  the  streets  in  the  heart  of  the  city  being  paved  with 
vitrified  brick,  and  those  in  the  outskirts  with  stone  mac- 
adam. In  February,  1905,  authority  was  granted  to  Mr. 
Wallace  for  the  construction  of  eight  new  hotels,  and  by 
June  1,  two  of  them,  at  Culebra  and  at  Corozal,  were  finished 
and  occupied,  though  the  supervising  architect,  M.  O.  John- 
son, died  of  yellow  fever  in  April  of  that  year.     By  July  1, 

1905,  Mr.  Wallace  had  increased  the  working  force  tenfold, 
to  a  total  of  10,000  men.  In  a  subsequent  chapter  we  shall 
see  what  a  penalty  was  paid  for  the  delay  in  sanitation,  and 
how  much  better  it  would  have  been  had  the  demand  to 


290  BEGINNING  THE  WOKK 

"make  the  dirt  fly"  been  held  in  abeyance  until  the  Isthmus 
had  been  redeemed  from  pestilence. 

For  the  present,  let  us  turn  back  to  the  engineering  and 
surveying  work  which  Mr.  Wallace  so  elaborately  organised. 
The  investigations  at  Gatun  showed  conclusively  that  a  dam 
there  would  be  extremely  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  con- 
struct. For  a  dam  of  such  dimensions,  a  foundation  of  bed 
rock  was  regarded  as  necessary,  and  that  was  not  to  be  found 
nearer  the  surface  than  two  hundred  feet  below  sea  level. 
It  was  thereupon  assumed  by  the  engineers  that  a  dam  at 
that  point  was  outside  the  limits  of  practical  consideration. 
At  Bohio  another  gigantic  dam  had  been  proposed,  such  as 
would  need  a  bed-rock  foundation.  But  that  was  nowhere 
found  in  that  region  at  a  less  depth  than  167  feet  below  the 
sea,  which  was  also  regarded  by  many  engineers  as  too  deep. 
At  Gamboa,  on  the  other  hand,  undoubted  bed  rock  was 
found  at  about  sea  level,  and  therefore,  in  Mr.  Wallace's 
opinion,  that  was  decidedly  the  best  point  for  a  dam.  The 
Gamboa  dam  would  not  be  needed  if  the  highest  level  plan, 
90  feet,  were  adopted,  but  it  would  form  an  essential  feature 
of  any  lower  level,  or  of  the  sea-level  plan.  If  the  last  named 
were  adopted,  the  Gamboa  dam  would  shut  the  waters  of 
the  Chagres  from  the  canal  altogether,  and  would  divert 
them,  through  a  tunnel  and  the  San  Juan  River,  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  or,  perhaps  preferably,  through  an  open  cut- 
ting to  the  Caribbean. 

Work  in  the  great  Culebra  cut  was,  as  I  have  said,  neces- 
sary no  matter  what  plan  of  canal  was  adopted.  Mr.  Wal- 
lace conducted  it  largely,  however,  in  experimental  fashion, 
and  for  the  sake  of  determining  the  best  method  of  doing  it 
and  the  lowest  cost  at  which  it  could  be  done.  He  began 
with  the  old-fashioned  machinery  left  by  the  French,  but 
in  November,  1904,  began  the  use  of  enormous  steam  shovels 
of  American  design  and  make,  of  which  he  secured  and 
introduced  more  than  a  dozen.  Each  of  these  machines, 
manned — with  its  appurtenant  trains  of  cars  for  carting 
away  the  dirt — by  fifty  men,  did  the  work  of  500  men  under 


FOUR  CANAL  PLANS  291 

the  old  system.  Mr.  Wallace  was  thus  enabled  to  reduce 
the  cost  of  excavation  much  below  the  eighty  cents  a  cubic 
yard  estimated  by  the  former  Canal  Commission  and  used 
by  it  as  the  basis  of  computation  of  the  cost  of  the  canal. 
From  May  4,  1904,  to  January  1,  1905,  largely  under  the 
old  methods,  there  were  excavated  243,472  cubic  yards,  at 
an  average  cost  of  55  cents  a  yard.  From  January  1  to  April 
1,  1905,  under  Mr.  Wallace's  direction  and  largely  with  im- 
proved methods,  there  were  excavated  278,680  cubic  yards, 
at  an  average  cost  of  45  cents.  Seeing  that  there  were  from 
100,000,000  to  200,000,000  cubic  yards  to  be  excavated, 
according  to  the  plan  adopted,  a  saving  of  from  25  to  35 
cents  a  yard  meant,  Mr.  Wallace  held,  a  considerable  reduc- 
tion of  cost  from  the  estimates  of  the  former  Commission. 
Moreover,  he  believed  that  with  the  further  introduction  of 
improved  machinery,  and  with  the  provision  of  better  cars 
and  engines  for  hauling  away  the  excavated  matter,  the  cost 
could  be  still  further  reduced.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
only  fair  to  state,  other  engineers  insisted  that  Mr.  Wallace 
was  doing  the  very  easiest  and  cheapest  of  the  work,  and 
that  the  cost  thus  incurred  by  him  was  no  criterion  by  which 
to  judge  the  whole  job. 

Four  plans  of  canal  construction  were,  in  general,  con- 
sidered by  Mr.  Wallace,  in  his  surveys  and  investigations. 
These  were  as  follows : 

1.  The  high-level  plan  of  the  former  Canal  Commission, 
involving  an  enormous  dam  at  Bohio  and  a  number  of  locks, 
the  level  of  the  lake  at  the  summit  of  the  canal  being  ninety 
feet  above  the  sea.  Under  this  plan  there  would  be  no  dam 
at  Gamboa  to  divert  the  waters  of  the  Chagres,  but  the  entire 
flow  of  that  stream  would  enter  the  lake  which  would  form 
the  central  part  of  the  canal.  The  former  Commission  had 
estimated  the  canal  could  thus  be  opened  for  use  in  eight 
years  and  finished  in  ten  years,  at  a  cost  of  $200,000,000 
(including  the  purchase  price  from  the  French  Company). 
Mr.  Wallace,  on  the  basis  of  his  reduced  cost  of  excavation, 
was  inclined  to  reduce  the  estimate  of  cost  to  $145,000,000. 


292  BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

2.  The  sixty-foot  level  plan,  comprising  a  dam  and  two 
locks  at  Bohio  or  Gatun,  and  a  dam  at  Gamboa  to  divert  so 
much  of  the  Chagres  water  as  was  needed  to  fill  the  canal ; 
the  summit  of  the  canal  to  be  60  feet  above  tide-level.  This, 
according  to  the  Commission's  figures,  would  take  ten  years 
to  open  and  twelve  to  finish,  and  would  cost  |225,000,000 ; 
which  latter  figures  Mr.  Wallace  thought  might  be  reduced  to 
1178,000,000. 

3.  The  thirty-foot  level  plan,  involving  a  dam  and  a  single 
lock  at  Bohio,  and  another  lock  at  Miraflores  on  the  Pacific 
slope,  with  a  dam  at  Gamboa  as  in  the  preceding  plan.  The 
Commission's  estimate  was  that  such  a  canal  could  be  opened 
for  use  in  twelve  years  and  finished  in  fifteen,  at  a  cost  of 
1250,000,000.    Mr.  Wallace  put  the  cost  at  $195,000,000. 

4.  The  sea-level  plan,  originally  proposed  by  Ferdinand  de 
Lesseps,  with  no  locks  whatever,  but  a  dam  at  Gamboa  to 
divert  all  the  waters  of  the  Chagres  into  some  other  channel 
and  rid  the  canal  of  that  troublesome  stream.  Some  have 
held,  and  still  hold,  that  in  such  a  canal  a  "tidal  lock"  at 
Miraflores  would  be  necessary,  to  control  the  flow  of  the 
tides,  seeing  that  the  Pacific  rises  and  falls  ten  feet  above 
and  below  the  mean,  against  only  as  many  inches  in  the 
Caribbean.  This  argument  does  not  seem  convincing.  With 
the  Pacific  ten  feet  above  or  below  the  Caribbean,  there 
would  be  a  fall  in  the  canal  of  only  ten  feet  in  forty-seven 
miles,  or  a  trifle  more  than  two  and  one-half  inches  to  the 
mile.  That  is  the  fall  of  a  slow-flowing  river,  and  would 
cause  nothing  more  than  a  gentle  current  through  the  canal, 
half  the  time  in  one  direction  and  half  the  time  in  the  other, 
which  would  do  no  harm  and  would  serve  the  excellent  pur- 
pose of  flushing  the  canal  and  keeping  its  water  pure.  Of 
course,  it  would  be  necessary  to  cut  the  canal  at  the  Pacific 
end  ten  feet  deeper  than  would  be  necessary  with  a  tidal 
lock,  so  as  to  keep  it  navigable  at  low  tide,  but  that  would 
be  preferable  to  the  lock.  According  to  the  Commission's 
data,  such  a  canal  would  require  fifteen  years  to  open,  and 
twenty  years  to  finish,  and  would  cost  $300,000,000.     Mr. 


THE  SEA-LEVEL  PLAN  293 

Wallace  was  disposed  to  reduce  that  estimate  of  cost  to 
about  1230,000,000.  He  thought  the  time  estimates  of  this 
plan,  as  well  as  of  the  other  plans,  might  also  be  correspond- 
ingly reduced. 

As  a  result  of  these  investigations  and  computations,  Mr. 
Wallace  was  strongly  inclined  toward  a  sea-level  canal.  For 
such  preference  there  were  and  are,  indeed,  strong  reasons. 
Even  the  most  of  those  who  for  one  cause  or  another  favour 
a  lock  canal  at  some  elevation  concede  that  in  time  we  must 
cut  down  to  sea  level.  Well,  if  that  is  ultimately  to  be  done, 
it  would  seem  to  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  do  it  at  the  outset. 
That  is  partly  because  it  would  probably  be  cheaper,  quicker, 
and  easier  to  do  it  at  once  than  to  postpone  it.  Alterations 
of  completed  works  are  usually  costly  and  troublesome,  mak- 
ing the  works  in  the  end  much  more  expensive  than  they 
would  have  been  had  the  final  plan  been  executed  at  the 
beginning.  Also,  there  is  a  grave  question  whether  it  would 
be  possible  to  cut  a  high-level  canal  down  to  tide  level  with- 
out for  the  time  suspending  navigation  through  it.  I  believe 
Mr.  Wallace  was  pretty  strongly  of  opinion  that  while  such 
cutting  down  without  interruption  of  traffic  might  be  possi- 
ble on  a  twenty  or  thirty-foot  level  canal,  it  was  impractica- 
ble on  one  at  ninety  feet  elevation.  Obviously,  it  would  be  a 
very  bad  thing  to  be  compelled  to  suspend  traffic  on  the 
canal  for  a  term  of  years,  some  years  after  it  had  been  opened 
and  lines  of  commerce  and  travel  had  been  adapted  to  its 
use. 

Before  leaving  this  phase  of  the  subject,  however,  I  must 
add  that  at  least  one  eminent  and  authoritative  engineer 
has  unequivocally  and  aggressively  committed  himself  to  a 
view  exactly  contrary  to  that  which  I  have  just  described. 
That  is  M.  Bunau-Yarilla,  of  whose  distinguished  career 
something  has  already  been  said — sufficient  to  indicate  that 
his  opinions  upon  any  matter  connected  with  Panama  and 
the  canal  are  to  be  regarded  with  respectful  consideration.  I 
shall  not  here  attempt  to  give  even  a  synopsis  of  his  plans 
of  canal  construction,  which  he  has  himself  publicly  set  forth 


294  BEGINNING  THE  WORK 

in  a  most  lucid  manner.  It  will  suffice,  without  entering 
into  technical  details,  to  say  that  he  is  strongly  in  favour  of 
a  sea-level  canal.  Indeed,  he  would  make  it  and  call  it  not 
a  canal  but  the  "Straits  of  Panama."  He  holds,  however, 
that  the  easiest,  quickest,  and  cheapest  way  of  constructing 
such  a  seaway  is  first  to  make  and  put  into  use  a  lock  canal 
at  high  level,  and  then  cut  it  down  to  tide  level.  This,  he  is 
sure,  could  be  done  without  interruption  of  traffic,  and  he 
shrewdly  argues  that  it  is  more  economical  of  time,  labour, 
and  money  to  dredge  or  pump  out  mud  than  to  dig  and  haul 
dry  earth. 

Two  other  plans  should  also  be  noted  in  passing,  for  full 
accounts  of  which,  however,  I  must  refer  the  reader  to  the 
publications  of  them  made  by  their  respective  authors.  Lin- 
don  W.  Bates,  an  engineer  of  distinguished  attainments  and 
achievements,  proposed  in  1905  what  has  been  called  a  "lake 
canal."  Instead  of  merely  damming  the  Chagres  River  at  Ga- 
tun  or  Bohio,  he  would  construct  an  extended  barrage,  or 
huge  dyke,  along  the  sea  front  at  and  west  of  Colon,  and  an- 
other at  the  Pacific  side  of  the  Isthmus,  so  as  to  form  a  broad 
lake,  reaching  nearly  or  quite  across  the  Isthmus,  at  a  mod- 
erate elevation  above  sea  level.  In  such  a  body  of  water, 
he  cogently  argues,  navigation  would  be  much  more  rapid 
and  safer  than  in  a  narrow  canal  with  some  pretty  sharp 
curves.  Major  Cassius  E.  Gillette,  of  the  United  States 
Army,  also  an  engineer  of  distinction  and  authority,  pro- 
posed a  canal  with  locks,  and  urged  that  the  difficulty  of 
dam  building  at  Bohio,  Gatun,  or  elsewhere  should  be  over- 
come by  constructing  not  a  masonry  dam  resting  on  bed 
rock,  but  one  of  sheet  steel  piling,  driven  down  to  the 
required  depth,  backed  with  concrete  forced  into  place  under 
hydraulic  pressure.  His  plan,  as  did  that  of  Mr.  Bates, 
received  careful  consideration  and  was  highly  appreciated 
for  the  valuable  suggestions  which  it  gave  to  those  engaged 
in  the  laborious  and  responsible  task  of  determining  what 
plan  should  be  officially  adopted. 

If  anything  which  has  been  said  above  appears  to  indicate 


SEA  LEVEL  OK  HIGH  LEVEL?  295 

a  preference  on  the  part  of  the  present  writer  for  a  sea-level 
canal,  it  is  by  no  means  misleading.  A  sea-level  canal  is 
surely  the  ideal  highway  between  the  two  oceans.  It  is  the 
only  one  that  would  be  secure,  or  reasonably  secure,  against 
damage  by  earthquake  shocks;  and  we  must  remember  that 
Panama  is  a  volcanic  region,  where  seismic  disturbances 
have  at  times  been  severe  and  where  they  are  now  by  no 
means  things  of  the  past.  Granted  that,  as  I  have  elsewhere 
pointed  out,  they  have  long  been  so  slight  as  to  do  no  mate- 
rial harm,  I  know  of  no  guarantee  that  science  can  give 
against  the  recurrence  of  destructive  tremblings.  A  compar- 
atively slight  shock  might  wreck  the  masonry  and  machinery 
of  a  costly  lock  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would  take  months 
of  time  and  cost  hundreds  of  thousands  if  not  millions  of 
dollars  to  repair  it;  all  use  of  the  canal  being  for  the  time 
suspended.  It  would  take  an  almost  unprecedentedly  severe 
shock  to  do  real  damage  to  a  tide-level  canal.  Again,  there 
is  the  Chagres  River.  In  any  high-level  plan  that  capricious 
and  formidable  stream  must  be  depended  upon  to  supply 
the  canal  with  water  and  not  to  overflood  it  or  to  wash  away 
its  banks.  Perhaps  it  would  be  possible  to  control  it,  so  as 
to  make  it  as  useful  a  servant  as  it  has  been  destructive, 
obstructive,  and  generally  undesirable;  though  those  who 
have  seen  its  antics  under  the  stress  of  a  characteristic  Isth- 
mian rain  must  be  pardoned  if  they  regard  the  harnessing  of 
the  Chagres  to  the  canal  as  something  much  like  the  harness- 
ing of  a  mad  elephant  to  a  family  carriage.  Better  far  to 
put  a  barrier  between  that  raging  monster  and  the  canal, 
make  an  opening  for  it  at  the  other  side,  and  bid  it  rush  as 
madly  as  it  pleases  to  the  sea,  but  to  keep  away  from  the 
canal. 

There  is  the  question  of  cost,  too,  in  both  money  and  time. 
Beyond  doubt,  the  sea-level  canal  would  cost  more  than  any 
other,  at  the  beginning.  But  that  is  a  partial  and  most 
inadequate  and  misleading  basis  of  judgment.  The  first  cost 
of  a  canal,  the  cost  of  construction,  is  not  the  whole  cost. 
It  is  only  one,  and  not  the  most  important,  of  four  items, 


296  BEGINNING  THE  WOKK 

the  sum  of  all  which  must  be  considered  in  estimating  the 
cost  of  the  work.  The  second  item  is  the  cost  of  mainte- 
nance. The  third  is  the  cost  of  operation.  The  fourth  is 
the  cost  of  transit,  determined  by  the  value  of  a  ship's  time 
consumed  in  passing  through.  That  canal  will  be  cheapest 
which  costs  the  least  not  for  any  one  of  these  items,  but  for 
all  four  of  them  added  together.  Now,  the  first  item  is  a 
temporary  one.  It  must  be  paid  once  for  all.  But  the  others 
are  continuing  and  perpetual.  They  will  be  charges  against 
the  canal  as  long  as  it  exists.  If  we  were  going  to  build  a 
canal  for  temporary  use  or  for  a  few  years  only,  we  might 
do  well  to  select  the  plan  that  would  cost  least  for  original 
construction.  But  this  is  to  be  a'  canal  for  all  time,  and 
we  must  have  regard  for  the  fixed  charges  against  it,  which 
will  continue  for  all  time.  It  would  be  poor  economy  to 
build  a  canal  for  |200,000,000  which  would  cost  |5,000,000 
a  year  for  maintenance  and  operation,  when  we  could  build 
one  for  |300,000,000  which  would  cost  only  |1,000,000  a  year. 
The  canal  which  at  the  beginning  cost  |100,000,000  the  less 
would  at  the  end  of  fifty  years  have  cost  |100,000,000  the 
more.  (Of  course,  I  do  not  mention  these  sums  as  even 
approximate  estimates  of  yearly  cost,  but  merely  as  illus- 
trations.) We  must,  as  Cartier  said,  "regard  the  future." 
We  and  the  world  have  already  waited  long  for  this  canal, 
but  that  is  no  reason  why  we  should  now  hurry  ourselves 
into  adopting  an  inferior  and  unsatisfactory  plan.  Better 
take  a  little  more  time  and  have  the  best  possible  plan  for 
all  time  to  come. 


CHAPTER  XYII 

REORGANISATION 

The  work  thus  begun  was  not  destined  long  to  continue 
under  the  same  direction.  As  early  as  the  summer  of  1904, 
complaints  arose  of  delay  on  the  part  of  the  Canal  Commis- 
sion in  supplying  urgent  needs  of  the  men  on  the  Isthmus,  of 
an  excess  of  red  tape,  and  of  a  general  lack  of  flexibility, 
adaptiveness,  and  responsiveness.  The  members  of  the  Com- 
mission spent  little  time  at  Panama.  Their  oflSce  was  in 
Washington,  and  there  they  transacted  their  business. 
Requisitions  for  supplies,  even  for  things  urgently  needed  in 
the  hospitals  and  by  the  sanitary  squad,  in  cases  where  every 
hour  was  precious,  had  to  be  sent  to  Washington,  deliberated 
upon  by  the  Commissioners,  approved  or  rejected  with  little 
or  no  knowledge  of  the  circumstances,  and  then,  if  approved, 
advertised,  awarded,  and  finally  filled  weeks  or  months  after 
date.  In  such  fashion  it  took  several  months  to  get  an  X-ray 
apparatus  for  the  Ancon  hospital.  It  took  many  weeks  to 
get  mosquito-netting  for  the  windows  of  the  canal  office 
building,  and  then  not  enough  was  supplied;  and  in  the 
mean  time  some  of  the  most  valuable  men  of  the  staff  were 
prostrated  by  the  bites  of  malarial  mosquitoes.  The  chief 
sanitary  officer  wanted  netting  for  all  the  official  buildings 
in  the  Canal  Zone.  This  request  was  refused  as  extravagant 
and  unnecessary.  Then  he  asked  for  at  least  enough  to 
inclose  the  verandas  of  the  hospitals.  This,  too,  was 
refused,  and  he  was  told  that  there  was  no  need  of  inclosing 
more  than  half  the  verandas,  and  that  even  then  a  part  of 
the  space  should  be  solidly  boarded  up  instead  of  screened ! 
In  June,  1904,  Colonel  Gorgas,  Mr.  Wallace,  and  others 
urged  the  immediate  assumption  of  sanitary  control  over 
the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  in  order  to  prevent  an  out- 

297 


298  KEOKGANISATION 

break  of  yellow  fever,  but  the  Commission  would  not  permit 
this  until  some  months  thereafter,  when  the  dreaded  disease 
had  appeared  and  was  threatening  to  become  epidemic.  The 
need  of  a  proper  water  supply  for  Panama  was  urgent.  Mr. 
Wallace  pushed  the  work  of  constructing  a  reservoir  and  dig- 
ging ditches  for  the  iron  conduit  pipe,  and  expected  and 
promised  to  have  the  water  turned  on  in  the  city  by  the  end 
of  1904.  This  promise  he  could  and  would  have  fulfilled  had 
his  requisition  for  iron  piping  been  promptly  granted. 
But  it  was  not.  Months  passed,  and  no  pipe  came.  Mr. 
Wallace  cabled  to  Washington,  urging  that  it  be  sent,  and 
the  only  answer  was  a  reminder  that  "cabling  cost  money" 
— practically  a  reprimand  for  wasting  money  on  cable  tolls ! 
Finally,  in  February,  1905,  small  quantities  of  pipe  began 
to  reach  the  Isthmus,  and  the  water  was  turned  on  in  Pan- 
ama on  July  4,  six  months  later  than  it  should  have  been. 
It  was  also  complained,  and  truly,  that  the  workmen  on  the 
canal  were  ill-housed,  and  ill-fed,  at  extortionate  prices. 

The  effect  of  such  a  policy,  partly  exasperating  and  partly 
discouraging  upon  the  men  at  the  front,  who  were  waging  a 
life-and-death  war  with  pestilences,  may  be  imagined.  There 
was,  no  doubt,  an  explanation  of  it,  if  not  an  excuse  or  a 
justification.  The  Commissioners  were  mindful  of  the  prof- 
ligacy and  corruption  which  had  run  riot  in  De  Lesseps's 
time,  and  they  were  determined  to  avoid  all  possibility  of  a 
repetition  of  it.  But  in  fulfilling  that  praiseworthy  resolu- 
tion they  ran  into  the  opposite  extreme.  It  became  evident, 
therefore,  that  a  radical  reorganisation  of  affairs  must  be 
made.  The  Commissioners  must  either  spend  most  of  their 
time  on  the  Isthmus,  where  they  would  be  constantly  in 
touch  with  the  work  and  would  appreciate  its  needs,  or  they 
must  give  place  to  others  who  would  do  so.  The  President 
became  convinced  of  this  necessity  soon  after  Secretary 
Taft's  return  to  Washington  from  Panama  in  December, 
1904,  and  asked  Congress  to  enact  legislation  to  that  end. 
In  a  message  on  January  13,  transmitting  to  Congress  a  let- 
ter of  Secretary  Taft's  upon  the  subject,  he  suggested  that 


CHANGES  IN  THE  COMMISSION  299 

authority  should  be  given  to  him  to  form  a  new  Commission 
of  five,  or,  better  still,  of  only  three  members.  The  desirabil- 
ity of  such  a  change  was  widely  recognised.  There  was  no 
disposition  to  condemn  the  existing  Commission,  or  to  be- 
little its  achievements.  It  had  done  a  most  valuable  and 
important  work.  But  now  its  work  was  done.  The  whole 
enterprise  was  entering  a  new  stage.  Diplomacy,  and  the 
preliminary  negotiations  and  tentative  explorations,  were  to 
be  laid  aside  for  the  most  intense  and  active  execution.  The 
Commissioners  had  been  well  adapted  to  the  former  tasks. 
They  were,  most  of  them,  not  suited  to  the  latter.  The  old 
system  of  organisation  and  procedure  had  served  the  old 
purposes  well — with  such  exceptions  as  I  have  noted.  They 
would  not  and  could  not  serve  the  new  purposes.  There 
must  be  a  less  complicated,  more  flexible,  and  more  direct 
administration. 

Already,  indeed,  a  week  before  this  message  of  the  Presi- 
dent's, acting  upon  knowledge  of  what  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  in  mind,  proposals  of  reorganisation 
had  been  made  in  Congress.  One  was  for  the  abolition  of 
the  existing  Commission  and  the  substitution  of  a  new  one 
consisting  of  only  three  members,  all  engineers — not  a  desir- 
able thing,  for  some  other  than  purely  engineering  ability 
was  needed.  Another  was  for  the  simple  abolition  of  the 
Commission ;  and  the  bestowal  upon  the  President  of  power 
to  replace  it  in  any  manner  he  saw  fit.  These  proposals  were 
made  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  after  some  debate 
that  body  enacted  a  bill  in  accord  with  the  President's  views. 
The  Senate,  however,  failed  to  pass  it.  Then  the  President 
decided  to  take  matters  into  his  own  hands.  He  could  not 
change  the  Commission  from  one  of  seven  members  to  one  of 
only  three,  as  he  wished,  but  he  could  practically  compel  the 
existing  Commissioners  to  resign,  and  he  could  fill  their 
places  with  new  men,  and  organise  the  new  Commission  on  a 
new  plan.    This  was  what  he  did. 

Already  one  of  the  Commissioners,  Colonel  Hecker,  had 
resigned,  on  November  18,  1904.    In  March,  1905,  the  other 


300  KEORGANISATION 

Commissioners  also  resigned,  and  on  April  1  a  new  Com 
mission  was  appointed,  consisting  of  Theodore  P.  Shonts, 
of  Illinois,  a  civil  engineer  and  railroad  president;  Charles 
E.  Magoon,  of  Nebraska,  a  distinguished  jurist,  who  had 
been  general  legal  counsel  to  the  old  Commission  and,  before 
that,  law  officer  of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  of  the  War 
Department ;  John  F.  Wallace,  a  civil  engineer,  who  had  been 
Chief  Engineer  under  the  old  Commission,  and  who  had  had 
much  experience  in  railroad  and  canal  work;  Mordecai  T. 
Endicott,  a  Rear-Admiral  of  the  United  States  Navy  on  the 
retired  list,  who  had  been  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Yards  and 
Docks  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  had  been  a  civil  engi- 
neer before  entering  the  Navy ;  Peter  C.  Hains,  a  Brigadier- 
General  of  the  United  States  Army  on  the  retired  list,  who 
had  been  educated  at  West  Point,  had  served  with  distinction 
in  the  Civil  War,  and  had  been  identified  with  many  impor- 
tant harbour  works  and  other  engineering  undertakings  of 
the  Government;  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  a  Colonel  in  the  United 
States  Army,  who  had  been  educated  at  West  Point  and  had 
served  with  distinction  in  the  Engineering  Corps;  and  Ben- 
jamin M.  Harrod,  of  Louisiana,  an  accomplished  civil  engi- 
neer, who  had  been  a  member  of  the  former  Canal  Commis- 
sion. Thus  all  the  members  of  the  new  Commission  were 
engineers  save  one,  Judge  Magoon,  and  he  was  meant  for 
administrative  and  diplomatic  work  as  Governor  of  the 
Canal  Zone  and  also  as  United  States  Minister  to  Panama. 
Mr.  Shonts  was  made  Chairman  of  the  Commission,  with 
headquarters  in  Washington,  and  Mr.  Magoon  was  made 
Governor  of  the  Zone,  and  Mr.  Wallace  was  made  Chief 
Engineer,  with  their  offices  at  Panama.  These  three  formed 
an  Executive  Committee,  with  general  charge  of  the  work; 
the  other  members  of  the  Commission  acting  chiefly  in  an 
advisory  capacity.  The  President  embodied  the  suggestions 
of  Secretary  Taft  in  a  detailed  bill  of  instructions  and  rules 
for  the  guidance  of  the  Commission,  and  the  new  Commis- 
sioners promptly  entered  upon  their  duties. 
The  President  ordered  that  the  Commission  should  meet  at 


EULES  FOR  THE  COMMISSION  301 

Panama  quarterly,  four  members  constituting  a  quorum  for 
all  purposes;  and  that  meetings  of  the  Executive  Committee, 
two  being  a  quorum,  should  be  held  at  Panama  on  Monday 
and  Wednesday  of  every  week.    The  rules  continued : 

"For  the  convenience  of  executing  the  work  to  be  done, 
there  shall  be  constituted  three  executive  departments. 

"(a)  The  head  of  the  first  department  shall  be  the  chair- 
man of  the  commission,  who  shall  have  direct  and  imme- 
diate charge  of — 

"First — The  fiscal  affairs  of  the  commission. 

"Second — The  purchase  and  delivery  of  all  materials  and 
supplies. 

"Third — The  accounts,  bookkeeping,  and  audits. 

"Fourth — The  commercial  operations  in  the  United  States 
of  the  Panama  railroad  and  steamship  lines. 

"Fifth — He  shall  have  charge  of  the  general  concerns  of 
the  commission,  subject  to  the  supervision  and  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  shall  perform  such  other  duties 
as  may  be  placed  upon  him  from  time  to  time  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War. 

"The  head  of  the  second  department  shall  be  the  Governor 
of  the  Zone,  with  the  duties  and  powers  indicated  in  the 
executive  order  of  May  9,  1904,  which  includes  in  general — 

"First — The  administration  and  enforcement  of  law  in 
the  Zone. 

"Second — All  matters  of  sanitation  within  the  Canal 
Zone,  and  also  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  and  the 
harbours,  etc.,  so  far  as  authorised  by  the  treaty,  the  execu- 
tive orders  and  decrees  of  December  3,  1904,  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  relating  thereto. 

"Third — The  custody  of  all  supplies  needed  for  sanitary 
purposes  and  such  construction  necessary  for  sanitary  pur- 
poses as  may  be  assigned  to  this  department  by  the  com- 
mission. 

"Fourth — Such  other  duties  as  he  may  be  charged  with 
from  time  to  time  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"Fifth — He  shall  reside  on  the  Isthmus  and  devote  his 
entire  time  to  the  service,  except  when  granted  leave  of 
absence  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"The  head  of  the  third  department  shall  be  the  chief  engi- 
neer.    He  shall  have  full  charge  on  the  Isthmus — 

"First — Of  all  the  actual  work  of  construction  carried  on 
by  the  commission  on  the  Isthmus. 


302  REORGANISATION 

"Second — The  custody  of  all  the  supplies  and  plant  of  the 
commission  upon  the  Isthmus. 

"Third — The  practical  operation  of  the  railroad  on  the 
Isthmus  with  the  special  view  to  its  utilisation  in  canal  con- 
struction work. 

"Fourth — He  shall  reside  on  the  Isthmus  and  devote  his 
entire  time  to  the  service,  except  when  granted  leave  of 
absence  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"All  officers  and  emploj^es  shall  be  appointed  and  their 
salaries  shall  be  fixed  by  the  head  of  the  department  in  which 
they  are  engaged.  Their  appointment  and  salary  shall  be 
subject  to  the  approval  either  of  the  commission  or,  if  the 
commission  is  not  in  session,  of  the  executive  committee. 
The  employment  of  labourers  where  the  contract  of  employ- 
ment is  made  in  the  United  States  or  outside  of  the  Isthmus, 
shall  be  negotiated  and  concluded  by  the  chairman  of  the 
commission,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  executive  com- 
mittee. Where  the  employment  of  labourers  is  effected  upon 
the  Isthmus,  it  shall  be  conducted  under  the  supervision  of 
the  chief  engineer,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  executive 
committee. 

"Contracts  for  the  purchase  of  supplies  or  for  construc- 
tion involving  an  estimated  expenditure  exceeding  $10,000, 
shall  only  be  made  after  due  public  advertisement  in  news- 
papers of  general  circulation,  and  shall  be  awarded  to  the 
lowest  responsible  bidder,  except  in  case  of  emergency, 
when,  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  W^ar,  advertis- 
ing may  be  dispensed  with.  In  the  making  of  contracts  for 
supplies  or  construction  involving  an  estimated  expenditure 
of  more  than  |1,000  and  less  than  $10,000,  competitive  bids 
should  be  secured  by  invitation  or  advertisement  whenever 
practicable. 

"The  commission  under  the  supervision  and  direction  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
President,  is  charged  with  the  general  duty  of  the  adoption 
of  the  plans  for  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  the 
canal  and  with  the  execution  of  the  work  of  the  same;  with 
the  purchase  and  delivery  of  supplies,  machinery  and  neces- 
sary plant,  the  employment  of  the  necessary  officers,  employ- 
ees, and  labourers,  and  with  the  fixing  their  salaries  and 
wages;  with  the  commercial  operation  of  the  Panama  Rail- 
road Company  and  its  steamship  lines,  as  common  carriers; 
with  the  utilisation  of  the  railroad  as  a  means  of  construct- 
ing the  canal ;  with  the  making  of  contracts  for  construction 


PUKCHASE  OF  SUPPLIES  '  303 

and  excavation,  and  with  all  other  matters  incident  and 
necessary  to  the  building  of  a  waterway  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  as  provided  by  the  act  of  Congress  of  June  28, 
1902." 

If  this  was  not  in  all  respects  an  ideal  administration  for 
the  canal,  it  was  at  least  a  great  improvement  upon  the 
former  one,  and  it  was  probably  the  best  the  President  could 
do  in  the  absence  of  the  new  legislation  which  Congress  had 
declined  to  grant.  The  constitution  of  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee, whose  members  would  be  at  Panama  practically  all 
the  time,  was  regarded  as  a  most  auspicious  thing.  Mr. 
Shonts  was  known  as  a  competent  executive  in  important 
undertakings.  Mr.  Magoon  was  admirably  qualified  by 
training,  by  temperament,  and  by  ingratiation  with  the  peo- 
ple of  Panama,  to  fill  the  two  offices  of  Governor  and  Minis- 
ter— a  union  of  functions  which  had  been  recommended  to 
the  President  by  his  predecessor  in  the  Ministry  to  Panama, 
John  Barrett.  Mr.  Wallace's  appointment  as  a  member  of 
the  Commission  was  universally  recognised  as  most  appro- 
priate. It  was  believed  that  through  such  organisation  the 
evils  complained  of  under  the  former  Commission  would  be 
avoided,  and  such  proved  to  be  the  case. 

Another  important  and  commendable  step  was  taken  on 
May  15,  1905,  when  Secretary  Taft  approved  a  decision  of 
the  Executive  Committee  to  the  effect  that  supplies  for  the 
canal  should  be  purchased  not  necessarily  in  the  United 
States  but  wherever  they  could  be  most  advantageously 
secured.  Lowness  of  price,  promptness  of  delivery,  and  all 
other  essential  details,  were  to  be  taken  into  account.  This 
was  no  sudden  nor  unexpected  decision.  Months  before,  at 
the  beginning  of  December,  1904,  in  his  annual  report.  Sec- 
retary Taft  had  suggested  such  a  policy,  and  had  asked  the 
will  of  Congress  in  the  matter.    He  had  at  that  time  said : 

"An  important  question  of  policy  is  yet  to  be  determined. 
If  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  are  not  bound  by  any 
restriction  of  Congress  as  to  where  they  shall  purchase 


304  KEOEGANISATION 

machinery,  material,  and  supplies,  then  it  would  seem  to  be 
their  duty  to  construct  the  canal  as  cheaply  as  possible,  and 
so  to  buy  what  they  need  where  they  can  get  it  cheapest. 
This,  however,  is  certain  to  produce,  every  time  that  a  large 
contract  is  awarded  to  a  foreign  manufacturer  or  dealer,  an 
outcry  on  the  part  of  the  American  unsuccessful  competi- 
tors. If  Congress  approves  the  policy  of  favouring  Ameri- 
can manufacturers  and  dealers,  even  if  it  increases  the  cost 
of  the  construction  of  the  canal,  then  it  seems  to  me  only 
just  that  it  should  declare  this  policy  by  law  and  lay  down 
a  rule  which  the  commission  can  exactly  follow." 

Congress  having,  from  December  to  May,  declined  or 
failed  to  take  any  action  upon  the  matter,  but  having  left  it 
entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  President,  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  the  Canal  Commission,  it  was  proper  and  indeed 
necessary  that  a  decision  should  be  made,  which  should 
remain  in  force  until  Congress,  at  some  future  time,  might 
otherwise  enact.  Mr.  Shonts,  the  Chairman  of  the  Commis- 
sion, truly  said,  in  vindication  of  the  action : 

"As  sworn  officers  of  this  Government  and  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission,  it  is  our  bounden  duty  to  purchase 
machinery  and  supplies  necessary  for  the  construction  of 
the  canal  wherever  they  can  be  most  advantageously  ob- 
tained, whether  in  foreign  or  domestic  markets.  I  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  it  necessarily  follows  that  these  supplies 
must  be  purchased  where  they  can  be  obtained  the  cheapest, 
but  where  they  can  be  obtained  most  advantageously,  all 
matters  being  considered." 

The  propriety,  economy,  necessity,  and  wisdom  of  the 
order  were  widely  recognised,  although  bitter  attacks  were 
instantly  made  upon  it  by  the  representatives  of  some  pro- 
tected monopolies,  and  by  those  so-called  "stand-patters"  in 
Congress  who  were  opposed  to  anything  even  remotely  look- 
ing to  a  revision  of  the  tariff.  Such  attacks  upon  it  were 
illogical  and  ill-founded.  The  principle  of  the  protective 
tariff  was  not  and  is  not  to  be  effectively  invoked  against 
the  order,  for  the  reason  that  protection  is  intended  to  pre- 
serve the  home  market  for  the  home  producer,  and  the  Pan- 


QUESTIONS  OF  ECONOMY  305 

ama  Canal  is  not  a  home  market.  The  Canal  Zone  is  not  a 
part  of  the  United  States,  and  the  canal  which  we  are  con- 
structing there  is  not  to  be  a  domestic  institution,  such  as, 
let  us  say,  the  Erie  Canal  or  one  of  the  Pacific  railroads. 
The  canal  will  be  owned  by  this  country,  and  will  be  oper- 
ated and  controlled  by  this  country.  Perhaps  in  time  it 
will  also  be  used  by  this  country  more  than  by  any  other. 
But,  nevertheless,  it  will  be  in  a  foreign  land,  and  it  will 
be,  by  the  most  sacred  guarantees,  open  impartially  for  inter- 
national and  universal  use.  It  does  not  appear,  then,  that 
it  is  properly  to  be  regarded  as  under  the  rule  of  the  pro- 
tective system.  There  are,  on  the  other  hand,  strong  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  precisely  such  a  system  as  that  which 
was  adopted  by  the  Commission.  It  is  on  all  hands  agreed 
that — provided,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  be  the  best  possible 
canal  in  plan  and  workmanship — it  is  eminently  desirable 
that  the  canal  shall  be  constructed  as  quickly  and  as  cheaply 
as  possible.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  much  time,  per- 
haps a  year  or  two,  and  much  money,  amounting  perhaps  to 
tens  of  millions  of  dollars,  could  be  saved  through  the  policy 
adopted  by  the  Commission. 

In  at  least  two  important  particulars  the  Government  had 
long  been  committed  to  this  very  policy.  In  purchasing  the 
unfinished  canal  from  the  French  company  it  purchased  mil- 
lions of  dollars'  worth  of  foreign  machinery  and  other  sup- 
plies. Having  done  that  at  the  beginning,  it  would  seem  to 
be  logical  for  it  to  continue  so  doing  whenever  it  is  to  its 
material  advantage  to  do  so.  Again,  the  principle  of  employ- 
ing alien  labour  has  been  well  established.  Natives  of 
Panama,  imported  workmen  from  Jamaica,  and  other  non- 
Americans  are  employed  and  are  to  be  employed.  This  is 
necessary,  since  it  would  probably  be  impossible  to  get 
labour  in  this  country  to  do  the  work.  If,  then,  we  are  to 
employ  foreign  workmen,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  reason 
why  they  should  not  use  foreign  machinery. 

There  was  no  real  expectation,  however,  that  under  this 
order  many  supplies  would  be  purchased  abroad.    That  was 


306  EEOEGANISATION 

not  the  purpose  of  the  order,  and  it  was  realised,  by  even 
the  "stand-patters,"  that  it  would  not  be  its  effect.  It  would 
simply  compel  American  manufacturers  to  sell  to  their  own 
government  as  cheaply  as  to  foreign  customers,  and  to  con- 
tinue selling  at  Panama  at  such  prices  as  they  had  hitherto 
been  glad  to  get.  Before  the  United  States  acquired  the 
Canal  Zone,  American  manufacturers  and  merchants  had 
enjoyed  almost  a  monopoly  of  the  hardware,  machinery,  and 
other  trades  at  Panama,  and  had  found  them  highly  profita- 
ble, although  they  had  no  tariff  protection  but  were  com- 
pelled to  compete  in  open  market  with  their  rivals  of 
England  and  Germany.  Secretary  Taft  rightly  held,  there- 
fore, that  they  should  continue  to  do  business  in  that  same 
way  under  American  control  of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  should 
not  be  permitted  under  the  shelter  of  the  American  tariff  to 
raise  their  prices  far  above  what  they  had  thitherto  been 
glad  to  get.  It  is  true  there  were  threats  that  as  soon  as 
Congress  met  in  the  fall  the  order  would  be  annulled  by  it, 
and  the  Commission  would  be  compelled  by  law  to  purchase 
all  supplies  in  the  American  market,  at  no  matter  how  high 
a  price.  So  strenuous  was  the  opposition  to  the  order, 
indeed,  that  it  seemed  for  a  time  doubtful  whether  it  would 
be  executed.  But  it  was  put  into  effect,  and  when  Congress 
met  the  next  fall  it  was  not  rescinded.  Not  until  June,  1906, 
did  Congress  take  any  action  whatever  upon  it,  and  then  it 
adopted  a  shifty  and  unworthy  resolution  which  did  not 
deal  decisively  with  the  matter,  but  merely  directed  that 
supplies  for  the  canal  should  be  purchased  in  the  American 
market  unless,  in  the  President's  opinion,  the  prices  de- 
manded here  were  unreasonable  or  extortionate.  Even  with 
this  unsatisfactory  action  of  Congress,  the  incident  will 
doubtless  prove  to  have  a  salutary  effect,  in  keeping  down 
the  cost  of  the  canal  to  within  reasonable  limits. 

Another  step  of  reorganisation  was  taken  in  January, 
1905,  when  Secretary  Taft  recommended  the  acquisition  by 
the  United  States  of  the  few  shares  of  Panama  Railroad 
stock  which  were  held  by  individuals.    The  great  majority 


THE  PANAMA  KAILEOAD  307 

of  the  stock  had  been  purchased  by  the  United  States  along 
with  the  unfinished  canal,  but  a  small  minority  of  it  was 
still  in  private  hands.  This  recommendation  was  approved 
and  executed,  and  the  United  States  thus  became  the  sole 
owner  of  the  Isthmian  railroad  and  of  its  steamship  line 
from  Colon  to  New  York.  The  result  of  that  transaction 
was — in  time — a  breaking  of  the  monopoly  which  the  Pacific 
Mail  Steamship  Company  had  enjoyed  by  virtue  of  a  com- 
pact with  the  old  Panama  Railroad  Company,  and  a  conse- 
quent great  improvement  of  traffic  conditions.  Concerning 
this  matter  an  important  report  was  made  in  July,  1905,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  by  Joseph  L.  Bristow,  who  had  been 
specially  commissioned  for  the  purpose,  and  who,  as  the 
result  of  exhaustive  investigations,  recommended : 

^'That  the  Panama  Railway  be  double  tracked  and  pro- 
vided with  all  possible  facilities  for  handling  business,  such 
as  increased  wharves,  etc. ;  that  it  charge  a  rate  for  transpor- 
tation based  on  improved  facilities  for  handling  traffic,  plus 
a  moderate  amount  with  which  to  pay  dividends;  that  the 
policy  of  charging  a  per  cent,  of  the  rates  on  through  busi- 
ness, subject  to  certain  minima,  be  adhered  to;  that  the 
steamship  line  between  New  York  and  Colon  be  retained; 
that  contracts  with  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company 
and  with  South  American  lines  be  cancelled,  and  the  traf- 
fic be  thrown  open  to  all  steamship  lines  on  equal  terms; 
that,  unless  a  private  steamship  line  be  established  between 
Colon  and  the  Gulf  ports  of  the  United  States  within  a 
reasonable  time,  the  Panama  Railway  establish  such  line; 
that  if  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company  withdraws  its 
present  service,  some  other  company  be  induced  to  estab- 
lish a  line  between  Panama  and  all  important  Pacific  ports 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  if  this  cannot  be  done  the 
Panama  Railway  itself  establish  such  line ;  and,  finally,  that 
American  vessels  be  favoured  where  that  can  be  done  without 
violating  the  treaty  obligations  of  the  United  States.'' 

Now  came  one  of  the  most  unexpected  and  most  unpleas- 
ant incidents  in  th^  history  of  the  American  canal  enter- 
prise at  Panama.  This  was  the  resignation  or  dismissal  of 
Mr.  Wallace  from  his  place  as  a  member  of  the  Commission 


308  REOKGANISATION 

and  as  Chief  Engineer  of  the  canal.  There  was  no  doubt 
that  he  had  been  much  dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the 
former  Commission,  but  he  was  supposed  to  be  not  only  con- 
tent but  highly  gratified  with  the  new  order  of  things.  He 
was  receiving  a  salary  of  |25,000  a  year,  and  was  living  in 
the  finest  house  in  Panama.  Under  the  reorganisation  of 
the  Commission  he  would  have  almost  absolute  authority 
over  the  engineering  features  of  the  work.  The  enterprise 
was  one,  to  be  identified  with  the  successful  completion  of 
which  might  well  satisfy  the  ambition  of  any  man.  It  was, 
therefore,  assumed  that  he  would  remain  in  his  place  to 
the  end.  When  in  June,  1905,  rumours  arose  that  he  was 
coming  home  to  resign  his  place  and  to  engage  in  some  busi- 
ness enterprise  in  the  United  States  at  a  higher  salary,  they 
were  regarded  with  incredulity;  and  when  he  actually  did 
come,  it  was  confidently  assumed  that  he  would  speedily 
return  to  the  Isthmus. 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival,  however,  on  Sunday,  June 
26,  Messrs.  Taft,  Wallace,  and  Cromwell  had  a  more  or  less 
stormy  conference  in  New  York.  The  details  of  it  were  not 
at  once  revealed,  but  it  was  made  known  that  Mr.  Wallace's 
connection  with  the  canal  was  terminated,  either  by  his  res- 
ignation or  his  dismissal.  A  few  days  later.  Secretary  Taft 
made  public  what  had  occurred.  He  quoted  Mr.  Wallace's 
letters  of  December  20,  1904,  and  March  15,  1905,  asking  that 
he  be  appointed  a  commissioner,  and  suggesting  the  new 
organisation  of  the  Commission,  including  the  appointment 
of  an  executive  committee  of  three  members.  He  said  that 
Mr.  Wallace's  suggestions  were  followed  out,  and  quoted  Mr. 
Wallace  as  expressing  unequivocal  approval  of  all  that  had 
been  done  under  a  date  as  late  as  May  26,  1905,  two  days 
before  the  chief  engineer  last  reached  the  Isthmus  and  twelve 
days  before  he  determined  to  resign.  The  Secretary's  report 
of  the  conference  of  June  26  was,  in  brief,  as  follows : 

"Mr.  Wallace  said  that  a  few  days  before  he  sent  his 
cable  to  the  Secretary  he  had  received  a  cable  from  prom- 


ME.  WALLACE'S  KETIREMENT  309 

inent  business  men  in  New  York,  asking  if  he  would  con- 
sider an  offer  to  accept  an  important  position  in  New  York, 
and  that  he  had  cabled  in  reply  that  it  was  simply  a  ques- 
tion of  terms  and  conditions,  and  that  he  had  requested 
particulars;  that  the  particulars  came,  and  it  proved  to  be 
a  definite  offer  of  a  position  as  president  of  a  large  holding 
company,  controlling  several  other  corporations,  with  cer- 
tain stock  benefits  and  other  advantages  to  himself,  which, 
with  the  salary,  made  it  equivalent  to  |50,000  a  year;  that 
he  did  not  at  once  accept  the  offer,  but  delayed  it  for  a  few 
days  in  order  to  cable  the  Secretary  of  War,  during 
which  the  parties  increased  their  proposals  between  $10,000 
and  115,000  a  year,  making  it  equivalent  to  |60,000  or 
165,000. 

"Mr.  Wallace  stated  that  the  position  was  an  especially 
attractive  one;  that  the  duties  of  the  new  position  were 
especially  agreeable  and  afforded  opportunities  to  make 
money  through  investments,  etc.;  further,  that  the  position 
was  such  a  good  on^  that  he  did  not  consider  that  he  could 
decline  it.  Concluding,  he  stated  that  while  he  was  severing 
his  connection  with  the  canal  work,  he  was  willing  to  make 
up  his  annual  report,  and  he  would,  if  desired  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, continue  to  serve  as  a  commissioner,  but  not  as 
chief  engineer  in  charge  of  the  construction  work  on  the 
Isthmus." 

At  this.  Secretary  Taft's  usually  equable  temperament 
was  much  disturbed,  and  he  expressed  his  indignation  in  no 
uncertain  tones.    Addressing  Mr.  Wallace,  he  said: 

"I  am  inexpressibly  disappointed,  not  only  because  you 
have  taken  this  step,  but  because  you  seem  so  utterly  insen- 
sible of  the  significance  of  your  conduct.  You  come  with  the 
bald  announcement  that  you  quit  your  task  at  a  critical 
moment,  on  the  eve  of  important  work  and  in  the  midst  of 
reorganisation  plans  under  which  you  accepted  your  posi- 
tion, with  your  department  unperfected  in  organisation. 
.  .  .  When  the  President  found  it  necessary  to  make  a  re- 
organisation of  the  former  Commission,  you  were  consulted 
in  the  frankest  manner  about  every  feature  of  the  reorgan- 
isation and  were  encouraged  freely  to  express  your  opinions. 
Indeed,  your  voluntary  suggestions  from  the  Isthmus  em- 
braced the  proposal  that  you  yourself  be  made  a  member  of 


3 10  KEOKG  ANI S  ATION 

the  Commission  and  Chief  Engineer  on  the  Isthmus.  The 
substance  of  the  plan  of  reorganisation,  as  afterward  em- 
bodied in  the  President's  executive  order  of  April  1,  was 
cabled  to  you  by  me,  and  you  cabled  me  your  fullest  approval 
of  it,  and  your  thanks;  for  it  included  the  appointment  of 
yourself  as  a  Commissioner,  as  you  had  solicited,  and  a 
member  of  the  Executive  Committee. 

"The  new  plan  of  organisation  was  warmly  accepted  and 
indorsed  by  you  when  you  arrived  in  Washington,  and  you 
expressed  your  hearty  approval  of  it  in  the  most  unequivocal 
manner,  not  only  to  the  President  and  myself,  but  to  the 
members  of  the  Commission  and  its  counsel,  and  just  before 
sailing  for  the  Isthmus  you  called  upon  us  and  voluntarily 
thanked  me  in  the  warmest  terms  for  what  had  been  done  in 
the  reorganisation  of  the  canal  work  and  in  the  positions 
which  had  been  given  you.    .    .    . 

"Now,  within  twelve  days  after  your  arrival  upon  the 
Isthmus,  you  send  me  a  cable  which,  read  in  the  light  of 
what  you  say  to-day,  signifies  your  practical  acceptance  of 
an  offer  of  another  position  inconsistent  with  the  perform- 
ance of  your  duties  on  the  Isthmus.  I  am  astonished  that 
you  should  be  so  disregardful  of  the  splendid  opportunities 
of  the  position  which  would  have  made  you  famous  the  world 
over  by  the  honourable  performance  of  your  duties  of  chief 
engineer.  For  mere  lucre  you  change  your  position  over 
night,  without  thought  of  the  embarrassing  position  in  which 
you  place  jour  Government  by  this  action,  when  the  engi- 
neering forces  on  the  Isthmus  are  left  without  a  real  head 
and  your  department  is  not  perfected  in  organisation,  when 
the  Advisory  Board  of  Engineers  is  to  assemble  under  call 
of  the  President  within  two  months,  and  when  I  am  depart- 
ing for  the  Philippines  on  public  duty.  I  consider  that  by 
every  principle  of  honour  and  duty  you  were  bound  to  treat 
the  subject  differently.  You  have  permitted  the  President 
and  all  of  us  to  proceed  in  full  confidence  that  you  would  per- 
form the  functions  of  Chief  Engineer,  and  now  in  an  hour 
you  drop  your  great  duties  and  throw  them  back  upon  us 
as  if  it  were  a  matter  of  no  consequence,  and  all  this  for 
your  personal  advantage  solely.    .    .    . 

"Under  the  circumstances,  Mr.  Wallace,  and  with  great 
personal  pain  and  disappointment,  I  am  bound  to  say  that 
I  consider  the  public  interests  require  that  you  tender  your 
resignation  at  this  moment  and  turn  over  the  records  of  your 
office  to  the  chairman  of  the  Commission." 


MR  WALLACE'S  OWN  STATEMENT  311 

Mr.  Wallace  thereupon  tendered  his  resignation,  both  as 
Commissioner  and  as  Chief  Engineer,  and  it  was,  on  June 
28,  accepted  by  the  President,  to  take  effect  immediately. 
On  June  30,  Mr.  Wallace  made  a  public  statement  in  reply  to 
Secretary  Taft's  strictures  upon  him,  in  which  he  said : 

"The  primary  causes  which  led  me  to  tender  my  resigna- 
tion as  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
were  underlying  and  fundamental,  and  I  must  emphatically 
resent  the  charge  that  my  motive  in  leaving  the  work  was  a 
financial  one.  A  careful  consideration  of  the  entire  subject 
had  brought  me  to  the  decision  that  I  should  disconnect  my- 
self with  the  work  at  the  earliest  possible  date  that  it  could 
be  done  without  embarrassment  to  the  administration  or 
injury  to  the  work.  It  is  unnecessary  to  state  the  reasons 
for  this  decision,  except  that  in  fairness  I  should  say  that 
they  involve  no  criticism  of  any  act  of  the  President  or  the 
Secretary  of  War.  My  final  decision  was  arrived  at  as  the 
result  of  the  six  days'  uninterrupted  thought  which  I  was 
able  to  give  the  subject  in  all  its  bearings  during  my  voyage 
from  New  York  to  Colon,  in  May.  Furthermore,  I  had 
pledged  myself  to  my  family  to  give  the  matter  of  my  resig- 
nation as  Chief  Engineer,  or  of  any  position  which  would 
require  my  continuous  residence  on  the  Isthmus,  serious 
consideration. 

"It  was  at  this  psychological  moment  that  I  received  a 
cable  message  from  New  York  offering  me  a  business  oppor- 
tunity which  I  was  bound  to  consider.  I,  therefore,  imme- 
diately cabled  the  Secretary  of  War  requesting  a  conference 
and  arrived  in  New  York  for  that  purpose  on  Thursday, 
June  22.  In  the  meantime  I  had  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
Secretary,  in  which  I  confirmed  the  request  for  an  inter- 
view, and  also  requested  my  annual  leave  of  absence,  which 
was  part  of  my  original  understanding  with  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission,  and  which  I  had  requested  from  Admiral 
Walker  in  March,  to  take  effect  at  our  mutual  convenience 
some  time  later  in  the  season,  which  request,  however,  was 
not  complied  with  or  answered,  owing,  probably,  to  a  sudden 
change  made  in  the  Commission  on  April  1. 

"On  my  arrival  in  New  l^ork  I  was  met  by  Mr.  William 
Nelson  Cromwell,  who  stated  that  he  was  delegated  by  the 
Secretary  to  arrange  for  a  personal  interview  with  me,  and 
asked  me  if  I  would  meet  him  at  the  Manhattan  Hotel  at 


3 1 2  EEOEGANIS  ATION 

10  a.  m.,  Sunday,  June  25.  While  Mr.  Cromwell  treated  me 
with  the  suavity  and  courtesy  for  which  he  is  noted,  he 
endeavoured  to  draw  from  me  my  reasons  for  desiring  to 
see  the  Secretary.  I  told  him  frankly  that  1  did  not  con- 
sider it  would  be  proper  for  me  to  discuss  the  matter  in 
advance  of  my  interview,  and  I  also  requested  him  to 
arrange  for  me  with  the  Secretary  that  the  interview  should 
be  absolutely  private,  and  that  no  one  but  the  Secretary  and 
myself  should  be  present. 

"On  arriving  at  the  Manhattan  on  Sunday,  I  was  met  by 
Mr.  Cromwell,  who  ushered  me  into  the  Secretary's  private 
apartment,  accompanied  by  my  son.  Assuming  that  arrange- 
ments had  been  made  for  a  strictly  private  interview,  my 
son  withdrew,  expecting  Mr.  Cromwell  to  do  the  same. 
However,  the  Secretary,  in  a  rather  peremptory  manner, 
directed  Mr.  Cromwell  to  remain.  This  action,  of  course, 
caused  irritation  and  apprehension  on  my  part  that  the 
interview  would  be  unpleasant  and  unsatisfactory,  and  the 
irritation  under  which  the  Secretary  was  evidently  labouring 
had  a  tendency  to  prevent  that  calm  and  dignified  considera- 
tion of  the  question  in  all  its  bearings  which  should  have 
been  given  it. 

"If  the  Secretary  understood  me  to  say  that  I  had  accepted 
a  position  in  New  York,  he  laboured  under  a  misapprehen- 
sion. I  did  state  to  him  that  I  desired  to  accept  one,  but 
under  such  circumstances  and  conditions  and  at  such  time 
as  would  cause  the  least  embarrassment  to  the  administra- 
tion and  the  least  injury  to  the  work,  and  that  I  was  even 
willing  to  go  to  the  extent  of  remaining  for  an  indefinite 
time  on  the  Commission,  should  he  desire  my  counsel  and 
advice  in  arranging  for  the  change,  assisting  in  preparing 
plans  for  submission  to  the  Advisory  Board  of  Engineers  in 
September,  or  in  the  further  consideration  of  the  question 
by  the  administration  or  Congress  during  its  next  session. 

"Much  to  my  surprise  he  indignantly  spurned  my  sug- 
gestion and  took  the  position  that  I  was  compelled  under 
what  he  called  my  contract  to  remain  in  charge  of  the  Isth- 
mian canal,  regardless  of  circumstances  or  conditions,  until 
the  completion  of  the  work,  and  spoke  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  outrage  my  feeling  to  such  an  extent  that  further  discus- 
sion of  the  reasons  for  my  action  was  out  of  the  question. 

"I  did  not  seek  the  position  of  chief  engineer  of  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission,  and,  considering  my  salary  as  gen- 
eral manager  of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company  and 


A  PAINFUL  EPISODE  313 

my  other  sources  of  earnings,  my  financial  condition  was 
not  improved  by  my  acceptance  of  the  position,  and  it  was 
with  the  greatest  reluctance  that  I  did  so. 

"While  it  was  my  own  expectation  that  I  should  continue 
my  connection  with  the  work,  it  did  not  occur  to  me  that  I 
was  not  free  to  withdraw  if  justice  to  myself  and  my  family 
and  to  my  reputation  as  an  engineer  required  me  to  do  so.  It 
was  not  only  my  right,  but  my  duty,  to  give  the  matter  most 
careful  consideration  in  all  its  bearings,  considering  not  only 
the  general  situation  as  it  affected  the  work,  but  my  family, 
personal  and  business  relations,  and  all  the  various  factors 
entering  into  the  problem,  and  I  could  not  concede  the  right 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  or  any  one  to  dictate  my  decision. 
The  only  debatable  questions  were  the  details  as  to  putting 
my  decision  into  effect,  and,  while  I  stated  to  the  Secretary 
what  my  desires  were,  I  told  him  that  I  was  perfectly  willing 
to  conform  to  his  wishes  as  far  as  possible  as  to  the  time  and 
manner  of  my  withdrawal. 

"I  have  made  no  criticism  of  personnel  or  individuals,  but 
do  believe  that  the  obstacles  due  to  the  government  meth- 
ods required  by  existing  laws  are  so  serious  that  they  will 
have  to  be  eliminated  if  the  American  people  are  to  see  the 
Panama  Canal  constructed  in  a  reasonable  time  and  at  a 
moderate  cost." 

Upon  one  point  there  was  universal  agreement:  namely, 
that  this  episode  was  a  most  painful  and  regrettable  one. 
The  most  general  opinion  was  that  Secretary  Taft  had  acted 
in  a  justifiable  and,  indeed,  necessary  manner,  and  that  Mr. 
Wallace  had  sacrificed  a  splendid  fame  for  sordid  consider- 
ations. There  were  those,  however,  who  while  holding  this 
general  opinion  thought  the  Secretary  had  been  needlessly 
severe  with  Mr.  Wallace.  The  minority  opinion  was  that 
Mr.  Wallace  had  been  unjustly  forced  out  of  his  place,  or 
else  was  justifiable  in  his  act  of  resigning.  But  even  those 
who  held  this  view,  and  even  his  warm  friends  and  sup- 
porters, regretted  that  he  did  not  more  clearly  state  the 
reasons  for  his  action.  He  spoke  of  the  "primary  causes"  as 
"underlying  and  fundamental,"  but  he  did  not  say  what  they 
were.  He  spoke  of  "obstacles  due  to  the  governmental  meth- 
ods required  by  existing  laws"  as  "serious,"  but  he  did  not 


314  KEOEGANISATION 

say  what  they  were.  Such  vagueness  was  disappointing  and 
discouraging  to  his  friends,  who,  had  he  spoken  more  explic- 
itly, would  have  been  glad  to  rush  to  his  defence  and  vindi- 
cation. There  were  those  who  ventured  to  assume  that  they 
knew  his  reasons,  and  who  gave  public  intimation  of  what 
they  believed  to  be  their  nature.  One  was,  that  he  was 
unwilling  longer  to  inflict  upon  his  family  the  distress  and 
anxiety  they  suffered  during  his  stay  in  a  plague-smitten 
place.  A  second  was,  that  he  was  disgusted  with  the  red 
tape  and  delay  which  had  formerly  prevailed,  and  feared 
their  continuance.  A  third  was,  that  his  heart  was  set  upon 
a  sea-level  canal  and  he  was  unwilling  to  be  identified  with 
any  other ;  that  he  knew  it  would  be  impossible  to  construct 
such  a  canal  at  a  cost  which  Congress  would  sanction  unless 
supplies  could  be  bought  in  the  cheapest  market,  as  Secre- 
tary Taft  had  ordered ;  and  that  he  believed  Congress  would 
rescind  that  order  and  thus  so  increase  the  cost  of  work  that 
a  sea-level  canal  would  be  out  of  the  question. 

All  this,  however,  was  conjecture,  and  Mr.  Wallace  made 
no  further  explanation  of  his  course  for  some  time.  But 
in  February,  1906,  he  was  called  as  a  witness  before  a  com- 
mittee of  the  United  States  Senate  which  was  investigating 
canal  affairs,  and  was  asked  to  explain  the  causes  of  his 
resignation.  In  reply  he  made  it  appear  that  he  had  been 
largely,  perhaps  chiefly,  moved  by  personal  incompatibility 
with  or  antagonism  to  Mr.  Shouts,  his  colleague  on  the 
Commission,  and  Mr.  Cromwell.  Concerning  the  former,  he 
said: 

^'I  told  Secretary  Taft  that  I  did  not  want  to  go  back  to 
the  Isthmus  as  Chief  Engineer.  My  reason  was,  that  I  was 
made  jointly  responsible  with  Mr.  Shonts  and  Mr.  Magoon 
for  work  on  the  canal,  while  Mr.  Shonts  had  a  verbal  agree- 
ment with  the  President  that  he  should  have  a  free  hand 
in  the  management  of  all  matters.  I  felt  Mr.  Shonts  was 
not  as  well  qualified  as  I  was  either  as  a  business  man  or  an 
administrator,  and  he  was  not  an  engineer.  I  thought  I 
was  to  be  director-general  of  the  canal  work.    I  thought  it 


THE  NEW  CHIEF  ENGINEER  315 

better  to  sacrifice  my  ambitions  regarding  this  work,  which 
was  to  be  the  crowning  event  of  my  life,  than  remain  to  be 
humiliated,  forced  to  disobey  orders,  or  create  friction." 

His  objections  to  Mr.  Cromwell  were,  chiefly,  that  he  had 
too  much  influence  with  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
War,  and  was  interested  in  too  many  things : 

"I  thought  about  him  as  being  the  man  who  brought  about 
the  sale  of  the  canal  to  the  government ;  who  brought  about 
the  revolution  in  Panama;  who  assisted  the  government  of 
Panama  in  making  its  investments;  who  is  carried  on  the 
diplomatic  list  of  that  government,  and  who  is  interested 
in  public  utilities  on  the  Isthmus.  I  felt  that  a  man  mixed 
up  in  so  many  things  might  have  his  mind  perverted,  and  at 
some  time  he  might  give  the  wrong  advice,  and  the  result 
would  be  a  scandal." 

With  this,  we  may  take  leave  of  this  regrettable  incident, 
with  sincere  gratification,  however,  that  it  had  no  mischie- 
vous effect  upon  the  canal  enterprise.  Mr.  Wallace's  place 
on  the  Commission  was  not  at  once  filled,  but  his  successor 
as  Chief  Engineer  was  selected  and  announced  almost  simul- 
taneously with  his  resignation.  This  was  John  F.  Stevens, 
who  was  at  that  time  supervising  the  Government's  plans  for 
a  thousand  miles  of  railroads  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and 
who  had  formerly  been  chief  engineer  and  general  manager 
of  some  of  the  most  important  railroads  in  the  United 
States.  He  had  been  about  to  start  for  the  Philippines. 
Instead,  he  went  straight  to  Panama.  In  the  summer  of 
1905,  Joseph  Bucklin  Bishop,  of  New  York,  an  experienced 
journalist,  was  made  Secretary  to  the  Commission,  and  in 
December  following  was  appointed  by  the  President  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Canal  Commission.  His  nomination  was  not  acted 
upon  by  the  Senate,  however,  and  at  the  end  of  the  Con- 
gressional session,  in  June,  1906,  it  was  withdrawn,  or  per- 
mitted to  lapse,  and  Mr.  Bishop  was  returned  to  his  former 
place  as  Secretary  to  the  Commission.  At  the  same  time 
Colonel  Ernst,  who  had  been  placed  upon  the  retired  list 


316  KEORGANISATION 

of  the  army,  retired  from  the  Commission,  and  Mr.  Stevens, 
the  Chief  Engineer,  was  appointed  a  Commissioner  in  his 
place. 

Another  important  feature  of  the  reorganisation  effected 
in  1905  was  the  appointment  of  a  Board  of  Consulting  or 
Advisory  Engineers,  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  considering 
and  recommending  a  plan  for  the  canal — whether  at  high 
level  or  sea  level.  The  creation  of  such  a  Board  had  been 
recommended  by  Secretary  Taft  in  a  letter  to  the  President 
on  March  30, 1905,  and  the  President,  in  his  instructions  and 
directions  to  the  reorganised  Commission,  had  promised 
that  it  should  be  done.  The  Board  was  made  to  consist 
of  the  following  members;  five  of  them  being  appointed 
by  European  governments  on  request  of  the  President: 
Major-General  George  W.  Davis,  U.  S.  A.  (retired), 
formerly  Canal  Commissioner  and  Governor  of  the  Canal 
Zone,  and  an  engineer  of  long  and  wide  experience, 
chairman;  Brigadier-General  Henry  L.  Abbot,  U.  S.  A. 
(retired),  a  distinguished  engineer,  long  intimately  conver- 
sant with  and  connected  with  the  Panama  Canal  enterprise ; 
Eugen  Tincauzer,  chief  engineer  of  the  Kiel  Canal,  appointed 
by  the  German  Government;  Edouard  Quellennec,  consult- 
ing engineer  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  J.  W.  Welcker,  an 
eminent  engineer,  director  of  the  State  Waterways  of  Hol- 
land, appointed  by  the  government  of  the  Netherlands; 
Adolph  Guerard,  a  leading  official  engineer  of  France,  in- 
spector-general of  bridges  and  highways,  appointed  by  the 
French  Government;  Henry  W.  Hunter,  chief  engineer  of 
the  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  appointed  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment; Isham  Randolph,  of  Illinois,  engineer  of  the 
Chicago  Drainage  Canal ;  Frederick  P.  Stearns,  of  Massa- 
chusetts, the  hydraulic  engineer  of  the  city  of  Boston ;  Wil- 
liam H.  Burr,  of  New  York,  Professor  of  Engineering  in 
Columbia  University;  Joseph  Ripley,  of  Illinois,  chief  engi- 
neer of  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal;  William  Barclay  Par- 
sons, the  chief  engineer  of  the  New  York  City  Subway ;  and 
Alfred  Noble,  chief  engineer  of  a  division  of  the  Pennsyl- 


THE  ADVISORY  BOABD  Sil 

vania  Railroad.  Captain  John  C.  Oakes,  U.  S.  A.,  was  made 
secretary  of  the  Board.  To  this  Board,  the  President  had 
ordered,  there  should  be  submitted  by  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  for  its  consideration  and  advice  the  important 
engineering  questions  arising  in  the  selection  of  the  best 
plan  for  the  construction  of  the  canal.  "The  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  shall  be  con- 
sidered by  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  and,  with  the 
recommendations  of  the  Commission,  shall  finally  be  sub- 
mitted, through  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  the  President  for 
his  decision." 

This  Board — obviously  one  of  exceptional  distinction  and 
authority — was  organised  and  began  its  work  early  in  Sep- 
tember, 1905.  The  instructions  given  to  it  by  President 
Roosevelt  were  general  in  terms,  outlining  the  spirit  and 
purpose  of  its  undertaking,  rather  than  its  details  of  exe- 
cution.   He  said : 

"There  are  two  or  three  considerations  which  I  trust  you 
will  steadily  keep  before  your  minds  in  coming  to  a  conclu- 
sion as  to  the  proper  type  of  canal.  I  hope  that  ultimately 
it  will  prove  possible  to  build  a  sea-level  canal.  Such  a 
canal  would  undoubtedly  be  best  in  the  end, if  feasible;  and  I 
feel  that  one  of  the  chief  advantages  of  the  Panama  route  is 
that  ultimately  a  sea-level  canal  will  be  a  possibility.  But, 
while  paying  due  heed  to  the  ideal  perfectibility  of  the 
scheme  from  an  engineer's  standpoint,  remember  the  need  of 
having  a  plan  which  shall  provide  for  the  immediate  building 
of  a  canal  on  the  safest  terms  and  in  the  shortest  possible 
time.  If  to  build  a  sea-level  canal  will  but  slightly  increase 
the  risk,  then,  of  course,  it  is  preferable.  But  if  to  adopt  the 
plan  of  a  sea-level  canal  means  to  incur  a  hazard,  and  to 
insure  indefinite  delay,  then  it  is  not  preferable.  If  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  are  closely  balanced,  I  expect 
you  to  say  so.  I  desire  also  to  know  whether,  if  you  recom- 
mend a  high-level  multi-lock  canal,  it  will  be  possible,  after 
it  is  completed,  to  turn  it  into  or  substitute  for  it,  in  time, 
a  sea-level  canal,  without  interrupting  the  traffic  upon  it. 
Two  of  the  prime  considerations  to  be  kept  steadily  in  mind 
are: 

"First — The  utmost  practicable  speed  of  construction. 


318  EEOEGANISATION 

"Second — Practical  certainty  that  the  plan  proposed  will 
be  feasible;  that  it  can  be  carried  out  with  the  minimum 
risk. 

"The  quantity  of  work  and  the  amount  of  work  should  be 
minimised  so  far  as  possible. 

"There  may  be  good  reason  why  the  delay  incident  to 
the  adoption  of  a  plan  for  an  ideal  canal  should  be  incurred ; 
but  if  there  is  not,  then  I  hope  to  see  the  canal  constructed 
on  a  system  which  will  bring  to  the  nearest  possible  date 
in  the  future  the  time  when  it  is  practicable  to  take  the  first 
ship  across  the  Isthmus;  that  is,  which  will  in  the  shortest 
time  possible  secure  a  Panama  waterway  between  the  oceans 
of  such  a  character  as  to  guarantee  permanent  and  ample 
communication  for  the  greatest  ships  of  our  navy  and  for 
the  larger  steamers  on  either  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific. 
The  delay  in  transit  of  the  vessels  owing  to  additional  locks  • 
would  be  of  small  consequence  when  compared  with  short- 
ening the  time  for  the  construction  of  the  canal  or  diminish- 
ing the  risks  in  its  construction. 

"In  short,  I  desire  your  best  judgment  on  all  the  various 
questions  to  be  considered  in  choosing  among  the  various 
plans  for  a  comparatively  high-level  multi-lock  canal,  for 
a  lower  level,  with  fewer  locks,  and  for  a  sea-level  canal. 
Finally,  I  urge  upon  you  the  necessity  of  as  great  expedition 
in  coming  to  a  decision  as  is  compatible  with  thoroughness 
in  considering  the  conditions." 

The  President's  policy  was,  in  brief,  to  construct  the  best 
canal  in  the  shortest  time.  The  two  supremely  desirable 
qualities  were  promptness  and  efficiency,  and  they  were 
coordinate.  Neither  was  to  be  sacrified  to  the  other,  and 
if  not  to  the  other,  certainly  not  to  any  or  to  all  other 
considerations  in  the  world.  As  for  these  two,  they  were 
to  go  harmoniously  hand  in  hand,  and  everything  else  was 
to  make  way  for  them  and  adapt  itself  to  their  requirements. 
That  was  precisely  as  it  should  be.  This  nation  does  not 
want  to  wait  a  single  day  unnecessarily  for  the  canal  for 
which  it  and  the  world  have  waited  so  long  and  which  they 
need  so  much ;  but  neither  does  it  want,  however  speedily  it 
might  be  provided,  a  canal  which  will  prove  unsafe  or  un- 
satisfactory, or  of  which  men  will  say  it  might  have  been 
made  better  had  a  little  more  time  been  given  it. 


MAJOKITY  FOR  SEA  LEVEL  319 

The  Board  proceeded  to  the  Isthmus  and  made  a  careful 
study  of  the  canal  route.  At  first  the  majority  had  been 
opposed  to  the  sea-level  plan,  but  the  views  of  several  were 
quickly  changed  by  personal  inspection  of  the  route,  and 
on  November  18,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Board  in  Washington, 
after  its  return  from  Panama,  it  was  decided  by  a  vote  of 
8  to  5  to  recommend  a  canal  at  sea  level.  The  report  of  the 
majority  of  the  Board,  on  January  10,  1906,  was  signed  by 
Messrs.  Davis,  Parsons,  Burr,  Hunter,  Guerard,  Tincauzer, 
Welcker,  and  Quellennec.  It  was  largely  technical  in  char- 
acter, entering  into  minute  engineering  details.  Its  gist  was 
that  all  plans  involving  lift-locks,  whether  few  or  many, 
should  be  rejected  and  that  a  sea-level  plan  should  be 
adopted  "as  the  only  one  giving  reasonable  assurance  of 
safe  and  uninterrupted  navigation."  In  conclusion  this 
report  said : 

"It  is  the  belief  of  the  Board  that  the  essential  and  indis- 
pensable features  of  a  convenient  and  safe  ship  canal  at 
the  American  Isthmus  are  now  known;  that  such  a  canal 
can  be  constructed  in  twelve  or  thirteen  years'  time ;  that  the 
cost  will  be  less  than  |250,000,000 ;  that  it  will  endure  for 
all  time. 

"The  Board  does  not  believe  that  a  provisional  treatment 
of  this  great  question  would  yield  results  which  would  be 
satisfactory  to  the  American  nation  or  advantageous  to 
American  commerce,  or  that  such  treatment  would  be  in 
consonance  with  the  increase  of  population,  of  trade,  and  of 
wealth  which  will  surely  take  place  during  the  next  half 
century  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.'^ 

The  report  of  the  minority  of  the  Board  was  signed  by 
Messrs.  Abbot,  Noble,  Stearns,  Ripley,  and  Randolph.  It 
traversed  largely  the  same  ground  as  the  other,  but  differed 
from  it  in  estimates  of  cost  and  time,  and  concluded  as 
follows : 

"In  view  of  the  unquestioned  fact  that  the  lock  canal 
herein  advocated  will  cost  about  |100,000,000  less  than  the 
proposed  sea-level  canal;  believing  that  it  can  be  built  in 


320  REOKGANISATION 

much  less  time ;  that  it  will  afford  a  better  navigation ;  that 
it  will  be  adequate  for  all  its  uses  for  a  longer  time,  and  can 
be  enlarged,  if  need  should  arise,  with  greater  facility  and 
less  cost,  we  recommend  the  lock  canal  at  elevation  85  for 
adoption  by  the  United  States." 

Exception  may  properly  be  taken  to  the  phrase  "unques- 
tioned fact,"  applied  to  the  estimate  of  |100,000,000  differ- 
ence in  cost  between  the  two  plans,  seeing  that  the  majority 
report  estimated  that  difference  at  not  more  than  about 
^71,000,000. 

A  report  was  also  made  by  the  Chief  Engineer,  Mr. 
Stevens,  strongly  in  favour  of  a  lock  canal  at  high  level; 
going  to  such  an  extreme  as  to  declare  a  preference  for  such 
a  canal  even  if  one  at  sea  level  could  be  made  as  quickly  and 
as  cheaply.    Mr.  Stevens  said : 

"The  sum  of  my  conclusions  is,  that,  all  things  consid- 
ered, the  lock  or  high-level  canal  is  preferable  to  the  sea- 
level  type,  so  called,  for  the  following  reasons : 

"It  will  provide  as  safe  and  a  quicker  passage  for  ships, 
and,  therefore,  will  be  of  greater  capacity. 

"It  will  provide,  beyond  question,  the  best  solution  of  the 
vital  problem  of  how  safely  to  care  for  the  flood  waters  of 
the  Chagres  and  other  streams. 

"Provision  is  made  for  enlarging  its  capacity  to  almost 
any  extent  at  very  much  less  expense  of  time  and  money  than 
can  be  provided  for  by  any  sea-level  plan. 

"Its  cost  of  operation,  maintenance,  and  fixed  charges  will 
be  very  much  less  than  any  sea-level  canal. 

"The  time  and  cost  of  its  construction  will  be  not  one- 
half  that  of  a  canal  of  the  sea-level  type. 

"The  element  of  time  might  become,  in  case  of  war,  actual 
or  threatened,  one  of  such  importance  that  measured,  not  by 
years,  by  months,  or  even  days,  the  entire  cost  of  the  canal 
would  seem  trivial  in  comparison. 

"Finally,  even  at  the  same  cost  in  time  and  money  for  each 
type,  I  would  favour  the  adoption  of  the  high-level  lock- 
canal  plan  in  preference  to  that  of  the  proposed  sea-level 
canal." 

These  three  reports  were  submitted  to  the  Canal  Commis- 
sioners, all  of  whom  met  in  Washington  to  consider  them, 


COMMISSION  KEVERSES  ENGINEEES  321 

in  February,  1906.  After  due  deliberation  the  Commission- 
ers made  two  reports,  that  of  the  majority  agreeing  with  the 
minority  report  of  the  consulting  engineers,  and  the  minor- 
ity report  of  the  Commission  agreeing  with  the  majority 
report  of  the  engineers.  The  majority  report  was  signed 
by  Messrs.  Shonts,  Magoon,  Hains,  Ernst,  and  Harrod.  It 
admitted  that  the  ideal  canal  would  be  one  at  sea  level,  pro- 
vided it  were  made  of  sufficient  width;  but  it  declared  that 
the  cost  of  making  a  canal  of  such  dimensions  would  be 
prohibitive.  It,  therefore,  favoured  a  canal  with  locks,  at 
85  feet  level  above  the  sea,  saying : 

"It  appears  that  the  canal  proposed  by  the  minority  of 
the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  can  be  built  in  half  the 
time  and  a  little  more  than  half  the  cost  of  the  canal  pro- 
posed by  the  majority  of  the  board,  and  that  when  completed 
it  will  be  a  better  canal  for  the  following  reasons : 

"(1)  It  provides  greater  safety  for  ships  and  less  danger 
of  interruption  to  traffic  by  reason  of  its  wider  and  deeper 
channels. 

"(2)  It  provides  quicker  passage  across  the  Isthmus  for 
large  ships  or  a  large  traffic. 

"(3)  It  is  in  much  less  danger  of  damage  to  itself  or  of 
delays  to  ships  from  the  flood  waters  of  the  Chagres  and 
other  streams. 

"(4)  Its  cost  of  operation  and  maintenance,  including 
fixed  charges,  will  be  less  by  some  |2,000,000  or  more  per 
annum. 

''(5)  It  can  be  enlarged  hereafter  much  more  easily  and 
cheaply  than  can  a  sea-level  canal. 

"(6)  Its  military  defence  can  be  effected  with  as  little  or, 
perhaps,  less  difficulty  than  the  sea-level  canal. 

"(7)  It  is  our  opinion  that  the  plan  proposed  by  the 
minority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  is  a  most 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem  of  an  Isthmian  canal, 
and,  therefore,  we  recommend  that  the  plan  of  the  minority 
be  adopted." 

The  minority  report  was  signed  by  only  one  Commis- 
sioner, Rear-Admiral  Endicott,  and  its  conclusions  were  as 
follows : 


322  REOKGAOTSATION 

"The  undersigned  does  not  concur  in  the  preference  for  a 
lock  canal,  expressed  by  the  Commission,  but  regards  a  sea- 
level  canal,  as  proposed  by  the  majority  of  the  Board  of  Con- 
sulting Engineers,  a  better  canal  for  commercial  and  mili- 
tary purposes. 

"(1)  Because,  while  for  exceptionally  large  vessels,  such 
as  built  for  Atlantic  liners,  the  time  of  transit  might  be  as 
long  as,  or  longer  than,  in  the  lock  canal,  the  average  time 
of  transit  of  the  class  of  vessels  which  will  use  the  canal 
for  a  long  term  of  years  will  be  less  than  in  the  lock  canal. 

"(2)  Because  the  risks  of  interruption  to  traffic  from 
accident  are  deemed  greater  in  a  high-level  canal  with  six 
locks  than  in  a  sea-level  canal  with  a  tidal  lock,  notwith- 
standing the  greater  distance  in  the  latter  canal,  which 
might  be  obstructed  by  a  sunken  vessel. 

"(3)  Because  the  cost  of  maintenance  and  operation  of 
the  sea-level  canal  will  be  less. 

"(4)  Because  in  the  enlargements  to  accommodate  in- 
crease in  traffic  the  relative  advantages  of  the  sea-level  canal 
will  increase.    .    .    . 

"(5)  Because  it  is  a  better,  safer,  and  more  capacious 
canal  from  a  military  standpoint." 

All  these  reports  were  laid  before  the  Secretary  of  War, 
who  considered  them  carefully  and  then  transmitted  them  to 
the  President,  with  a  letter  of  recommendation.  In  that 
letter  he  recalled  the  fact  that  the  existing  act  of  Congress 
practically  fixed  the  minimum  dimensions  of  the  locks  (if 
any)  and  the  width  and  depth  of  the  canal,  by  the  require- 
ment that  the  canal  should  be  of  sufficient  capacity  for  the 
largest  vessels  afloat:  to  wit,  ships  800  feet  long,  88  feet 
beam,  and  38  feet  draught.  The  locks  proposed  in  the  high- 
level  plan  would  accommodate  such  vessels,  and  so  would 
the  entire  canal.  But  the  proposed  sea-level  plan  would 
not  meet  the  requirements.    Said  Mr.  Taft : 

"In  the  high-level  canal  a  vessel  of  the  dimensions  noted 
would  have,  with  the  exception  of  the  4.7  miles  where  the 
width  is  only  200  feet,  ample  lee-way  for  safe  navigation  and 
good  speed,  without  objectionable  currents  and  without  dif- 
ficulties at  the  points  Avhere  changes  in  course  are  necessary. 


ME.  TAFT  ON  CANAL  PLANS  323 

"With  the  proposed  sea-level  canal  conditions  are  differ- 
ent. The  depth  is  but  two  feet  greater  than  the  draught  of 
the  ship,  not  suflicient  to  permit  her  to  proceed  under  her 
own  steam,  except  at  great  risk;  twenty-one  miles  of  the 
canal  is  not  sufficiently  wide  for  two  such  ships  to  pass; 
currents  caused  by  the  regulation  of  the  Chagres  and  by  the 
flow  of  other  streams  into  the  canal,  and  its  many  curves, 
combine  to  increase  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  naviga- 
tion. In  short  the  sea-level  canal  recommended  is  'not  of 
suflScient  capacity  and  depth'  to  'afford  convenient  passage 
for  vessels  of  the  largest  tonnage  and  greatest  depth,'  and 
can  be  made  so  only  by  materially  increasing  the  depth  and 
width,  and  at  a  considerable  increase  of  time  and  money.  If 
the  suggested  width  of  150  to  200  feet  is  the  greatest  width 
economically  permissible  for  a  sea-level  canal,  the  cost  of  the 
enlargement  required  must  be  prohibitive. 

"It,  therefore,  follows  that  the  high-level  canal  more  fully 
meets  the  requirements  of  Congress." 

The  Secretary  further  discussed  the  questions  of  locks,  of 
speed  and  safety  of  navigation,  of  time  and  cost  of  construc- 
tion, and  others,  finally  recommending  the  adoption — with 
some  modifications — of  the  high-level  plans  of  the  minority 
of  the  engineers  and  the  majority  of  the  commissioners.  He 
said: 

"When  I  visited  the  Isthmus  a  year  and  a  half  ago  and 
went  over  the  site  and  talked  with  the  then  Chief  Engineer,  I 
received  a  strong  impression  that  the  work  of  construction 
upon  which  the  United  States  was  about  to  enter  was  of 
such  world-wide  importance  and  so  likely  to  continue  in 
active  use  for  centuries  to  come  that  it  was  wise  for  the 
government  not  to  be  impatient  of  the  time  to  be  taken  or 
of  the  treasure  to  be  spent.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  sea-level 
canal  was  necessarily  so  much  more  certain  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  the  world's  commerce  than  a  lock  canal  that 
both  time  and  money  might  well  be  sacrificed  to  achieve  the 
best  form,  and  this  feeling  was  emphasized  by  reading  the 
very  able  report  of  the  majority.  But  the  report  of  the 
minority,  in  showing  the  actual  result  of  the  use  of  the  locks 
in  ship  canals,  in  pointing  out  the  dangers  of  so  narrow  and 
contracted  a  canal  prism  as  that  which  the  majority  pro- 
poses, and  in  making  clear  the  great  additional  cost  in  time 


324  EEOKGANISATION 

and  money  of  a  sea-level  canal,  has  led  me  to  a  different 
conclusion." 

The  next  word  was  spoken  by  the  President.  On  February 
19,  1906,  he  referred  the  whole  matter  to  Congress  for  its 
final  decision,  accompanying  the  mass  of  reports  and  docu- 
ments with  a  brief  message,  in  which  he  declared  his  con- 
currence with  the  recommendation  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
In  the  message  he  said : 

"It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  is  no  question  of 
building  what  has  been  picturesquely  termed  'the  Straits  of 
Panama;'  that  is,  a  waterway  through  which  the  largest 
vessels  could  go  with  safety  at  uninterrupted  high  speed. 
Both  the  sea-level  canal  and  the  proposed  lock  canal  would 
be  too  narrow  and  shallow  to  be  called  with  any  truthful- 
ness a  strait,  or  to  have  any  of  the  properties  of  a  wide,  deep 
water  strip.  Both  of  them  would  be  canals,  pure  and  sim- 
ple. Each  type  has  certain  disadvantages  and  certain  advan- 
tages. But,  in  my  judgment,  the  disadvantages  are  fewer 
and  the  advantages  very  much  greater  in  the  case  of  a  lock 
canal  substantially  as  proposed  in  the  papers  forwarded 
herewith ;  and  a  careful  study  of  the  reports  seems  to  estab- 
lish a  strong  probability  that  the  following  are  the  facts: 
The  sea-level  canal  would  be  slightly  less  exposed  to  damage 
in  the  event  of  war;  the  running  expenses,  apart  from  the 
heavy  cost  of  interest  on  the  amount  employed  to  build  it, 
would  be  less ;  and  for  small  ships  the  time  of  transit  would 
probably  be  less.  On  the  other  hand,  the  lock  canal,  at  a 
level  of  80  feet  or  thereabouts,  would  not  cost  much  more 
than  half  as  much  to  build,  and  could  be  built  in  about  half 
the  time,  while  there  would  be  very  much  less  risk  connected 
with  building  it,  and  for  large  ships  the  transit  would  be 
quicker;  while,  taking  into  account  the  interest  on  the 
amount  saved  in  building,  the  actual  cost  of  maintenance 
would  be  less.  After  being  built,  it  would  be  easier  to 
enlarge  the  lock  canal  than  the  sea-level  canal. 

"The  law  now  on  our  statute  books  seems  to  contemplate 
a  lock  canal.  In  my  judgment  a  lock  canal,  as  herein  rec- 
ommended, is  advisable.  If  the  Congress  directs  that  a  sea- 
level  canal  be  constructed  its  direction  will,  of  course,  be 
carried  out.  Otherwise,  the  canal  will  be  built  on  substan- 
tially the  plan  for  a  lock  canal  outlined  in  the  accompanying 


HIGH-LEVEL  PLAN  CHOSEN  325 

papers,  such  changes  being  made,  of  course,  as  may  be  found 
actually  necessary." 

The  question  of  the  plan  of  the  canal  was  thus  left  with 
Congress  for  final  determination,  and  that  body,  at  the  close 
of  its  session  in  June,  1906,  decided  in  favour  of  a  high-level 
lock  canal,  substantially  on  the  lines  suggested  by  the  minor- 
ity of  the  Advisory  Board  and  by  the  majority  of  the  Canal 
Commission. 


CHAPTER  XYIII 

THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

It  was  realised  by  judicious  observers  at  the  outset  of  the 
Isthmian  canal  enterprise  that  the  work  of  sanitation  was 
of  supreme  importance,  and  especially  the  elimination  of 
yellow  fever,  which,  if  not  the  most  destructive  of  diseases 
there,  was  decidedly  the  most  terrifying  and  demoralising. 
Nearly  a  century  before,  Humboldt  had  written  that  yellow 
fever  and  other  diseases  at  Panama  were  due  to  the  marine 
plants,  mollusks,  etc.,  on  the  beach  at  low  tide,  exposed  to 
the  heat  of  the  sun,  while  on  the  Caribbean  coast,  at  Porto 
Bello  and  elsewhere,  bilious  fever  was  due  to  putrescent 
emanations  from  rank  vegetation.  The  world  knows  better 
than  that  now,  having  learned  of  the  bacterial  nature  of 
those  diseases  and  of  the  part  played  by  certain  varieties  of 
mosquitoes  in  propagating  them — the  Stegomyia  yellow 
fever  and  the  Anopheles  malaria.  The  attention  of  sanitari- 
ans at  Panama  was,  therefore,  given  largely  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  those  insects,  and  to  the  guarding  of  non-immune 
people  against  their  bites.  In  his  address  to  the  members 
of  the  Canal  Commission,  on  their  entrance  upon  their  duties 
in  the  spring  of  1904,  President  Roosevelt  said : 

"There  is  one  matter  to  which  I  wish  to  ask  your  special 
attention — the  question  of  sanitation  and  hygiene.  You  will 
take  measures  to  secure  the  best  medical  experts  for  this 
l)urpose  whom  you  can  obtain,  and  you  will,  of  course,  make 
the  contractors  submit  as  implicitly  as  your  own  employees 
to  all  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  medical  department 
under  you." 

It  was  remembered  that  epidemic  diseases  had  been  among 
the  most  formidable  of  the  difficulties  which  the  French 

326 


STATISTICS  OF  MOETALITY  327 

companies  had  encountered  on  the  Isthmus,  though  there 
was  encouragement  in  the  fact  that  conditions  had  generally 
improved  since  the  beginning  of  De  Lesseps's  enterprise.  To 
that  effect  some  statistics  may  be  cited  from  Dr.  Lacroisade, 
who  was  for  many  years  director  of  the  great  French  hospi- 
tal at  Ancon  Hill,  Panama.  From  1881  to  1888  under  the 
original  company  the  number  of  employees  averaged  10,854, 
and  the  mean  yearly  percentage  of  disease  was  62.58,  and 
of  mortality  5.97  (though  for  a  time  there  was  the  appalling 
death  rate  of  60  per  cent,  a  year) .  From  1889  to  1894,  under 
the  receivership,  the  average  number  of  men  was  only  971 
and  the  percentage  of  disease  was  49.68,  and  of  mortality 
2.88.  Under  the  new  French  company,  from  1895  to  1901  the 
number  of  men  averaged  2,703,  and  the  percentage  of  disease 
was  37.17,  and  of  mortality  2.61.  Moreover,  of  this  last  mor- 
tality percentage,  2.61,  European  diseases  amounted  to  2.10, 
and  characteristic  tropical  diseases  to  only  0.51.  From  1892 
to  1897  there  was  no  yellow  fever  on  the  Isthmus.  With 
these  figures  before  them,  it  behooved  the  American  admin- 
istrators to  improve,  if  possible,  upon  the  record. 

As  early  as  January  7,  1904,  Mr.  Buchanan,  the  American 
Minister  to  Panama,  conferred  \tith  Rear- Admiral  Glass,  in 
command  of  the  United  States  ships  at  Panama,  concerning 
measures  to  prevent  the  importation  of  disease  from  Ecua- 
dorean  or  other  South  American  ports,  and  two  days  later 
he  wrote  to  Senor  Espriella,  the  Panaman  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  congratulating  him  upon  the  fact  that  there 
then  existed  upon  the  Isthmus  no  case  of  yellow  fever,  small- 
pox, or  bubonic  plague,  and  suggesting  an  active  and  inti- 
mate cooperation  of  Panaman  and  American  authorities  for 
the  preservation  of  that  immunity.  To  this  Senor  Espriella 
responded  cordially,  and  the  practical  work  of  hospital 
reorganisation  and  quarantine  improvement  was  promptly 
begun.  The  Provisional  Board  of  Government  of  Panama  on 
January  21  issued  a  decree  imposing  severe  penalties  upon 
all  physicians  and  pharmacists  who  should  fail  at  once  to 
report  to  the  National  Board  of  Hygiene  any  cases  of  con- 


328  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

tagions  diseases  coming  under  their  notice.  Nevertheless,  a 
few  cases  of  yellow  fever  presently  appeared.  Two  deaths 
from  that  disease  occurred  in  the  hospital  of  San  Tomas, 
Panama,  on  January  15,  and  other  cases  occurred  at  inter- 
vals during  the  year.  On  July  1,  1904,  the  American  sani- 
tary officers  assumed  charge  of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  from 
that  date  to  December  20  following  there  were  ten  cases  of 
yellow  fever,  of  which  two  resulted  fatally.  Four  of  these 
cases  occurred  in  the  first  two  weeks  of  December,  and  two 
of  them  were  known  to  Secretary  Taft  and  his  party  on 
their  visit  to  Panama  at  that  time.  Secretary  Taft  was, 
indeed,  greeted  on  his  arrival  with  the  fearsome  whisper 
that  a  case  or  two  had  just  occurred.  No  public  proclama- 
tion was  made  of  the  fact,  for  fear  of  creating  a  panic,  but 
the  fact  was  perfectly  well  known  to  the  visitors,  and  was 
variously  regarded.  Some  were  frightened,  while  others 
pooh-poohed  and  scorned  the  idea  that  yellow  fever  could 
make  any  serious  headway  under  American  administration. 
But  it  did  make  headway.  Week  by  week  new  cases  oc- 
curred, steadily  increasing  in  numbers.  The  rainy  season 
came  on,  making  almost  every  square  foot  of  the  wretched 
cobblestone  pavements  a  breeding  ground  for  the  Stegomyia. 
To  make  the  situation  worse,  many  of  the  streets  were  torn 
up  for  the  laying  of  sewers  and  water-mains,  and,  under  the 
torrential  tropic  rains,  were  transformed  into  sluggish  rivers 
of  mud.  Meantime  demoralisation  grew  apace  in  the  minds 
of  the  American  colony.  Among  many  fear  and  fright 
developed  into  absolute  panic.  As  for  those  who  had  for- 
merly scoffed,  they  assumed  a  cynical  bravado  and  fatalism. 
The  refrain  of  their  daily  song  was  the  old 

'*  One  cup  for  the  dead  already, 
And  hurrah  for  the  next  that  dies  1  '* 

They  professed  contempt  for  the  mosquito  theory,  and 
ostentatiously  tore  holes  in  the  nettings  which  had  been 
placed  over  the  windows  of  the  canal  building,  or  removed 
them  altogether,  and  disregarded  all  the  sanitary  precau- 


CAUSES  OF  DEMOKAIJSATION  329 

tions  and  regulations  which  had  been  prescribed  by  the 
health  officers. 

It  would  be  ungracious  to  dwell  in  too  great  detail  or  with 
too  much  emphasis  upon  responsibility  for  this  state  of 
affairs.  Careful  investigation  and  conservative  considera- 
tion warrant,  however,  the  charging  of  it  chiefly  to  two 
causes.  One  was,  the  failure  of  the  Canal  Commission  to 
support  the  efforts  of  the  sanitary  officers  with  the  prompt- 
ness and  liberality  which  were  required  if  those  efforts  were 
to  be  in  the  highest  degree  successful.  There  was  too  much 
^'red  tape."  Those  sanitary  officers  were  in  the  positions  of 
army  officers  on  the  firing  line.  It  was  necessary  that  they 
should  have  all  the  arms  and  munitions  of  sanitary  war- 
fare that  they  wanted,  and  should  have  them  right  away. 
The  enforced  waiting  for  weeks  or  months  sometimes  meant 
disaster.  It  is  not  for  a  moment  to  be  supposed  the  Canal 
Commissioners  were  careless  in  the  matter.  They  were  as 
desirous  as  anybody  that  the  fever  should  be  suppressed  and 
the  sanitary  conditions  of  the  Isthmus  should  be  improved. 
But  at  Washington  they  did  not  and  could  not  realise  the 
urgency  of  the  case  as  fully  as  did  the  men  at  Colon  and 
Panama.  Moreover,  they  were  under  the  restraint  of  caution 
lest  they  should  be  charged  with  looseness  of  business  meth- 
ods and  with  opening  the  door  to  "graft."  In  former  years 
the  name  of  Panama  had  been  synonymous  with  scandal  and 
corruption.  These  men  proposed  to  avoid  a  repetition  of 
that  state  of  affairs,  and  if  in  doing  so  they  erred,  they  erred 
on  the  side  of  caution. 

The  other  cause  of  trouble  was,  the  haste  of  the  American 
nation  to  have  the  canal  built.  Because  of  that  heedless 
haste,  the  cart  was  put  before  the  horse.  The  canal  work 
was  begun  before  essential  preparations  for  it  were  complete. 
This  should  have  been  realised  at  the  outset.  In  its  original 
bargain  with  the  new-born  Republic  of  Panama  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal,  the  United  States  Government  con- 
tracted to  do  a  vast  work  of  sanitation  in  the  cities  of  Pan- 
ama and  Colon  and  in  the  whole  stretch  of  country  between 


330  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

them.  It  undertook  to  create  in  them  a  sewer  system,  a 
water  supply  system,  and  civilised  street  pavements,  and  to 
do  its  utmost  to  destroy  the  Anopheles  and  Stegomyia  mos- 
quitoes, so  as  to  banish  malarial  and  yellow  fevers.  It  was 
not  through  pure  benevolence  to  Panama  that  the  United 
States  undertook  such  tasks,  but  in  order  to  facilitate  and 
expedite  the  construction  of  the  canal ;  for  it  was  seen  that, 
if  the  canal  was  to  be  built,  the  Isthmus  must  be  rendered 
fit  for  the  builders  to  live  in.  There  were  those  then  who 
thought  this  preparatory  work  of  sanitation  should  be  done 
first,  and  that  nobody  should  be  set  to  work  on  the  canal 
until  yellow  fever  had  been  completely  stamped  out,  as  it 
had  been  years  before  in  Cuba — under  the  direction  of  the 
same  health  officer,  Colonel  Gorgas,  who  is  now  in  charge  at 
Panama.  But  the  popular  impatience  for  the  canal,  and 
the  President's  desire  "to  make  the  dirt  fly,"  were  too  strong 
to  be  at  once  resisted.  The  work  of  sanitation  was  begun, 
but  without  waiting  for  it  to  be  completed  several  thousand 
men  were  also  set  at  work  upon  the  canal.  The  result  was 
not  exactly  disastrous,  but  it  was  deplorable  and  demor- 
alising. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  May,  1905,  when  Governor  Magoon 
arrived  upon  the  scene,  may  be  summed  up  in  three  words — 
panic,  lethargy,  bravado;  and  the  three  together  meant 
demoralisation.  In  that  month  there  were  thirty-eight  cases 
of  fever  on  the  Isthmus,  with  a  threat  of  a  large  increase  in 
June.  Governor  Magoon  arrived  on  May  25,  and  it  did  not 
take  him  long  to  perceive  two  things.  One  was  that  the  first 
supreme  and  necessitous  duty  of  the  administration  was  to 
get  rid  of  yellow  fever,  whether  a  single  spadeful  of  earth 
was  dug  on  the  canal  or  not.  The  other  was  that  the  first 
step  toward  getting  rid  of  the  fever  must  be  to  restore  the 
public  mind — that  of  the  non-immune  Americans,  especially 
— to  sanity.  He  began  by  frankly  and  publicly  declaring 
that  he,  personally,  was  afraid  of  the  fever,  and  that  in  his 
opinion  all  nonimmunes  who  professed  not  to  be  afraid  were 
"talking  rot!"    Then  he  ordered  all  the  window  screens  to 


West,  Photo. 
CHARLES  E.  MAGOON, 
Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  American  Minister  to  Panama  in  1905-6. 


GOVEKNOR  MAGOON  TAKES  HOLD      331 

be  repaired  and  replaced  and  kept  in  place,  and  announced 
that  if  any  man  was  caught  leaving  them  open  or  tearing 
holes  in  them,  something  uncommonly  unpleasant  would 
happen  to  him.  Now,  when  a  man  of  Judge  Magoon's  mental 
and  physical  stature  admits  that  he  is  afraid,  any  lesser  man 
is  a  fool  to  say  he  isn't ;  and  when  a  man  of  Judge  Magoon's 
resolution  gives  an  order  and  prescribes  a  penalty  for  its 
violation,  that  order  is  very  likely  to  be  obeyed.  In  this  case 
it  was,  and  there  was  an  end  to  the  cheap  bravado  that  had 
proved  so  costly. 

The  next  step,  promptly  taken,  was  destruction  of  all 
mosquitoes  possible  by  fumigation.  They  began  with  the 
canal  building  in  Panama.  It  was  thoroughly  fumigated  on 
the  first  Sunday  after  the  Governor's  arrival,  and  every  sec- 
ond Sunday  thereafter  for  some  months,  when  the  interval 
was  increased  to  three  weeks.  But  that  was  not  enough. 
There  were  probably  many  infected  mosquitoes  in  other 
buildings  throughout  the  city,  which  must  be  destroyed.  In 
Havana,  Colonel  Gorgas  had  followed  the  rule  of  disinfect- 
ing three  houses  for  every  case  of  fever:  to  wit,  the  house 
in  which  it  had  occurred  and  the  house  on  each  side  of  it. 
That  practice  was  effective  there.  But  Havana  is  a  thousand 
miles  further  north  than  Panama,  and  has  a  winter  climate 
which  is  fatal  to  the  delicate  Stegomyia.  No  such  aid  from 
nature  was  possible  on  the  Isthmus,  wherefore  artifice  must 
be  more  energetic.  The  heroic  plan  was,  therefore,  conceived 
of  fumigating  and  disinfecting  every  building  in  the  city  of 
Panama!  It  was  at  first  hoped  to  do  this  enormous  work 
within  twelve  days,  the  period  of  yellow  fever's  incubation 
in  the  Stegomyia,  but  this  was  found  to  be  impossible,  and 
the  time  actually  required  was  more  than  thirty  days;  but 
it  seems  probable  that  the  work  was  just  as  effective  as 
though  it  had  been  accomplished  in  the  shorter  time.  As 
an  illustration  of  the  energy  and  expedition  with  which 
Isthmian  affairs  were  then  administered,  it  may  be  recalled 
that  Governor  Magoon  had  to  send  to  Washington  for 
material  and  appliances  for  the  work.    He  did  so  by  tele- 


332  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

graph,  and  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  filing  of  his 
despatch  the  supplies  were  shipped  and  on  their  way  to 
Panama.  There  was  a  time  when  it  would  have  taken  nearer 
forty-eight  days. 

It  was  evident  to  Governor  Magoon,  also,  that  the  efforts 
of  the  Health  Department  had  been  for  some  reason  not  as 
effective  as  they  should  have  been  under  so  admirable  a  staff 
as  that  of  Colonel  Gorgas  and  with  so  excellent  a  hospital 
equipment,  and  he  set  about  discovering  where  the  fault  lay. 
It  was  found  in  the  system  of  reporting  cases  of  fever.  In  a 
majority  of  cases  the  patients  were  ill  four  or  five  days 
before  they  were  taken  to  the  hospital  or  isolated  and 
screened.  Now,  the  first  three  or  four  days  of  the  fever  are 
the  very  time  in  which  mosquitoes  are  most  surely  infected 
through  biting  the  patient.  Immediate  isolation  is,  there- 
fore, of  the  utmost  importance.  .  But  here  these  patients  had 
been  left  exposed  to  the  bites  of  mosquitoes  during  that  crit- 
ical period,  the  time  of  all  times  when  they  should  have 
been  under  screens.  What  was  the  cause  of  such  laxity?  It 
appeared  that  the  health  oflBcers  had  not  sufficient  means  at 
their  disposal  to  employ  expert  inspectors,  and  were,  there- 
fore, compelled  to  depend  for  information  upon  voluntary 
reports  of  patients  or  their  families,  and  upon  reports  from 
ordinary  inexpert  workmen  who  were  engaged  in  cleansing 
water  tanks  and  similar  work.  No  wonder,  under  these  con- 
ditions, that  the  fever  was  constantly  spreading.  Governor 
Magoon  changed  all  that  in  a  twinkling.  He  employed  eight 
native  Panaman  physicians  as  sanitary  inspectors,  selecting, 
with  the  valuable  aid  of  President  Amador,  who  is  a  dis- 
tinguished authority  on  yellow  fever  and  other  tropical 
diseases,  those  who  were  most  familiar  with  yellow  fever 
and  who  would  be  most  likely  to  recognise  it  in  its  earliest 
stages.  Then  he  divided  the  whole  city  of  Panama  into  eight 
districts,  and  assigned  one  of  these  physicians  to  each  dis- 
trict, with  orders  to  make  a  thorough  inspection  of  every 
house  in  it  every  day.  That  was  thorough  inspection  with  a 
In  addition,  these  physicians  were  directed  to 


A  SCHOOL  OF  SANITATIOK  333 

act  as  missionaries  and  teachers,  explaining  to  the  people 
the  mosquito  theory,  and  impressing  upon  them  the  impor- 
tance of  hearty  and  constant  cooperation  with  the  American 
authorities  in  sanitation.  The  employment  of  native  Pan- 
aman  physicians  for  this  purpose  was  a  tactful  device  and 
obviated  friction  and  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  people. 

Colonel  Gorgas  also  organised  a  practical  school  of  sani- 
tation for  the  employees  of  his  department,  both  inspectors 
and  workmen,  to  teach  them  what  was  to  be  done  and  why 
it  must  be  done,  and  to  enable  them  in  turn  to  explain  mat- 
ters to  the  people.  Then  the  whole  city  was  thoroughly  gone 
over,  with  a  view  to  destroying  all  Stegomyia  larvae  which 
might  be  found  in  water  tanks  or  other  vessels,  and  either 
abolishing  the  receptacles  or  screening  them  so  thoroughly 
that  no  more  mosquitoes  could  get  access  to  them.  The 
Panamans  are  generally  immune  against  yellow  fever,  and 
many  of  them  had  no  faith  in,  if  even  knowledge  of,  the 
mosquito  theory;  and  so  they  were  disinclined  to  take  the 
trouble  to  screen  the  tanks  and  to  replace  the  screens  care- 
fully every  time  they  were  removed  to  get  at  the  water.  Tact 
and  patience,  however,  in  time  overcame  this  difficulty  and 
secured  the  hearty  and  efficient  cooperation  of  the  people  of 
Panama.  This  achievement  was,  of  course,  greatly  promoted 
by  the  introduction  of  a  new  water  supply  and  the  conse- 
quent abolition  of  the  old  tanks  and  cisterns.  Governor 
Magoon  at  an  early  date  withdrew  the  workmen  from  the 
canal  and  concentrated  all  efforts  upon  the  waterworks  and 
sewers,  with  happy  results.  By  July  4,  the  principal  water 
main  was  extendea  as  far  as  the  Cathedral  Plaza,  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  city,  and  on  that  day  the  water  was  turned  on 
for  public  use.  It  was  supplied  freely  from  street  hydrants 
until  plumbing  connections  were  made  with  the  houses.  In 
addition,  as  a  temporary  measure,  until  the  mains  could  be 
extended  to  all  parts  of  the  city,  ten  large  ^'water  wagons" 
were  employed  to  go  about  the  city,  distributing  water  freely 
to  all  who  could  not  get  it  from  the  hydrants.  With  such 
facilities  afforded  to  the  people,  it  was  possible  to  proceed 


334  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVEE 

vigorously  with  the  work  of  destroying  water  barrels  and 
tanks  and  filling  up  wells  and  underground  cisterns.  Before 
the  end  of  the  year  fully  nineteen-twentieths  of  such  water 
receptacles  which  had  existed  in  Panama  had  been  destroyed. 
Meantime,  a  careful  watch  was  kept  on  all  the  streets  of  the 
city  for  the  immediate  removal  and  destruction  of  all  empty 
cans,  bottles,  etc.,  which,  holding  a  little  water,  might  serve 
as  mosquito  nests,  and  the  filling  up,  drainage,  or  treating 
with  oil  or  disinfectants  of  all  pools  and  puddles  of  water. 
In  this  way  it  was  made  practically  impossible  for  the 
Stcgomyia  to  be  propagated  in  Panama.  A  similar  work 
was  performed  in  Colon  and  in  the  various  villages  along 
the  line  of  the  railroad  and  canal. 

Statistics  show  the  results  of  this  policy.  I  have  said 
that  in  May,  1905,  there  were  thirty-eight  cases  and  more 
were  expected  in  June.  They  came,  of  course,  because  the 
results  of  former  neglect  were  then  to  be  reaped,  and  there 
was  not  time  for  the  results  of  the  new  policy,  which  dates 
from  Governor  Magoon's  arrival  on  May  25,  to  appear.  In 
June  there  were  sixty-two  cases  and  Governor  Magoon,  with- 
out losing  faith  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of  his  and  Colonel 
Gorgas's  policy,  seriously  considered  the  question  of  tem- 
porarily removing  the  entire  non-immune  population  of  Pan- 
ama from  the  city,  and  placing  it  upon  the  beautiful  and 
salubrious  island  of  Taboga,  in  the  bay.  It  is  probable  that 
the  whole  clerical  force  of  the  canal  administration,  at  least, 
would  thus  have  been  transferred  had  the  buildings  on 
Taboga  been  in  proper  condition  to  receive  it.  As  it  was, 
this  step  was  not  taken  and  was  soon  seen  not  to  be  needed. 
In  July  the  number  of  cases  decreased  to  forty-two,  and  a 
general  feeling  of  encouragement  arose.  In  August  the  num- 
ber fell  to  twenty-seven  and  victory  was  within  sight.  In 
September  the  disease  came  to  an  end,  with  a  total  of  only 
six  cases.  The  last  case  in  Colon  occurred  on  August  27, 
and  the  last  case  in  the  city  of  Panama  on  September  14. 
The  last  case  anywhere  in  the  Canal  Zone  occurred  at  the 
village  of  Matachin,  on  September  29,  where  I  think  the 


THE  TRIUMPH  OF  SANITATION  335 

fever  had  never  been  known  before.  The  case  was  obviously 
an  adventitious  one,  imported  by  some  remote  chance,  but 
to  guard  against  even  the  slightest  danger  of  its  duplication, 
the  whole  village  was  literally  saturated  with  disinfectants, 
so  that  a  Stegomyia  flying  over  it  would  probably  have 
dropped  dead. 

Thus  "Finis"  was  written  to  the  story  of  yellow  fever  in 
Panama.  For  some  weeks  Colonel  Gorgas  with  Governor 
Magoon's  sanction  publicly  and  conspicuously  advertised  a 
reward  of  $50  in  gold  to  any  one  not  connected  with  the 
Health  Department  who  should  report  a  case  of  the  fever  in 
the  Canal  Zone  or  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  but 
nobody  claimed  the  reward.  The  offer,  was  not,  of  course, 
made  in  any  spirit  of  bravado  or  vainglory.  It  was  intended 
to  serve  two  exceedingly  important  and  practical  purposes. 
One  was  to  reassure  the  minds  of  all  nonimmunes  and  put  a 
final  quietus  upon  the  demoralisation  which  had  recently 
existed.  The  other  was  to  inspire  the  utmost  vigilance 
among  all  people,  to  transform  every  member  of  the  poula- 
tion  into  an  amateur  sanitary  detective,  and  thus  to  secure 
for  the  health  officers  the  earliest  possible  information  of 
any  suspicious  case  of  illness;  for  now  that  yellow  fever  is 
actually  suppressed  every  sanitarian  will  appreciate  the 
supreme  necessity  of  guarding  against  the  spread  of  infec- 
tion from  any  solitary  sporadic  case  which  may  occur. 

The  completeness  of  the  triumph  of  sanitation  may  be 
estimated  from  the  fact  that  in  August,  1905,  the  month  in 
which  yellow  fever  was  practically  subdued,  the  death  rate 
in  the  Canal  Zone  was  only  25  to  the  thousand  yearly,  which 
is  little  more  than  that  of  many  of  our  northern  cities,  and 
vastly  less  than  that  of  many  tropical  and  semi-tropical  com- 
munities. The  death  rate  of  Alexandria,  Egypt,  is  about  35, 
that  of  Cairo  is  nearly  38,  that  of  Calcutta  is  30,  that  of 
Madras  is  38,  and  that  of  Bombay  is  55.  Panama  is  a  sani- 
tarium compared  with  those  places.  In  1904  the  death  rate 
of  Dublin  and  its  suburbs  was  23.3,  of  Breslau  23.5,  of  Mos- 
cow 27.6,  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  22,  of  St.  Petersburg  23.7,  of 


336  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

Trieste  25.8,  of  Venice  22.2,  of  Liverpool  22.6,  of  New 
Orleans  21.5,  and  of  New  York  22.6.  Compared  with  these 
the  rate  of  25  at  Panama  is  highly  creditable.  In  that  same 
month  of  August,  1905,  out  of  12,000  workmen  in  the  Canal 
Zone,  only  301  entered  the  hospitals.  That  fact  compares 
well  with  conditions  in  almost  any  industrial  community. 

Nor  is  the  work  of  sanitation  by  any  means  complete,  nor 
is  the  death  rate  reduced  as  low  as  we  may  hope  it  will  soon 
be.  Down  to  the  beginning  of  1906  there  had  been,  in  the 
Canal  Zone,  less  than  an  acre  of  swamp  actually  filled  in, 
and  about  145  acres  drained;  three  and  a  half  miles  of  new 
ditches  dug,  and  less  than  30  miles  of  old  ditches  cleaned 
and  paved ;  and  about  412  acres  of  grass  and  jungle  cut  and 
burned.  These  achievements  were  only  a  scratching  of  the 
surface,  only  a  beginning  of  the  work  which  is  to  redeem 
Panama  from  pestilence  and  make  it  as  healthful  as  it  is 
beautiful. 

Much  was  promptly  done  by  the  reorganised  Commis- 
sion in  1905  for  the  general  welfare  of  the  staff,  employees, 
and  residents  of  the  Canal  Zone,  apart  from,  and  in  addition 
to,  the  works  of  sanitation.  Reading  rooms,  club  rooms, 
gymnasiums,  and  other  places  of  social  entertainment  and 
recreation  were  provided.  They  had  been  much  needed,  for 
the  Zone  was  formerly  quite  destitute  of  such  things.  Still 
more  important  was  the  supplying  of  food.  Governor 
Magoon,  upon  his  arrival  at  the  Isthmus,  quickly  perceived 
that  this  was  a  matter  of  supreme  and  vital  interest,  and 
he  quickly  set  about  the  task  of  dealing  with  it.  There  was 
no  hope  of  getting  satisfactory  supplies,  at  reasonable  prices, 
on  the  Isthmus.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  natives  never 
look  beyond  their  present  necessities,  no  surplus  food  supply 
ever  accumulates.  This  normal  condition  of  no  surplus  was 
greatly  intensified  by  the  almost  total  failure  of  the  crops 
for  the  two  preceding  years,  by  the  abandonment  by  agricul- 
tural labourers  of  their  farms  back  in  the  hills  for  work  on 
the  canal,  where  they  received  higher  pay  for  shorter  hours, 
and  by  quarantine  against  the  port  of  Panama  on  account 


ESTABLISHING  COMMISSARIES  337 

of  bubonic  plague,  which  prevented  the  arrival  of  foodstuff 
from  neighbouring  provinces.  The  Commission  was  thus 
brought  face  to  face  with  the  problem  of  feeding  17,000  men 
with  the  base  of  supplies  2,000  miles  away. 

Governor  Magoon  soon  arranged  to  open  local  commis- 
sary stores  at  every  important  labour  camp,  to  provide  mess 
houses,  and  to  furnish  food,  both  cooked  and  uncooked,  to 
all  employees  at  cost.  Orders  were  sent  by  cable  to  have 
the  Commission's  steamers  equipped  with  refrigerating 
plants,  arrangements  were  made  for  the  erection  of  a  tem- 
porary cold  storage  plant  at  Colon,  and  refrigerator  cars 
were  purchased  for  immediate  shipment  to  the  Isthmus,  thus 
establishing  a  line  of  refrigeration  from  the  markets  of  the 
United  States  to  the  commissary  stations  of  the  Isthmus. 
The  equipment  in  existing  hotels  was  also  purchased  from 
individuals  lessees  and  their  management  assumed  by  the 
Commission.  The  net  result  of  these  efforts  is  that  to-day 
all  employees  have  an  opportunity  to  obtain  an  abundant 
supply  of  wholesome  food,  cooked  and  uncooked,  at  reason- 
able prices.  The  silver  men — that  is,  the  common  labourers 
— are  being  fed  for  30  cents  a  day,  and  the  gold  employees 
— that  is,  those  of  the  higher  class — at  90  cents  per  day, 
and  they  get  good  food  in  place  of  bad. 

I  have  related  the  story  of  the  commissaries  thus  briefly, 
chiefly  in  the  words  of  the  Commission's  own  report.  It 
should  be  added  that  the  people  of  Panama  at  first  strongly 
protested  against  the  arrangement,  fearing  it  would  deprive 
them  of  a  profitable  market  for  their  wares;  but  Governor 
Magoon  diplomatically  argued  the  point  with  them  and  rec- 
onciled them  to  the  new  order  of  things,  on  the  ground  that 
it  would  be  better  for  them  to  have  the  canal  constructed 
promptly  than  to  have  it  delayed  in  order  to  retain  a  market 
for  their  produce  at  exorbitant  prices.  Mr.  Shouts  then 
made  a  contract  with  a  leading  railroad  and  hotel  caterer  of 
the  United  States  to  undertake  the  work  of  feeding  all  the 
employees  in  the  Zone;  but  before  anything  material  was 
done  to  execute  it  the  contract  was  cancelled  and  the  com- 


338  THE  FIGHT  WITH  FEVER 

missary  department  remained  under  the  direct  charge  of  the 
Commission. 

A  victory  was  won  for  morals  and  thrift  in  the  Canal 
Zone,  in  September,  1905,  when  the  first  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  Zone  was  rendered.  The  purport  of 
that  decision  was  to  confirm  the  validity  of  Act  No.  4  of 
the  Canal  Zone  laws,  under  which  the  conducting  of  a  public 
gambling  place  is  made  a  penal  offence.  A  man  was  charged 
with  running  a  roulette  table.  He  did  not  deny  the  fact,  but 
claimed  a  right  to  maintain  the  place  under  a  concession 
from  the  Republic  of  Panama.  The  Circuit  Court  overruled 
his  plea  and  found  him  guilty,  sentencing  him  to  a  fine  of 
f  100  and  thirty  days'  imprisonment.  He  made  appeal  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  which  unanimously  affirmed  the  decree  of 
the  lower  court,  with  a  modification  of  the  sentence.  It  was 
^eld  by  this  decision  that  under  the  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  United 
States  has  full  control  of  the  Canal  Zone,  just  as  though  it 
were  the  actual  sovereign  of  that  territory,  free  from  all 
anterior  obligations  or  concessions  of  any  kind,  and  has  also 
full  power  to  legislate  for  the  Zone.  If  any  concession  holder 
is  aggrieved  by  such  exercise  of  authority  by  the  United 
States,  his  remedy  is  in  action  against  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama, and  not  against  the  United  States.  The  prohibition 
of  gambling  within  the  Zone  was  within  the  legal  power  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  under  the  treaty  and  under 
the  act  of  Congress  constituting  the  Commission,  and  is 
therefore  valid.  The  effect  of  this  decision  was  most  salu- 
tary. Gambling  had  long  been  one  of  the  chief  vices  of  Pan- 
ama. It  was  one  of  the  worst  features  of  the  regime  of  the 
French  canal  companies.  The  purveyor  of  lottery  tickets 
and  the  tout  for  gambling  dens  dogged  the  heels  of  the  pay- 
master, and  a  large  share  of  the  wages  paid  went  quickly 
into  the  pockets  of  professional  gamblers.  It  is  now  deter- 
mined that  there  shall  be  no  more  gambling  within  the  limits 
of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  that  means  that  there  will  be  none 
within  reach  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  canal  employees. 


KULES  AND  KEGULATIONS  339 

This  is  a  gratifying  assurance  for  morals,  for  industry,  and 
for  thrift,  and  it  will  serve  as  another  of  those  valuable 
object  lessons  which  Americans  are  giving  to  the  Panamans, 
and  which  the  latter,  it  is  encouraging  to  observe,  appreciate 
and  use  to  their  own  profit. 

Early  in  1906  two  more  decisions  were  made  with  a  view 
to  facilitating  and  expediting  the  work  of  canal  construc- 
tion. One  was  made  on  January  8,  by  the  President,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  Chairman  of  the  Canal  Commission, 
the  Chief  Engineer,  and  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission, to  the  effect  that  the  civil  service  rules  and  regula- 
tions, devised  for  use  in  the  United  States,  should  not  apply 
in  Panama,  in  the  employment  of  what  were  termed  in  a 
general  way  "outside  men," — that  is,  track  layers,  skilled 
labourers,  foremen,  etc.  To  other  classes  of  employees, 
stenographers,  clerks,  bookkeepers,  and  other  "inside  men," 
the  rules  were  to  continue  to  apply.  The  other  decision  was 
made  by  Congress,  a  month  later ;  to  the  effect  that  the  eight- 
hour  labour  law  should  no  longer  be  enforced  upon  the  Isth- 
mus. It  was  recognised  that  that  law,  devised  for  the  bene- 
fit of  American  labourers  in  America,  was  not  suited  to  the 
conditions  at  Panama,  where  the  labourers  were  nearly  all 
aliens,  who  had  never  even  heard  of  the  eight-hour  law  before 
and  who  had  no  desire  for  its  application.  The  enforcement 
of  that  law  would,  therefore,  benefit  nobody  and  please 
nobody,  but  would  greatly  delay  the  completion  of  the  canal 
and  increase  its  cost. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

STULTILOQUENTIA 

The  progeny  of  Gifted  Hopkins  is  numerous  and  vocifer- 
ous. There  is  no  important  subject  upon  which  much  non- 
sense is  not  spoken,  and  there  is  no  great  work  concerning 
which  there  are  not  counsels  of  folly.  In  most  cases  we  may 
perhaps  concede  these  to  have  been  the  output  of  honest 
ignorance,  or  of  that  intrepidity  and  precipitancy  of  judg- 
ment to  which  the  human  mind  is  too  often  prone.  When 
the  Quarterly  Review  declared  a  man  might  as  well  ride 
upon  a  Congreve  rocket  as  upon  a  railroad  train  at  twenty 
miles  an  hour,  it  was  doubtless  sincere,  and  not  moved  by 
malice  against  Stephenson.  We  may  say  the  same  of  Thiers, 
with  his  cocksure  pronouncement  that,  however  useful  rail- 
roads might  be  for  some  purposes,  they  could  never  be  of 
value  for  transporting  freight.  Lardner  was  doubtless  ani- 
mated by  a  purely  scientific  spirit  when  he  argued  that  no 
steamship  could  carry  enough  coal  to  feed  its  engines  on  a 
voyage  across  the  Atlantic.  The  railings  against  the  Erie 
Canal  were  perhaps  less  honest,  having  a  strong  tincture  of 
partisan  politics;  and  the  British  prophecies  that  the  Suez 
Canal  would  never  pay  its  cost  were  probably  in  part  in- 
spired by  jealousy  of  the  French  builders  of  that  great 
highway.  In  the  case  of  Panama,  there  has  been  more  folly 
emitted  than  in  any  of  these  others,  and  it  has  been  of 
a  distinctly  lower  type,  marked  chiefly  either  with  deliber- 
ate malice  or  with  a  crass  ineptitude  most  urgently  requir- 
ing the  fool-killer's  attention.  It  would  require  a  large 
volume  to  contain  even  a  synopsis  of  the  half-foolish  and 
half-malicious  stuff  which  has  been  spoken,  written,  and 
printed  about  various  phases  of  the  Panama  enterprise  in 
the  last  three  years.    The  compass  of  this  chapter  would  not 

840 


THEESITES  KUNNING  AMUCK  341 

suffice  for  a  mere  catalogue  of  it.  But  it  may  serve  the  pur- 
pose to  cite  just  a  few  samples  of  its  chief  types.  Ex  pede — 
Thersitem! 

One  of  the  first  propagandists  of  folly,  in  point  of  time, 
was  employed  by  a  political  organisation  in  the  United 
States,  to  go  into  a  foreign  land  and  there  lampoon  and 
libel  his  own  country  and  its  government  for  the  sake 
of  hoped-for  partisan  advantages  in  a  political  campaign. 
He  went  to  Colombia  in  December,  1903,  right  after  the 
Panaman  revolution,  and  sought  to  cultivate  the  acquaint- 
ance of  the  President,  Dr.  Marroquin.  He  represented 
himself  as  the  agent  of  the  newspaper  press  of  one  of 
the  great  political  parties  of  this  country,  which  was 
strongly  opposed  to  President  Roosevelt's  administration 
and  especially  to  his  policy  toward  Colombia  and  Panama. 
He  had  come,  he  said,  to  investigate  and  to  report  upon  the 
^^situation  of  Colombia  with  regard  to  the  painful  occur- 
rences upon  the  Isthmus  of  Panama."  "There  prevails  in  my 
country,  with  respect  to  this  matter,"  he  said,  "  a  great  senti- 
ment of  sympathy  for  Colombia;  and  the  acts  and  attitude 
of  the  Roosevelt  government  are  regarded  with  profound 
repugnance."  He,  therefore,  sought  "such  information  and 
opinions  as  shall  enable  the  American  people  to  make  a 
decision  in  favour  of  your  excellency's  government  and  the 
people  of  Colombia."  That  is  to  say,  he  was  confessedly 
seeking,  in  a  foreign  land,  mud  to  throw  at  his  own  gov- 
ernment !  The  political  ethics  of  Colombia  have  not  always 
been  of  the  highest  type,  but  they  were  far  too  high  for  such 
a  scheme  as  that,  and  Dr.  Marroquin  pretty  promptly  and 
curtly  declined  to  lend  himself  to  the  tainted  scheme.  He 
answered  the  applicant  with  a  few  words  which  produced 
"the  most  painful  impression."  Thereupon  this  precious 
propagandist  betook  himself  to  Panama,  as  the  accredited 
agent  of  a  political  organisation,  and  there,  in  September 
and  October,  1904,  during  the  Presidential  campaign  in  the 
United  States,  busied  himself  with  trying  to  prove  that  Dr. 
Marroquin — ^who  by  this  time  was  dead  and  unable  to  defend 


342  STULTILOQUENTIA 

himself  against  such  attacks — had  been  a  perjured  and  sor- 
did knave,  who  had  conspired  with  President  Roosevelt  to 
betray  Colombia  for  American  gold !  The  astounding  fiction 
was  evolved  that  President  Roosevelt,  through  Secretary 
Hay,  had  bribed  Dr.  Marroquin,  with  $250,000,  himself  to 
foment  the  Panaman  revolution  and  so  turn  the  Canal  Zone 
over  to  the  United  States.  Cipher  despatches  were  actually 
sent  by  this  accomplished  discoverer  of  mare's  nests  from 
Panama  to  his  political  employers  in  the  United  States, 
declaring  that  if  he  were  supplied  with  suflScient  funds  he 
could  secure  documentary  proofs  of  such  a  bargain !  Doubt- 
less he  could  have  done  so.  The  supply  of  fiction  is  always 
adequate  to  the  demand,  especially  under  the  potent  inspi- 
ration of  "Culebra  cocktails."  I  do  not  think  the  slightest 
perceptible  result  was  produced  upon  the  United  States 
election  by  this  fantastic  folly,  but  I  do  know  that  the  joy 
of  Panama  was  materially  enhanced  by  it.  For  many  a 
week  thereafter  the  very  mention  of  that  versatile  propa- 
gandist's name,  whether  in  a  club  on  the  Cathedral  Plaza  or 
in  the  less  conventional  purlieus  of  the  road  to  "Section," 
was  an  unfailing  and  irresistible  provocation  to  something 
more  than  Homeric  mirth. 

Another  outbreak  occurred  a  year  later.  At  the  beginning 
of  September,  1905,  the  corner  stone  of  a  new  school  building 
was  laid  at  La  Trinchera,  in  the  presence  of  the  President  of 
Panama  and  his  Cabinet,  and  an  oration  was  pronounced  by 
a  prominent  young  member  of  the  Opposition  party.  Im- 
mediately it  was  announced,  and  bruited  over  the  world,  that 
the  speaker  had  bitterly  referred  to  the  impending  spolia- 
tion of  Panama  by  the  United  States,  and  impassioned  homi- 
lies were  published  upon  the  wickedness  of  America's  thus 
oppressing  the  little  republic,  and  we  were  warned — all  this 
stuff  in  our  own  American  press,  of  course — that  when  the 
Liberals  came  into  power  in  Panama  there  would  be  resist- 
ance to  the  bitter  end  against  our  confiscatory  schemes.  It 
is  quite  true  that  he  did  speak  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  as 
being  about  to  be  "rent  in  twain  by  the  iron  hand  of  Amer- 


A  WAIL  OF  WOE  343 

ica,"  but  there  was  scarcely  a  person  in  the  audience  who  did 
not  understand  what  was,  of  course,  his  meaning — that 
America  was  going  to  cut  a  big  ditch  across  the  Isthmus! 
He,  in  fact,  welcomed  that  prospect,  as  assuring  the  future 
greatness  of  Panama. 

I  remember,  too,  another  case,  in  which  a  probably  well- 
meaning  descendant  of  the  illustrious  Hopkins,  in  an 
important  magazine  article,  dolefully  descanted  upon  the 
primitive  and  barbarous  conditions  which  prevailed  along 
the  line  of  the  canal.  When  this  pious  pilgrim  visited  the 
labourers'  camp  at  Culebra,  he  found  there  actually  no  pave- 
ments on  the  sidewalks.  Neither  were  there  electric  lights. 
He  could  find  no  resorts  of  entertainment  and  social  culture, 
excepting  a  reading  room  and  a  cafe,  the  latter,  by  the  way, 
deserted !  Beside  all  of  which,  it  rained !  Men  familiar  with 
similar  camps  in  the  United  States  will  appreciate  the 
unrelieved  horror  of  the  situation,  and  will  join  with  that 
scribe  in  condemning  the  American  Government  for  trying  to 
dig  a  canal  without  first  establishing  squash  courts  and  auto- 
mobile garages  all  along  the  line,  and  changing  the  climate 
so  that  it  could  be  depended  upon  not  to  rain  when  dis- 
tinguished visitors  were  in  town. 

At  the  risk  of  tediousness,  I  must  quote  somewhat  at 
length  a  really  notable  gem  of  anti-Panaman  literature, 
which  has  recently  been  widely  current.    Here  it  is : 

"A  land  as  feverish  to  the  imagination  as  to  the  body  is 
Panama.    It  is  a  land  making  a  fitting  environment  tothe 
deeds  of  conspiracy,  piracy,  loot,  cruelty,  and  blood  that 
have  principally  made  its  history  for  centuries.  This  gloomy, 
God-forsaken  Isthmus  is  a  nightmare  region.    One  descrip-  f 
tive  writer  has  truly  said  of  it  that  it  is  a  land  where  the  \ 
flowers  have  no  odour,  the  birds  no  song ;  where  the  men  are 
without  honour,  and  the  women  without  virtue.    He  is  not  \ 
far  wrong.     The  birds,  brilliant  as  is  their  plumage,  have 
no  musical  notes.    The  dense  forests  teem  with  bright-hued 
parrots,   parroquets,   and   other   birds,    which    squeak   and 
scream  but  do  not  sing.    There  are  beautiful  orchids  to  be 
found  in  the  swamps  and  jungles,  fair  to  look  upon,  but  they 
have  no  odour.     The  oranges  have  green  skins,  instead  of 


344  STULTILOQUENTIA 

golden,  the  plantains  must  be  fried  to  make  them  fit  to  eat, 
the  reptiles  and  insects  are  often  venomous,  and  myriads  of 
parasites  are  ever  ready  to  invade  the  human  body  and  bring 
disease  and  death.  In  the  atmosphere  itself  is  something 
suggestive  of  the  days  of  the  old  pirates  and  their  fiendish 
cruelties  and  orgies.  There  is  no  life  in  the  air;  it  is  depress- 
ing, damp,  miasmatic,  and  intensely  hot.  For  a  great  part 
of  the  year  thunder  showers  succeed  each  other  all  day 
long  and  half  the  night,  with  sheet  lightning  all  around 
the  horizon  after  dark.  There  is  practically  no  twilight,  day 
passing  almost  instantly  into  night.  It  is  no  wonder  that 
this  uncanny  land  has  made  its  residents  degenerate  into 
plotters,  revolutionists,  murderers,  and  thieves.  Its  aspect 
is  one  of  darkness,  treachery,  and  curse." 

Now  I  wonder  if  the  author  of  that  precious  twaddle 
really  regards  a  land  of  exceptionally  brilliant  and  profuse 
sunshine  as  "gloomy."  I  wonder  if  he  is  really  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  rule  in  all  tropical  lands,  and  indeed 
to  a  considerable  extent  in  all  the  world,  that  the  most  bril- 
liantly coloured  birds  are  songless  and  the  singers  are  of 
plain  and  inconspicuous  dress ;  and  that  the  gaudiest  flowers 
are  destitute  of  sweet  perfume.  Did  he  never  compare  a 
blue-jay  with  a  cat-bird,  or  a  wood-duck  with  a  nightingale? 
Did  he  never  observe  the  differences  between  a  peony  and  a 
violet?  It  is  quite  true  that  at  Panama  the  oranges  have 
green  skins.  So  they  do  everywhere,  before  they  are  ripe! 
It  is  true  that  plantains  are  better  fried  than  raw,  as  they 
are  in  Jamaica,  and  New  York,  and  everywhere ;  though  they 
are  better  raw  in  Panama  than  in  almost  any  other  part  of 
the  world,  and  are  eaten  raw  there  as  often  as  anywhere  else. 
Of  course,  there  is  little  twilight ;  but  does  anybody  suppose 
that  is  a  condition  peculiar  to  Panama  and  unknown  in 
other  tropical  lands?  As  for  the  monstrous  fling  at  the 
people  of  Panama,  it  could  not — save  in  an  ignorance 
scarcely  removed  from  criminality — have  been  made  by  any 
one  capable  of  appreciating  either  the  honour  of  men  or  the 
virtue  of  women.  I  should  not  have  quoted  the  offensive 
stuff,  save  for  the  purpose  which  is  sometimes  served  of 
letting  a  bit  of  carrion  in  the  pillory. 


MR  BIGELOW'S  BLAST  345 

One  more  example  of  stultiloquentia  running  amuck,  and 
I  leave  this  unpleasant  phase  of  my  subject.  I  refer  to  Mr. 
Poultney  Bigelow's  screed  on  "Our  Mismanagement  at  Pan- 
ama," in  the  New  York  Independent,  of  January  4,  1906, 
chiefly  for  two  reasons.  One  is,  that  its  writer's  name  is 
somewhat  more  conspicuous  than  the  names  of  most  of  the 
other  purveyors  of  misinformation  and  malice  who  have 
expended  their  ignorance  or  spleen  upon  Panama,  and  the 
other  is,  that  it  was  deemed  of  sufiScient  interest  to  be  the 
subject  of  Executive  inquiry  and  Congressional  investiga- 
tion. But  I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  whether  to  regard  it  as 
the  more  malicious  or  absurd.  Certainly  nothing  could  be 
more  preposterous  than  the  pretensions  to  encyclopaedic 
wisdom  which  are  put  forth  in  the  article,  when  contrasted 
with  the  meagreness  of  the  writer's  information  and  of  his 
opportunity  for  acquiring  information. 

"I  have  had,"  says  Mr.  Bigelow,  "abundant  opportunity 
to  hear  the  views  of  opposing  witnesses,  but  I  have  also  been 
in  a  position  to  examine  on  the  spot  many  things  which 
have  so  far  been  conspicuous  by  their  absence  in  so-called 
'oflSciaP  and  authoritative  reports.  ...  I  made  a  house- 
to-house  visitation  throughout  the  best  part  of  a  blazing  hot 
day.  .  .  .  One  day  I  stopped  to  chat  with  a  well-dressed, 
intelligent,  and  energetic  negro.  .  .  .  Next  day  I  came  to 
the  same  place  for  another  chat.    He  was  not  there.  .  .  ." 

The  facts  are  that  Mr.  Bigelow  reached  Colon  on  the 
steamer  Trent,  at  10  a.  m.  on  November  30,  went  across  to 
Panama,  returned  to  Colon  the  same  evening,  and  sailed 
away  at  2.10  p.  m.  on  December  1.  Thus  he  spent  precisely 
twenty-eight  hours  and  ten  minutes  on  the  Isthmus,  half  of 
that  time  being  a  holiday  when  no  work  was  done.  The 
"abundant  opportunity"  was  all  within  that  brief  period. 
The  "best  part  of  a  blazing  hot  day"  was  presumably  the 
forenoon  of  December  1,  just  before  he  sailed.  The  "one 
day"  and  the  "next  day"  were  the  only  days  he  spent  at 
Panama.  Note,  also,  that  his  article,  which  was  published  in 
New  York,  on  January  4,  1906,  was  dated,  as  a  letter,  at 


346  STULTILOQUENTIA 

"Panama,  December,  1905,"  as  though  it  had  been  written  at 
Panama  and  sent  on  from  that  place  where  he  was  still 
remaining;  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  not  and  could 
not  have  been  written  there,  for  it  bears  intrinsic  and  con- 
fessed evidence  of  having  been  written  at  least  some  days 
later,  at  some  place  remote  from  Panama. 

The  specific  charges  against  the  canal  management  which 
Mr.  Bigelow  made  were  specifically  answered  by  Mr.  Stevens, 
the  Chief  Engineer.  Mr.  Bigelow's  information  as  to  the 
awful  unhealthfulness  of  Colon  seems  to  have  been  derived 
largely  from  a  man  who  had  lived  there  for  more  than  forty 
years  and  had  all  that  time  been  in  splendid  health!  The 
"vast  hordes"  of  negroes  whom  Mr.  Bigelow  saw  fleeing  from 
the  Isthmus  had  been  employed  there  for  the  best  part  of 
a  year,  and  were  going  home  to  spend  the  Christmas  holi- 
days. The  quarter-mile  awning  which  Mr.  Bigelow  saw 
stretched  over  a  ditch,  which  he  was  told  was  "to  protect  the 
workmen  from  the  sun,"  and  which  tale  he  believed  because 
"no  one  could  invent  such  midsummer  madness,"  was  really 
put  there  to  protect  the  concrete  lining  of  the  drain  from 
rain  until  it  had  hardened.  Concerning  the  new  hotel  at 
Corozal,  said  Mr.  Stevens,  "Mr.  Bigelow's  statement  that 
it  is  deserted  is  absolutely  false.  Every  room  is  occupied, 
and  has  been  since  it  was  opened."  The  "big  new  dredges  at 
the  Culebra  cut"  were  not  dredges  at  all  but  steam  shovels. 
"The  statement  that  there  is  no  water  supply  at  Colon  is 
absolutely  and  unqualifiedly  false."  In  such  manner,  with 
citations  of  facts,  figures,  and  indisputable  evidence,  Mr. 
Stevens  traversed  and  refuted  practically  every  serious 
accusation  made  by  Mr.  Bigelow.  On  some  essential  points 
further  refutation  was  provided  by  Governor  Magoon.  In 
summing  the  matter  up  in  an  official  report  to  the  Presi- 
dent, Secretary  Taft  said : 

"I  learn  from  the  isthmus  that  the  writer  arrived  in  Pan- 
ama on  the  Royal  Mail  steamer  Trent  from  Jamaica,  and 
left  by  the  same  steamer.  The  steamer  docked  at  10  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  November  30,  and  sailed  at  2  o'clock  on  the 


TWENTY-EIGHT  HOURS  OF  WISDOM  347 

afternoon  of  December  1.  Assuming  that  after  landing  and 
docking  the  writer  at  once  began  work,  it  is  not  unfair  to 
say  that  his  opportunities  for  observation  were  limited  to 
twenty-eight  hours,  including  daytime  and  nighttime.  It 
would  seem  not  to  be  a  very  long  period  in  which  to  look 
carefully  into  and  determine  the  character  of  the  engineering 
difficulties  of  the  greatest  constructive  enterprise  yet  under- 
taken by  man,  the  efficiency  of  tropical  negro  labour,  the 
healthfulness  of  a  city,  the  proper  place  to  put  dredges,  the 
proper  amount  of  capacity  to  obtain  from  steam  shovels,  the 
character  of  the  administration  of  justice,  the  proper  posi- 
tion of  hotels  along  the  line  of  the  road,  the  question  whether 
a  sewer  system  should  be  adapted  to  Panama  at  all,  or 
whether  the  sewer  system  as  established  was  sufficient  for  the 
purpose.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  offer  the  abundant  opportunity 
for  examining  opposing  witnesses  on  controverted  issues 
which  the  writer  of  the  article  assures  us  that  he  had.  The 
^many  things  on  the  spot'  which  he  says  he  was  able  to 
examine  must,  therefore,  be  taken  with  some  qualification. 
In  view  of  the  time  which  this  critic — a  man  with  no  knowl- 
edge of  engineering  whatever — took  to  decide  all  the  ques- 
tions which  arise  in  the  construction  of  the  canal  and  pro- 
nounce them  of  altogether  vanishing  difficulty,  he  should 
not  take  exception  to  the  seven  or  eight  days  which  twelve 
of  the  most  distinguished  engineers  in  the  world  in  canal 
construction  devoted  to  the  same  task.    .    .    . 

"The  writer  of  the  article  says  that  he  proposes  to  state 
the  truth  from  the  standpoint  'neither  of  an  officeholder  nor 
an  office  seeker,  much  less  that  of  a  disappointed  contractor 
or  an  invalided  labourer;'  that  'he  has  had  abundant  oppor- 
tunity to  hear  the  views  of  opposing  witnesses'  and  was  in  a 
position  'to  examine  on  the  spot  many  things  so  far  con- 
spicuous for  their  absence  in  so-called  "official"  and  authori- 
tative reports.'  It  will  be  observed  that  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end  of  the  article  the  writer  shows  that  instead  of 
seeking  evidence  from  the  officials  responsible  for  the  work 
on  the  Isthmus  he  deliberately  avoided  consulting  them  or 
giving  them  any  opportunity  whatever  to  state  their  knowl- 
edge or  explanation  of  the  facts  which  he  says  had  attracted 
his  attention.  When  the  actual  facts  are  compared  with 
the  statements  in  this  article  it  gives  rise  to  doubt  what 
the  real  explanation  of  the  article  is — whether  it  was  written 
from  such  a  wanton  motive  as  actuates  a  pure  sensation 
monger  or  whether  it  arises  from  the  exaggerated  eccentric- 


348  STULTILOQUENTIA 

ity  of  mind  which  furnishes  both  an  excuse  and  an  expla- 
nation." 


If  I  have  thus  devoted  more  space  to  Mr.  Bigelow's  attack 
upon  the  canal  administration  than  the  importance  of  it  may 
seem  to  some  to  warrant,  it  is  because  of  all  such  attacks 
his  was  apparently  the  most  studied  and  detailed,  and  of 
all  who  have  made  such  attacks  he  was  the  best  known  and 
the  most  likely  to  command  attention  and  credence.  If, 
therefore,  his  attack  was  not  important,  it  was  at  any  rate 
the  least  unimportant  of  them  all.  In  one  respect  it  was 
highly  important,  and  that  was,  as  an  exposure  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  enemy.  It  was  with  reason  said  on  every  hand 
that  if  that  was  the  most  destructive  criticism  that  could 
be  directed  against  the  canal  administration,  then  that 
administration  must  be  pretty  nearly  sans  peur  et  sans 
reprochc,  and  the  net  result  unquestionably  was  to  dis- 
credit all  other  attacks  upon  the  administration  and  to  con- 
firm it  more  strongly  than  ever  before  in  public  confidence. 

Nevertheless,  even  though  good  be  thus  brought  out  of  it, 
evil  remains  evil  still;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a 
way  of  absolving  Mr.  Bigelow — or  his  article — from  the 
imputation  either  of  evil  intent  or  of  evil  ignorance.  If  his 
misstatements  were  made  knowingly,  Mr.  Stevens's  charac- 
terisations of  them,  in  stronger  terms  than  any  I  have 
quoted,  must  be  deemed  well  deserved.  If  they  were  made 
ignorantly,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  ignorance  that  assumes 
omniscience?  It  is  just  possible,  however,  that  there  is  a 
third  explanation,  beside  the  two  suppositious  ones  already 
named,  and  that  it  is  the  true  one,  to  wit,  habit.  Account 
must  be  taken  of  idiosyncrasies.  Almost  simultaneously 
with  the  publication  of  this  diatribe  in  New  York  there 
appeared  from  Mr.  Bigelow's  pen  in  a  leading  London 
journal — The  Outlook — an  attack  upon  the  American  army 
administration  which  I  can  scarcely  describe  with  a  milder 
word  than  malignant.  Taking  for  his  text  some  statements 
of  Secretary  Taft — whom  he  repeatedly  called  "my  illus- 


KEVILING  THE  AEMY  349 

trious  friend" — in  defence  of  the  American  army  against 
some  German  criticisms,  this  American  writer  in  a  foreign 
journal  assured  his  foreign  readers  that  "during  the  Span- 
ish war  of  1898  the  military  authorities  at  Washington 
treated  the  army  mainly  as  a  means  of  political  jobbery;" 
that  "the  commanders  of  brigades,  divisions,  and  army  corps 
were  as  a  rule  profoundly  ignorant  of  elementary  military 
matters;" — to  wit,  Generals  Miles,  Wheeler,  Shatter,  Lee, 
Chaffee,  Lawton,  Brooke,  Merritt,  Grant,  Wilson,  Stone, 
MacArthur,  et  al. ;  that  "our  generals  are  mainly  conspic- 
uous for  not  having  been  educated  at  West  Point ;"  that  "the 
American  army  is  not  fit  to  take  the  field  to-day.  The  same 
spirit  which  made  it  the  tool  of  political  jobbers  during  the 
Spanish  war  is  dominant  to-day,"  et  cetera.  If  these  stric- 
tures and  railings  had  been  true,  the  publication  of  them 
in  an  American  paper  might  have  been  entirely  justifiable, 
and  commendable.  But  to  select  a  foreign  medium  and  a 
foreign  constituency  for  the  publication  of  such  a  belittle- 
ment  of  one's  own  country,  might  well  be  regarded  as  indi- 
cating a  mental  habit  as  much  at  variance  with  patriotic 
manners  and  morals  as  that  shown  in  the  Panama  article 
was  at  variance  with  truth. 

It  was  in  reviewing  such  utterances  as  those  which  I  have 
cited  in  this  chapter,  of  which  the  name,  all  through  the 
year  1905,  was  legion,  that  President  Roosevelt,  on  January 
8,  1906,  wrote  in  a  message  to  Congress : 

"From  time  to  time  various  publications  have  been  made, 
and  from  time  to  time  in  the  future  various  similar  publica- 
tions, doubtless,  will  be  m^de,  purporting  to  give  an  account 
of  jobbing  or  immorality  or  inefficiency  or  misery  as  obtain- 
ing on  the  Isthmus.  I  have  carefully  examined  into  each 
of  these  accusations  which  seemed  worthy  of  attention.  In 
every  instance  the  accusations  have  proved  to  be  without 
foundation  in  any  shape  or  form.  They  spring  from  several 
sources.  Sometimes  they  take  the  shape  of  statements  by 
irresponsible  investigators  of  a  sensational  habit  of  mind, 
incapable  of  observing  or  repeating  with  accuracy  what  they 
see,  and  desirous  of  obtaining  notoriety,  by  wide-spread  slan- 


350  STULTILOQUENTIA 

der.  More  often  thej  originate  with  or  are  given  currency  by 
individuals  with  a  personal  grievance.  The  sensation  mon- 
gers, both  those  who  stay  at  home  and  those  who  visit  the 
Isthmus,  may  ground  their  accusations  on  false  statements 
by  some  engineer,  who,  having  applied  for  service  on  the 
Commission  and  been  refused  such  service,  now  endeavours 
to  discredit  his  successful  competitors,  or  by  some  lessee 
or  owner  of  real  estate  who  has  sought  action  or  inaction  by 
the  Commission  to  increase  the  value  of  his  lots,  and  is  bitter 
because  the  Commission  cannot  be  used  for  such  purposes,  or 
on  the  tales  of  disappointed  bidders  for  contracts,  or  of 
oflSceholders  who  have  proved  incompetent  or  who  have  been 
suspected  of  corruption  and  dismissed,  or  who  have  been 
overcome  by  panic  and  have  fled  from  the  Isthmus.  Every 
specific  charge  relating  to  jobbery,  to  immorality,  or  to 
ineflBciency,  from  whatever  source  it  has  come,  has  been 
immediately  investigated  and  in  no  single  instance  have  the 
statements  of  these  sensation  mongers  and  the  interested 
complainants  behind  them  proved  true.  The  only  discredit 
inhering  in  these  false  accusations  is  to  those  who  originate 
and  give  them  currency,  and  who,  to  the  extent  of  their 
abilities,  thereby  hamper  and  obstruct  the  completion  of  the 
great  work  in  which  both  the  honour  and  the  interest  of 
America  are  so  deeply  involved.  It  matters  not  whether 
those  guilty  of  these  false  accusations  utter  them  in  mere 
wanton  recklessness  and  folly,  or  in  a  spirit  of  sinister  mal- 
ice to  gratify  some  personal  or  political  grudge." 

To  that,  we  may  well  add  that  it  is  high  time  we  were  at  an 
end  of  this  flood  of  folly  and  worse  than  folly,  and  were  at 
least  within  measurable  distance  of  an  end  of  the  discussions 
and  investigations  of  Panaman  affairs  which  have  been  so 
copious  for  most  of  the  time  since  the  great  enterprise  was 
undertaken.  That  view  of  the  case  was  well  expressed  by 
Secretary  Taft,  in  a  public  address  at  Detroit,  Michigan,  in 
February,  1906.  He  had  been  speaking  of  the  then  current 
investigation  into  canal  affairs,  and  had  made  it  clear  that 
neither  he  nor  the  President  nor  anybody  else  in  authority 
shrank  from  the  most  searching  scrutiny  of  everything  that 
had  been  done.    But,  he  continued : 

"After  one  thorough  investigation  has  been  completed  and 
every  truthful  man  and  every  liar  has  been  heard,  then  let 


TIME  TO  STOP  BABBLING  351 

the  work  go  on.  You  can't  be  answering  questions  and  build- 
ing a  canal  at  the  same  time.  You  can't  have  the  chief  engi- 
neer and  the  other  constructing  officers  engaged  in  that  work 
both  in  Washington  and  on  the  Isthmus.  Therefore,  I  say 
that  all  those  who  wish  to  be  heard  ought  to  be  heard  now, 
or  ever  after  hold  their  peace." 

There  spoke  the  voice  of  common  sense  and  justice.  Dis- 
cussion and  investigation  have  doubtless  been  necessary. 
But  some  day  there  should  be  an  end  of  them,  and  that  day 
should  be  somewhere  this  side  of  the  Greek  Kalends. 


CHAPTER  XX 
THE  NEXT  THING 

The  task  before  us  at  Panama  is  well  begun.  Despite  the 
proverb,  however,  it  is  not  half  done,  and  it  will  not  be 
done  years  hence  when  the  canal  is  opened  to  the  commerce 
of  the  world.  It  is  a  never-ending  task  which  we  have  under- 
taken, a  perpetual  responsibility  which  we  have  assumed. 
That  is  a  fact  which  should  be  well  borne  in  mind.  "Do  the 
next  thing"  is  a  wise  counsel;  and  we  may  supplement  it 
with  many  others  to  the  same  effect,  from  the  divine  "suflS- 
cient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof,"  to  the  homely  adjura- 
tion not  to  cross  a  bridge  until  we  reach  it.  But  there  is 
an  equal  marshalling  of  authorities  to  the  contrary  effect, 
that  it  is  not  wise  to  begin  building  a  house  until  the  plans 
are  drawn  and  the  cost  is  counted.  Assuredly  it  would  not 
be  wise  to  engage  in  a  permanent  undertaking  upon  a  tem- 
porary basis.  In  every  detail  of  our  work  at  Panama,  there- 
fore, it  is  to  be  remembered  that  we  are  doing  a  work  for 
all  time;  whether  in  engineering,  or  in  sanitation,  or  in  the 
establishment  of  political  and  social  relationships  with  the 
Isthmian  people. 

That  was  one  powerful  argument  in  favour  of  a  sea-level 
canal,  as  I  have  already  tried  to  show.  If  we  were  con- 
structing a  canal  for  ten  or  twenty  years,  one  at  high  level 
might  be  preferable,  and  would  certainly  be  the  less  expen- 
sive. But  we  are  making  a  canal  for  all  time,  to  be  in  ui  3 
as  long  as  the  trade  winds  sweep  the  Caribbean  and  the  tides 
of  the  Pacific  rise  and  fall.  The  plan  of  it  should,  there- 
fore, be  determined  and  adopted  with  such  destiny  in  view. 
And  there  are  still  those  who  hold  that,  despite  the  contrary 
decision  now  made  and  the  high-level  plan  now  adopted,  we 

852 


LOOKING  AHEAD  353 

shall  in  time  have  to  come  to  the  sea-level  plan.  The  ques- 
tion is  whether  we  shall  secure  for  ourselves  and  for  poster- 
ity the  advantage  and  the  reward  of  a  wise  forethought,  or 
shall  incur  the  inexorable  penalty  of  cowardice  and  delay. 
Surely  it  would  seem  that  the  fulfilment  of  the  world's  desire 
of  four  centuries  in  the  completion  of  an  equatorial  water- 
way around  the  globe  is  an  enterprise  more  worthily  to  be 
achieved  in  a  Promethean  than  in  an  Epimethean  spirit. 

The  same  is  to  be  said  of  the  adjunct  and  auxiliary  works. 
There  are  harbours  to  construct ;  perhaps,  on  the  Caribbean, 
a  new  terminal  city  to  build ;  the  appurtenances  of  civilisa- 
tion to  supply  throughout  the  Canal  Zone.  These  are  not 
simply  to  be  done  for  the  construction  of  the  canal,  during 
the  next  five  or  ten  or  fifteen  years,  but  for  the  perpetual 
maintenance  of  the  canal  for  uncounted  centuries  to  come. 
It  was  a  heroic  task  to  get  rid  of  yellow  fever  in  the  summer 
of  1905.  But  what  is  it  going  to  be,  to  keep  the  Isthmus 
free  from  that  and  other  pestilences  ^^far  on,  in  summers 
that  we  shall  not  see,"  in  1955,  and  2005?  Is  that  looking 
too  far?  We  must  respect  the  future,  said  Jacques  Cartier. 
There  are  those  who  would  interpret  that  to  mean  that  we 
should  not  overtax  ourselves  with  efforts  and  expenditures 
for  the  remote  future,  but  should  leave  a  share  of  the  burden 
for  the  future  itself  to  bear.  That  in  a  measure  is  true.  But 
a  no  less  true  interpretation  is  that  we  are  not  to  impose 
upon  the  future  the  handicap  of  our  weakness  and  cowardice, 
nor  to  compel  it  to  undo  the  ill-devised  deeds  of  our  short- 
sighted blundering.  It  might  be  well  to  leave  the  pecuniary 
cost  of  the  canal  to  be  paid  little  by  little  through  the  next 
century,  or  the  next  five  centuries.  It  would  not  be  well 
to  turn  a  single  spadeful  of  soil  or  to  lay  a  single  stone  for 
some  future  generation  to  undo.  "SuflScient  unto  the  day 
is  the  evil  thereof,"  and  suflScient  unto  the  future  days  will 
be  the  tasks  of  that  time,  without  a  legacy  of  our  ineptitude. 

This  principle  applies  with  peculiar  force  to  the  question 
of  labour  on  the  canal.  There  is  a  vast  amount  of  work  to 
be  done,  and  of  manual  work  despite  our  utmost  introduc- 


364  THE  NEXT  THING 

tion  of  machinery.  It  is  reckoned  that  as  many  as  25,000 
workmen,  efficient  according  to  the  American  standard,  will 
need  to  be  employed,  if  the  canal  is  to  be  constructed  with 
all  possible  expedition.  Now  the  efficiency  of  labour  in  the 
United  States  is  about  three  times  as  great  as  that  in  Pan- 
ama. To  secure  such  a  working  energy,  therefore,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  employ  something  like  75,000  men.  That  will 
be  a  formidable  army,  equal  in  numbers  to  the  entire  adult 
male  population  of  the  republic.  It  will  be  no  easy  task  to 
secure  such  hosts  of  workingmen,  and  from  the  political  and 
social  point  of  view  it  will  be  no  light  thing  to  introduce 
them  into  the  Zone  and  into  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

There  arises  at  once  the  question  whether  they  are  to  be 
introduced  for  the  temporary  purposes  of  canal  construction, 
or  as  permanent  residents  of  the  Isthmus.  Beyond  doubt,  I 
think,  the  latter  would  be  preferable,  provided  they  were  of 
proper  character.  Panama  needs  more  men.  The  popula- 
tion of  the  state  is  not  more  than  a  tithe  of  what  it  should 
be.  Belgium,  scarcely  more  than  one-third  as  extensive  in 
area,  has  twenty-two  times  as  many  people.  Bulgaria,  only 
a  little  larger  than  Panama,  has  ten  times  its  population. 
Switzerland,  only  half  as  large  as  Panama,  and  with  so 
much  of  its  area  uninhabitable,  has  ten  times  as  many  people 
as  the  Isthmian  republic.  Nor  need  we  confine  ourselves  to 
comparisons  with  distant  lands  in  another  zone.  The  neigh- 
bouring Republic  of  Salvador  has  scarcely  a  quarter  of  Pan- 
ama's area,  yet  has  more  than  three  times  its  population. 
Hayti  has  only  a  third  of  Panama's  area,  yet  has  four  times 
its  population.  Nor  is  there  any  natural  inhibition  against 
the  increase  of  population  on  the  Isthmus.  Climate  and  soil 
and  products  are  all  well  calculated  for  the  prosperous  main- 
tenance of  ten  times  the  present  number  of  inhabitants.  We 
need  not  here  enter  elaborately  into  the  causes  which  have 
retarded  growth.  They  have  been  sufficiently  indicated  in 
the  story  of  Panama's  misgovernment  at  the  hands  of  Colom- 
bia, with  all  the  attendant  wars  and  revolutions,  the  neglect 
of  sanitation  and  other  public  interests,  and  the  general 


THE  LABOUR  PROBLEM  355 

prostitution  of  Isthmian  interests  and  welfare  to  the  pas- 
sions and  greed  of  Bogotd.  With  the  new  era  that  was 
established  in  1903,  a  marked  change  in  the  Isthmian  census 
should  be  effected. 

It  would  be  desirable,  then,  to  increase  the  population  of 
Panama  by  introducing  an  army  of  workmen  for  the  canal 
who  would  remain  as  permanent  residents  after  the  comple- 
tion of  the  canal.  But  in  that  case,  as  I  have  already  hinted, 
they  must  be  men  of  desirable  character,  from  both  the  Pan- 
aman  and  the  American  point  of  view.  They  must  be  such 
as  would  be  congenial  and  acceptable  to  the  present  people 
of  Panama,  and  would  be  worthy  citizens  of  that  republic; 
and  they  must  be  also  well  disposed  toward  the  United 
States  and  its  administration  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  its 
protectorate  of  Panama.  It  would  be  criminal  to  introduce 
an  element  which  would  be  antagonistic  to  the  Panamans, 
and  it  would  be  one  of  those  blunders  which  are  worse  than 
crimes  to  plant  upon  the  Isthmus  a  numerous  colony 
hostile  to  the  United  States.  From  what  source,  then,  could 
we  secure  a  permanent  industrial  army  answering  these 
requirements  ? 

The  answer,  I  fear,  must  be  that  there  is  no  adequate 
source.  Workmen  can  doubtless  be  secured,  but  not  enough 
of  them  of  a  kind  desirable  for  citizenship  in  Panama.  For 
to  be  thus  desirable,  or  even  acceptable,  they  must  be  of  the 
Caucasian  race.  This  is  to  be  said  without  the  slightest 
prejudice  against  either  the  black  or  the  yellow  race,  but 
with  the  fullest  sympathy  with  them  and  the  fullest  appre- 
ciation of  their  excellent  qualities.  But  even  those  who — like 
myself — most  strongly  condemn  the  savage  proscription  and 
persecution  of  Chinamen  which  was  begun  by  the  hoodlums 
and  criminals  of  the  Pacific  Coast  and  which — through 
agencies  too  well  understood  to  require  elucidation — have 
now  become  potent  throughout  the  land,  even  we,  I  say, 
would  shrink  from  the  prospect  of  introducing  say  ten  mil- 
lion Chinese  coolies  into  the  United  States.  Well,  propor- 
tionally, it  would  be  as  bad  as  that  to  introduce  fifty  thou- 


356  THE  NEXT  THING 

sand  of  them  into  Panama.  There  are  already,  I  think,  more 
Chinese  in  Panama  than  in  the  United  States,  proportion- 
ally ;  and  the  Panaman  government  is  certainly  as  much  jus- 
tified as  our  own  in  prohibiting  their  further  immigration. 
Those  who  are  already  there  are  treated  with  a  degree  of 
courtesy  and  justice  which  makes  the  American  observer 
blush  at  the  contrast  it  presents  to  the  savagery  of  New 
York,  San  Francisco,  and  Rock  Springs.  But  to  the  increase 
of  their  number  to  an  extent  which  would  make  them  one- 
seventh  the  population  of  the  whole  republic,  Panama  not 
unreasonably  nor  unrighteously  objects. 

Neither  would  it  be  well  to  plant  there  so  large  a  per- 
manent colony  of  the  negro  race.  In  saying  this  there  is  no 
thought  of  prejudice  against  the  negro.  But  it  is  not  well 
to  transform  a  white  man's  country  into  a  black  man's 
country;  and  especially  it  is  not  well  to  plant  the  seeds  of 
racial  antagonisms  in  a  country  where  that  noxious  plant 
has  hitherto  been  unknown.  At  the  present  time,  the  white 
race  is  the  dominant  race  in  Panama,  though  there  is  no 
discrimination  whatever  against  the  coloured  race.  A  negro 
is  as  good  as  a  Spaniard  in  Panama,  provided  his  character 
and  capacity  are  equal  to  the  Spaniard's.  Or  if  there  is 
any  disposition  to  treat  the  negro  as  an  inferior,  it  has  been 
introduced  there  by  Americans.  As  to  numbers,  I  believe  the 
negroes  equal  and  perhaps  outnumber  the  whites,  and  might 
be  able  to  outvote  them  and  control  the  government  if  they 
were  so  disposed.  But  they  are  not  so  disposed,  but  amica- 
bly acquiesce  in  an  almost  purely  white  government.  That 
is  partly  because  the  whites  treat  the  blacks  with  so  much 
friendliness  and  equity  that  the  blacks  feel  their  interests 
to  be  quite  safe  in  white  men's  hands  without  any  need  of 
their  own  self-assertion;  and  partly  because  the  negroes 
have  no  particular  taste  or  aptitude  for  politics,  while  the 
white  Panama ns  are  born  politicians  and  possess  the  genius 
of  government  in  an  eminent  degree.  So  long  as  matters 
remain  in  their  present  general  condition,  therefore,  we  need 
fear  for  Panama  none  of  the  brutal  race  conflicts  which  have 


IMPRACTICABLE  COLONISTS  357 

disgraced  America  from  New  York  to  Texas.  But  if  from 
fifty  to  seventy-five  thousand  negro  labourers  were  perma- 
nently colonised  in  Panama,  and  were  made  citizens  of  the 
state,  Panama  would  be  made  a  "black  republic"  almost  as 
much  as  Hayti  is  to-day.  With  negro  voters  outnumbering 
the  whites  more  than  two  to  one,  the  opportunity  for  ill- 
advised  or  unscrupulous  ambition  would  be  dangerously 
great,  and  we  should  probably  soon  see  there  a  political  and 
social  war  of  races  which  would  be  disastrous  to  the  prop- 
erty and  progress  of  Panama,  and  embarrassing  in  a  great 
degree  to  our  own  administration  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

If  then  we  rule  out  the  yellow  and  black  races  from  exten- 
sive colonisation  in  Panama,  whence  are  the  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  recruits  to  be  drawn?  There  have  been  various 
suggestions,  chiefly  futile.  I  have  heard  it  gravely  proposed 
that  colonies  of  Russian  refugees,  Jews  or  others,  should  be 
planted  there.  Some  Russians  have,  I  believe,  settled  in 
Mexico  and  are  reported  to  be  doing  well.  But  the  idea  of 
transplanting  extensive  communities  from  sub-arctic  to 
tropical  latitudes  does  not  commend  itself  to  reason. 
Another  suggestion  was  that  Boers  should  be  brought  from 
South  Africa.  From  the  climatic  point  of  view  that  seems 
not  impracticable,  for  the  Transvaal  lies  within  the  semi- 
tropical  zone.  But  the  Boers  are,  of  course,  not  sufiQciently 
numerous  to  provide  the  labour  needed  at  Panama  without 
depopulating  their  own  land  of  all  save  those  whom  they 
used  to  call  Outlanders;  they  indicate  no  desire  to  emigrate 
in  any  considerable  numbers;  and  they  would  certainly 
prove  irreconcilably  antagonistic  to  the  Panamans,  and 
uncommonly  difficult  for  American  administrators  to  deal 
with.  The  hosts  of  emigrants  from  Europe  who  now  come  to 
our  shores  are,  with  the  exception  of  the  Italians,  unsuited 
for  labour  in  the  tropics.  For  the  same  reason,  of  course, 
we  must  rule  out  our  own  people,  the  white  men  of  the 
United  States.  I  have  been  confronted  with  the  inquiry  why, 
if  we  are  eliminating  yellow  fever  and  making  the  Isthmus 
healthful,  an  army  of  American  labourers  cannot  safely  go 


J^ 


358  THE  NEXT  THING 

thither  and  do  the  work.  The  answer  is  easy.  We  can  make 
Panama  sanitary,  but  we  cannot  make  it  temperate  in  cli- 
mate. Tropical  it  is  and  tropical  it  will  remain ;  and  Ameri- 
cans will  not  and  cannot  successfully  engage  in  habitual  and 
severe  manual  exertion  in  the  tropics.  Moreover,  Americans 
who  can  earn  high  wages  at  home  will  not  go  to  Panama  to 
work  for  low  wages.  Engineers,  foremen,  draughtsmen,  and 
the  large  clerical  force,  can,  of  course,  be  taken  from  the 
United  States,  and  in  such  capacities  there  are  and  will  be 
many  desirable  opportunities  for  young  Americans  of  ability 
and  character,  and  of  common  sense  enough  to  live  in  proper 
fashion  in  the  tropics  and  not  get  hobnails  on  their  livers 
through  recklessness  in  food  and  drink.  But  American 
workingmen  have  no  call  to  Panama,  any  more  than  Eng- 
lish workingmen  have  to  the  plains  of  India. 

There  remain  the  peoples  of  the  two  great  southern  penin- 
sulas of  Europe.  Spain  is  not  commonly  thought  of  as  a 
land  of  considerable  emigration.  Its  less  than  19,000,000 
people  do  not  overcrowd  it.  Nor  do  we  regard  the  Spanish 
as  a  conspicuously  industrial  race.  Yet,  in  fact,  many  Span- 
iards do  go  abroad  each  year,  and  they  are  capable  of 
splendid  efficiency  in  industrial  pursuits,  even  in  the  hardest 
forms  of  manual  labour.  It  might  not  be  possible  to  get 
anything  like  a  sufficient  number  of  workingmen  from  Spain. 
If  it  were  possible  it  would  be  a  most  advantageous  thing 
to  do,  and  it  would  be  well  in  any  case  to  encourage  as  large 
an  immigration  to  Panama  from  Spain  as  may  be  secured; 
because  such  colonists  would  be  in  admirable  accord  with 
the  existing  population  of  Panama,  and  would  make  a  homo- 
geneous and  harmonious  addition  thereto. 

The  Italians  have  already  been  mentioned,  ^heir  splendid 
^physical  efficiency  is  amply  known  in  the  United  States,  as 
are  also  their  devotion  to  dutv,  their  ambition,  their  frugal- 
ity, and  their  adaptability  to  new  modes  of  life.  They  would 
probably  get  along  well  with  the  Panamans,  and  would  form 
a  valuable  addition  to  the  permanent  population  of  the  Isth- 
mus.   Of  their  ability  to  endure  the  climate  there  need  be 


CHINESE  LABOUK  359 

little  question.  Each  year  now  sees  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  them  go  abroad,  chiefly  to  the  United  States  and  to  Argen- 
tina and  Brazil.  It  would  be  an  admirable  stroke  of  policy, 
from  every  point  of  view,  to  divert  a  part  of  that  great 
stream  of  migration  from  our  own  shores  to  Panama.  We 
do  not  need  so  many  Italians  here,  and  we  do  need  them  in 
Panama,  and  Panama  needs  them  to  cultivate  her  waste 
places  and  to  transform  the  jungles  into  gardens. 

Such  are  the  possible — and  impossible — sources  of  labour, 
if  that  labour  is  to  remain  permanently  in  Panama.  There 
remains  the  other  course,  less  desirable,  of  securing  a  suf- 
ficient force  of  workmen  for  the  construction  of  the  canal, 
with  the  understanding  that  when  that  task  is  done  they 
will  depart  from  the  Isthmus.  That  plan  must  be  adopted  if 
suitable  permanent  colonists  cannot  be  found,  and  in  that 
case  it  will  probably  be  best  to  look  to  China  for  a  supply. 
It  is  true  that  Panama  has  a  strict  Chinese  exclusion  law, 
which  it  will  probably  be  necessary  to  maintain.  But  even 
with  that  law  in  force  it  w^ould  be  easy  to  make  a  contract 
with  some  of  the  great  Chinese  companies,  for  the  supplying 
of  so  many  thousand  labourers,  who  would  live  at  Panama 
within  a  certain  pale,  and  when  their  work  there  was  done 
would  return  to  China.  Precisely  such  an  arrangement  has 
been  effected  in  South  Africa  for  tjie  working  of  mines,  and, 
despite  the  political  campaign  clamour  which  has  been  raised 
against  it,  it  seems  to  be  reasonably  successful  and  satis- 
factory. I  can  see  no  convincing  argument  against  the  adop- 
tion of  such  a  system  at  Panama,  while  the  arguments  in 
its  favour  are  many,  obvious,  and  strong.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  of  the  ability  of  the  Chinese  to  endure  the  climate  and 
to  do  the  work  with  marked  efficiency.  Their  labour  would 
be  inexpensive,  and  they  would  be  exceptionally  trustworthy 
and  easy  to  govern ;  while  their  return  home  could  be  much 
more  readily  and  certainly  assured  than  that  of  any  other 
temporary  levy. 

We  must  remember,  too,  that  we  are  not  merely  doing  at 
Panama  an  immense  physical  work  that  is  to  endure,  under 


360  THE  NEXT  THING 

our  control  and  responsibility,  for  all  time.  We  are  also 
entering  into  political  and  social  relations  with  an  alien 
people,  and  those  relations,  in  some  form,  are  to  endure  for 
all  time.  Concerning  that  feature  of  the  case,  of  unsur- 
passed interest  and  importance,  three  things  may  be  asserted 
with  confidence.  One  is,  that  we  do  not  wish  to  annex  Pan- 
ama, nor  to  subvert  nor  interfere  with  its  autonomy  further 
than  is  provided  in  our  treaty  with  that  republic  and  in  its 
own  Constitution.  The  second  is,  that  we  do  intend  to  main- 
tain our  protectorate  over  Panama  and  our  special  and  ex- 
clusive privileges — and  responsibilities — there.  The  third 
is,  that  we  desire  these  relations  to  be  maintained  in  a  spirit 
of  mutual  amity,  confidence,  and  contentment.  It  would  be 
a  most  unwelcome — I  might  almost  say,  an  abhorrent — ^thing 
to  be  compelled  for  any  reason  to  reduce  Panama  to  the  con- 
dition of  a  subject  province,  or  to  add  it  to  the  category  of 
those  alien  possessions  which  were  forced  upon  us  by  the 
logic  of  an  unsought  war,  and  which  are  to  us  to-day  a 
^'white  man's  burden"  which  is  heavy  and  costly  to  bear — 
though  we  shall  doubtless  bear  it  unflinchingly  as  long  as 
necessity  or  duty  may  require.  It  would  be  no  less  unpro- 
pitious  for  us  to  lose  our  hold  upon  the  Isthmus  in  any  way ; 
the  hold  which  we  have  had,  for  its  profit  and  our  own,  not 
merely  since  the  treaty  of  1904,  but  since  the  treaty  of  1846 
was  signed.  Assuredly,  it  would  be  intolerable  to  have  our 
permanent  relations  with  Panama  incessantly  or  even  peri- 
odically marked  with  friction  and  irritation. 

How,  then,  are  we  to  insure  the  permanence  of  pleasant 
relations  between  America  and  Panama?  I  would  answer, 
first  of  all,  that  we  must  treat  Panama  with  justice.  The 
Panaman  sense  of  justice  is  as  highly  cultivated,  and  the 
Panaman  sensitiveness  to  and  resentment  of  injustice  are  as 
keen,  as  our  own.  I  shall  never  forget  an  incident  of  Sec- 
retary Taft's  visit  to  Panama  in  1904 — to  which  I  have 
already  devoted  a  chapter.  At  the  state  banquet  in  his  hon- 
our on  the  evening  of  December  1,  at  which  were  present  the 
representative  men  of  Panama,  of  all  parties,  he  said  in  the 


JUSTICE  FOK  PANAMA  361 

course  of  his  address  that  since  his  arrival  there  he  had 
become  convinced  "that  justice  had  not  been  done  to  Pan- 
ama." The  approving  applause  was  instantaneous,  spon- 
taneous, electric,  universal,  tremendous.  The  whole  heart  of 
Panama,  without  regard  to  party,  responded  to  that  senti- 
ment, nor  was  there  a  whisper  of  dissent  from  any  of  the 
well-informed  Americans  present.  There  were  two  possible 
interpretations  of  those  words.  One  was,  that  justice  had 
not  been  done  to  the  climate,  the  resources,  and  the  attract- 
iveness of  Panama.  The  other  was,  that  Panama  had  not 
been  justly  treated  in  the  customs  and  postal  arrangements 
between  it  and  the  United  States.  There  was  some  doubt, 
among  some,  as  to  which  of  these  things  the  speaker  meant. 
I  have  purposely  refrained  from  asking  him.  But  I  think 
that  it  may  safely  be  assumed  that,  whichever  thought  may 
for  the  moment  have  been  uppermost  in  his  mind, — for  he 
spoke  entirely  ex  tempore^ — upon  mature  reflection  he  would 
have  meant  and  did  mean  both.  Indeed,  only  four  days 
later,  speaking  again  from  almost  the  same  place,  he  made 
it  quite  clear  that  he  did  mean  both  those  things. 

There  can  be  no  question,  however,  of  the  interpretation 
of  his  words  which  instantly  sprang  uppermost  in  the  mind 
of  every  one  of  his  Panaman  hearers.  It  was  the  latter  of 
the  two.  They  had  felt  for  months  past  that  they  were 
being  unjustly  treated — as  they  were.  They  had  been 
divided  in  opinion,  some  holding  that  the  injustice  was  inten- 
tional and  would  be  arrogantly  persisted  in  by  the  irresisti- 
ble northern  power,  and  others  declaring  that  it  was  unin- 
tentional and  would  be  abated  as  soon  as  the  state  of  affairs 
was  made  clear  to  the  American  government.  Secretary 
Taft's  visit,  therefore,  was  crucial.  It  was  to  determine  and 
to  demonstrate  which  of  these  views  was  correct.  Until  he 
arose  to  speak  that  night,  he  had  given  no  intimation  as  to 
what  he  thought  of  the  matter.  But  in  almost  the  opening 
sentence  of  his  address  he  made  the  unequivocal  declaration 
which  I  have  quoted.  That  settled  it.  In  that  instant  he 
won  the  loyalty  and  the  affection  and  the  confidence  of  Pan- 


362  THE  NEXT  THING 

ama  as  America  had  never  had  it  before.  The  Panamans, 
some  to  their  pleased  surprise  and  some  to  the  welcome  con- 
firmation of  their  hopes,  realised  that  the  injustice  they  had 
suffered  had  been  unintentional,  and  that  the  American  gov- 
ernment was  great  enough  and  brave  enough  to  admit  and 
to  repair  its  inadvertent  fault.  I  doubt  if  in  all  the  story  of 
our  dealings  with  Panama  there  is  an  utterance  or  a  deed 
more  auspicious  of  good,  or  more  significant  of  the  true 
policy  to  be  pursued,  than  was  that  pregnant  sentence  in  an 
after-dinner  speech. 

We  must,  in  the  next  place,  act  with  firmness,  and  with 
consistent  firmness.  We  must  do  that,  for  the  maintenance 
of  our  own  rights  and  privileges,  and  also  for  the  protection 
of  Panama  alike  from  external  foes — which  are  little  to  be 
feared — and  from  intestine  disorder — which  is  not  beyond 
the  bounds  of  reasonable  apprehension.  Let  me  revert  again 
to  that  speech  of  Mr.  Taft's  to  say  again  that  some  of  the 
very  heartiest  and  most  universal  applause — I  am  convinced 
it  was  as  sincere  as  it  was  tumultuous — was  given  to  his 
declaration  that  the  United  States  would  countenance  no 
political  revolutions  in  Panama  other  than  those  constitu- 
tionally effected  at  the  polls.  The  approval  of  that  decla- 
ration was,  indeed,  no  less  positive  than  that  which  greeted 
his  statement  concerning  the  doing  of  justice  to  Panama. 
The  people  of  the  Isthmus  want  justice.  But  equally  they 
are  willing  to  submit  themselves  to  such  American  authority 
as  they  have  in  their  Constitution  formally  accepted.  They 
realise  the  inexorable  force  of  the  familiar  principle,  that 
authority  and  responsibility  must  be  commensurate  and 
inseparable.  They  have  accepted  with  gratitude  the  guard- 
ianship of  the  United  States,  and  they  have  in  equal  measure 
accepted  its  control. 

We  must  act,  moreover,  with  discretion  and  with  tact. 
The  first  part  of  oratory,  said  Demosthenes,  is  action;  the 
second  part  is  action ;  and  the  third  part  is  action.  Danton, 
prescribing  or  describing  political  success,  said  "De  I'audace, 
encore  de  I'audace,  toujours  de  I'audace!"     I  would  that 


THE  NEED  OF  TACT  363 

some  voice  of  similar  authority  might  impress  upon  all 
Americans,  official  and  unofficial,  the  necessity  and  the 
supreme  utility,  first,  of  tact ;  second,  of  tact ;  and  third,  of 
tact.  It  would  not  hurt  us  to  cultivate  that  quality  in  our 
domestic  operations.  In  our  dealings  with  foreign  peoples, 
it  is  simply  indispensable;  if  our  car  of  progress  is  not 
always  to  be  at  least  a  potential  powder  cart.  Nor  are 
there  any  people  in  the  world  toward  whom  the  exercise  of 
tact  is  more  desirable  than  our  Latin- American  or  Spanish- 
American  neighbours  at  the  south.  It  was  all  very  well  for 
Pinckney  to  read  the  riot  act  to  Godoy,  and  for  John  Quincy 
Adams  to  treat  Onis  and  Vives  with  New  England  brusque- 
ness.  That  was  the  particular  type  of  tact  which  those 
Spanish  statesmen  needed  to  have  applied  to  them;  and, 
moreover,  we  were  quite  ready  and  not  at  all  reluctant  to 
accept  the  consequences,  even  though  they  had  been  militant. 
Nor  should  we  forget  that  a  great  power,  such  as  Spain  then 
still  professed  to  be,  can  endure  bullying  much  more  easily 
than  can  a  small  one.  The  great  power  can  yield  to  a  peremp- 
tory demand  as  a  matter  of  magnanimous  grace,  where  a 
small  power  would  feel  and  would  seem  coerced  and 
humiliated. 

Now  Panamans  are  weak,  but  they  are  also  proud  and 
sensitive.  It  would  be  in  our  power,  of  course,  to  drive  them 
whithersoever  we  pleased ;  but  they  would  greatly  and  prop- 
erly resent  it.  It  is  in  our  power  to  lead  them  in  certain 
desirable  and  beneficent  ways,  and  for  our  doing  so  they  will 
be  grateful.  But  even  in  leading  them  instead  of  driving 
them,  we  should  exercise  tact  and  discretion.  It  is  not 
desirable  to  lead  them  into  all  the  ways  which  we  ourselves 
might  properly  and  profitably  pursue.  For  they  are  Pan- 
amans and  we  are  Americans,  and  there  is  a  difference 
between  us.  I  do  not  mean  that  there  is  a  difference  which 
is  significant  of  superiority  on  the  one  hand  and  of  infe- 
riority on  the  other.  Peers  differ  among  themselves.  The 
antecedents  of  the  Spanish  people  for  many  centuries  have 
been  radically  different  from  those  of  the  Anglo-Saxons. 


364  THE  NEXT  THING 

Their  temperaments  and  dispositions,  their  ambitions,  their 
whole  mental  and  spiritual  make-up,  are  different  from  ours. 
There  could  be  nothing  more  foolish  and  more  fruitless  than 
to  try  to  make  them  like  ourselves.  Between  them  and  us 
there  are  and  there  will  be  some  things  in  common,  but  there 
also  are  and  will  always  be  some  decided  differences;  and 
the  sooner  and  the  more  fully  we  realise,  accept,  and  act 
upon  that  fact,  the  better  it  will  be  for  all  concerned. 

Improvement,  not  transformation,  is  needed.  We  could 
not  make  Panama  wholly  American  if  we  should  try,  and 
we  could  not  transform  the  Panamans  into  Americans.  To 
attempt  it  would  be  both  futile  and  impertinent.  Instead, 
we  should  seek  to  promote  the  development  of  all  that  is 
best  in  Panama  and  the  Panamans,  as  Panamans  and  not  as 
pseudo-Americans.  As  the  latter  they  would  be  our  inferi- 
ors, while  as  the  former  they  are  our  equals.  We  cannot 
make  ourselves  Panamans,  no  matter  how  hard  we  try.  No 
matter  how  long  we  live  there,  no  matter  how  well  we  learn 
their  language,  no  matter  how  much  we  strive  to  adopt 
their  customs,  we  remain  aliens,  awkward  and  absurd,  until 
the  second  or  third  generation.  If  any  American  wants  to 
make  of  himself  a  butt  of  merited  ridicule,  all  he  has  to  do 
is  to  go  to  Panama  and  try  to  pose  as  a  Panaman.  He  will 
find  himself  inferior  to  the  poorest  and  most  ignorant  native. 
But  if  he  goes  thither  and  remains  confessedly  an  American, 
he  will  command  respect.  Now  it  is  precisely  the  same  with 
Panamans.  They  cannot  rival  us  as  Americans.  But  if 
they  remain  Panamans,  and  make  the  best  of  themselves  as 
such,  they  will  be  entitled  to  our  respect. 

What  is  incumbent  upon  us,  then,  is  to  regard  Panama 
from  the  Panaman  point  of  view,  just  as  we  demand  that 
Panamans  and  other  aliens  shall  regard  America  from  the 
American  point  of  view.  That  is  not  easy  to  do,  I  know.  It 
is  not  easy,  perhaps  not  always  possible,  to  see  ourselves 
as  others  see  us;  and  it  is  no  less  diflScult  to  see  others  as 
they  see  themselves.  But  this  latter  ability  is  just  as  much 
to  be  desired  as  the  former,  and  is  just  as  necessary  to  a 


NEW  YOKK  AND  PANAMA  365 

correct  judgment  of  our  neighbours.  To  each,  his  own  stand- 
ard. Judged  by  the  standard  of  New  York,  Panama  would 
seem  a  contemptible  place.  Judged  by  the  standard  of  Pan- 
ama, New  York  would  be  intolerable.  Judged  by  its  own 
standard,  Panama  is  the  equal  and  perhaps  the  superior  of 
New  York.  It  has  probably  more  nearly  attained  its  ideal 
than  has  the  American  metropolis.  Perhaps  the  New  York 
standard  is  the  higher  and  better,  in  some  respects — for  New 
Yorkers,  not  for  Panamans.  But  that  is  not  the  essential 
point.  What  we  need  to  recognise  is  the  equality  of  Panama 
with  America — its  equal  rights  to  live  its  own  life  and 
develop  its  own  destiny.  No  matter  if  Panama  is  not 
America's  equal,  measured  by  our  rule.  No  two  men  in  the 
world  are  exactly  equal ;  yet  we  have  agreed  to  regard  them 
as  so,  for  purposes  of  business  and  politics  and  social  inter- 
course. Upon  such  foundation  of  equality  must  we  build  our 
permanent  relationship  with  Panama,  if  the  structure  is 
to  be  enduring  and  is  to  be  a  temple  of  peace. 

Such  tactful  policy  is,  moreover,  as  necessary  in  private 
and  individual  as  in  official  and  public  affairs.  At  home  we 
may  lay  the  flattering  unction  to  our  souls  that  we  are  The 
People,  as  much  as  we  please.  But  that  will  not  work  well 
abroad.  The  American  who  goes  to  Panama  and  regards  the 
Panamans  as  "damned  Greasers" — as  I  have  known  only  too 
many  to  do — sets  himself  down  at  once  as  a  boor  and  a  fool. 
He  is  a  boor,  thus  to  treat  those  upon  whose  hospitality  he 
has  intruded  himself;  and  he  is  a  fool,  because  he  shows 
himself  incapable  of  appreciating  people  who  in  manners 
and  learning  are  decidedly  his  superiors.  He  is  and  does 
something  still  worse.  He  brings  reproach  upon  his  coun- 
try, and  engenders  ill-feeling  between  it  and  the  land  he  thus 
maligns.  For,  generally  speaking,  a  nation  is  estimated  not 
according  to  its  constitution  or  its  government  or  its  ab- 
stract rank  in  the  scale  of  civilisation,  but  according  to  the 
concrete,  individual  specimens  of  its  people  with  whom  we 
come  into  contact.  If  a  lot  of  individual  Americans  go  to 
Panama  and  call  the  Panamans  "damned  Greasers,"  the 


366  THE  NEXT  THING 

Panamans  will  not  say — as  they  might,  truly — "These  are 
only  a  few  unworthy  Americans,  who  have  left  their 
country  for  their  country's  good.  The  mass  of  the  American 
people  and  the  American  Government  are  just  and  cour- 
teous." No,  but  they  will  say — as  we  should  do  in  their 
place — "So!  The  Americans  regard  us  as  ^damned  Greas 
ers,'  do  they?  Well,  who  cares  what  the  damned  Yankees 
think,  anyway?"  Seriously,  it  is  in  such  fashion  that  half 
the  international  animosities  in  the  world  are  generated. 

There  is  need,  too,  that  we  shall  study  Panama  and  the 
Panamans.  Certainly  we  ought  to  know  as  much  about  them 
as  they  do  about  us.  At  present  we  certainly  do  not.  Few 
things  impressed  me  more  at  Panama  than  the  perfect  famil- 
iarity of  Panamans  with  America  and  American  affairs,  as 
contrasted  with  the  ignorance  of  Americans  of  Panama  and 
Panaman  affairs.  The  Panamans  have  visited  America.  They 
have  studied  in  our  schools  and  colleges.  They  are  familiar 
with  our  social  customs.  But  what  do  we  know  of  them? 
It  will  not  do  to  say  that  America  is  worth  but  Panama  is 
not  worth  studying.  Our  own  conduct  gives  that  excuse  the 
lie.  If  Panama  is  worth  going  to,  as  we  are  going  to  it, 
it  is  worth  studying.  If  the  Panamans  are  worthy  of  the 
relationships  with  them  which  we,  at  our  own  initiative, 
have  sought,  they  are  worthy  of  study.  We  have  much  to 
teach  them,  but  they  have  also  much  to  teach  us.  Especially 
have  they  to  teach  us  a  lesson  of  tactful  adaptation.  The 
Panaman  endeavours  to  treat  his  American  guest  as  that 
American  wants  to  be  treated.  He  studies  his  tastes,  sus 
ceptibilities,  prejudices,  national  idiosyncrasies.  He  says,  in 
effect,  "Your  ways  are  not  my  ways,  and  I  would  not  like 
them  for  myself ;  but  they  are  yours,  and  therefore  I  respect 
them  and  cater  to  them  to  the  best  of  my  ability."  Do 
Americans  treat  Panamans  thus?  Some  do,  and  some  do 
not ;  but  it  is  in  proportion  as  they  do  so  that  they  establish 
mutually  satisfactory  relations  with  them. 

This  is  a  lesson  which  Americans  greatly  need  to  learn  in 
commercial  matters,  not  only  in  Panama  but  in  all  the  lands 


TRADE  METHODS  367 

of  Central  and  South  America.  It  is  a  matter  of  surprise 
and  regret  to  many  that  our  European  rivals  so  far  outstrip 
us  in  the  markets  of  those  countries.  To  those  who  have 
studied  and  compared  the  methods  of  Americans  and  Euro- 
peans in  pushing  trade,  it  is  a  matter  of  no  surprise  at  all. 
A  Panaman  merchant  expressed  it  to  me  epigrammatically 
but  most  comprehensively,  when  he  said,  "The  American 
brings  samples,  but  the  European  gets  samples."  That  is 
precisely  it.  The  American  commercial  agent  goes  to  Cen- 
tral or  South  America  with  a  case  full  of  samples  of  goods 
such  as  we  use  at  home  and  such  as  are  not  at  all  designed 
for  use  in  the  tropics,  and  tries  to  persuade  the  people  that 
these  are  the  things  they  ought  to  buy  and  to  use,  instead 
of  the  things  they  have  long  been  accustomed  to  and  which 
are  especially  suited  to  their  needs.  "You  poor,  benighted 
heathen,"  he  says,  in  effect,  "you  ought  to  give  up  your  ways 
and  manners,  your  tools  and  clothes,  and  adopt  such  as  we 
Superior  People  have.  You  don't  know  what  is  best  for 
you.  We  do.  Behold,  here  are  the  things  you  ought  to 
buy !"  The  German,  or  the  Frenchman,  or  the  Englishman, 
on  the  other  hand,  goes  to  them  with  an  empty  bag,  and  asks 
"What  kind  of  clotheg  do  you  like  to  wear?  And  what  kind 
of  tools  do  you  prefer  to  use?  And  what  are  your  tastes  in 
this  and  that  and  the  other  thing?"  He  gets  samples  of 
all  the  things  they  use,  and  takes  home  a  bag  full  of  them. 
Then  his  employers  at  home  manufacture  exactly  the  sorts 
of  things  which  he  has  found  out  the  people  want,  and  they 
send  those  goods  to  them,  and  sell  them  at  a  handsome  profit, 
and  get  a  practical  monopoly  of  the  market. 

Now  that  is  what  we  must  do,  if  we  are  to  win  the  place 
in  the  Central  and  South  American  market  which  we  desire. 
We  must  cater  to  our  customers.  We  must  give  them  the 
things  they  want,  and  not  try  to  force  upon  them  the  things 
they  don't  want  but  which  we  think  they  ought  to  want.  In 
Europe  there  are  vast  manufacturing  establishments  whose 
wares  are  never  seen  in  European  markets,  but  are  all 
shipped  abroad,  for  the  supplying  of  foreign  demands.    And 


368  THE  NEXT  THING 

the  foreign  order  is  faithfully  filled,  no  matter  how  strange 
or  outlandish  it  may  seem.  As  a  widely  and  shrewdly 
observant  friend  of  mine  said  one  day,  "It  is  no  business  of 
ours  what  they  want.  Our  business  is  to  supply  it.  No 
matter  if  it  is  razors  without  edges,  or  guns  without  trig- 
gers, or  shoes  without  soles — if  they  want  such  things  and 
are  willing  to  pay  for  them,  in  the  name  of  Mercury,  god 
of  trade,  let  them  have  them!'^  As  a  matter  of  fact,  our 
Panaman  friends  know  what  they  want  and  what  is  good 
for  them  a  great  deal  better  than  we  do.  They  have  been 
settled  on  that  tropical  Isthmus  for  a  hundred  years  longer 
than  we  have  been  settled  here,  and  they  understand  their 
natural  environment  not  only  better  than  we  do  but,  I  am 
inclined  to  think,  actually  better  in  some  respects  than  we 
understand  our  own. 

All  this,  however,  is  not  to  say  that  we  are  not  to  introduce 
any  of  our  ways  and  manners  at  Panama.  On  the  contrary, 
we  must  do  so,  promptly  and  resolutely,  if  our  enterprise 
there  is  to  prove  successful.  Americans  cannot  live  at  Pan- 
ama as  the  Panamans  live,  and  cannot  do  in  all  things  as  the 
Panamans  do.  There  must  be  special  laws  and  customs  and 
institutions  provided  for  the  benefit  of  the  Americans  who 
are  now  there  and  who  will  be  and  must  be  there  in  increas- 
ing numbers  in  future.  For  example,  Panamans  are  largely 
immune  against  yellow  fever,  while  Americans  are  not.  Pan- 
amans could  therefore  afford  to  neglect  sanitary  precautions 
which  are  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Americans.  But  for 
the  sake  of  Americans,  it  is  necessary  that  the  Panamans 
shall  adopt  and  maintain  regulations  which  seem  to  them 
unnecessary.  They  are  willing,  of  course,  to  do  so.  But 
even  with  their  voluntary  and  efficient  cooperation,  the  task 
of  keeping  Panama  free  from  pestilence  is  not  going  to  be 
an  easy  one.  That  is  not  because  the  place  itself  is  essen- 
tially unhealthful,  or  must  remain  so,  for  it  can  be  made 
almost  a  tropical  sanitarium,  but  because  it  is  and  will  be 
increasingly  subject  to  invasion  from  all  parts  of  the  world. 
It  is  to-day  a  cosmopolitan  spot.     But  when  the  canal  is 


"ETERNAL  VIGILANCE"  369 

opened  it  will  be  a  veritable  world  centre,  the  resort  of  trade 
and  travel  from  every  continent  and  from  all  the  islands  of 
the  seas.  With  every  plague  of  every  clime  making  insidi- 
ous approaches  to  it,  Panama  will  need,  and  needs  to-day 
and  from  this  day  forward  unremittingly,  a  sanitary  guard- 
ianship surpassed  by  none  in  the  world  for  intelligence,  for 
vigilance,  and  for  inflexible  authority. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PANAMA 

I  HESITATE  to  Write  of  Panama.  I  mean  not  only  Panama 
the  country,  but  also  and  more  especially  Panama  the  city, 
and  its  environs,  and  its  people.  I  mean  Panama,  with  its 
faults  and  frailties,  and  also  with  its  beauties  and  its  vir- 
tues, and  with  its  unique  and  ineffable  charm.  One  may  well 
hesitate  to  write  about  his  host,  save  with  unfailing  courtesy. 
Yet  at  least  equally  one  must  hesitate  to  write  aught  but  the 
truth.  Let  me  hope  that  in  writing  the  truth,  both  pleasant 
and  unpleasant,  unfailing  courtesy  may  prevail,  and  the  net 
balance  may  be  on  the  side  which  is  not  only  agreeable  but 
welcome  to  my  friends  in  Panama.  The  memory  of  that 
place  is  one  of  blue  skies,  seen  through  a  fairy  tracery  of 
palm-fronds;  of  quaint  old  streets  that  made  me  dream  a 
composite  dream  of  Seville,  Naples,  and  Hong  Kong;  of  a 
sea  more  blue  and  more  calm  than  ever  is  seen  on  our  bois- 
terous Atlantic  coasts ;  of  a  strange  mingling  of  the  fifteenth 
century  with  the  twentieth ;  of  pearl-roofed  spires  and  clan- 
gorous bells ;  of  a  riot  of  rich  colours  and  sweet  sounds ;  of 
a  hospitality  at  once  stately  and  inviting,  dignified  and 
cordial,  which  made  the  stranger  to  feel  at  home  and  the 
wanderer  to  realise  that  he  had  won  the  goal  of  his  desire. 
Because  of  such  memories  I  have  deferred  writing  of  Pan- 
ama until  I  have  written  of  all  else  that  I  may  write  about 
upon  the  Isthmus,  and  now  I  shall  try  to  write  of  Panama 
as  it  was,  but  as  it  will  be  no  more.  It  was  then  trembling 
upon  the  verge  of  a  great  and  strange  transition.  The  Pan- 
ama of  Philip  of  Hapsburg  still  remained,  and  the  Panama 
of  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  dawning  into  existence.  No 
more  suggestive  contrast  has  been  seen  in  all  the  world  than 

370 


IMPBESSIONS  OP  COLOK  371 

was  there  and  then  presented,  and  none  more  worthy  of 
commemoration. 

The  approach  was,  of  course,  by  way  of  Colon — the  Aspin- 
wall  of  earlier  years — and  it  must  be  confessed  it  was  not 
impressive.  The  translucent  ultramarine  of  the  Caribbean 
was  changed  as  we  approached  the  coast  to  turbid,  tawny 
yellow,  due  partly  to  the  muddy  outflow  of  the  Chagres  and 
partly  to  the  all  but  insistent  trade-winds  which  beat  upon 
that  coast  and  so  disturb  the  waters  of  the  open  roadstead 
as  constantly  to  stir  up  the  mud  from  the  shallower  bottoms. 
Yet  the  coast  itself  was  not  unattractive.  Low  and  flat  as 
Manzanillo  Island  itself  is,  at  each  side  and  at  the  inland 
background  the  eye  found  grateful  variety  in  swelling  hills 
and  jutting  headlands,  while  everywhere  was  a  riotous  pro- 
fusion of  verdure,  both  low  and  lofty.  The  rows  of  graceful, 
towering  palms,  all  leaning  at  a  uniform  angle  before  the 
trade-winds,  gave  even  the  squalid  streets  of  Colon  an  air 
of  distinction  at  a  distance.  But  it  must  be  confessed  that 
the  enchantment  of  the  view  was  in  great  measure  lent  by 
distance.  It  needed  only  a  short  time  ashore  to  persuade  me 
that  Colon  was  a  wretched  blunder.  The  site  is  all  but 
hopeless.  It  is  wind-swept,  and  therefore  not  as  hot  as  some 
other  places  on  the  Isthmus.  But  it  lies  at  only  the  slightest 
elevation  above  an  almost  tideless  sea,  in  one  of  the  rainiest 
climates  of  the  world.  The  result  is  such  humidity  as  not 
even  the  Ganges  Delta  knows,  and  an  almost  hopeless  lack  of 
drainage.  The  elevation  is  scarcely  sufficient  to  permit  sew- 
erage into  the  sea,  though  we  have  been  building  a  sewer 
system  there ;  and  such  sewage  as  does  find  its  way  into  the 
sea  is  not  swept  away  into  the  depths,  but  is  beaten  back 
upon  the  shore,  or  churned  about  in  the  shore  waters.  We 
used  to  say  of  certain  lands  that  they  would  be  delightful  if 
only  they  could  be  submerged  in  the  sea  for  an  hour,  until 
all  the  inhabitants  were  drowned  beyond  resuscitation,  and 
then  be  raised  again  for  a  new  population.  Colon  would  be 
an  attractive  place  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  could  be  elevated 
in  a  mass  ten  or  twenty  feet,  and  sustained  there.    If  enough 


3V2  PANAMA 

earth  for  that  purpose  can  be  brought  down  from  Culebra, 
well  and  good.  Colon  may  be  redeemed.  Otherwise,  it 
would  be  best  to  abandon  it  altogether  and  rebuild  else- 
where. 

When,  however,  we  got  away  from  the  reeking  coast 
swamps,  and  reached  solid  ground,  and  began  to  wind  our 
way  among  the  hills,  the  prospect  was  charmingly  trans- 
formed. The  general  landscape  varied  from  the  beautiful 
to  the  sublime,  while  detailed  bits  on  every  hand  presented 
an  exquisite  loveliness  beyond  the  power  of  words  to  describe. 
There  were  impenetrable  jungles  of  vines  and  fern  and  brake, 
and  there  were  stately  open  woodlands  of  palm  and  cedar 
and  mahogany  and  ceiba  and  a  hundred  other  woods.  There 
were  near  the  coast  some  sluggish  waters,  from  which  alli- 
gators leered  at  us  with  half-human,  half-reptilian  eyes, 
but  elsewhere  the  swift-flowing  streams  were  clear  as  crys- 
tal. Orchids  and  innumerable  other  flowers  glowed  and 
blazed  with  colours  which  would  be  the  despair  of  a  painter's 
palette,  but  of  course,  as  is  the  rule  in  tropic  lands,  most — 
not  all — of  them  were  without  perfume.  (Is  not,  by  the 
way,  the  same  to  be  said  of  our  flowers  in  the  north?  The 
majority  of  the  showy  ones  are  odourless,  or  have  unpleasant 
odours.)  Monkeys  chattered  in  the  treetops,  and  there 
was  assuredly  no  "loneliness  of  wings,"  with  the  countless 
multitudes  of  birds,  from  the  humming-birds,  scarcely  bigger 
than  a  bumble  bee,  to  parrots  and  cockatoos  as  big  as  barn- 
yard fowls — and,  of  course,  the  omnipresent  black  vulture, 
sailing  and  circling  on  motionless  wings  far  up  the  sky. 
Again,  according  to  the  rule  of  tropic  lands,  the  most  bril- 
liantly coloured  birds  were  songless.  (But  why  say  the  rule 
of  tropic  lands?  With  few  exceptions  the  same  is  true  else- 
where. One  little  brown  house  wren  can  outsing  a  whole 
flock  of  your  brilliant  jays  and  tanagers,  and  even  bluebirds 
and  orioles,  while  the  greatest  of  all  our  feathered  choir,  the 
catbird,  the  mocking-bird,  and  the  veery,  are  very  Quakers 
and  nuns  for  plainness  of  garb.) 

The  stretches  of  open  and  cultivated  country  were  by  no 


RESOUKCES  OF  ISTHMIAN  LANDS  373 

means  unattractive.  There  was  not,  of  course,  the  thrift  of  a 
New  England  farm,  nor  were  there  the  magnificent  expanses 
of  tillage  which  our  western  prairies  and  plains  afford.  But 
there  were  fine  corn-fields  and  creditable  gardens,  and  the 
rich  pasture  lands  showed  herds  of  cattle,  and  nowhere  did 
I  see  the  piteous  neglect  of  some  of  our  ^'abandoned  farms," 
or  the  dreary  shiftlessness  of  the  poorer  regions  of  our 
Southern  States.  Jerrold  said  that  in  Australia  "Earth  is 
so  kind,  that  just  tickle  her  with  a  hoe  and  she  laughs  with 
a  harvest."  In  Panama  she  does  not  need  so  much  as  the 
tickling.  If  ever  there  was  a  land  of  natural  plenty,  "flow- 
ing with  milk  and  honey,"  it  is  Panama.  Unhappily,  such 
profusion  of  nature's  bounty,  and  the  consequent  ease  of 
sustenance,  in  the  absence  of  commercial  and  industrial 
stimulus,  have  greatly  induced  neglect  and  sloth.  There 
is  nothing  more  impressive  on  the  Isthmus  than  the  magni- 
tude of  the  opportunities  and  the  completeness  with  which 
they  are  neglected.  Corn  grows  as  well  there  as  in  Georgia 
or  Illinois,  and  you  can  grow  three  crops  of  it  in  a  year. 
Yet  it  is  a  neglected  industry.  Some  cattle  are  raised,  with 
much  success.  But  what  would  not  be  possible  in  a  land 
where  the  rich  guinea  grass  produces  the  equivalent  of  from 
20  to  30  tons  of  hay  to  the  acre,  and  of  course  cattle  can 
be  at  pasture  the  whole  year  round?  There  are,  I  am  told, 
some  300  acres  planted  with  india  rubber  trees,  in  Panama. 
Yet  there  are  hundreds  of  square  miles  on  which  some  of 
them — notably  the  fine  Castilloa  elastica — would  flourish. 
You  may  plant  a  hundred  trees  on  the  acre,  at  a  cost 
of  only  thirty  dollars,  and  in  a  few  years  each  tree  will  be 
yielding  from  two  to  ten  pounds  of  rubber  a  year,  worth 
nearly  a  dollar  a  pound.  The  San  Bias  Indians  raise  some 
of  the  finest  coffee  in  the  world,  and  its  culture  might  be 
general  throughout  much  of  the  republic.  As  for  cocoanuts, 
bananas,  all  the  citrus  fruits,  vanilla,  sarsaparilla,  ipecac- 
uanha, indigo,  and  what  not  else,  the  Isthmus  is  their 
chosen  home. 

Amid  all  this  luxuriance  and  these  unbounded  possibili- 


374  PANAMA 

ties  a  large  proportion  of  the  people  lead  an  indolent,  unam- 
bitious life.  Cabins  built  of  logs  and  thatch  form  their 
homes,  surrounded  by  banana  and  cocoanut  trees,  with  per- 
haps an  acre  or  two  of  cultivated  ground.  Scarcely  less 
primitive,  and  much  more  squalid,  are  the  homes  in  the  vil- 
lages. The  "native"  streets  of  the  villages  along  the  rail- 
road, and  practically  the  entire  villages  remote  from  that 
line,  are  composed  of  thatched  cabins  of  one  or  two  rooms 
each.  The  main  streets  of  the  railroad  villages,  built  largely 
by  foreigners,  have  two-storied  houses  of  dressed  lumber, 
which  are  really  far  more  squalid  and  vastly  less  picturesque 
than  the  thatched  cabins.  These  villages  are  not  lovely  to 
look  at  or  to  smell  of.  Squalid  and  savage,  most  visitors 
would  say.  Yes,  but  in  that  genial  clime  life  in  such  quar- 
ters is  not  physically  uncomfortable,  and  really  its  condi- 
tions even  at  the  worst  are  not  nearly  as  shocking,  not  as 
squalid,  not  as  repulsive  to  see,  as  are  those  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  both  blacks  and  whites  in  our  own  Southern 
States,  and  in  some  parts  of  some  of  our  Northern  States, 
or  of  the  denizens  of  the  overcrowded,  reeking,  rotting  slums 
of  our  great  cities.  I  have  seen  within  an  hour  or  two  of 
New  York,  and  even  in  the  immediate  suburbs  of  that  city, 
in  rural  villages,  families  of  white  Americans,  of  several 
generations  of  American  ancestry,  living  in  worse  squalor 
than  any  in  Panama ;  while  as  for  some  of  the  metropolitan 
tenements,  which  still  exist  in  this  Twientieth  Century,  by 
the  side  of  them  the  hovels  of  Panama  appear  like  sanita- 
riums and  pleasure  resorts. 

The  city  of  Panama  is  unfortunate  in  its  entrance-way,  by 
land;  the  railroad  delivering  you  in  one  of  its  very  poorest 
quarters.  In  that  respect  it  does  not  differ  from  many  other 
places  of  greater  pretensions.  Some  parts  of  Newark  (New 
Jersey),  for  example,  and  of  Atlanta  (Georgia),  are  excep- 
tionally handsome  and  attractive;  yet  it  would  be  diflScult  to 
imagine  anything  more  dreary  and  uninviting  than  the 
aspect  of  those  really  splendid  cities  from  a  railroad  train. 
At  the  time  of  our  advent  in  Panama,  the  roadways  of  the 


THE  STKEETS  OF  PANAMA  375 

streets  were  mud,  dust,  and  cobblestones,  varied  with  cob 
blestones,  mud,  and  dust.  Perhaps  there  were  worse  paved 
streets,  somewhere.  Of  course  we  used  to  have  in  New  York 
and  Brooklyn  streets  paved  with  cobblestones,  in  all  respects 
but  one  probably  as  bad  as  those  of  Panama.  But  the  Pan- 
aman  streets  were  unique  in  having  a  sort  of  fret-work,  or 
diaper  work,  composed  of  rows  of  bigger  stones,  rising  above 
the  general  cobble-level  two  or  three  inches,  and  crossing 
the  streets  at  all  sorts  of  angles,  a  few  feet  or  yards  apart. 
It  is  all  changed  now;  and  you  may  ride  about  the  town, 
from  the  Chiriqui  Plaza  to  the  Savannahs,  on  smooth  pave- 
ments of  vitrified  brick,  and  macadam.  But  never,  till  oste- 
opathy is  a  lost  art,  shall  I  forget  the  sensations  of  riding 
along  those  fretted-cobblestone  streets,  in  a  cabriolet  with- 
out rubber  tires,  and  with  the  most  inflexible  of  springs,  and 
with  the  little  horses  always  at  a  gallop ! 

The  streets  were — and  are — generally  narrow,  many  of 
them  little  if  any  wider  than  some  of  the  narrowest  in  New 
York  and  Boston  and  Philadelphia.  Their  narrowness  is 
accentuated,  too,  by  the  overhanging  balconies  which  run 
along  the  second  stories  of  many  of  the  houses,  from  one  to 
the  other  of  which  an  agile  man  might  leap  across  some 
streets.  Yet  none  of  the  streets  seem  quite  as  narrow  as 
some  in  New  York,  for  the  reason  that  the  buildings  seldom 
exceed  three  stories  in  height.  Panama  contains  no  such 
canyon  of  gloom  and  hideousness  as  Nassau  Street  or  Ex- 
change Place,  in  New  York.  Some  Panaman  streets  are 
crooked,  though  as  a  rule  they  are  straighter  and  more  regu- 
lar than  those  of  some  parts  of  New  York  and  Boston — not 
to  mention  many  European  cities.  Some  of  them  are  steep, 
too,  so  that  the  sidewalks  are  built  like  flights  of  stairs,  but 
these  are  very  few.  The  sidewalks  are  narrow,  and  the 
buildings  abut  directly  upon  them,  without  any  intervening 
area,  bringing  the  passer-by  into  a  somewhat  startling  prox- 
imity to  the  interiors,  with  the  doors  and  windows  wide 
open,  at  sidewalk-level.  As  a  rule,  however,  the  ground 
floors  are  not  used  for  dwelling  purposes,  save  by  the  poorer 


376  PANAMA 

classes.  All  the  better  residences  are  upstairs,  sometimes 
with  shops  or  business  offices  below,  and  sometimes  with  the 
ground  floor  a  vacant  court-yard.  The  typical  house  of  the 
best  class  is  built  of  stone,  brick,  or  concrete,  with  thick 
walls  through  which  the  heat  of  the  sun  never  penetrates. 
It  is  built  around  an  open  central  court,  and  has  a  shaded 
balcony  along  the  street  front  of  the  second  story.  The  roof 
is  of  heavy,  heat-resisting  tiles.  Often  the  windows  are  void 
of  glass,  slatted  blinds  taking  the  place  of  sashes. 

The  city  contains  a  number  of  parks,  the  most  important 
being  the  Plaza  de  la  Cathedral  and  the  Plaza  Santa  Anna. 
These  are  small,  mere  squares,  but  of  much  beauty.  The 
Plaza  de  la  Cathedral  is  the  real  centre  of  the  city.  Upon 
it  face  the  stately  old  Cathedral,  with  its  towers  roofed  with 
mother-of-pearl;  the  Bishop's  palace,  with  the  office  of  the 
Panama  Lottery  Company  on  the  ground  floor;  the  Grand 
Central  Hotel,  the  City  Hall,  the  handsome  Canal  Adminis- 
tration Building,  and  several  important  banking  houses  and 
stores,  while  close  by  are  the  fine  mansion  of  the  American 
Minister  and  the  attractive  quarters  of  the  Commercial  Club. 
In  the  park  is  a  band  stand,  where  an  excellent  band  dis- 
courses music  every  Sunday  evening  and  on  various  other 
occasions.  The  Government  House  is  a  few  squares  away. 
It  is  a  stately  and  sumptuously  furnished  mansion,  fronting 
eastward  upon  the  Bay  of  Panama;  and  commanding  from 
its  spacious  balconies  a  landscape  and  seascape  of  singular 
beauty.  The  ancient  sea  wall  which  extends  along  the  water- 
front at  the  southwest  part  of  the  city  affords  a  charming 
promenade,  at  an  elevation,  from  which  one  can  overlook 
on  the  one  hand  the  red-tiled  roofs  of  the  city  interspersed 
with  masses  of  palm  fronds,  with  the  great  mass  of  Ancon 
Hill  in  the  background,  and  on  the  other  the  serene  azure 
expanse  of  the  Pacific,  with  the  islands  of  Taboga,  Naos, 
Perico,  and  Flamengo  jutting  up  "like  peaks  of  some  sunk 
continent." 

There  is,  of  course,  a  seamy  side  to  Panama.  I  found 
some  streets  given  over  to  filth  and  squalor,  but  none  worse, 


THE  SEAMY  SIDE  377 

on  the  whole,  than  some  I  have  seen  in  New  York.  Indeed, 
I  should  say  that  nowhere  did  I  find  conditions  quite  as 
depressing  and  repulsive  as  some  in  the  American  metrop- 
olis. However  poor  the  place,  and  however  ragged  the 
clothing,  house  and  people  still  had  a  certain  artistic  air,  or 
at  least  an  air  of  joyousness  and  content.  There  was  none  of 
the  sordid  sullenness  and  black  despair  which  are  so  ominous 
a  feature  of  the  denizens  of  our  northern  slums.  The  place 
at  its  poorest  reminded  me  of  the  Spanish  caballero  of  ruined 
fortune  who  discovered  that  he  had  not  enough  money  to 
buy  a  breakfast,  and  so  must  go  hungry,  but  at  least  had 
enough  to  buy  a  bunch  of  violets !  To  pick  one's  steps  among 
a  dozen  quite  naked  babies,  sunning  themselves  on  a  side- 
walk in  Panama,  was  not  half  as  unpleasant  to  humane  sus- 
ceptibilities as  to  see  a  single  barefoot  newsboy  in  the  streets 
of  New  York.  No  doubt  there  is  vice,  too,  in  Panama.  The 
American  colony  there  would  assure  that.  And  vice  is  vice, 
the  world  over.  But  at  least  it  does  not  flaunt  itself  in  Pan- 
ama as  openly  as  in  many  cities  of  the  United  States;  and 
while  the  native  morals  of  Panama  are  doubtless  open  to 
much  reproach,  it  is,  I  believe,  a  fact  that  the  chief  pur- 
veyors of  vice  and  the  chief  patronage  of  their  establish- 
ments are  of  North  American  origin. 

One  thing  that  gTeatly  impressed  me  at  Panama  was  the 
sobriety  of  the  people.  There  was  much  drinking,  no  doubt, 
and  it  was  drinking  of  strong  liquors,  too.  Whiskey  and 
rum  and  brandy  and  gin  flowed  freely.  Yet  there  was  no 
drunkenness,  save  among  the  American  element.  I  cannot 
remember  that  I  saw  a  single  Panaman  intoxicated,  though 
I  was  compelled  to  blush  for  shame  at  the  condition  of  sev- 
eral of  my  own  countrymen.  One  evening — it  was  the  even- 
ing when,  as  I  have  related  in  a  former  chapter,  Secretary 
Taft  made  his  memorable  speech  to  the  people  of  Panama 
from  the  balcony  of  the  Grand  Central  Hotel — it  was  an- 
nounced that  for  two  hours,  from  six  to  eight  o'clock,  every 
barroom  on  the  Cathedral  Plaza  would  serve  free  drinks  to 
all  comers  at  government  expense.    A  shocking  way  for  a 


378  PANAMA 

national  government  to  celebrate  a  great  occasion,  some  will 
say.  Doubtless  it  was,  from  some  points  of  view.  But,  as  I 
have  already  tried  to  make  plain,  there  are  other  points  of 
view  than  ours,  which  perhaps  are  no  less  entitled  to  respect 
from  us  than  ours  is  from  others.  I  remembered,  that  night, 
the  saloon  I  had  noticed  one  day  on  the  road  to  "Section," 
with  its  hospitable  sign :  "Caf6  of  All  Nations :  All  Nations 
Welcome,  except  Carrie !"  and  I  wondered  how  such  a  festi- 
val would  be  regarded  by  the  strenuous  hatchet-wielder 
whose  name  was  thus  taken  in  vain.  At  about  the  height 
of  the  orgy  I  went  over  to  the  barroom  of  the  Grand  Central 
Hotel,  the  biggest  and  most  frequented  in  the  city,  and 
watched  the  proceedings  from  the  coign  of  vantage  afforded 
by  the  top  of  a  large  up-ended  cask.  The  scene  was  not 
unlike  the  Brooklj^n  Bridge  entrance  in  rush  hours.  At 
one  end  of  the  big  room  there  poured  in  a  tumultuous  throng 
of  men  and  boys  of  all  ages,  colours,  and  present  conditions 
of  thirstiness,  literally  climbing  over  each  other  in  their 
eagerness  to  reach  the  bar.  Before  the  bar  they  were 
crowded  like  massed  players  in  a  football  rush.  Behind  the 
bar  were  half  a  dozen  active  and  agile  men,  handing  out 
drinks  with  both  hands.  But  not  drinks  by  the  glass.  Oh, 
no!  A  full  bottle  was  placed  in  every  outstretched  hand, 
whiskey  or  wine  or  beer,  as  the  taste  might  be.  And  then 
at  the  other  end  of  the  room  there  poured  out  a  half- 
reluctant  throng,  each  man  or  boy  with  at  least  one  bottle 
snugly  held  beneath  his  arm. 

Now,  suppose  that  had  been  tried  in  New  York,  or  Wash- 
ington, or  any  North  American  city?  I  do  not  care  whether 
it  had  been  on  Fifth  Avenue  or  on  the  Bowery — in  five  min- 
utes there  would  have  been  a  dozen  fights,  and  a  hurry  call 
for  police  reserves  and  ambulances,  and  it  would  have 
required  an  expert  census-taker  to  enumerate  the  "drunks." 
But  in  Panama  there  was  not  a  man  intoxicated,  not  a  blow 
struck,  not  a  hard  word  spoken ;  and  all  the  police  had  to  do 
was  to  stand  around  and  watch  the  fun !  Of  course,  it  was 
a  hideous  orgy,  a  degrading  debauch,  and  all  that.    Yet  it 


AN  ISTHMIAN  SUNDAY  379 

was  as  good-natured,  and  as  free  from  ruflSanism,  and  as 
sober,  as  a  Sunday  School  picnic.  And  somehow  I  could  not 
help  contrasting  it,  and  not  to  the  disadvantage  of  Panama, 
with  some  particularly  fashionable  and  aristocratic  "social 
functions"  in  Washington  and  Philadelphia  and  New  York, 
from  which  many  of  the  guests  went  away  maudlin.  Nay, 
a  contrast  was  presented  later  that  same  evening,  when  I 
personally  assisted,  with  physical  force,  in  restraining  two 
of  my  fellow  Americans,  who  had  become  hopelessly  drunk, 
from  creating  a  public  scandal. 

On  Sunday  evenings  all  Panama  went  to  the  promenade 
concert  in  the  Cathedral  Plaza.  The  fashion  and  the  beauty 
of  the  city  were  there,  strolling  to  and  fro  beneath  the  palm 
fronds,  now  in  the  full  blaze  of  the  electric  lights,  and  now 
under  only  the  softer  lustre  of  the  tropical  constellations.  It 
suggested  a  scene  in  a  great  conservatory  adjoining  some 
fashionable  New  York  ballroom,  save  that  the  men  were  in 
white  duck  instead  of  black  broadcloth.  Moreover,  there 
were  plebeians  as  well  as  patricians — the  twenty  thousand 
as  well  as  the  Four  Hundred  of  Panama.  But  in  what  city 
of  the  United  States,  at  an  open-air  evening  concert  in  a 
park,  would  it  be  fitting,  as  in  Panama,  for  girls  and  women 
of  refinement  to  stroll  about  without  chaperons  or  male 
escorts;  and  where,  if  they  did  so,  would  they  be  secure 
against  insult  or  annoyance?  Where,  indeed,  would  such 
a  gathering  be  exempt  from  an  amount  of  "hoodlumism'^ 
requiring  frequent  activity  of  the  police? 

It  was  a  queer  Sunday,  that  of  Panama ;  at  least  to  any 
one  possessed  of  even  a  fragment  of  the  traditional  "New 
England  conscience.'^  In  the  forenoon  we  went  to  church, 
if  we  were  so  disposed;  and  noticed  the  multitudes  of  mos- 
quito "wigglers"  in  the  holy  water  in  the  Cathedral  font. 
At  noon  we  went  to  the  Bishop's  palace,  to  attend  the  weekly 
drawing  of  the  lottery,  and  to  assure  ourselves  that  we  had 
nothing  better  than  blanks.  Most  of  the  afternoon  was  given 
up  to  the  siesta.  In  the  evening  there  was  the  promenade 
concert ;  and  after  that  there  was,  for  the  select  few,  a  ball 


380  PANAMA 

at  the  Commercial  Club,  where  the  youth  and  beauty  of 
Panama  danced  until  well  on  into  Monday  morning.  Most 
of  it  was  very  reprehensible  and  shocking,  no  doubt,  from 
the  orthodox  United  States  point  of  view;  and  yet  it  was 
all  very  orderly  and  quiet  and  well  disposed,  and  not  nearly 
as  offensive  to  the  thoughtful  mind  as  the  furtive  sneaking 
in  and  out  of  saloon  side  doors  in  a  city  where  reputedly 
rigid  "Sunday  laws"  prevail.  Of  course,  I  am  not  arguing 
that  these  Panaman  customs  should  be  adopted  in  New  York. 
That  would  be  incongruous  and  indeed  impossible — as  much 
so  as  to  enforce  our  customs  in  Panama.  The  point  to  be 
kept  in  mind  is  that  which  I  have  already  expressed,  that 
Panama  is  Panama  and  not  the  United  States,  and  is  prop- 
erly to  remain  so,  and  not  be  dragooned  into  the  alien  ways 
of  the  alien  folk  who  have  now  come  into  so  close  relations 
with  it. 

Business  in  Panama  is  business,  as  it  is  the  world  over. 
There  are  handsome  and  well-stocked  "department  stores," 
or  bazaars  as  they  are  called;  some  conducted  by  Panamans 
and  some  by  Chinese  merchants.  The  transaction  of  busi- 
ness is  more  quiet  and  deliberate  than  in  American  cities, 
but  certainly  not  less  satisfactory.  Prices  rule  much  lower 
than  in  New  York,  whether  for  American  or  for  European 
goods.  In  some  lines  of  goods,  particularly  for  men's  wear, 
it  was  somewhat  disappointing  to  American  pride  to  find 
the  European  goods  of  by  far  the  better  quality,  at  the  same 
or  actually  less  price.  In  other  lines,  however,  notably  hard- 
ware, American  goods  easily  dominated  the  market. 

The  Panama  landlord  is  much  like  his  brethren  elsewhere. 
His  rule  is  to  get  as  much  and  spend  as  little  as  he  can.  A 
friend  of  mine  wanted  to  lease  a  house  in  the  city.  The  land- 
lord positively  refused  to  give  him  a  year's  lease,  and  was 
with  the  utmost  diflBculty  at  last  prevailed  upon  to  give  him 
a  lease  for  as  long  as  two  months.  Why?  Because,  he 
frankly  said,  he  might  want  to  increase  the  rental  before  a 
year  had  passed.  And  he  did.  The  house  contained  no  bath- 
room and  no  plumbing,  and  as  the  landlord  would  not  supply 


BUSINESS  WAYS  AND  MEANS  381 

such  things,  my  American  friend,  who  regarded  them  as 
necessities,  had  them  put  in  at  his  own  expense.  I  believe 
he  spent  about  $500,  in  permanent  improvements  on  the 
house,  which,  of  course,  would  remain  there  for  the  land- 
lord's benefit.  Thereupon,  at  the  end  of  the  two  months,  the 
landlord  promptly  and  very  materially  raised  the  rent; 
because,  he  naively  explained,  the  house  was  worth  a  great 
deal  more,  since  all  those  improvements  had  been  made  in  it ! 

Hotel  rates  were  high.  My  friends  told  me  that  when 
they  paid  their  weekly  bills,  they  felt  that  they  ought  to  get 
in  return  title  deeds  for  the  building  and  ground !  I  know 
that  when,  occasionally,  I  was  compelled  to  patronise  a 
hotel,  it  impressed  me  unpleasantly  to  have  to  pay  two  or 
three  dollars  for  a  breakfast  which  I  could  easily  equal  in 
New  York  or  Washington  for  less  than  a  dollar.  In  the 
matter  of  cab  fares,  however,  Panama  had  an  advantage 
over  all  American  cities  of  my  acquaintance.  Ten  cents 
was  the  uniform  rate,  for  any  distance  within  the  city 
limits.  It  was,  however,  necessary  to  make  it  a  "contin- 
uous passage."  If  the  cab  was  halted  for  even  an  instant, 
to  speak  to  a  friend,  to  take  a  snap-shot  photograph,  or  for 
any  other  purpose,  a  second  fare  was  charged.  Thus  a  ride 
of  ten  minutes,  with  five  stops  of  a  minute  each,  would  cost 
fifty  cents,  while  a  ride  of  half  an  hour  with  no  stops  would 
cost  only  ten  cents.  On  the  whole,  even  with  frequent  stop- 
pings, it  was  cheap  riding.  And  there  was  no  extra  charge 
for  the  osteopathic  treatment  we  got  from  the  combination 
of  cobblestones,  steel  tires,  and  stiff  springs. 

If  some  Panaman  business  men,  especially  landlords  and 
hotel  proprietors,  do  seem  a  bit  rapacious,  there  is  no  cause 
for  wonder  and  little  cause  for  blame.  They  are  merely 
living  up  to  the  traditions  of  the  land.  We  were  talking  one 
day  with  some  Panamans,  whose  family  names  are  on  the 
rolls  of  Columbus's  and  Balboa's  and  Cortez's  companies. 
"Did  your  ancestors  come  hither  with  Balboa?"  I  asked  one. 
Before  he  could  reply,  an  audacious  American  broke  in  with 
"No!  with  Harry  Morgan!"     The  Panamans  roared  with 


382  PANAMA 

laughter,  and  confessed  the  hit  well  made.  I  have  never 
felt  inclined  greatly  to  blame  our  Southern  negroes  for 
sometimes  disregarding  the  law  of  meum  et  tuum,  especially 
when  chickens  or  watermelons  are  in  question,  because  for 
generations,  in  slavery  days,  that  law  was  practically  made 
a  dead  letter  to  them.  Well,  so  it  is  with  the  Panamans — 
with  a  distinction,  of  course.  In  the  old  Spanish  days, 
from  Pedrarias  Davila,  through  the  days  of  Drake,  in  the 
dark  time  of  Morgan,  and  all  the  way  down  to  Sharpe  and 
Paterson,  they  were  so  frequently  the  victims  of  spoliation 
that  they  began  to  apply  to  all  life 

"...  the  good  old  rule 

the  simple  plan, 

That  they  should  take  who  have  the  power, 
And  they  should  keep  who  can." 

Nor  did  their  three-fourths  of  a  century  of  connection 
with  Colombia  do  aught  to  change  their  view  or  practice. 
The  rule  in  the  days  of  the  "Forty-Niners"  was  to  exact  all 
possible  tribute  from  the  gold-seekers  and  gold-bearers  who 
crossed  the  Isthmus,  and  the  mad  profligacy  of  the  De  Les- 
sepsian  regime  confirmed  them  in  whatever  grasping  procliv- 
ities heredity  had  given  them.  Some  of  them  are  probably 
disappointed  and  grieved,  to  find  that  the  American  advent 
does  not  mean  a  renewal  and  perpetuation  of  the  extrava- 
gance and  "graft"  of  the  French.  Yet,  on  the  whole,  I  fancy 
that  the  business  men  of  Panama  are  no  less  honest  and  no 
more  selfish  or  rapacious  than  those  of  other  cities,  the  world 
around. 

Above  all,  as  I  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  I 
hesitate  to  write  of  the  people  of  Panama,  as  I  met  them 
and  knew  them,  and  of  their  social  and  domestic  life,  into 
which  I  was  permitted  to  enter.  I  shall  probably  not  be 
able  to  do  so  without  incurring  the  imputation  of  partiality, 
which,  however,  I  feel  certain  I  do  not  deserve.  To  me,  the 
Panamans  were  almost  wholly  charming.  I  had  not  been 
prepossessed  in  their  favour.    For  many  years  I  had  come 


COSMOPOLITAN  CULTUEE  383 

into  occasional  contact,  here  in  the  United  States,  with  peo- 
ple from  Latin  America,  and  I  had  not  learned  to  like  them. 
Perhaps  that  was  because  they  were  here  removed  from  their 
native  and  harmonious  environment.  But  when  I  got  among 
them  in  their  own  land  and  city,  the  whole  impression  was 
one  of  charm.  In  the  first  place,  there  was  a  fine  cosmopoli- 
tanism of  knowledge  and  interest,  such  as  not  more  than  one 
or  two  American  cities — and  not  New  York — could  rival.  I 
found  that  they  knew  a  great  deal  more"  about  us  than  we 
about  them.  They  knew  at  least  as  much,  too,  about  Europe 
and  the  world  at  large  as  the  best  informed  and  most  widely 
travelled  Americans.  Why  not?  Here  was  one  who  had 
spent  four  years  in  one  of  the  largest  American  universi- 
ties and  four  more  in  a  New  York  medical  college.  Here  was 
one  who  was  graduated  from  a  New  England  college  and 
from  a  great  German  university.  Here  was  one  who  had 
travelled  three  times  around  the  world,  by  three  different 
routes.  Here  was  a  jurist  who  could  make  arguments  or 
render  decisions  with  equal  readiness  in  Spanish,  English, 
French,  or  Latin.  Here  were  half  a  dozen  pretty  girls,  chat- 
tering away  in  a  medley  of  tongues,  as  in  a  boudoir  at  Babel ; 
and  when  I  ventured  to  compliment  one  upon  her  perfect 
English  accent,  they  cried  in  chorus,  "What's  the  matter  with 
the  rest  of  us  ?  We  all  studied  in  New  Y^'ork  and  Baltimore !" 
If  there  is  as  high  an  average  of  intellectual  acumen  and  of 
cosmopolitan  culture  in  a  fashionable  New  Y^'ork  reception 
as  I  found  in  gatherings  in  the  salon  of  President  Amador, 
then  the  groves  of  Academia  are  nearer  to  the  banks  of  the 
Hudson  than  I  have  supposed. 

This  cosmopolitanism  of  Panama  has  been,  of  course, 
much  promoted  by  the  advantage  of  situation.  Mohammed 
has  not  had  to  go  to  the  mountain;  the  mountain  has  come 
to  him.  All  the  world  has  crossed  the  Isthmus  and  has 
passed  through  the  streets  of  Panama.  We  were  at  a  great 
state  banquet  given  by  the  government  one  evening  and  I 
was  admiring — as  they  well  deserved  to  be  admired — its 
general  appointments,  which  would  have  been  highly  cred- 


384  PANAMA 

itable  to  the  best  New  York  hotel.  "Panama  has  certainly 
^done  herself  proud/  to-night,"  I  said.  "Yes,"  said  my  Pan- 
aman  neighbour,  "but  she  has  drawn  upon  the  whole  world 
to  enable  her  to  do  it.  This  fish,  and  some  of  these  fruits, 
are  from  Panama.  These  olives  and  these  vegetables  are 
from  the  United  States.  This  butter  is  from  Denmark. 
This  wine  is  from  France,  and  Italy.  This  whiskey  is  from 
Scotland.  This  mineral  water  is  from  Germany."  And  so 
he  went  through  the  entire  menu ;  and  what  was  true  of  that 
banquet  is  largely  true  of  the  whole  life  of  Panama. 

So  will  it  be  henceforward,  in  the  great  new  era  which 
is  dawning  upon  Panama.  Through  the  canal  which  we  are 
cutting  the  tides  of  the  world's  travel  and  trade  will  flow  in 
floods  such  as  have  scarcely  been  dreamed  of  in  former  days. 
Half  the  people  of  the  world  live  in  lands  fronting  upon 
the  Paciflc,  and  this  canal  will  be  the  gateway  of  that  ocean. 
That  fact  alone  is  of  ample  significance.  Couple  with  it  the 
fact  that  the  canal  will  be  an  integral  part  of  our  own 
coast  line,  giving  for  the  first  time  direct  navigation  be- 
tween our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports  on  the  one  hand  and  our 
Pacific  ports  on  the  other.  Once  more,  observe  that  by  way 
of  Panama  we  shall  have  for  the  first  time  direct  water  com- 
munication with  the  rich  western  coast  of  South  America. 
Let  us  note  a  few  comparative  distances.  From  New  York 
to  San  Francisco  by  way  of  the  Strait  of  Magellan  is  13,107 
miles,  and  by  way  of  Panama  it  will  be  only  5,294,  a  saving 
of  7,813  miles.  From  New  York  to  Callao  (Peru),  by  way  of 
Cape  Horn  is  9,700  miles,  and  by  way  of  Panama  it  will 
be  only  3,359  miles,  or  a  little  more  than  one-third  as  far. 
From  New  York  to  Auckland  by  way  of  Cape  Horn  is  11,771 
miles,  and  by  way  of  Panama  it  will  be  only  8,610  miles, 
a  saving  of  3,161  miles.  From  New  York  to  Sydney  by  way 
of  Cape  Horn  is  13,051  miles  and  by  way  of  Panama  it  will 
be  only  9,709  miles,  a  saving  of  3,342.  Marked,  too,  is  the 
contrast  against  the  Suez  route.  From  New  York  to  Shang- 
hai by  way  of  Suez  is  13,324  miles,  while  by  way  of  Pan- 
ama it  will  be  only  10,689  miles.    From  New  York  to  Yoke- 


g^i^coH  Ubt«ty 


COMPAKISONS  OF  EOUTES  385 

hama  by  way  of  Suez  is  13,042  miles,  and  by  way  of  Panama 
it  will  be  only  9,719  miles.  Nor  will  New  York  be  the  only 
gainer.  All  our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports  will  profit,  some 
in  even  more  notable  degree.  Thus  from  New  Orleans  to 
San  Francisco  by  way  of  Cape  Horn  is  13,650  miles,  while 
by  way  of  Panama  it  will  be  only  4,700  miles.  From  New 
Orleans  to  Callao  by  way  of  Cape  Horn  is  10,100  miles,  and 
by  way  of  Panama  it  will  be  only  2,750  miles. 

If  we  reckon  Panama  the  centre  of  the  Pacific  Coast  of 
the  American  continents,  as  indeed  it  is,  for  it  lies  almost 
exactly  equidistant  between  Sitka  and  Cape  Horn,  we  may 
measure  the  gain  of  the  canal  to  Atlantic  commerce  by  the 
difference  in  distance  to  Panama  by  way  of  the  Strait  of 
Magellan,  now  the  shortest  existing  water  route,  and  by 
the  canal.  Let  us  regard  such  distances  from  both  Ameri- 
can and  European  ports,  in  tabular  form : . 


To  Panama 

By  Strait  of 

By 

the 

Saving  by 

from 

Magel] 

ian 

Canal 

Canal 

Antwerp 

11,383 

miles 

4,463 

miles 

6,920  miles 

Charleston 

10,803 

1,611 

9,192    " 

Galveston 

11,391 

1,545 

9,846    " 

Genoa 

11,143 

5,229 

5,914     " 

Hamburg 

11,614 

5,054 

6,560     " 

Havana 

10,682 

1,425 

9,257     " 

Havre 

11,156 

4,648 

6,508     " 

Liverpool 

11,261 

4,575 

6,686     " 

Marseilles 

10,985 

5,071 

5,914     " 

New  Orleans 

10,286 

1,425 

8,861     " 

New  York 

10,851 

2,017 

8,834     " 

Southampton 

11,137 

4,608 

6,529     " 

These  figures  tell  their  own  story  and  they  speak  with 
convincing  eloquence  of  the  future  of  Panama.  The  two 
ports  of  Panama  and  Colon  are  now  visited  by  1,000  vessels 
a  year,  landing  1,000,000  tons  of  merchandise,  and  the  Isth- 
mus is  crossed  by  100,000  travellers.  What  will  those  fig- 
ures be  when  the  canal  is  opened,  and  there  goes  thither  all 
the  traffic  that  now  passes  around  Cape  Horn  and  through 


386  PANAMA 

the  Strait  of  Magellan  and  much  that  goes  by  way  of  Suez? 
Nor  will  it  do  to  say  the  canal  will  be  a  mere  passageway, 
and  that  the  city  and  republic  of  Panama  will  profit  from 
it  no  more  than  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  has  locally  profited 
from  its  canal.  There  is  an  immeasurable  difference  between 
the  two.  The  climate,  the  people,  the  scenery,  the  resources, 
and  all  the  conditions  and  circumstances  of  Panama  are  as 
attractive,  opulent,  and  promising  as  those  of  Suez  are  abom- 
inable, squalid,  and  depressing.  No  rational  man  desires  at 
Suez  anything  more  than  the  utmost  speed  in  passing 
through  and  getting  away,  and  his  memory  of  it,  in  sight 
and  smell  and  sound  and  taste  and  feeling  is  altogether  one 
which  he  would  gladly  erase  from  the  tortured  tablets  of  the 
mind.  But  those  who  pass  by  way  of  Panama  will  wish  to 
linger  long  in  sheer  delight  amid  its  scenes  of  beauty;  and, 
taking  at  last  a  reluctant  leave,  will  cherish  forever  a  mem- 
ory of  emerald  shores  and  sapphire  seas,  of  feathery  palm 
fronds  and  pearl-roofed  spires,  of  lovely  women  and  of 
courteous,  hospitable  men,  of  a  fascinating  cosmoculus  of 
all  times  and  places,  manners  and  customs,  tribes  and 
nations,  of  nature's  very  masterpiece  of  riotous  luxuriance — 

*'  Larger  constellations  burning,  mellow  moons  and  happy  skies, 
Breadths  of  tropic  shade  and  palms  in  cluster,  knots  of  Paradise." 

On  one  never-to-be-forgotten  Sunday  at  Panama  we  visited 
the  Pearl  Islands — that  wondrous  cluster  of  summer  isles  ot 
Eden  lying  not  in  dark  purple  spheres  of  sea  but  in  a  sea 
that  differs  from  the  overarching  sky  only  in  being  a  deeper, 
purer  blue.  We  had  trailed  the  daring  divers  through  the 
deeps  by  their  long  wakes  of  opalescent  bubbles;  we  had 
spied  out  the  nestling  villages  beneath  the  palm  trees  on 
the  cliffs;  we  had  feasted,  and  danced,  and  drunk  deep  of 
the  beauty  and  mystery  of  the  sea — of  that  storied  South 
Sea  where  Drake  had  mingled  crimson  with  the  blue  and 
blended  thus  the  purple  of  world-wide  empire ;  we  had  even 
organised,  some  favoured  few  of  us,  such  a  joyous  Junta 
as  surely  not  even  that  realm  of  Juntas  had  known  before; 


A  MEMORABLE  PANORAMA  387 

and  then  at  last,  we  were  returning,  with  reluctance  to 
leave  the  Fortunate  Isles  and  the  Sea  of  Peace,  though  with 
gladness  to  regain  the  gardens  and  the  palm  groves  that  lay 
in  the  shadow  of  Ancon  Hill.  Then,  as  we  neared  the  city, 
as  the  sun  was  setting,  and  the  rich  colouring  of  sea  and 
sky  and  land  gave  to  the  scene  an  air  of  unreal  and  unearthly 
beauty,  a  strange  thing  appeared.  Upon  the  crest  of  Ancon, 
and  upon  the  summits  and  shoulders  and  ledges  of  the  more 
distant  amphitheatre  of  hills  that  girt  the  fair  city  round, 
from  beyond  the  ruined  tower  of  Old  Panama  in  the  darken- 
ing east  to  Chorrera  in  the  still  glowing  west,  we  saw  what 
seemed  like  drifts  of  snow,  pure,  glittering  white  amid  the 
dark  green  of  the  hillside  forests.  I  marvelled,  for  I  knew 
that  in  that  tropic  latitude  snow  never  fell.  Yet  there  the 
drifts  lay,  white,  spectral,  motionless,  precisely  as  I  had 
seen  them  upon  the  peaks  and  ledges  of  our  own  White 
Hills.  But  as  we  drew  nearer  and  nearer,  I  saw  they  were 
not  snow,  nor  any  solid  thing,  but  only  masses  of  mist  and 
floating  cloud,  which  presently  faded  from  our  view  and 
vanished.  Then,  as  from  the  full  golden  glow  of  day  we 
rushed  through  the  brief  tropic  twilight  into  the  purple 
solemnities  of  night,  and  the  Southern  Cross  and  all  the 
luminous  constellations  of  the  Equatorial  heavens  shone  out 
in  splendour,  I  fell  to  likening  those  seeming  snowdrifts  and 
glaciers  to  the  difficulties  and  dangers  which  the  faint- 
hearted and  the  hostile  have  conjured  up  as  besetting  our 
way  in  our  great  enterprise  at  Panama,  and  it  seemed  to  me 
that  the  worst  of  them,  the  most  chilling  and  oppressive  and 
ominous,  might  in  the  end  prove  to  be  as  tenuous  and  as 
evanescent  as  those  fugitive  cloud-wraiths,  so  that  we  might 
cry  to  it  in  confident  defiance, 

"  Thou  art  a  phantom, 
A  shape  of  the  sea-mist, 
A  shape  of  the  brumal 
Rain,  and  tlie  darkness 
Fearful  and  formless; 
Day  dawns,  and  thou  art  not! " 


388  PANAMA 

We  have  only  to  be  true  to  our  opportunities,  true  to  our 
principles,  true  to  our  destiny,  true  to  ourselves,  to  make 
the  obstacles  before  us  flee  as  the  clouds  from  the  mountains ; 
to  fulfil  the  great  designs  of  Columbus  and  Cortez ;  to  make, 
to  our  own  honour  and  the  inestimable  profit  of  the  whole 
world,  the  Panama  canal  an  accomplished  fact ;  to  open  up  a 
highway  of  peaceful  commerce  between  the  two  great  oceans ; 
and,  after  four  centuries  have  their  full  cycles  turned,  to 
achieve  at  last  the  triumphant  fulfilment  of  the  world's  age- 
long desire. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDICES 

APPENDIX  I 

The  United  States — New  Granada  (Colombia)  Treaty 
OF  1846  (In  part). 

Ratified  June  10,  Wi6 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  New 
Granada,  desiring  to  make  as  durable  as  possible  the  relations 
which  are  to  be  established  between  the  two  parties  by  virtue 
of  this  treaty,  have  declared  solemnly  and  do  agree  to  the 
following  points:    .    .    . 

For  the  better  understanding  of  the  preceding  articles, 
it  is  and  has  been  stipulated  between  the  high  contracting 
parties  that  the  citizens,  vessels,  and  merchandise  of  the 
United  States  shall  enjoy  in  the  ports  of  New  Granada, 
including  those  of  the  part  of  the  Granadian  territory  gener- 
ally denominated  Isthmus  of  Panama,  from  its  southernmost 
extremity  until  the  boundary  of  Costa  Rica,  all  the  exemp- 
tions, privileges,  and  immunities  concerning  commerce  and 
navigation  which  are  now  or  may  hereafter  be  enjoyed 
by  Granadian  citizens,  their  vessels,  and  merchandise;  and 
that  this  equality  of  favours  shall  be  made  to  extend  to  the 
passengers,  correspondence,  and  merchandise  of  the  United 
States  in  their  transit  across  the  said  territory  from  one  sea 
to  the  other.  The  government  of  New  Granada  guarantees 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States  that  the  right  of 
way  or  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  upon  any 
modes  of  communication  that  now  exist  or  that  may  be  here- 
after constructed,  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the  government 
and  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  for  the  transportation 
of  any  articles  of  produce,  manufactures  or  merchandise,  of 
lawful  commerce,  belonging  to  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States;  that  no  other  tolls  or  charges  shall  be  levied  or  col- 
lected upon  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  their  said 
merchandise  thus  passing  over  any  road  or  canal  that  may 
be  made  by  the  government  of  New  Granada,  or  by  the 


392  APPENDICES 

authority  of  the  same,  than  is,  under  like  circumstances, 
levied  upon  and  collected  from  the  Granadian  citizens ;  that 
any  lawful  produce,  manufactures,  or  merchandise  belong- 
ing to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  thus  passing  from 
one  sea  to  the  other,  in  either  direction,  for  the  purpose  of 
exportation  to  any  other  foreign  country,  shall  not  be  liable 
to  any  import  duties  whatever,  or,  having  paid  such  duties, 
they  shall  be  entitled  to  drawback  upon  their  exportation; 
nor  shall  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  be  liable  to  any 
duties,  tolls,  or  charges  of  any  kind  to  which  native  citizens 
are  not  subjected  for  thus  passing  the  said  Isthmus.  And, 
in  order  to  secure  to  themselves  the  tranquil  and  constant 
enjoyment  of  these  advantages,  and  as  an  especial  compen- 
sation for  the  said  advantages,  and  for  the  favours  they 
have  acquired  by  the  4th,  5th,  and  6th  articles  of  this  treaty, 
the  United  States  guarantee  positively  and  efiBcaciously  to 
New  Granada,  by  the  present  stipulation,  the  perfect  neutral- 
ity of  the  before-mentioned  Isthmus,  with  the  view  that  the 
free  transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  sea  may  not  be  inter- 
rupted or  embarrassed  in  any  future  time  while  this  treaty 
exists;  and,  in  consequence,  the  United  States  also  guaran- 
tee, in  the  same  manner,  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  prop- 
erty which  New  Granda  has  and  possesses  over  the  said 
territory. 


APPENDIX  II 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
Ratified  July  5,  1850 

The  United  States  of  America  and  Her  Britannic  Majesty, 
being  desirous  of  consolidating  the  relations  of  amity  which 
so  happily  subsist  between  them,  by  setting  forth  and  fixing 
in  a  convention  their  views  and  intentions  with  reference 
to  any  means  of  communication  by  ship-canal  which  may 
be  constructed  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans  by 
the  way  of  the  river  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua  and  either  or 
both  of  the  Lakes  of  Nicaragua  or  Managua,  to  any  port 
or  place  on  the  Pacific  Ocean,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  conferred  full  powers  on  John  M.  Clayton,  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States,  and  Her  Britannic 
Majesty  on  the  Right  Honourable  Sir  Henry  Lytton  Bulwer, 
a  member  of  Her  Majesty's  most  honourable  Privy  Council, 
Knight  Commander  of  the  most  honourable  Order  of  the 
Bath,  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  to  the  United  States,  for  the 
aforesaid  purpose ;  and  the  said  plenipotentiaries  having  ex- 
changed their  full  powers,  which  were  found  to  be  in  proper 
form,  have  agreed  to  the  following  articles : 

article  I 

The  governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
hereby  declare  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  will  ever 
obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control  over  the 
said  ship-canal ;  agreeing  that  neither  will  ever  erect  or  main- 
tain any  fortifications  commanding  the  same  or  in  the  vicin- 
ity thereof,  or  occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonise,  or  assume,  or 
exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mos- 
quito Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America ;  nor  will  either 
make  use  of  any  protection  which  either  affords  or  may 
afford,  or  any  alliance  which  either  has  or  may  have  to  or 
with  any  state  or  people,  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  or  main- 
taining any  such  fortification,  or  of  occupying,  fortifying, 


394  APPENDICES 

or  colonising  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast, 
or  any  part  of  Central  America,  or  of  assuming  or  exercising 
dominion  over  the  same ;  nor  will  the  United  States  or  Great 
Britain  take  advantage  of  any  Intimacy,  or  use  any  alliance, 
connection,  or  influence  that  either  may  possess  with  any 
state  or  government  through  whose  territory  the  said  canal 
may  pass,  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  or  holding,  directly 
or  indirectly,  for  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  one,  any 
rights  or  advantages  in  regard  to  commerce  or  navigation 
through  the  said  canal  which  shall  not  be  offered  on  the 
same  terms  to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  other. 


ARTICLE   II 

Vessels  of  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain  traversing 
the  said  canal  shall,  in  case  of  war  between  the  contracting 
parties,  be  exempted  from  blockade,  detention,  or  capture 
by  either  of  the  belligerents;  and  this  provision  shall  extend 
to  such  a  distance  from  the  two  ends  of  the  said  canal  as 
may  hereafter  be  found  expedient  to  establish. 


ARTICLE   III 

In  order  to  secure  the  construction  of  the  said  canal,  the 
contracting  parties  engage  that  if  any  such  canal  shall  be 
undertaken  upon  fair  and  equitable  terms  by  any  parties 
having  the  authority  of  the  local  government  or  governments 
through  whose  territory  the  same  may  pass,  then  the  per- 
sons employed  in  making  the  said  canal,  and  their  property 
used,  or  to  be  used  for  that  object,  shall  be  protected,  from 
the  commencement  of  the  said  canal  to  its  completion,  by 
the  governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
from  unjust  detention,  confiscation,  seizure,  or  any  violence 
whatsoever. 

ARTICLE   IV 

The  contracting  parties  will  use  whatever  influence  they  re- 
spectively exercise  with  any  state,  states,  or  governments  pos- 
sessing or  claiming  to  possess  any  jurisdiction  or  right  over 
the  territory  which  the  said  canal  shall  traverse,  or  which 
shall  be  near  the  waters  applicable  thereto,  in  order  to 
induce  such  states  or  governments  to  facilitate  the  con- 
struction of  the  said  canal  by  every  means  in  their  power. 


APPENDICES  395 

And  furthermore,  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  agree 
to  use  their  good  offices,  wherever  or  however  it  may  be  most 
expedient,  in  order  to  procure  the  establishment  of  two  free 
ports,  one  at  each  end  of  the  canal. 

ARTICLE  V 

The  contracting  parties  further  engage,  that  when  the 
said  canal  shall  have  been  completed,  they  will  protect  it 
from  interruption,  seizure,  or  unjust  confiscation,  and  that 
they  will  guarantee  the  neutrality  thereof,  so  that  the  said 
canal  may  forever  be  open  and  free,  and  the  capital  invested 
therein  secure.  Nevertheless,  the  governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  in  according  their  protection  to 
the  construction  of  the  said  canal,  and  guaranteeing  its 
neutrality  and  security  when  completed,  always  understand 
that  this  protection  and  guaranty  are  granted  condition- 
ally, and  may  be  withdrawn  by  both  governments,  or  either 
government,  if  both  governments,  or  either  government, 
should  deem  that  the  persons  or  company  undertaking  or 
managing  the  same  adopt  or  establish  such  regulations  con- 
cerning the  traffic  thereupon  as  are  contrary  to  the  spirit 
and  intention  of  this  convention,  either  by  making  unfair 
discriminations  in  favour  of  the  commerce  of  one  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  over  the  commerce  of  the  other,  or  by 
imposing  oppressive  exactions  or  unreasonable  tolls  upon 
passengers,  vessels,  goods,  wares,  merchandise,  or  other 
articles.  Neither  party,  however,  shall  withdraw  the  afore- 
said protection  and  guaranty  without  first  giving  six 
months'  notice  to  the  other. 


ARTICLE   VI 

The  contracting  parties  in  this  convention  engage  to  invite 
every  state  with  which  both  or  either  have  friendly  inter- 
course to  enter  into  stipulations  with  them  similar  to  those 
which  they  have  entered  into  with  each  other,  to  the  end  that 
all  other  states  may  share  in  the  honour  and  advantage  of 
having  contributed  to  a  work  of  such  general  interest  and 
importance  as  the  canal  herein  contemplated.  And  the  con- 
tracting parties  likewise  agree  that  each  shall  enter  into 
treaty  stipulations  with  such  of  the  Central  American 
states  as  they  may  deem  advisable,  for  the  purpose  of  more 
effectually  carrying  out  the  great  design  of  this  convention : 


396  APPENDICES 

namely,  that  of  constructing  and  maintaining  the  said  canal 
as  a  ship  communication  between  the  two  oceans  for  the 
benefit  of  mankind,  on  equal  terms  to  all,  and  of  protecting 
the  same ;  and  they  also  agree,  that  the  good  offices  of  either 
shall  be  employed,  when  requested  by  the  other,  in  aiding 
and  assisting  the  negotiation  of  such  treaty  stipulations; 
and  should  any  differences  arise  as  to  right  or  property  over 
the  territory  through  which  the  said  canal  shall  pass  be- 
tween the  states  or  governments  of  Central  America,  and 
such  differences  should  in  any  way  impede  or  obstruct  the 
execution  of  the  said  canal,  the  governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  will  use  their  good  offices  to  settle 
such  differences  in  the  manner  best  suited  to  promote  the 
interests  of  the  said  canal,  and  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
friendship  and  alliance  which  exist  between  the  contracting 
parties. 

ARTICLE     VII 

It  being  desirable  that  no  time  should  be  unnecessarily 
lost  in  commencing  and  constructing  the  said  canal,  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  determine 
to  give  their  support  and  encouragement  to  such  persons 
or  company  as  may  first  offer  to  commence  the  same,  with  the 
necessary  capital,  the  consent  of  the  local  authorities,  and  on 
such  principles  as  accord  with  the  spirit  and  intention  of 
this  convention;  and  if  any  persons  or  company  should 
already  have,  with  any  state  through  which  the  proposed 
ship  canal  may  pass,  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  such 
a  canal  as  that  specified  in  this  convention,  to  the  stipula- 
tions of  which  contract  neither  of  the  contracting  parties 
in  this  convention  have  any  just  cause  to  object,  and  the 
said  persons  or  company  shall  moreover  have  made  prepa- 
rations, and  expended  time,  money,  and  trouble,  on  the  faith 
of  such  contract,  it  is  hereby  agreed  that  such  persons  or 
company  shall  have  a  priority  of  claim  over  every  other  per- 
son, persons,  or  company  to  the  protection  of  the  govern- 
ments of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  be 
allowed  a  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifica- 
tions of  this  convention  for  concluding  their  arrangements, 
and  preventing  evidence  of  sufficient  capital  subscribed  to 
accomplish  the  contemplated  undertaking;  it  being  under- 
stood that  if,  at  the  expiration  of  the  aforesaid  period,  such 
persons  or  company  be  not  able  to  commence  and  carry  out 
the  proposed  enterprise,  then  the  governments  of  the  United 


APPENDICES  397 

States  and  Great  Britain  shall  be  free  to  afford  their  pro- 
tection to  any  other  persons  or  company  that  shall  be 
prepared  to  commence  and  proceed  with  the  construction  of 
the  canal. 

ARTICLE   VIII 

The  governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
having  not  only  desired,  in  entering  into  this  convention, 
to  accomplish  a  particular  object,  but  also  to  establish  a 
general  principle,  they  hereby  agree  to  extend  their  protec- 
tion, by  treaty  stipulations,  to  any  other  practicable  com- 
munications, whether  by  canal  or  railway,  across  the 
isthmus  which  connects  North  and  South  America,  and 
especially  to  the  interoceanic  communications,  should  the 
same  prove  to  be  practicable,  whether  by  canal  or  railway, 
which  are  now  proposed  to  be  established  by  the  way  of 
Tehuantepec  or  Panama.  In  granting,  however,  their  joint 
protection  to  any  such  canals  or  railways  as  are  by  this 
article  specified,  it  is  always  understood  by  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  that  the  parties  constructing  or 
owning  the  same  shall  impose  no  other  charges  or  conditions 
of  traffic  thereupon  than  the  aforesaid  governments  shall 
approve  of  as  just  and  equitable;  and  that  the  same  canals 
or  railways,  being  open  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  equal  terms,  shall  also, 
be  open  on  like  terms  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  every 
other  state  which  is  willing  to  grant  thereto  such  protection 
as  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  engage  to  afford. 

ARTICLE    IX 

The  ratifications  of  this  convention  shall  be  exchanged  at 
Washington  within  six  months  from  this  day,  or  sooner  if 
possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries,  have 
signed  this  convention,  and  have  hereunto  affixed  our  seals. 

Done  at  Washington,  the  nineteenth  day  of  April,  anno 
Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty. 

John  M.  Clayton  (L.  S.) 
Henry  Lytton  Bulwer  (L.  S.) 


APPENDIX  III 

The  Isthmian  Canal  Convention 
(Commonly  called  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty) 

Signed,  November  18,  1901 

Submitted  to  the  Senate,  December  5,  1901 

Ratified  hy  the  Senate,  December  16,  1901 

I.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the  present 
treaty  shall  supersede  the  afore-mentioned  (Clayton-Bulwer) 
convention  of  April  19,  1850. 

II.  It  is  agreed  that  the  canal  may  be  constructed  under 
the  auspices  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  either 
directly  at  its  own  cost,  or  by  gift  or  loan  of  money  to 
Individuals  or  corporations,  or  through  subscription  to  or 
purchase  of  stock  or  shares,  and  that,  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  present  treaty,  the  said  government  shall  have 
and  enjoy  all  the  rights  incident  to  such  construction,  as 
well  as  the  exclusive  right  of  providing  for  the  regulation, 
and  management  of  the  canal. 

III.  The  United  States  adopts  as  the  basis  of  the  neu- 
tralisation of  such  ship  canal  the  following  rules  substan- 
tially as  embodied  in  the  Convention  of  Constantinople, 
signed  the  28th  October,  1888,  for  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Suez  Canal;  that  is  to  say: 

First — The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels 
of  commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  rules, 
on  terms  of  entire  equality,  so  that  there  shall  be  no  dis- 
crimination against  any  such  nation  or  its  citizens  or  sub- 
jects in  respect  of  the  conditions  or  charges  of  traffic,  or 
otherwise.  Such  conditions  and  charges  of  traffic  shall  be 
just  and  equitable. 

Second — The  canal  shall  never  be  blockaded,  nor  shall 
any  right  of  war  be  exercised  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be 
committed  within  it.  The  United  States,  however,  shall  be 
at  liberty  to  maintain  such  military  police  along  the  canal 
as  may  be  necessary  to  protect  it  against  lawlessness  and 
disorder. 


APPENDICES  399 

Third — ^Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  shall  not  revictual 
nor  take  any  stores  in  the  canal  except  so  far  as  may  be 
strictly  necessary;  and  the  transit  of  such  vessels  through 
the  canal  shall  be  effected  with  the  least  possible  delay  in 
accordance  with  the  regulations  in  force,  and  with  only  such 
intermission  as  may  result  from  the  necessities  of  the 
service. 

Prizes  shall  be  in  all  respects  subject  to  the  same  rules  as 
vessels  of  war  of  the  belligerents. 

Fourth — No  belligerent  shall  embark  or  disembark 
troops,  munitions  of  war  or  warlike  materials  in  the  canal 
except  in  case  of  accidental  hindrance  of  the  transit  and 
in  such  case  the  transit  shall  be  resumed  with  all  possible 
despatch. 

Fifth — The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  apply  to 
waters  adjacent  to  the  canal,  within  three  marine  miles  of 
either  end.  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  shall  not  remain 
in  such  waters  longer  than  twenty-four  hours  at  any  one 
time  except  in  case  of  distress,  and  in  such  case  shall  depart 
as  soon  as  possible,  but  a  vessel  of  war  of  one  belligerent 
shall  not  depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  depart- 
ure of  a  vessel  of  war  of  the  other  belligerent. 

Sixth — The  plant,  establishments,  buildings  and  all 
works  necessary  to  the  construction,  maintenance  and  oper- 
ation of  the  canal  shall  be  deemed  to  be  parts  thereof  for 
the  purpose  of  this  treaty,  and  in  time  of  war,  as  in  time  of 
peace,  shall  enjoy  complete  immunity  from  attack  or  injury 
by  belligerents,  and  from  acts  calculated  to  impair  their  use- 
fulness as  part  of  the  canal. 

IV.  It  is  agreed  that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty 
or  of  international  relations  of  the  country  or  countries 
traversed  by  the  before  mentioned  canal  shall  affect  the  gen- 
eral principle  of  neutralisation  or  the  obligation  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  under  the  present  treaty. 

V.  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  His  Britannic  Majesty;  and  the 
ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Washington  or  at  London 
at  the  earliest  possible  time  within  six  months  from  the 
date  hereof. 


APPENDIX  IV 

The   Isthmian   Canal   Law 
(Commonly  called  the  Spooner  Bill) 

Approved^  June  28,  1902 

Be  it  enacted,  etc.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States 
is  hereby  authorised  to  acquire,  for  and  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  |40,000,000,  all  of  the 
rights,  privileges,  franchises,  concessions,  grants  of  land, 
right  of  way,  unfinished  work,  plants  and  other  property, 
real,  personal  and  mixed,  of  every  name  and  nature,  owned 
by  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  of  France,  on  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama,  and  all  its  maps,  plans,  drawings,  records, 
on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  in  Paris,  including  ail  the 
capital  stock,  not  less,  however,  than  68,863  shares  of  the 
Panama  Eailroad  Company,  owned  by  or  held  for  the  use  of 
said  canal  company,  provided  a  satisfactory  title  to  all  of 
said  property  can  be  obtained. 

Sec.  2.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorised  to  acquire 
from  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  for  and  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  upon  such  terms  as  he  may  deem  reasonable, 
exclusive  and  perpetual  control  in  perpetuity  of  a  strip  of 
land  from  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  not  less 
than  6  miles  in  width,  extending  from  the  Caribbean  Sea  to 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  right  to  use  and  dispose  of  the 
waters  thereon,  and  to  excavate,  construct  and  to  perpet- 
ually maintain,  operate  and  protect  thereon  a  canal,  of  such 
depth  and  capacity  as  will  afford  convenient  passage  of  ships 
of  the  greatest  tonnage  and  draught  now  in  use,  from  the 
Caribbean  Sea  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  which  control  shall  in- 
clude the  right  to  perpetually  maintain  and  operate  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad,  if  the  ownership  thereof  or  a  controlling 
interest  therein  shall  have  been  acquired  by  the  United 
States,  and  also  jurisdiction  over  said  strip  and  the  ports  at 
the  ends  thereof ;  to  make  such  police  and  sanitary  rules  and 
regulations  as  shall  be  necessary  to  preserve  order  and  pre- 

400 


APPENDICES  401 

serve  the  public  health  thereon,  and  to  establish  such  judicial 
tribunals  thereon  as  may  be  necessary  to  enforce  such  rules 
and  regulations.  The  President  may  acquire  such  additional 
territory  and  rights  from  Colombia  as  in  his  judgment  will 
facilitate  the  general  purposes  hereof. 

Sec.  3.  That  when  the  President  shall  have  arranged  to 
secure  a  satisfactory  title  to  the  property  of  the  New  Pan 
ama  Canal  Company,  as  provided  in  Section  1  hereof,  and 
shall  have  obtained  by  treaty  control  of  the  necessary  terri- 
tory from  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  as  provided  in  Section 
2  hereof,  he  is  authorised  to  pay  for  the  property  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  $40,000,000,  and  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Colombia  such  sums  as  shall  have  been  agreed  upon 
and  a  sum  sufficient  for  both  said  purposes  is  hereby  appro- 
priated out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise 
appropriated,  to  be  paid  on  warrant  or  warrants  drawn  by 
the  President. 

The  President  shall  then  cause  to  be  excavated,  con- 
structed and  completed,  utilising  to  that  end  as  far  as 
practicable  the  work  heretofore  done  by  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company,  of  France,  and  its  predecessor  company,  a 
ship  canal  from  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
Such  canal  shall  be  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth  as  shall 
afford  convenient  passage  for  vessels  of  the  largest  tonnage 
and  greatest  draught  now  in  use,  and  such  as  may  be  rea- 
sonably anticipated  and  shall  be  supplied  with  all  necessary 
locks  and  other  appliances  to  meet  the  necessities  of  vessels 
passing  through  the  same  from  ocean  to  ocean ;  and  he  shall 
also  cause  to  be  constructed  such  safe  and  commodious  har- 
bours at  the  terminals  of  said  canal,  and  make  such  pro- 
visions for  defence  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  safety  and 
protection  of  said  canal  and  harbours.  That  the  President 
is  authorised  for  the  purposes  aforesaid  to  employ  such  per- 
sons as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  to  fix  their  compensa- 
tion. 

Sec.  4.  That  should  the  President  be  unable  to  obtain  for 
the  United  States  a  satisfactory  title  to  the  property  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company,  and  the  control  of  the  neces- 
sary territory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  and  the  rights 
mentioned  in  Sections  1  and  2  of  this  act,  within  a  reasona- 
ble time  and  upon  reasonable  terms,  then  the  President, 
having  first  obtained  for  the  United  States  exclusive  and 
perpetual  control,  by  treaty,  of  the  necessary  territory  from 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  upon  terms  which  he  may  con- 


402  APPENDICES 

sider  reasonable,  for  the  construction,  perpetual  mainte- 
nance, operation  and  protection  of  a  canal  connecting  the 
Caribbean  Sea  with  the  Pacific  Ocean  by  what  is  commonly 
known  as  the  Nicaragua  route,  shall  cause  to  be  excavated 
and  constructed  a  ship  canal  and  waterway  from  a  point  on 
the  shore  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  near  Greytown,  by  way  of 
Lake  Nicaragua,  to  a  point  near  Brito,  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
Said  canal  shall  be  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth  to  afiford 
convenient  passage  for  vessels  of  the  largest  tonnage  and 
greatest  draught  now  in  use,  and  such  as  may  be  reasonably 
expected,  and  shall  be  supplied  with  all  necessary  locks  and 
other  appliances  to  meet  the  necessities  of  vessels  passing 
through  the  same  from  ocean  to  ocean ;  and  he  shall  also  con 
struct  such  safe  and  commodious  harbours  at  the  terminal 
of  such  canal  as  shall  be  necessary  for  the  safe  and  conven- 
ient use  thereof,  and  shall  make  such  provisions  for  defence 
as  may  be  necessary  for  the  safet}^  and  protection  of  said 
harbours  and  canal ;  and  such  sum  or  sums  of  money  as  may 
be  agreed  upon  b}'  such  treaty  as  compensation  to  be  paid 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  for  the  concessions  and  rights 
hereunder  provided  to  be  acquired  by  the  United  States  are 
hereby  appropriated  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not 
otherwise  appropriated,  to  be  paid  on  warrant  or  warrants 
drawn  by  thfe  President. 

The  President  shall  cause  such  surveys  as  may  be  neces- 
sary for  said  canal  and  harbours  to  be  made,  and  in  making 
such  surveys,  and  in  the  construction  of  said  canal,  may 
employ  such  persons  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  may  fix 
their  compensation. 

In  the  excavation  and  construction  of  said  canal  the  San 
Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  or  such  parts  of  each  as 
may  be  made  available,  shall  be  used. 

Sec.  5.  That  the  sum  of  |10,000,000  is  hereby  appropriated 
out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appro- 
priated, toward  the  project  herein  contemplated,  by  either 
route  so  selected. 

And  the  President  is  hereby  authorised  to  cause  to  be 
entered  into  such  contract  or  contracts  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  for  the  proper  excavation,  construction,  comple- 
tion and  defence  of  said  canal,  harbours  and  defences,  by  the 
route  finally  determined  upon  under  the  provisions  of  this 
act.  Appropriations  therefor  shall  from  time  to  time  be 
hereafter  made,  not  to  exceed  in  the  aggregate  the  addi- 
tional sum  of  1135,000,000,  should  the  Panama  route  be 


APPENDICES  403 

adopted,  or  |180,000,000,  should  the  Nicaragua  route  be 
adopted. 

Sec.  6.  That  in  any  agreement  with  the  Republic  of  Co- 
lombia or  with  the  States  of  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  the 
President  is  authorised  to  guarantee  to  said  republic  or 
said  States  the  use  of  said  canal  and  harbours,  upon  such 
terms  as  may  be  agreed  upon,  for  all  vessels  owned  by  said 
States  or  by  citizens  thereof. 

Sec.  7.  That  to  enable  the  President  to  construct  the 
canal  and  works  appurtenant  thereto,  as  provided  in  this 
act,  there  is  hereby  created  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
the  same  to  be  composed  of  seven  members,  who  shall  be 
nominated  and  appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  and  who  shall  serve  during 
the  pleasure  of  the  President,  and  one  of  whom  shall  be 
named  as  the  chairman  of  said  commission. 

Of  the  seven  members  of  said  commission,  at  least  four 
shall  be  persons  learned  and  skilled  in  the  practice  of  engi- 
neering, and  of  the  four  at  least  one  shall  be  an  officer  of 
the  United  States  Army,  and  at  least  one  other  shall  be  an 
officer  of  the  United  States  Navy,  the  said  officers  respect- 
ively being  either  upon  the  active  or  the  retired  list  of  the 
army  or  of  the  navy.  Said  commissioners  shall  each  receive 
such  compensation  as  the  President  shall  prescribe  until  the 
same  shall  have  been  otherwise  fixed  by  Congress.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  members  of  said  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  the 
President  is  hereby  authorised,  through  said  commission,  to 
employ  in  said  service  any  of  the  engineers  of  the  United 
States  Army  at  his  discretion,  and  likewise  to  employ  any 
engineers  in  civil  life,  at  his  discretion,  and  any  other  per- 
sons necessary  for  the  proper  and  expeditious  prosecution  of 
said  work.  The  compensation  of  all  such  engineers  and 
other  persons  employed  under  this  act  shall  be  fixed  by  said 
commission,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President.  The 
official  salary  of  any  officer  appointed  or  employed  under 
this  act  shall  be  deducted  from  the  amount  of  salary  or  com- 
pensation provided  by  or  which  shall  be  fixed  under  the 
terms  of  this  act. 

Said  commission  shall  in  all  matters  be  subject  to  the 
direction  and  control  of  the  President,  and  shall  make  to  the 
President  annually  and  at  such  other  periods  as  may  be 
required  either  by  law  or  by  the  order  of  the  President  full 
and  complete  reports  of  all  their  actings  and  doings  and  of 
all  moneys  received  and  expended  in  the  construction  of  said 


404  APPENDICES 

work,  and  in  the  performance  of  their  duties  in  connection 
therewith,  which  said  reports  shall  be  by  the  President  trans- 
mitted to  Congress. 

And  the  said  commission  shall  furthermore  give  to  Con- 
gress, or  either  House  of  Congress,  such  information  as  may 
at  any  time  be  required  either  by  act  of  Congress  or  by  the 
order  of  either  House  of  Congress.  The  President  shall 
cause  to  be  provided  and  assigned  for  the  use  of  the  commis- 
sion such  offices  as  may,  with  the  suitable  equipment  of  the 
same,  be  necessary  and  proper,  in  his  discretion,  for  the 
proper  discharge  of  the  duties  thereof. 

Sec.  8.  That  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  hereby 
authorised  to  borrow  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States  from 
time  to  time,  as  the  proceeds  may  be  required  to  defray 
expenditures  authorised  by  this  act  (such  proceeds  when  re- 
ceived to  be  used  only  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  such  ex- 
penditures) the  sum  of  |130,000,000,  or  so  much  thereof  as 
may  be  necessary,  and  to  prepare  and  issue  therefor  coupon 
or  registered  bonds  of  the  United  States  in  such  form  as  he 
may  prescribe,  and  in  denominations  of  $20  or  some  multiple 
of  that  sum,  redeemable  in  gold  coin  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
United  States  after  ten  years  from  the  date  of  their  issue, 
and  payable  twenty  years  from  such  date,  and  bearing  inter- 
est payable  quarterly  in  gold  coin  at  the  rate  of  2  per  cent, 
per  annum ;  and  the  bonds  herein  authorised  shall  be  exempt 
from  all  taxes  or  duties  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  from 
taxation  in  any  form  by  or  under  State,  municipal  or  local 
authority. 

Provided,  That  said  bonds  may  be  disposed  of  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  at  not  less  than  par,  under  such 
regulations  as  he  may  prescribe,  giving  to  all  citizens  of 
the  United  States  an  equal  opportunity  to  subscribe  there- 
for, but  no  commissions  shall  be  allowed  or  paid  thereon; 
and  a  sum  not  exceeding  one-tenth  of  1  per  cent,  of  the 
amount  of  the  bonds  herein  authorised  is  hereby  appropri- 
ated, out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appro- 
priated, to  pay  the  expense  of  preparing,  advertising  and 
issuing  the  same. 

And  provided  further,  that  none  of  the  said  bonds  shall 
be  sold  to  pay  the  sums  appropriated  in  Sections  1  and  2  of 
this  act,  or  to  pay  the  sum  of  $10,000,000  appropriated  in 
Section  5  of  this  act. 


APPENDIX  V 

The   Panaman   Declaration   of   Independence 
Signed  and  Promulgated  on  November  4y  190S 

The  transcendental  act  that  by  a  spontaneous  movement 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  have  just  executed 
is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  situation  which  has  become 
graver  daily. 

Long  is  the  recital  of  the  grievances  that  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Isthmus  have  suffered  from  their  Colombian  brothers ; 
but  those  grievances  would  have  been  withstood  with  resig- 
nation for  the  sake  of  harmony  and  national  union  had  its 
separation  been  possible  and  if  we  could  have  entertained 
well-founded  hopes  of  improvement  and  of  effective  prog- 
ress under  the  system  to  which  we  were  submitted  by  that 
Republic.  We  have  to  solemnly  declare  that  we  have  the 
sincere  and  profound  conviction  that  all  the  hopes  were 
futile  and  useless,  all  the  sacrifices  on  our  part. 

The  Isthmus  of  Panama  has  been  governed  by  the  Republic 
of  Colombia  with  the  narrow-mindedness  that  in  past  times 
was  applied  to  their  colonies  by  the  European  nations — the 
Isthmian  people  and  territory  were  a  source  of  fiscal  re- 
sources and  nothing  more.  The  contracts  and  negotiations 
regarding  the  railroad  and  the  Panama  Canal  and  the 
national  taxes  collected  in  the  Isthmus  have  netted  to 
Colombia  tremendous  sums  which  we  will  not  detail,  not 
wishing  to  appear  in  this  exposition  which  will  go  down  to 
posterity  as  being  moved  by  a  mercenary  spirit,  which  has 
never  been  nor  is  our  purpose;  and  of  these  large  sums  the 
Isthmus  has  not  received  the  benefit  of  a  bridge  for  any  of 
its  numerous  rivers,  nor  the  construction  of  a  single  road 
between  its  towns,  nor  of  any  public  building  nor  of  a  single 
college,  and  has  neither  seen  any  interest  displayed  in  ad- 
vancing her  industries,  nor  has  a  most  infinite  part  of  those 
sums  been  applied  toward  her  prosperity. 

405 


406  APPENDICES 

A  very  recent  example  of  what  we  have  related  above  is 
what  has  occurred  with  the  negotiations  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  which,  when  taken  under  consideration  by  Congress, 
was  rejected  in  a  summary  manner.  There  were  a  few  pub- 
lic men  who  expressed  their  adverse  opinion,  on  the  ground 
that  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  alone  was  to  be  favoured  by 
the  opening  of  the  canal  by  virtue  of  a  treaty  with  the 
United  States,  and  that  the  rest  of  Colombia  would  not 
receive  any  direct  benefits  of  any  sort  by  that  work,  as  if 
that  way  of  reasoning,  even  though  it  be  correct,  would  jus-, 
tify  the  irreparable  and  perpetual  damage  which  would  be 
caused  to  the  Isthmus  by  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  in  the 
manner  in  which  it  was  done,  which  was  equivalent  to  the 
closing  of  the  doors  to  future  negotiations. 

The  people  of  the  Isthmus,  in  view  of  such  notorious 
causes,  have  decided  to  recover  their  sovereignty  and  begin 
to  form  a  part  of  the  society  of  the  free  and  independent 
nations,  in  order  to  work  out  its  own  destiny,  to  insure  its 
future  in  a  stable  manner,  and  discharge  the  duties  which  it 
is  called  on  to  do  by  the  situation  of  its  territory  and  its 
immense  richness. 

To  that  we,  the  initiators  of  the  movement  effected,  aspire 
and  have  obtained  a  unanimous  approval. 

We  aspire  to  the  formation  of  a  true  republic,  where  tol- 
erance will  prevail,  where  the  law  shall  be  the  invariable 
guide  of  those  governing  and  those  governed,  where  effective 
peace  be  established,  which  consists  in  the  frequent  and  har- 
monious play  of  all  interests  and  all  activities,  and  where, 
finally,  civilisation  and  progress  will  find  perpetual  sta- 
bility. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  life  of  an  independent  nation 
we  fully  appreciate  the  responsibilities  that  state  means,  but 
we  have  profound  faith  in  the  good  sense  and  patriotism  of 
the  Isthmian  people,  and  we  possess  sufficient  energy  to  open 
our  w^ay  by  means  of  labour  to  a  happy  future  without  any 
worry  or  any  danger. 

At  separating  from  our  brothers  of  Colombia  we  do  it 
without  hatred  and  without  any  joy.  Just  as  a  son  with- 
draws from  his  paternal  roof,  the  Isthmian  people  in  adopt- 
ing the  lot  it  has  chosen  have  done  it  with  grief,  but  in  com- 
pliance with  the  supreme  and  inevitable  duty  it  owes  to 
itself — that  of  its  own  preservation  and  of  working  for  its 
own  welfare. 

We  therefore  begin  to  form  a  part  among  the  free  nations 


APPENDICES  407 

of  the  world,  considering  Colombia  as  a  sister  nation,  with 
which  we  shall  be  whenever  circumstances  may  require  it, 
and  for  whose  prosperity  we  have  the  most  fervent  and 
sincere  wishes. 

JosB  Agustin  Arango, 
Federico  Boyd, 
ToMAS  Arias. 


APPENDIX  VI 

The  Panama  Canal  Convention 
(Commonly  called  the  Hay-Bunau  Varilla  Treaty) 

Signed  at  Washington,  November  18, 1903 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate,  December  7, 1903 
Ratification  advised  by  the  Senate,  February  23, 1904 
Ratified  by  the  President,  February  25,  1904 
Ratified  by  Panama,  December  2,  1903 
Ratifications  exchanged  at  Washington,  February  26,1904 
Proclaimed,  February  26,  1904 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama being  desirous  to  insure  the  construction  of  a  ship-canal 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  oceans,  and  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of 
America  having  passed  an  act  approved  June  28,  1902,  in 
furtherance  of  that  object,  by  which  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  authorised  to  acquire  within  a  reasonable 
time  the  control  of  the  necessary  territory  of  the  Republic 
of  Colombia,  and  the  sovereignty  of  such  territory  being 
actually  vested  in  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  have  resolved  for  that  purpose  to  conclude 
a  convention  and  have  accordingly  appointed  as  their 
plenipotentiaries, — 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  John  Hay, 
Secretary  of  State,  and  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  Philippe  Bunau  Varilla,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  there- 
unto specially  empowered  by  said  government,  who  after 
communicating  with  each  other  their  respective  full  powers 
found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  and 
concluded  the  following  articles: 

ARTICLE    I 

The  United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 


APPENDICES  409 

ARTICLE    II 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  in 
perpetuity  the  use,  occupation  and  control  of  a  zone  of  land 
and  land  under  water  for  the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of  said  Canal  of  the 
width  of  ten  miles  extending  to  the  distance  of  five  miles  on 
each  side  of  the  centre  line  of  the  route  of  the  Canal  to  be 
constructed;  the  said  zone  beginning  in  the  Caribbean  Sea 
three  marine  miles  from  mean  low  water  mark  and  extend- 
ing to  and  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  into  the  Pacific 
Ocean  to  a  distance  of  three  marine  miles  from  mean  low 
water  mark  with  the  proviso  that  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  and  the  harbours  adjacent  to  said  cities,  which  are  in- 
cluded within  the  boundaries  of  the  zone  above  described, 
shall  not  be  included  within  this  grant.  The  Republic  of 
Panama  further  grants  to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity 
the  use,  occupation  and  control  of  any  other  lands  and 
waters  outside  of  the  zone  above  described  which  may  be 
necessary  and  convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of  the  said  Canal  or  of 
any  auxiliary  canal  or  other  works  necessary  and  convenient 
for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and 
protection  of  the  said  enterprise. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  further  grants  in  like  manner 
to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity  all  islands  within  the 
limits  of  the  zone  above  described  and  in  addition  thereto 
the  group  of  small  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  named 
Perico,  Naos,  Culebra  and  Flamenco. 

ARTICLE    III 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  all 
the  rights,  power  and  authority  within  the  zone  mentioned 
and  described  in  Article  II  of  this  agreement  and  within  the 
limits  of  all  auxiliary  lands  and  waters  mentioned  and 
described  in  said  Article  II  which  the  United  States  would 
possess  and  exercise  if  it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  territory 
within  which  said  lands  and  waters  are  located  to  the  entire 
exclusion  of  the  exercise  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  of  any 
such  sovereign  rights,  power  or  authority. 

ARTICLE    IV 

As  rights  subsidiary  to  the  above  grants  the  Republic  of 
Panama  grants  in  perpetuity  to  the  United  States  the  right 


410  APPENDICES 

to  use  the  rivers,  streams,  lakes  and  other  bodies  of  water 
within  its  limits  for  navigation,  the  supply  of  water  or 
water-power  or  other  purposes,  so  far  as  the  use  of  said 
rivers,  streams,  lakes  and  bodies  of  water  and  the  waters 
thereof  may  be  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  construc- 
tion, maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of 
the  said  Canal. 


ARTICLE   V 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  in 
perpetuity  a  monopoly  for  the  construction,  maintenance 
and  operation  of  any  system  of  communication  by  means  of 
canal  or  railroad  across  its  territory  between  the  Caribbean 
Sea  and  the  Pacific  Ocean. 


ARTICLE   VI 

The  grants  herein  contained  shall  in  no  manner  invalidate 
the  titles  or  rights  of  private  land  holders  or  owners  of  pri- 
vate property  in  the  said  zone  or  in  or  to  any  of  the  lands 
or  waters  granted  to  the  United  States  by  the  provisions  of 
any  Article  of  this  treaty,  nor  shall  they  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  way  over  the  public  roads  passing  through  the  said 
zone  or  over  any  of  the  said  lands  or  waters  unless  said 
rights  of  way  or  private  rights  shall  conflict  with  rights 
herein  granted  to  the  United  States,  in  which  case  the  rights 
of  the  United  States  shall  be  superior.  All  damages  caused 
to  the  owners  of  private  lands  or  private  property  of  any 
kind  by  reason  of  the  grants  contained  in  this  treaty  or  by 
reason  of  the  operations  of  the  United  States,  its  agents  or 
employees,  or  by  reason  of  the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of  the  said  Canal  or  of 
the  works  of  sanitation  and  protection  herein  provided  for, 
shall  be  appraised  and  settled  by  a  joint  Commission 
appointed  by  the  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  whose  decisions  as  to  such  damages 
shall  be  final  and  whose  awards  as  to  such  damages  shall  be 
paid  solely  by  the  United  States.  No  part  of  the  work  on 
said  Canal  or  the  Panama  railroad  or  on  any  auxiliary 
works  relating  thereto  and  authorised  by  the  terms  of  this 
treaty  shall  be  prevented,  delayed  or  impeded  by  or  pending 
such  proceedings  to  ascertain  such  damages.  The  appraisal 
of  the  said  private  lands  and  private  property  and  the  assess- 


APPENDICES  411 

meat  of  damages  to  them  shall  be  based  upon  their  value 
before  the  date  of  this  convention. 

ARTICLE   VII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States 
within  the  limits  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  their 
adjacent  harbours  and  within  the  territory  adjacent  thereto 
the  right  to  acquire  by  purchase  or  by  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  any  lands,  buildings,  water  rights 
or  other  properties  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  con- 
struction, maintenance,  operation  and  protection  of  the 
Canal  and  of  any  works  of  sanitation,  such  as  the  collection 
and  disposition  of  sewage  and  the  distribution  of  water  in 
the  said  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  which,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  United  States,  may  be  necessary  and  convenient  for 
the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and 
protection  of  the  said  Canal  and  railroad.  All  such  works 
of  sanitation,  collection  and  disposition  of  sewage  and  dis- 
tribution of  water  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall 
be  made  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States,  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  its  agents  or  nominees  shall 
be  authorised  to  impose  and  collect  water  rates  and  sewer- 
age rates  which  shall  be  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  payment 
of  interest  and  the  amortisation  of  the  principal  of  the  cost 
of  said  works  within  a  period  of  fifty  years  and  upon  the 
expiration  of  said  term  of  fifty  years  the  system  of  sewers 
and  water  works  shall  revert  to  and  become  the  properties 
of  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  respectively ;  and  the  use 
of  the  water  shall  be  free  to  the  inhabitants  of  Panama  and 
Colon,  except  to  the  extent  that  water  rates  may  be  neces- 
sary for  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  said  system  of 
sewers  and  water. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  that  the  cities  of  Panama 
and  Colon  shall  comply  in  perpetuity  with  the  sanitary 
ordinances  whether  of  a  preventive  or  curative  character 
prescribed  by  the  United  States,  and  in  case  the  Government 
of  Panama  is  unable  or  fails  in  its  duty  to  enforce  this 
compliance  by  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  with  the  sani- 
tary ordinances  of  the  United  States  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama grants  to  the  United  States  the  right  and  authority  to 
enforce  the  same. 

The  same  right  and  authority  are  granted  to  the  United 
States  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order  in  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon  and  the  territories  and  harbours  adjacent 


412  APPE]<5^DICES 

thereto  in  case  the  Republic  of  Panama  should  not  be,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  United  States,  able  to  maintain  such 
order. 

ARTICLE   VIII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  •  the  United  States 
all  rights  which  it  now  has  or  hereafter  may  acquire  to  the 
property  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  Company  as  a  result  of  the  transfer  of  sov- 
ereignty from  the  Republic  of  Colombia  to  the  Republic  of 
Panama  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  authorises  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  to  sell  and  transfer  to  the 
United  States  its  rights,  privileges,  properties  and  conces- 
sions as  well  as  the  Panama  Railroad  and  all  the  shares  or 
part  of  the  shares  of  that  company;  but  the  public  lands 
situated  outside  of  the  zone  described  in  Article  II  of  this 
treaty  now  included  in  the  concessions  to  both  said  enter- 
prises and  not  required  in  the  construction  or  operation  of 
the  Canal  shall  revert  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  except  any 
property  now  owned  by  or  in  the  possession  of  said  com- 
panies within  Panama  or  Colon  or  the  ports  or  terminals 
thereof. 

ARTICLE   IX 

The  United  States  agrees  that  the  ports  at  either  entrance 
of  the  Canal  and  the  waters  thereof,  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  agrees  that  the  towns  of  Panama  and  Colon,  shall 
be  free  for  all  time,  so  that  there  shall  not  be  imposed  or 
collected  customhouse  tolls,  tonnage,  anchorage,  lighthouse, 
wharf,  pilot,  or  quarantine  dues  or  any  other  charges  or 
taxes  of  any  kind  upon  any  vessel  using  or  passing  through 
the  Canal  or  belonging  to  or  employed  by  the  United  States, 
directly  or  indirectly,  in  connection  with  the  construction, 
maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of  the 
main  Canal,  or  auxiliary  works,  or  upon  the  cargo,  officers, 
crew,  or  passengers  of  any  such  vessels,  except  such  tolls  and 
charges  as  may  be  imposed  by  the  United  States  for  the  use 
of  the  Canal  and  other  works,  and  except  tolls  and  charges 
imposed  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  upon  merchandise  des- 
tined to  be  introduced  for  the  consumption  of  the  rest  of 
the  Republic  of  Panama,  and  upon  vessels  touching  at  the 
ports  of  Colon  and  Panama  and  which  do  not  cross  the 
Canal. 


APPENDICES  413 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  have 
the  right  to  establish  in  such  ports  and  in  the  towns  of  Pan- 
ama and  Colon  such  houses  and  guards  as  it  may  deem 
necessary  to  collect  duties  on  importations  destined  to  other 
portions  of  Panama  and  to  prevent  contraband  trade.  The 
United  States  shall  have  the  right  to  make  use  of  the  towns 
and  harbours  of  Panama  and  Colon  as  places  of  anchorage, 
and  for  making  repairs,  for  loading,  unloading,  depositing, 
or  transshipping  cargoes  either  in  transit  or  destined  for  the 
service  of  the  Canal  and  for  other  works  pertaining  to  the 
Canal. 

ARTICLE   X 

The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  that  there  shall  not  be 
imposed  any  taxes,  national,  municipal,  departmental,  or  of 
any  other  class,  upon  the  Canal,  the  railways  and  auxiliary 
works,  tugs  and  other  vessels  employed  in  the  service 
of  the  Canal,  storehouses,  workshops,  offices,  quarters  for 
labourers,  factories  of  all  kinds,  warehouses,  wharves,  ma- 
chinery and  other  works,  property,  and  effects  appertain- 
ing to  the  Canal  or  railroad  and  auxiliary  works,  or  their 
officers  or  employees,  situated  within  the  cities  of  Panama 
and  Colon,  and  that  there  shall  not  be  imposed  contribu- 
tions or  charges  of  a  personal  character  of  any  kind  upon 
officers,  employees,  labourers,  and  other  individuals  in  the 
service  of  the  Canal  and  railroad  and  auxiliary  works. 

ARTICLE    XI 

The  United  States  agrees  that  the  official  despatches  of 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  be  trans- 
mitted over  any  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  established  for 
canal  purposes  and  used  for  public  and  private  business  at 
rates  not  higher  than  those  required  from  officials  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States. 


ARTICLE    XII 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  permit 
the  immigration  and  free  access  to  the  lands  and  workshops 
of  the  Canal  and  its  auxiliary  works  of  all  employees  and 
workmen  of  whatever  nationality  under  contract  to  work 
upon  or  seeking  employment  upon  or  in  any  wise  connected 


414  APPENDICES 

with  the  said  Canal  and  its  auxiliary  works,  with  their 
respective  families,  and  all  such  persons  shall  be  free  and 
exempt  from  the  military  service  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

ARTICLE  XIII 

The  United  States  may  import  at  any  time  into  the  said 
zone  and  auxiliary  lands,  free  of  custom  duties,  imposts, 
taxes,  or  other  charges,  and  without  any  restrictions,  any 
and  all  vessels,  dredges,  engines,  cars,  machinery,  tools, 
explosives,  materials,  supplies,  and  other  articles  necessary 
and  convenient  in  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation, 
sanitation  and  protection  of  the  Canal  and  auxiliary  works, 
and  all  provisions,  medicines,  clothing,  supplies  and  other 
things  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  officers,  employees, 
workmen  and  labourers  in  the  service  and  employ  of  the 
United  States  and  for  their  families.  If  any  such  articles 
are  disposed  of  for  use  outside  of  the  zone  and  auxiliary 
lands  granted  to  the  United  States  and  within  the  territory 
of  the  Republic,  they  shall  be  subject  to  the  same  import  or 
other  duties  as  like  articles  imported  under  the  laws  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama. 

ARTICLE   XIV 

As  the  price  or  compensation  for  the  rights,  powers  and 
privileges  granted  in  this  convention  by  the  Republic  of 
Panama  to  the  United  States,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  agrees  to  pay  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  the  sum  of 
ten  million  dollars  (|10,000,000)  in  gold  coin  of  the  United 
States  on  the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of  this  convention 
and  also  an  annual  pavment  during  the  life  of  this  conven- 
tion of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  (|250,000) 
in  like  gold  coin,  beginning  nine  years  after  the  date 
aforesaid. 

The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  be  in  addition  to  all 
other  benefits  assured  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  under 
this  convention.  But  no  delay  or  difference  of  opinion  under 
this  Article  or  any  other  provisions  of  this  treaty  shall  affect 
or  interrupt  the  full  operation  and  effect  of  this  convention 
in  all  other  respects. 

ARTICLE    XV 

The  joint  commission  referred  to  in  Article  VI  shall  be 
established  as  follows: 


APPENDICES  415 

The  President  of  the  United  States  shall  nominate  two 
persons  and  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall 
nominate  two  persons  and  they  shall  proceed  to  a  decision ; 
but  in  case  of  disagreement  of  the  Commission  (by  reason 
of  their  being  equally  divided  in  conclusion)  an  umpire  shall 
be  appointed  by  the  two  Governments  who  shall  render  the 
decision.  In  the  event  of  the  death,  absence,  or  incapacity  of 
a  commissioner  or  umpire,  or  of  his  omitting,  declining  or 
ceasing  to  act,  his  place  shall  be  filled  by  the  appointment 
of  another  person  in  the  manner  above  indicated.  All 
decisions  by  a  majority  of  the  Commission  or  by  the  umpire 
shall  be  final, 

ARTICLE   XVI 

The  two  Governments  shall  make  adequate  provision  by 
mutual  agreement  for  the  pursuit,  capture,  imprisonment, 
detention  and  delivery  within  said  zone  and  auxiliary  lands 
to  the  authorities  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  of  persons 
charged  with  the  commitment  of  crimes,  felonies  or  misde- 
meanours without  said  zone  and  for  the  pursuit,  capture,  im- 
prisonment, detention  and  delivery  without  said  zone  to  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States  of  persons  charged  with  the 
commitment  of  crimes,  felonies  and  misdemeanours  within 
said  zone  and  auxiliary  lands. 

ARTICLE   XVII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  the 
use  of  all  the  ports  of  the  Republic  open  to  commerce  as 
places  of  refuge  for  any  vessels  employed  in  the  Canal  enter- 
prise, and  for  all  vessels  passing  or  bound  to  pass  through 
the  Canal  which  may  be  in  distress  and  be  driven  to  seek 
refuge  in  said  ports.  Such  vessels  shall  be  exempt  from 
anchorage  and  tonnage  dues  on  the  part  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama. 

ARTICLE   XVIII 

The  Canal,  when  constructed,  and  the  entrances  thereto 
shall  be  neutral  in  perpetuity,  and  shall  be  opened  upon  the 
terms  provided  for  by  Section  I  of  Article  Three  of,  and  in 
conformity  with  all  the  stipulations  of,  the  treaty  entered 
into  by  the  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  on  November  18,  1901. 


416  APPENDICES 

ARTICLE   XIX 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  have  the 
right  to  transport  over  the  Canal  its  vessels  and  its  troops 
and  munitions  of  war  in  such  vessels  at  all  times  without 
paying  charges  of  any  kind.  The  exemption  is  to  be  extended 
to  the  auxiliary  railway  for  the  transportation  of  persons  in 
the  service  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  or  of  the  police  force 
charged  with  the  preservation  of  public  order  outside  of  said 
zone,  as  well  as  to  their  baggage,  munitions  of  war  and 
supplies. 


ARTICLE   XX 

If  by  virtue  of  any  existing  treaty  in  relation  to  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  whereof  the  obligations  shall 
descend  or  be  assumed  by  the  Republic  of  Panama,  there 
may  be  any  privilege  or  concession  in  favour  of  the  Govern- 
ment or  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  a  third  power  relative  to 
an  interoceanic  means  of  communication  which  in  any  of  its 
terms  may  be  incompatible  with  the  terms  of  the  present 
convention,  the  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  to  cancel  or  mod- 
ify such  treaty  in  due  form,  for  which  purpose  it  shall  give 
to  the  said  third  power  the  requisite  notification  within  the 
term  of  four  months  from  the  date  of  the  present  conven- 
tion, and  in  case  the  existing  treaty  contains  no  clause  per- 
mitting its  modification  or  annulment,  the  Republic  of 
Panama  agrees  to  procure  its  modification  or  annulment  in 
such  form  that  there  shall  not  exist  any  conflict  with  the 
stipulations  of  the  present  convention. 


ARTICLE   XXI 

The  rights  and  privileges  granted  by  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama to  the  United  States  in  the  preceding  Articles  are  under- 
stood to  be  free  of  all  anterior  debts,  liens,  trusts,  or  liabil- 
ities, or  concessions  or  privileges  to  other  Governments,  cor- 
porations, syndicates  or  individuals;  and  consequently,  if 
there  should  arise  any  claims  on  account  of  the  present  con- 
cessions and  privileges  or  otherwise,  the  claimant  shall 
resort  to  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  not 
to  the  United  States  for  any  indemnity  or  compromise  which 
may  be  required. 


APPENDICES  41 V 

ARTICLE   XXII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  renounces  and  grants  to  the 
United  States  the  participation  to  which  it  might  be  entitled 
in  the  future  earnings  of  the  Canal  under  Article  XV  of  the 
concessionary  contract  with  Lucien  N.  B.  Wyse  now  owned 
by  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  any  and  all  other 
rights  or  claims  of  a  pecuniary  nature  arising  under  or 
relating  to  said  concession,  or  arising  under  or  relating  to 
the  concessions  to  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  or  any 
extension  or  modification  thereof ;  and  it  likewise  renounces, 
confirms  and  grants  to  the  United  States,  now  and  hereafter, 
all  the  rights  and  property  reserved  in  the  said  concessions 
which  otherwise  would  belong  to  Panama  at  or  before  the 
expiration  of  the  terms  of  ninety-nine  years  of  the  conces- 
sions granted  to  or  held  by  the  above  mentioned  party  and 
companies,  and  all  right,  title  and  interest  which  it  now  has 
or  may  hereafter  have,  in  and  to  the  lands,  canal,  works, 
property  and  rights  held  by  the  said  companies  under  said 
concessions  or  otherwise,  and  acquired  or  to  be  acquired  by 
the  United  States  from  or  through  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company,  including  any  property  and  rights  which  might  or 
may  in  the  future  either  by  lapse  of  time,  forfeiture  or  other- 
wise, revert  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  under  any  contracts 
or  concessions,  with  said  Wyse,  the  Universal  Panama  Canal 
Company,  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  and  the  New  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company. 

The  aforesaid  rights  and  property  shall  be  and  are  free 
and  released  from  any  present  or  reversionary  interest  in  or 
claims  of  Panama  and  the  title  of  the  United  States  thereto 
upon  consummation  of  the  contemplated  purchase  by  the 
United  States  from  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  shall 
be  absolute,  so  far  as  concerns  the  Republic  of  Panama,  ex- 
cepting always  the  rights  of  the  Republic  specifically  secured 
under  this  treaty. 


ARTICLE  xxiii 

If  it  should  become  necessary  at  any  time  to  employ  armed 
forces  for  the  safety  or  protection  of  the  Canal,  or  of  the 
ships  that  make  use  of  the  same,  or  the  railways  and  aux- 
iliary works,  the  United  States  shall  have  the  right,  at  all 
times  and  in  its  discretion,  to  use  its  police  and  its  land  and 
naval  forces  or  to  establish  fortifications  for  these  purposes. 


418  APPENDICES 


ARTICLE   XXIV 


No  change  either  in  the  Government  or  in  the  laws  and 
treaties  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  United  States,  affect  any  right  of  the  United 
States  under  the  present  convention,  or  under  any  treaty 
stipulation  between  the  two  countries  that  now  exists  or 
may  hereafter  exist  touching  the  subject  matter  of  this 
convention. 

If  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  hereafter  enter  as  a  con- 
stituent into  any  other  Government  or  into  any  union  or 
confederation  of  states,  so  as  to  merge  her  sovereignty  or 
independence  in  such  Government,  union  or  confederation, 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  under  this  convention  shall 
not  be  in  any  respect  lessened  or  impaired. 

ARTICLE   XXV 

For  the  better  performance  of  the  engagements  of  this 
convention  and  to  the  end  of  the  efficient  protection  of  the 
Canal  and  the  preservation  of  its  neutrality,  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama  will  sell  or  lease  to  the  United 
States  lands  adequate  and  necessary  for  naval  or  coaling 
stations  on  the  Pacific  coast  and  on  the  western  Caribbean 
coast  of  the  Republic  at  certain  points  to  be  agreed  upon 
with  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

ARTICLE   XXVI 

This  convention  when  signed  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of 
the  Contracting  Parties  shall  be  ratified  by  the  respective 
Governments  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at 
Washington  at  the  earliest  date  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  convention  in  duplicate  and  have  here- 
unto affixed  their  respective  seals. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  the  18th  day  of  November 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  three. 

John  Hay  (Seal) 

P.  BuNAU  Varilla  (Seal) 


APPENDIX  VII 
Proclamation  of  the  Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  Issued 

AT  CULEBRA^  PANAMA,  MaY  19,  1904 

To  the  InhaMtants  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Zone: 

In  pursuance  of  the  terms  of  the  canal  convention 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the 
ratifications  of  which  were  exchanged  on  the  26th  day  of 
February,  1904,  the  Republic  of  Panama  granted  to  the 
United  States,  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  the  perpetual  use, 
occupation,  and  control  of  a  certain  zone  of  land  10  miles  in 
width,  and  land  under  water,  including  the  islands  within 
said  zone,  and  also  the  islands  of  Perico,  Naos,  Culebra,  and 
Flamenco,  situated  on  the  Bay  of  Panama,  and  the  use, 
occupation,  and  control  of  certain  other  lands  and  waters 
outside  said  zone,  which  may  be  found  to  be  necessary  and 
convenient,  all  to  be  utilised  for  and  in  connection  with  the 
construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation,  and  pro- 
tection of  the  ship  canal  which  the  United  States  is  to  con- 
struct, and  which  will  extend  from  the  Caribbean  Sea,  near 
Colon,  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  near  the  City  of  Panama. 

In  addition  to  the  perpetual  use,  occupation,  and  control 
of  the  lands  and  waters  referred  to,  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama has  also  granted  to  the  United  States  all  the  rights, 
powers,  and  authority  within  said  zone,  auxiliary  canals, 
islands,  and  lands  under  water  which  the  United  States 
would  possess  and  exercise  if  it  were  the  sovereign  of  the 
territory  granted,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  exercise  by 
the  Republic  of  Panama  of  any  such  sovereign  rights,  power, 
and  authority. 

The  canal  zone,  and  all  the  real  and  movable  property 
situated  within  it,  that  formerly  belonged  to  the  New  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company  have  been  purchased  and  taken  pos- 
session of  and  are  now  occupied  or  controlled  by  or  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

For  the  maintenance  of  order  within  the  territory  above 
described,  the  use,  occupation,  and  control  of  which  have 
been  granted  to  the  United  States,  and  in  order  that  the 

419 


420  APPENDICES 

inhabitants  may  be  protected  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
liberty,  property,  and  religion,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  been  empowered  by  the  Congress  to  establish  a 
temporary  government  for  the  canal  zone,  to  which  end  he 
has  been  authorised  to  delegate  to  such  person  or  persons 
as  he  may  designate,  and  to  control  the  manner  of  their 
exercise,  all  the  military,  civil,  and  judicial  powers  and 
authority  granted  to  the  United  States  by  the  Republic  of 
Panama  as  well  as  the  power  to  make  all  needful  rules  and 
regulations. 

With  respect  to  the  government  and  administration  of  the 
canal  zone,  the  President  has  delegated  to  the  undersigned, 
as  governor  of  the  zone,  all  necessary  executive  and  adminis- 
trative attributes,  with  power  to  appoint  the  officials  and 
organise  the  police  force  necessary  to  preserve  order  and  to 
carry  out  the  purposes  of  government  on  the  Isthmus.  The 
power  to  make  rules  and  regulations — in  short,  all  matters 
of  legislation  for  the  zone  and  its  inhabitants — have  been 
delegated  to  the  members  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion, of  whom  four  constitute  a  quorum  for  legislative  pur- 
poses; but  it  is  provided  that  the  governor  of  the  zone  and 
the  legislative  commission  shall  exercise  their  powers  and 
authority  and  carry  on  their  work  always  under  the  super- 
vision and  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  President  has  ordered  that  the  laws  of  the  land  w^hich 
were  in  force  on  the  27th  of  February,  1904,  shall  continue 
in  force  in  all  places  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  over  which 
the  United  States  has  jurisdiction  until  said  laws  are  altered 
or  annulled  by  the  canal  commission,  and  the  people  are 
entitled  to  security  in  their  persons,  property,  and  religion, 
and  in  all  their  private  rights  and  relations.  They  will  be 
disturbed  as  little  as  possible  in  their  customs  and  avoca- 
tions that  are  in  harmony  with  the  principles  of  well  ordered 
and  decent  living,  but  there  are  certain  great  principles  of 
government  that  have  been  made  the  basis  of  our  existence 
as  a  nation  which  are  deemed  essential  to  the  rule  of  law  and 
the  maintenance  of  order,  and  will  have  force  within  the 
canal  zone  and  within  other  lands  on  the  Isthmus  that  are 
controlled  by  the  United  States.  The  principles  referred  to 
may  be  generally  stated  as  follows: 

That  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law ;  that  private  property  shall 
not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation ;  that 
in  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 


APPEISTDICES  421 

of  a  speedy  and  public  trial,  to  be  informed  of  the  nature 
and  cause  of  the  accusation,  to  be  confronted  with  the  wit- 
nesses against  him,  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining 
witnesses  in  his  favour,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel 
in  his  defence ;  that  excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required  nor 
excessive  fines  imposed,  nor  cruel  or  unusual  punishment 
inflicted ;  that  no  person  shall  be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  for 
the  same  offence,  or  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be 
a  witness  against  himself;  that  the  right  to  be  secure  against 
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  shall  not  be  violated; 
that  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude  shall  exist, 
except  as  a  punishment  for  crime;  that  no  bill  of  attainder 
or  ex-post  facto  law  shall  be  passed;  that  no  law  shall  be 
passed  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press,  or  of 
the  rights  of  the  people  to  peaceably  assemble  and  petition 
the  Government  for  a  redress  of  grievances;  that  no  law 
shall  be  made  respecting  the  establishment  of  religion,  or 
prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof.  Provided,  however, 
that  the  commission  shall  have  power  to  exclude  from  time 
to  time  from  the  canal  zone  and  other  places  on  the  Isthmus 
over  which  the  United  States  has  jurisdiction,  persons  of 
the  following  classes  who  were  not  actually  domiciled  within 
the  zone  on  the  26th  of  February,  1904,  viz.:  idiots,  the 
insane,  epileptics,  paupers,  criminals,  professional  beggars, 
persons  afllicted  with  loathsome  or  dangerous  contagious 
diseases,  those  who  have  been  convicted  of  felony,  anarchists, 
those  whose  purpose  it  is  to  incite  insurrection,  and  others 
whose  presence  it  is  believed  by  the  commission  would  tend 
to  create  public  disorder,  endanger  the  public  health,  or  in 
any  manner  impede  the  prosecution  of  the  work  of  opening 
the  canal;  and  may  cause  any  and  all  such  newly  arrived 
persons,  or  those  of  the  same  classes  alien  to  the  zone,  to  be 
expelled  and  deported  from  the  territory  controlled  by  the 
United  States,  and  the  commission  may  defray  from  the 
canal  appropriation  the  cost  of  such  deportation,  as  neces- 
sary expenses  of  the  sanitation,  the  police  protection  of  the 
canal  route,  and  the  preservation  of  good  order  among  the 
inhabitants. 

The  President  has  further  directed  notification  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  canal  zone  that  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  lotteries  and  the  holding  of  lottery  drawings, 
or  sale  of  lottery  tickets,  or  the  conduct  of  gambling  meth- 
ods and  devices  of  a  character  that  is  prohibited  by  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  are  to  be  strictly  forbidden  by  the  canal 


422  APPENDICES 

commission,  within  the  canal  zone,  and  that  any  violation 
of  the  law  respecting  lotteries  and  gambling,  to  be  enacted, 
will  subject  the  offender  to  severe  punishment. 

The  municipal  laws  of  the  canal  zone  are  to  be  adminis- 
tered by  the  ordinary  tribunals  substantially  as  they  were 
before  the  change  of  government.  Alcaldes,  comisarios  de 
barrios,  and  other  persons  in  lawful  discharge  of  official 
duties  in  the  zone  that  are  in  harmony  with  the  principles 
of  government  herein  set  forth  will  be  continued  in  office  for 
the  present.  A  judge  of  a  superior  court  will  soon  be  ap- 
pointed, and  as  soon  as  practicable  the  limits  of  the  zone  will 
be  defined. 

The  following  announcements  are  made  of  heads  of 
departments  in  the  government  of  the  zone : 

Secretary:  Mr.  Ernest  Legarde,  Jr. 

Treasurer :  Paymaster  E.  C.  Tobey,  United  States  Navy. 
\  Captain  of  police :  Mr.  G.  R.  Shanton. 

Sanitary  officer :  Dr.  L.  W.  Sprattling,  United  States  Navy. 

Geo.  W.  Davis^  Governor. 


APPENDIX  VIII 

The  First  Administrative  Order 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  first  Administrative  Order, 
the  enforcement  of  which  was  regarded  by  the  Panama  Gov- 
ernment as  an  oppressive  hardship: 

War  Department, 
Washington,  June  24,  1904. 
To  the  Chairman  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission: 

By  direction  of  the  President  it  is  ordered : 

Section  1.  The  territory  of  the  canal  zone  of  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama  is  hereby  declared  open  to  the  commerce  of  all 
friendly  nations.  All  articles,  goods,  and  wares,  not  in- 
cluded in  the  prohibited  list,  entering  at  the  established 
customs  ports,  will  be  admitted  upon  payment  of  such  cus- 
toms duties  and  other  charges  as  are  in  force  at  the  time  and 
place  of  their  importation. 

Sec.  2.  For  the  purposes  of  customs  administration  in 
said  canal  zone,  there  are  hereby  established  two  collection 
districts,  as  follows : 

First.  The  district  of  Ancon,  comprising  the  southern 
half  of  said  canal  zone,  more  particularly  described  as 
follows : 

The  port  of  entry  in  said  district  shall  be  Ancon. 

Second.  The  district  of  Cristobal,  comprising  the  north- 
ern half  of  said  canal  zone,  more  particularly  described  as 
follows : 

The  port  of  entry  in  said  district  shall  be  Cristobal. 

Sec.  3.  There  is  hereby  created  and  shall  be  maintained  in 
the  government  of  the  canal  zone  a  subdivision  of  the  execu- 
tive branch  to  be  known  as  the  customs  service ;  the  general 
duties,  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  the  customs  service  shall 
be  to  administer  the  customs  laws  and  tariff  regulations  in 
force  in  said  zone.  The  governor  of  the  canal  zone  shall  be 
the  head  of  the  customs  service.  There  shall  be  a  collector 
of  customs  for  each  collection  district,  who  shall  receive  an 
annual  salary  of  |2,500  in  gold,  payable  in  monthly  instal- 

428 


424  APPENDICES 

ments.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  collector  to  collect  all 
revenues  derived  from  the  enforcement  of  the  customs  laws 
and  tariff  regulations  in  the  district  subject  to  his  juris- 
diction and  to  perform  such  other  service  in  the  administra- 
tion of  such  laws  as  is  ordinarily  performed  by  a  collector  of 
customs  or  as  he  may  be  required  to  perform  by  the  governor 
of  the  canal  zone.  The  collector  of  customs  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Isthmian  Commission.  The  governor  of  the  canal  zone  is 
hereby  authorised  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compensation  of 
deputy  collectors,  surveyors  of  customs,  and  such  other  sub- 
ordinates and  employees  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  efficient 
administration  of  the  customs  laws  and  service. 

Sec.  4.  The  governor  of  the  canal  zone  is  hereby  author- 
ised and  empowered  to  prescribe  and  enforce  rules  and  regu- 
lations for  the  administration  of  the  customs  laws  and 
service  of  said  zone,  and  report  the  same  to  the  chairman  of 
the  Commission,  and  said  rules  and  regulations  shall  have 
the  force  and  effect  of  law  until  annulled  or  modified  by 
legislative  act  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  or  other 
competent  authority. 

Sec.  5.  Until  otherwise  provided  by  competent  authority 
duties  on  importations  into  the  canal  zone  are  to  be  levied 
in  conformity  with  such  duties  as  Congress  has  imposed 
upon  foreign  merchandise  imported  into  other  ports  of  the 
United  States. 

Sec.  6.  Goods  or  merchandise  entering  the  canal  zone 
from  ports  of  the  United  States  or  insular  possessions  of 
the  United  States  shall  be  admitted  on  the  same  terms  as  at 
the  ports  of  the  States  of  this  Union. 

Sec.  7.  All  goods  or  merchandise,  whether  free  or  duti- 
able, entering  the  canal  zone  by  water,  by  rail,  or  otherwise, 
for  transportation  across  said  zone  must  be  entered  at  the 
custom  house  of  the  collection  district  wherein  the  point  of 
entrance  is  situated.  Violation  of  this  requirement  shall 
subject  the  goods  to  seizure  and  forfeiture  by  the  customs 
officials. 

Sec.  8.  The  governor  of  the  canal  zone  is  authorised  to 
enter  and  carry  out  an  agreement  with  the  President  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama  for  cooperation  between  the  customs 
service  of  the  canal  zone  and  that  of  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama to  protect  the  customs  revenues  of  both  Governments 
and  to  prevent  frauds  and  smuggling. 

Sec.  9.  The  governor  of  the  canal  zone  is  hereby  authorised 


APPENDICES  425 

to  enter  upon  negotiations  and  make  a  tentative  agreement 
with  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  respecting 
reciprocal  trade  relations  between  the  territory  and  inhabi- 
tants of  the  canal  zone  and  appurtenant  territory  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama;  also  a  readjustment  of  customs  duties 
and  tariff  regulations  so  as  to  secure  uniformity  of  rates  and 
privileges  and  avoid  the  disadvantages  resulting  from  differ- 
ent schedules,  duties,  and  administrative  measures  in  limited 
territory  subject  to  the  same  conditions  and  not  separated  by 
natural  obstacles.  The  governor  shall  report  as  to  such 
negotiations  and  proposed  agreement  to  the  chairman  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  for  submission  and  considera- 
tion by  the  Commission  and  such  action  by  competent 
authority  as  may  be  necessary  to  render  said  agreement 
effective  in  the  canal  zone. 

This  order  will  be  proclaimed  and  enforced  in  the  canal 
zone  at  Panama. 

(Signed) 

Wm.  H.  Taft,  Secretary  of  War, 


APPENDIX  IX 

The  Panaman  Protest 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  Panaman  Government's 
oflBcial  representation,  against  the  Administrative  Order.  It 
was  addressed  by  the  Panaman  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  American  Minister  at  Panama : 

Mr.  Arias  to  Mr.  Barrett. 

Memorandum. 

Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Government 
AND  Foreign  Affairs, 

Panama,  July  27,  1904. 

The  undersigned,  secretary  of  government  and  foreign 
affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  has  received  instructions 
from  the  President  of  the  aforesaid  Republic  to  submit  to 
his  excellency  the  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  pleni- 
potentiary of  the  United  States  the  following: 

Pursuant  to  orders  given  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  for  the  creation  of  ports  and  establish- 
ment of  customs  regulations  in  the  canal  zone,  the  governor 
of  said  zone  has  forthwith  declared  as  ports  of  entry  the 
section  denominated  La  Boca,  wherein  he  has,  in  conse- 
quence, thought  fit  to  assume,  disregarding  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  the  prerogatives  of  sovereign  of  the  port,  entering 
and  clearing  vessels,  establishing  and  collecting  port  dues 
and,  finally,  adopting  measures  tending  to  the  establishment 
in  the  canal  zone  of  the  customs  system  of  the  United  States. 
In  a  similar  fashion  the  postal  tariff  and  postage  stamps  of 
the  United  States  have  been  made  obligatory  within  the 
limits  of  the  canal  zone,  and  it  appears  the  belief  was  enter- 
tained that  the  United  States  could,  at  its  option,  establish 
in  the  canal  zone  a  monetary  system  different  from  any 
adopted  by  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Such  proceeding  and  intentions  are,  undoubtedly,  the 
result  of  the  interpretation  given  by  the  United  States  of 
America  to  the  treaty  concluded  with  Panama  on  the  18th 

429 


APPENDICES  427 

of  November,  1903,  on  points  such  as  those  of  vital  impor- 
tance for  the  growing  Republic  and  as  said  interpretation 
clashes  with  the  opinion  of  the  government  of  Panama  in 
what  concerns  the  treaty  itself  and  points  at  issue,  the 
undersigned,  in  the  name  of  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
respectfully  invites  his  excellency  the  envoy  extraordinary 
and  minister  plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  to  ex- 
change views  in  connection  with  the  measures  recently 
adopted  in  the  canal  zone,  so  as  to  convey  to  the  treaty,  by 
mutual  accord,  such  interpretation  as  is  found  more  to  con- 
form to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  its  stipulations. 

Although  the  Republic  of  Panama  when  negotiating  with 
the  United  States  the  treaty  of  the  18th  of  November,  1903, 
could  not  offer  any  obstacle  whatsoever  to  the  wishes  and 
convenience  of  the  United  States,  it  did  observe,  neverthe- 
less, with  pleasure,  when  approving  without  restrictions 
said  treaty,  that  the  United  States  had  waived  in  favour  of 
the  Republic  of  Panama  that  which  was  neither  needed  by 
the  United  States  nor  by  the  canal  enterprise,  but  which  for 
the  Republic  constitutes  the  most  effective  guaranty  of  its 
existence — in  other  words,  fiscal  and  economical  sovereignty 
within  and  without  the  canal  zone. 

This  point  is  of  great  importance  because  it  is  really  a 
fact  that  a  nation  can  cede  part  of  its  territory  and  sov- 
ereign rights  in  connection  therewith,  without  materially 
affecting  its  proper  existence,  in  surrendering  life  itself,  and 
this  very  life,  without  the  corresponding  nourishment,  is 
thereby  doomed  to  sure  death.  From  this  it  follows  that 
the  treaty  concluded  with  the  United  States  amply  provides, 
on  the  one  hand,  for  all  requirements  of  the  canal  enter- 
prise, and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  fully  provides  for  the 
perpetual  existence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

The  said  Republic  thus  agreed  to  surrender  a  strip  of  land 
of  the  required  size,  and  boundaries  to  be  excavated  for  a 
canal  and  to  be  eventually  used  by  the  shipping  communi 
eating  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  and  the  zone  thus 
surrendered  was  ceded  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  in  perpetuity  for  "the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation,  sanitation,  and  protection  of  said  canal."  (Arti- 
cle II  of  the  treaty.)     - 

Whatever  was  considered  indispensable  by  the  United 
States  to  secure  perpetually  the  canal  enterprise  was  readily 
granted  by  the  Republic  of  Panama.  By  such  concession  the 
canal  zone,  properly  speaking,  was  comprised  in  the  grant, 


428  APPENDICES 

and  such  lands  and  waters  without  the  zone  as  would  be 
found  necessary,  the  islands  of  Perico,  Naos,  Culebra,  and 
Flamenco,  and  moreover,  the  rights,  power,  and  authority 
(as  per  Article  III  of  the  treaty)  which  the  United  States 
'^shall  have  and  exercise  as  if  it  were  sovereign  of  the  terri- 
tory wherein  said  land  and  waters  are  located,"  entirely 
precluding  the  Republic  of  Panama  in  the  exercise  of  such 
sovereign  rights,  power,  or  authority. 

But  the  general,  and  so  to  speak,  the  universal  phase  of 
these  concessions  of  sovereignty,  has,  to  judge  from  the 
treaty,  two  conceptions,  one  conditional  and  the  other  excep- 
tional, both  indispensable  to  the  existence  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama. 

These  two  points  are  those  which  the  undersigned  believes 
have  been  disregarded  by  the  authorities  of  the  canal  zone, 
by  means  of  the  measures  set  forth  at  the  commencement  of 
this  memorandum. 

According  to  the  clause  in  question,  referred  to  in  Article 
II  of  the  treaty,  "the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and 
adjacent  ports  which  are  included  in  the  described  zone 
shall  not  be  considered  as  comprised  in  this  concession." 

This  provision  has  an  object  further  than  that  of  indicat- 
ing the  material  possession  of  said  cities  and  ports.  The 
evident  object  of  that  provision  tends  to  insure  and  safe- 
guard the  very  existence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  reserv- 
ing to  it  in  perpetuity  the  aforesaid  cities  and  ports  as  fiscal 
resources,  wherefrom  to  derive  the  most  effective  means  of 
subsistence. 

The  canal  zone,  bfefore  being  ceded  to  the  United  States 
and  subsequent  to  its  cession,  forms  part  of  the  region  where- 
from importation  and  exportation  take  place  and  is  the 
central  spot  between  the  two  seas.  The  very  existence  of 
the  Republic  is  derived  from  there;  hence  it  was  necessary 
to  reserve  that  spot,  although  in  other  respects  ceded  to  the 
United  States. 

Such  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  undersigned,  the  reason  and 
the  object  why  from  the  canal  zone  the  cities  of  Panama 
and  Colon  are  set  apart  and  the  ports  adjacent  thereto, 
virtually  leaving  the  zone  without  jurisdictional  ports. 

Hence  the  right  of  levying  and  collecting  maritime  taxes, 
etc.  (without  regard  to  the  exceptions  provided  in  the  treaty 
referring  to  all  shipping  and  otherwise  everything  connected 
with  the  canal  enterprise,)  has  iji variably  been  a  prerogative 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  and  the  Republic  claims  it  by 


APPENDICES  429 

virtue  of  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  treaty  concluded  on 
the  18th  of  November,  1903. 

Not  only  that,  the  Republic  claims  the  acknowledgment 
to  the  full  extent  of  its  economical  and  fiscal  sovereignty 
within  the  canal  zone,  not  only  because  it  considers  it  has  a 
right  according  to  the  treaty,  but  that  its  very  existence  and 
future  depend  on  it.  The  fact  stands,  therefore,  that  Pan- 
ama, being  the  original  owner  of  the  canal  zone,  clearly 
reserved  what  it  did  not  expressly  surrender.  ^ 

The  sovereign  right  of  levying  taxes  within  the  zone  does 
not  appear  by  any  of  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  to  have 
been  expressly  surrendered  to  the  United  States.  On  the 
contrary,  the  right  is  implicitly  acknowledged  by  Clauses  X 
and  XIII,  wherein  are  specified  the  effects  that  cannot  be 
subject  to  taxes.  It  follows  therefore,  that  other  effects  are 
liable  to  taxation.  In  other  words,  national  taxes  and  con- 
tribution take  effect  in  the  canal  zone  in  so  far  as  not 
expressly  excepted  by  said  Articles  X  and  XI 1 1. 

This  being  the  case,  the  fact  of  excluding  from  the  canal 
zone,  by  order  of  the  authorities  there,  the  postal  tariff  and 
postage  stamps  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  is,  to  say  the 
least,  improper,  inasmuch  as  such  proceedings  aft'ect,  in  a 
marked  manner,  a  source  of  revenue  from  which  it  expects 
brilliant  results  in  the  near  future. 

Finally,  and  as  logical  understanding  of  the  meaning  of 
a  treaty  whereby  the  fiscal  and  economical  sovereignty  is 
assured  to  the  Republic,  it  considers  that  the  rights  which 
it  so  clearl}^  and  expressly  reserved  to  itself  have  not  been 
taken  into  proper  consideration. 

The  foregoing  are  the  ideas  w^hich  have  been  considered 
as  proper  to  submit  to  his  excellency  the  envoy  extraordi- 
nary and  minister  plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  of 
America  as  a  true  expression  of  the  feeling  of  the  national 
government  in  order  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  interpretation  of 
the  treaty  of  the  18th  of  November,  1903,  in  a  matter  of 
such  vital  importance  for  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

ToMAS  Aeias. 


APPENDIX  X 

The  Revised  Executive  Order 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  new  administrative  or 
executive  order,  made  by  the  United  States  Secretary  of 
War  as  a  result  of  a  long  controversy  with  the  Panaman 
Government,  during  his  visit  to  Panama  in  1904. 

Panama,  December  3,  1904. 

By  the  direction  of  the  President  it  is  ordered,  that,  sub- 
ject to  the  action  of  the  Fifty-eighth  Congress,  as  contem- 
plated by  the  act  of  Congress  approved  April  28,  1904 : 

Section  1.  No  importation  of  goods,  wares,  and  merchan- 
dise shall  be  entered  at  Ancon  or  Cristobal,  the  terminal 
ports  of  the  canal,  except  such  goods,  wares, and  merchandise 
as  are  described  in  Article  XIII  of  the  treaty  between  the 
Republic  of  Panama  and  the  United  States,  the  ratifications 
of  which  were  exchanged  on  the  26th  day  of  February,  1904, 
and  except  goods,  wares  and  merchandise  in  transit  across 
the  Isthmus  for  a  destination  without  the  limits  of  said 
Isthmus,  and  except  coal,  and  crude  mineral  oil  for  fuel 
purposes  to  be  sold  at  Ancon  or  Cristobal,  to  sea-going 
vessels,  said  coal  and  oil  to  be  admitted  to  those  ports  free 
of  duties  for  said  purposes : 

Provided,  however,  that  this  order  shall  be  inoperative, 
first,  unless  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  reduce  the  ad 
valorem  duty  on  imported  articles  described  in  the  class  2 
of  the  act  of  the  National  Convention  of  Panama,  passed 
July  5,  1904,  and  taking  effect  October  12,  1904,  from  15  per 
centum  to  10  per  centum  and  shall  not  increase  the  rates  of 
duty  on  the  imported  articles  described  in  the  other  sched- 
ules of  said  act  except  on  all  forms  of  imported  wines, 
liquors,  alcohol,  and  opium,  on  which  the  Republic  may  fix 
higher  rates;  second,  unless  Article  38  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama  as  modified  by  Article  146  thereof, 
shall  remain  in  full  force  and  unchanged,  so  far  as  the 
importation  and  sale  of  all  kinds  of  merchandise  are  con 
cerned;  third,  unless  the  consular  fees  and  charges  of  the 

430 


APPENDICES  431 

Republic  of  Panama  in  respect  to  entry  of  all  vessels  and 
importations  into  said  ports  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall  be 
reduced  to  60  per  cent,  of  the  rates  now  in  force ;  and,  fourth, 
unless  goods  imported  into  the  ports  of  Panama  and  Colon, 
consigned  to  and  destined  for  any  part  of  the  canal  zone 
shall  not  be  subjected  in  the  Republic  of  Panama  to  any 
other  direct  or  indirect  impost  or  tax  whatever. 

Section  2.  In  view  of  the  proximity  of  the  port  of  Ancon 
to  the  port  of  Panama  and  of  the  port  of  Cristobal  to  the 
port  of  Colon,  the  proper  customs  or  port  official  of  the  canal 
zone  shall,  when  not  inconsistent  with  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  at  the  instance  of  proper  authority  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  permit  any  vessel  entered  at  or  cleared 
from  the  ports  of  Panama  and  Colon  together  with  its  cargo 
and  passengers  under  suitable  regulations  for  the  transit  of 
the  imported  merchandise  and  passengers  to  and  from  the 
territory  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  to  use  and  enjoy  the 
dockage  and  other  facilities  of  the  ports  of  Ancon  and  Cris- 
tobal respectively,  upon  payment  of  proper  dockage  dues 
to  the  owners  of  said  dock. 

Provided,  however,  that  reciprocal  privileges  as  to  dock- 
age and  other  facilities  at  Panama  and  Colon,  together  with 
suitable  arrangement  for  transit  of  imported  merchandise 
and  passengers  to  and  from  the  territory  of  the  canal  zone, 
shall  be  granted  by  the  authorities  of  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama when  not  inconsistent  with  its  interests,  to  any  vessel, 
together  with  its  cargo  and  passengers,  entered  at  or  cleared 
from  the  ports  of  Ancon  and  Cristobal;  provided,  however, 
that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  affect  the  complete  ad- 
ministrative, police  and  judicial  jurisdiction  of  the  two 
governments  over  their  respective  ports  and  harbours,  except 
-as  hereinafter  provided  in  Section  6. 

Provided,  also  that  vessels  entering  or  clearing  at  the  port 
of  Panama  shall  have  the  absolute  right  freely  to  anchor  and 
lade  and  discharge  their  cargoes  by  lighterage  from  and  to 
Panama  at  the  usual  anchorage  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
islands  of  Perico,  Flamenco,  Naos,  and  Culebra,  though 
included  in  the  harbour  of  Ancon  under  the  provisional 
delimitation  as  amended  under  Section  5  hereinafter,  and  in 
use  the  said  waters  of  said  harbour  for  all  lawful  com- 
mercial purposes. 

Section  3.  All  manifests  and  invoices  and  other  docu- 
ments in  respect  to  vessels  or  cargoes  cleared  or  consigned 
for  or  from  the  ports  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall,  as  hereto- 


432  APPENDICES 

fore,  be  made  by  the  officials  of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  All 
manifests,  invoices,  and  other  documents  in  respect  to  the 
vessels  and  cargoes  cleared  or  consigned  for  or  from  the 
ports  of  Ancon  or  Cristobal  shall  be  made  by  officials  of 
the  United  States. 

Section  4.  No  import  duties,  tolls,  or  charges  of  any  kind 
whatsoever  shall  be  imposed  by  the  authorities  of  the  canal 
zone  upon  goods,  wares,  and  merchandise  imported,  or  upon 
persons  passing  from  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama into  the  canal  zone;  and  Section  5  of  the  Executive 
Order  of  June  24,  1904,  providing  that  duties  on  importa- 
tions into  the  canal  zone  are  to  be  levied  in  conformity  with 
such  duties  as  Congress  has  imposed  upon  foreign  merchan- 
dise imported  into  ports  of  the  United  States,  is  hereby 
revoked;  but  this  order  shall  be  inoperative  unless  the 
authority  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  grant  by  proper 
order,  reciprocal  free  importations  of  goods,  wares,  and 
merchandise  and  free  passage  of  persons  from  the  territory 
of  the  canal  zone  into  that  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Section  5.  The  provisions  of  this  order  also  shall  not  be 
operative  except  upon  the  condition  that  the  delimitation  of 
the  cities  and  harbours  of  Colon  and  Panama,  signed  on  the 
15th  day  of  June,  1904,  by  the  proper  representatives  of  the 
governments  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  of  the  canal 
zone,  shall  be  provisionally  in  force;  and  while  the  same 
shall  remain  in  force,  with  the  consent  of  both  parties 
thereto,  the  provisional  delimitation  shall  include  not  only 
the  terms  set  forth  in  writing  thereof,  but  also  the  following, 
viz. :  that  the  harbour  of  Panama  shall  include  the  maritime 
waters  in  front  of  said  city  to  the  south  and  east  thereof, 
extending  3  marine  miles  from  mean  low-water  mark,  except 
the  maritime  waters  lying  westerly  of  a  line  drawn  from  a 
stake  or  post  set  on  Punta  Mala  through  the  middle  island 
of  the  three  islands  known  as  Las  Tres  Hermanas,  and  ex- 
tending 3  marine  miles  from  mean  low-water  mark  on  Punta 
Mala,  which  waters  shall  be  considered  in  the  harbour  of 
Ancon. 

Section  6.  This  order  also  shall  be  inoperative  unless  the 
proper  governmental  authorities  of  the  Republic  of  Panama 
shall  grant  power  to  the  authorities  of  the  canal  zone  to 
exercise  immediate  and  complete  jurisdiction  in  matters  of 
sanitation  and  quarantine  in  the  maritime  waters  of  the 
ports  of  Panama  and  Colon. 

Section  7.  The  Executive  Order  of  June  24,  1904,  concern- 


APPENDICES  433 

ing  the  establishment  of  post  offices  and  postal  service  in 
the  canal  zone,  is  modified  and  supplemented  by  the  follow- 
ing provisions : 

All  mail  matter  carried  in  the  territory  of  the  canal  zone, 
to  or  through  the  Republic  of  Panama,  to  the  United  States 
and  to  foreign  countries,  shall  bear  the  stamps  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama,  properly  crossed  by  a  printed  mark  of  the 
canal  zone  government,  and  at  rates  the  same  as  those 
imposed  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  upon  its 
domestic  and  foreign  mail  matter,  exactly  as  if  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  for  this  purpose  were 
common  territory.  The  authorities  of  the  canal  zone  shall 
purchase  from  the  Republic  of  Panama  such  stamps  as  the 
authorities  of  the  canal  zone  desire  to  use  in  the  canal  zone 
at  40  per  centum  of  their  face  value ;  but  this  order  shall  be 
inoperative  unless  the  proper  authorities  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  shall  by  suitable  arrangement  with  the  postal 
authorities  of  the  United  States  provide  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  mail  matter  between  post  offices  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  and  post  offices  in  the  United  States  at  the  same 
rates  as  are  now  charged  for  domestic  postage  in  the  United 
States,  except  all  mail  matter  lawfully  franked  and  inclosed 
in  the  so-called  penalty  envelopes  of  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment, concerning  the  public  business  of  the  United 
States,  which  shall  be  carried  free,  both  by  the  govern- 
ments of  Panama  and  of  the  canal  zone ;  provided,  however, 
that  the  zone  authorities  may,  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating 
the  transportation  of  through  mail  between  the  zone  and 
the  United  States  in  either  direction,  inclose  such  through 
mail,  properly  stamped  or  lawfully  franked,  in  sealed  mail 
pouches,  which  shall  not  be  opened  by  the  authorities  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama  in  transit,  on  condition  that  the  cost 
of  transportation  of  such  mail  pouches  shall  be  paid  by  the 
zone  government.  Buicroft  UbnuQp 

Section  8.  This  order  also  shall  not  be  operative  unless 
the  currency  agreement  made  at  Washington  June  20,  1904, 
by  the  representatives  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  the  United  States,  acting  with  the 
approval  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  gold  standard  of  value  in  the  Republic  of 
Panama  and  proper  coinage,  shall  be  approved  and  put  into 
execution  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  pur- 
suant to  the  authority  conferred  upon  him  by  law  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama  No.  84,  approved  June  20,  1904;  and 


434  APPENDICES 

unless  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  in  order 
that  the  operation  of  the  said  currency  agreement  in  secur- 
ing and  maintaining  a  gold  standard  of  value  in  the  Republic 
of  Panama  may  not  be  obstructed  thereby,  shall,  by  virtue  of 
his  authority,  conferred  by  law  No.  65,  enacted  by  the 
National  Assembly  of  Panama  on  June  6,  1904,  abolish  the 
tax  of  1  per  cent,  on  gold  coin  exported  from  the  Republic  of 
Panama. 

Section  9.  Citizens  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  at  any  time 
residing  in  the  canal  zone  shall  have,  so  far  as  concerns  the 
United  States,  entire  freedom  of  voting  at  elections  held  in 
the  Republic  of  Panama  and  its  provinces  or  municipalities, 
at  such  places  outside  of  the  canal  zone  as  may  be  fixed  by 
the  Republic  and  under  such  conditions  as  the  Republic  may 
determine;  but  nothing  herein  is  to  be  construed  as  intend- 
ing to  limit  the  power  of  the  Republic  to  exclude  or  restrict 
the  right  of  such  citizens  to  vote  as  it  may  be  deemed 
judicious. 

Section  10.  The  highway  extending  from  the  eastern  lim- 
its of  the  city  of  Panama,  as  fixed  in  the  above  mentioned 
provisional  delimitation  agreement  of  June  10,  1904,  to  the 
point  still  farther  to  the  eastward  where  the  road  to  the 
Savannahs  crosses  the  zone  line  (which  is  5  miles  to  east- 
ward of  the  centre  axis  of  the  canal),  shall  be  repaired  and 
maintained  in  a  serviceable  condition  at  the  cost  and  expense 
of  the  authorities  of  the  canal  zone ;  and  also  in  like  manner 
the  said  road  from  the  said  eastern  limits  of  the  city  of  Pan- 
ama to  the  railroad  bridge  in  the  city  of  Panama  shall  be 
repaired  at  the  cost  of  the  authorities  of  the  canal  zone.  But 
this  order  shall  not  be  operative  unless  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama shall  waive  its  claim  for  compensation  for  the  use  in 
perpetuity  of  the  municipal  buildings  located  in  the  canal 
zone. 

Section  11.  The  United  States  will  construct,  maintain, 
and  conduct  a  hospital  or  hospitals,  either  in  the  canal  zone 
or  in  the  territory  of  the  Republic,  at  its  option,  for  the 
treatment  of  persons  insane  or  afflicted  with  the  disease  of 
leprosy,  and  the  indigent  sick,  and  the  United  States  will 
accept  for  treatment  therein  such  persons  of  said  classes  as 
the  Republic  may  request;  but  this  order  shall  not  be  oper- 
ative unless,  first,  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  furnish 
without  cost  the  requisite  lands  for  said  purposes  if  the 
United  States  shall  locate  such  hospital  or  hospitals  in  the 
territory  of  the  Republic,  and,  second,  unless  the  Republic 


APPEKDICES  435 

shall  contribute  and  pay  to  the  United  States  a  reasonable 
daily  per  capita  charge  in  respect  of  each  patient  entering 
upon  the  request  of  the  Republic,  to  be  fixed  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  of  the  United  States. 

Section  12.  The  operation  of  this  executive  order  and  its 
enforcement  by  officials  of  the  United  States  on  the  one  hand, 
or  a  compliance  with  and  performance  of  the  conditions  of 
its  operation  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  its  officials  on 
the  other,  shall  not  be  taken  as  a  delimitation,  definition, 
restriction,  or  restrictive  construction  of  the  rights  of  either 
party  under  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama. 

This  order  is  to  take  effect  on  the  12th  day  of  December, 
1904. 

(Signed) 

Wm.  H.  Taft,  Secretary  of  War. 


APPENDIX  XI 
Data  op  Existing  Ship  Canals 

SUEZ 

The  Suez  Canal  connects  the  Mediterranean  and  Red  seas, 
extending  from  Port  Said  on  the  former  to  Suez  on  the 
latter,  and  is  at  sea  level,  without  locks  of  any  kind.  Its 
total  length  is  104.08  miles,  as  follows:  Channel  of  road- 
stead at  Port  Said,  1.86  miles;  Entrance  channel  of  outer 
harbour,  1.24;  Port  Said  Harbour,  2.48;  Lake  Timsah,  1.24; 
Large  Bitter  Lake,  9.32;  Channel  of  Suez  Roadstead,  1.55; 
Canal  proper,  including  Small  Bitter  Lake,  86.37.  The  canal 
was  authorised  by  the  Egyptian  government  in  1856,  and  con- 
firmed by  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  in  1866.  The  concession  runs 
to  November,  1968.  Work  was  begun  on  the  canal  in 
1860,  and  it  was  opened  to  commerce  in  1869.  The  orig- 
inal excavation  amounted  to  80,000,000  cubic  yards, 
chiefly  of  sand  but  with  some  strata  of  rock  two  or 
three  feet  thick.  The  original  depth  was  25  feet,  the  bot- 
tom width  72  feet,  and  the  surface  width  from  196  to 
328  feet,  according  to  the  character  of  the  soil  composing 
the  walls.  The  deepest  cutting  was  about  80  feet,  to  the 
bottom  of  the  canal.  In  1895  it  was  enlarged  to  a  depth  of 
31  feet,  and  to  a  width  of  108  feet  at  the  bottom  and  420 
feet  at  the  top.  This  work  increased  the  total  excavation 
to  98,000,000  cubic  yards.  The  original  cost  was  about  |90,- 
000,000,  which  was  increased  by  the  work  of  enlargement  to 
1102,500,000.  At  the  present  time  the  canal  is  being  further 
enlarged,  so  as  to  have  a  depth  of  a  little  more  than  34  feet. 
The  authorised  draught  of  vessels  passing  through  it  is,  how- 
ever, only  27  feet.  The  speed  of  vessels  is  limited  to  10  kilo- 
metres, or  5.4  knots,  an  hour.  The  average  time  of  passage 
is  18  hours.  The  entire  canal  is  lighted  with  electricity,  and 
vessels  pass  through  at  night  as  well  as  by  day.  A  current 
is  caused  by  the  tides,  sometimes  in  one  direction  and  some- 
times in  the  other,  seldom  exceeding  a  knot  an  hour.  Sta- 
tistics of  traffic  through  the  canal  in  the  years  stated  are 
as  follows: 

436 


APPENDICES 

437 

Year 

No.  of  Vessels 

Net  Tonnage 

Receipts 
from  Tolls 

1869 
1870 
1895 
1900 
1904 

10 

486 
3,434 
3,441 
4,237 

6,576 
436,609 

8,448,383 

9,738,152 

13,401,835 

£        2,178 

206,273 

3,124,148 

3,624,944 

4,616,034 

The  British  Government  purchased  shares  in  the  canal 
amounting  to  £4,000,000,  the  value  of  which  in  March,  1905, 
was  £30,857,755.  Despite  repeated  reductions  of  tolls,  the 
yearly  dividends  on  the  shares  show  a  tendency  to  exceed 
the  maximum  permitted,  of  25  per  cent.  In  1904  they  were 
141  francs  on  each  ordinary  share  of  500  francs,  and  117.50 
francs  on  the  Actions  de  Jouissance.  In  1893  tolls  were 
reduced  to  9  francs  a  ton,  in  1903  to  8.50  francs  a  ton,  and 
in  1905  to  7.75  francs  a  ton. 

KAISER   WILHELM    (kIEL) 

The  Kaiser  Wilhelm  or  Kiel  Canal,  constructed  by  the 
German  Government,  begun  in  1887  and  completed  in  1895, 
connects  the  Baltic  and  North  seas,  across  the  northern  part 
of  Germany.  It  is  a  sea-level  canal,  with  locks  at  the  ends 
to  control  the  influx  of  the  tides.  It  is  61  miles  long,  29.5 
feet  deep,  and  72  feet  wide  at  the  bottom,  with  a  number  of 
much  wider  "turn-outs"  at  which  vessels  may  pass  each 
other.  The  total  excavation  was  100,000,000  cubic  yards, 
and  the  cost  was  |40,000,000.     Statistics  of  traffic  follow: 


Year 

No.  of  Vessels 

Total  Tonnage 

Total  Revenue 
from  Tolls 
and  Towing 

1896 
1900 
1904 

16,834 
26,279 
32,038 

1,505,983 

3,488,767 
4,990,287 

AMSTERDAM 

1213,356 
430,768 
574,651 

The  Amsterdam  or  North  Sea  Canal,  giving  access  to  the 
inland  city  of  Amsterdam  from  the  North  Sea,  was  con- 
structed by  the  private  North  Sea  Canal  Company,  and  after- 
ward purchased  and  enlarged  by  the  government  of  the 
Netherlands.  It  is  a  sea-level  canal,  or  really  14  inches  below 
sea  level,  with  tide  locks  at  the  ends^  and  is  15.5  miles  long. 


438  APPENDICES 

Its  depth  is  27.9  feet,  which  is  now  being  increased  to  32.2 
feet.  The  width  at  the  bottom  is  115  feet  and  at  the  sur- 
face 164  feet.  It  was  begun  in  1865  and  opened  in  1876. 
The  cost  was  $15,000,000,  but  this  was  reduced  to  |10,000,- 
000  by  the  sale  of  lands  filled  in  and  reclaimed  from  the  sea. 

MANCHESTER 

The  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  connecting  the  inland  city  of 
Manchester,  England,  with  the  Atlantic  Ocean  by  way  of 
the  Mersey  River  and  the  harbour  of  Liverpool,  was  con- 
structed by  a  private  company,  and  was  begun  in  1887  and 
was  opened  to  traffic  on  January  1,  1894.  It  is  a  lock  canal, 
35  1-2  miles  long,  with  five  reaches  at  various  levels.  Begin- 
ning at  tidewater,  there  is  a  tidal  reach  of  21  miles.  The 
second  reach,  of  7  1-2  miles,  is  at  an  elevation  of  16  1-2  feet ; 
the  third,  of  2  miles,  is  16  feet  higher;  the  fourth,  of  3  1-4 
miles,  is  15  feet  above  the  third ;  and  the  fifth,  of  1  3-4  miles, 
is  13  feet  above  the  fourth.  Thus  the  elevation  of  the  Man- 
chester terminal  above  the  outlet  at  Liverpool  is  60  1-2  feet. 
The  depth  of  the  canal  is  26  feet.  The  width  varies.  For 
28  miles  the  bottom  width  is  120  feet,  with  occasional  "turn- 
outs" of  180  feet.  For  4  miles  the  bottom  width  is  170  feet 
and  is  now  being  increased  to  200  feet.  The  surface  width 
varies  from  175  to  230  feet.  The  total  amount  of  excavation 
was  about  45,000,000  cubic  yards,  of  which  one-fourth  was 
sandstone.  The  cost  was  |75,000,000.  The  time  required 
for  passage  is  from  five  to  eight  hours.  Statistics  of  traffic 
are  as  follows : 


Year 

No.  of  Vessels 

Tonnage 

Tons  of  Freight 

Receipts 

1894 
1895 
1896 
1900 

4,551 
4,761 
5,156 
5,362 

720,425 

879,204 
1,094,837 
1,492,320 

CORINTH 

925,659 
1,358,875 
1,826,237 
3,060,516 

£  94,656 
136,759 
179,834 
.290,474 

The  Corinth  Canal,  connecting  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  with 
the  Gulf  of  JEgma.  and  affording  a  short  cut  from  the  Adri- 
atic and  Mediterranean  seas  to  the  iEgean  Sea  and  the  Dar- 
danelles, was  begun  by  a  private  company  in  1884  and  was 
opened  for  traffic  in  1893.  It  is  a  perfectly  straight  canal, 
at  sea  level,  without  locks.    It  lacks  100  yards  of  being  four 


APPENDICES  439 

miles  long,  and  is  26  1-4  feet  deep.  At  the  bottom  it  is  69 
feet  wide,  and  at  the  surface  of  the  water  only  80  1-4  feet, 
the  banks  being  much  steeper  than  those  of  any  other  canal. 
The  total  excavation  was  15,000,000  cubic  yards,  a  large  part 
of  which  was  granite,  and  clay  so  hard  as  to  require  blasting. 
For  2  1-2  miles  there  is  a  cut  of  great  depth,  measuring  at 
the  centre,  to  the  bottom  of  the  canal,  286  feet,  or  about  the 
depth  that  would  be  required  at  Culebra  to  make  the  Pan- 
ama canal  at  sea  level.  The  cost  of  the  Corinth  Canal  was 
about  15,000,000.  There  are  strong  currents  in  the  canal, 
and  steamers  not  under  the  best  of  control  frequently  graze 
the  side  walls,  sometimes  with  much  force. 

CRONSTADT 

A  ship  canal  connects  Cronstadt,  on  the  Gulf  of  Finland, 
with  St.  Petersburg.  It  is  about  six  miles  long,  with  a  bay 
channel  of  ten  miles.  Its  depth  is  20  feet  and  its  width  from 
220  to  350  feet.    Its  cost  was  about  $10,000,000. 

WELLAND 

The  Welland  Canal,  connecting  Lake  Erie  with  Lake 
Ontario,  was  constructed  in  1883,  and  was  enlarged  in  1871 
and  again  in  1900.  It  is  27  miles  long,  and  has  twenty-five 
locks,  with  a  total  elevation  of  327  feet.  It  is  27  feet  deep, 
and  has  cost  |24,000,000. 


ST.    MARY^S   PALLS 

The  St.  Mary's  Falls  (Sault  Sainte  Marie)  canals  connect 
Lake  Superior  with  Lake  Huron,  around  the  falls  of  the  St. 
Mary's  Kiver,  and  are  two  in  number,  one  belonging  to  the 
United  States  and  one  to  Canada.  The  United  States  canal 
was  built  in  1853-55  by  the  State  of  Michigan,  at  a  cost  of 
11,000,000.  It  was  enlarged  in  1870-81  by  the  United  States 
Government,  and  in  1882  was  transferred  entirely  from  State 
to  Federal  control.  In  1887-96  it  was  again  enlarged.  It 
is  now  a  little  more  than  a  mile  long,  160  feet  wide,  and  25 
feet  deep,  but  the  depth  of  the  two  locks  is  only  17  and  22 
feet  respectively.  The  lift  of  the  locks  varies  from  16  to  20 
feet.  The  total  cost  of  the  canal  and  locks  to  1904  was  more 
than  $6,000,000.    Statistics  of  traffic  follow: 


440 

APPENDICES 

Tonnage  of 

Year 

No.  of  Vessels 

Vessels 

1855 

Not  reported 

106,296 

1860 

a             u 

403,657 

1865 

997 

409,062 

1870 

1,828 

690,826 

1875 

2,033 

1,259,534 

1880 

3,503 

1,734,890 

1885 

5,380 

3,035,937 

1890 

10,557 

8,454,435 

1895 

17,956 

16,806,781 

1900 

19,452 

22,315,834 

1904 

16,120 

24,364,138 

The  Canadian  Canal  at  St.  Mary's  Falls  was  built  by  the 
Canadian  government  in  1888-95.  It  is  a  mile  and  one-eighth 
long,  22  feet  deep,  and  150  feet  wide.  Its  total  cost  has  been 
nearly  |4,000,000.    Statistics  of  traffic  follow : 

Freight 
Year  No.  of  Vessels  Registered  Tonnage  Tonnage 

1900        3,003        2,160,490        2,018,999 
1903        4,353        4,737;580        5,502,185 


THE  END. 


INDEX 


Abbot,  Gen.  Henry  L.,  member  of 
Board  of  Advisory  or  Consulting 
Engineers,  316,  319. 

Achurra,  Captain,  165. 

Acosta,  Jos6  de,  33. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  72. 

Africa,  circumnavigated  by  Mene- 
laus,  2. 

Agua  Dulce,  228;  Gen.  Huertas  at, 
252. 

Ahorca  Lagarto,  229. 

Airian.  M.,  on  Caledonian  Bay 
route,  70. 

Aizpuru,  Rafael,  176. 

Aizpuru,  revolutionist,  95. 

Albemarle,  Duke  of,  Governor  of 
Jamaica,  52. 

Alceda,  Dionysius,  quoted,  34. 

Alfonso  V,  King  of  Portugal,  6. 

Allen,  Horatio.  Nicaragua  canal 
promoter,  47. 

Almirante  Bay,  218. 

Alvarez,  Felix,  165. 

Amador,  Antonio,  152. 

Amador,  Manuel,  (Guerrero),  Chair- 
man of  Panama  Council,  158; 
appeals  to  Colombian  govern- 
ment, 161;  plans  revolution,  163; 
member  of  Junta,  163;  mission 
to  United  States,  165;  calls  on 
W.  N.  Cromwell  and  John  Hay, 
166;  "Desanimado,"  167;  calls 
on  Lindo,  167;  finds  Bunau- 
Varilla,  168;  "  Esperanzas,"  169; 
second  visit  to  Hay,  169;  re- 
turns to  Panama,  170;  Secretary 
of  Treasury,  176,  209;  Commis- 
sioner to  United  States,  182; 
first  President  of  Panama,  213; 
Huertas's  letter  to,  239;  consults 
Lee,  242,  248;  consults  Barrett, 
248;  demands  Huertas's  resigna- 
tion, 249;  letter  to  Huertas,  251 ; 


disbands  army,  253;  receives 
Secretary  Taft,  259;  aids  in  sani- 
tation of  Panama,  332;  portrait, 
164,  209. 

Amador,  Raoul  A.,  248. 

America,  early  voyages  to,  1;  mis- 
taken for  Asia,  2;  legendary  map 
of,  4;  eliminated  by  Toscanelli, 
9;  believed  by  Columbus  to  be 
Asia,  10. 

America,  Central,  visited  by  Co- 
lumbus, 13;  becomes  independ- 
ent of  Spain,  44;  seeks  construc- 
tion of  canal,  44,  47;  union 
dissolved,  47;  origin  of  British 
claims  in,  51;  British  aggres- 
sions upon,  53,  56. 

America,  South,  discovered  by  Co- 
lumbus, 12;  becomes  independ- 
ent of  Spain,  43. 

'^American  Committee,"  organized 
by  De  Lesseps,  84;  its  activities, 
84.^ 

American  Policy  on  the  Isthmus, 
72;  established  by  Grant  and 
Hayes,  73;  strongly  stated  by 
Hayes,  81;  Edmunds's  resolution 
concerning,  96;  confirmed  in 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  119; 
policy  toward  Panama  revolution, 
187;  precedents  for,  190;  justi- 
fied by  domestic  obligations,  191; 
by  legal  obligations  to  Colombia, 
192;  by  equity  to  Colombia,  199; 
by  law  and  equity  to  other  na- 
tions, 203;  unselfish  and  benevo- 
lent, 205;  policy  toward  Huer- 
tas's revolutionary  attempt,  254; 
controversy  with  Panama,  256; 
Secretary  Taft's  mission  of  re- 
adjustment, 256,  268;  appealed 
to,  by  Liberal  Directorate,  273; 
questions  concerning,  275;  Secre- 
441 


442 


INDEX 


tary  Root's  Btatement,  278; 
vicious  libels  upon,  341;  future 
duties  and  responsibilities,  352; 
labour  problems,  353;  justice  re- 
quired, 360;  firmness,  362,  and 
tact,  362. 

Amerigo  Vespucci,  calls  America 
the  ''New  World,"  15;  clings  to 
Columbus's  errors,  15;  explora- 
tions, 16;  America  named  for 
him,  17;  first  European  to  reach 
mainland  of  America,  17;  ac- 
companies Ojeda,  18;  explores 
Atrato  River,  19. 

Ammen,  Daniel,  Rear  Admiral, 
Canal  Commissioner,  73;  at  in- 
ternational Engineering  Congress, 
78. 

Amphion,  British  cruiser,  179. 

Amsterdam  ship  canal,  data  of,  437. 

Ancon  Hill,  226. 

Andagoya,Govemor  of  Panama,  33. 

Anson,  Lord,  at  Panama,  224. 

Antigua,  Nuestra  Senora  de, 
founded  by  Ojeda,  21. 

Antilles,  discovered  by  Cartha- 
ginians, 3;  explored  and  named 
by  Columbus,  11. 

Antioquia,  province  of,  153. 

Anton  Point,  225. 

Antonelli,  Batista,  33. 

Appleton,  Nathan,  78. 

Arango,  Belisario,  162. 

Arango,  Fernando,  164. 

Arango,  Jos6  Agustin,  152. 

Arango,  Jos6  Agustin,  Jr.,  152; 
leader  of  revolution,  162;  mem- 
ber of  Junta,  163;  member  of 
Executive  Board  of  Republic, 
176,  209;    portrait,  164. 

Arango,  Jos6  Agustin,  3rd,  162, 175. 

Arango,  Ricardo  Manuel,  162,  176. 

Argentina,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Arias,  F.  Agustin,  176. 

Arias,  Ricardo,  joins  revolution, 
164;  member  of  Junta,  166; 
portrait,  164. 

Anas,  Tomas,  joins  revolution,  164; 
member  of  Junta,  166;  member 
of  Executive  Board  of  Republic, 
176,  209;  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  213;  removal  demanded 
by  Huertas,  238;  offers  resigna- 
tion, 242;  succeeded  by  Guardia, 
243;    portrait,  164^ 


Aristotle,  geographical  theories  of, 
2,  8;  on  discovery  of  Antilles  and 
Mexico,  3. 

Army  of  Panama,  disbandment 
upon,  248;  terms  of  disband- 
ment, 253;  disbandment  ef- 
fected, 254. 

Arosemena,  Antonio,  152. 

Arosemena,  Carlos  C.,  163;  mem- 
ber of  Junta,  163;  Commissioner 
to  United  States,  182;  portrait, 
164. 

Arosemena,  Fabio,  176. 

Arosemena,  Justo,  153. 

Arosemena,  Pablo,  President  of 
State  of  Panama,  deposed  and 
imprisoned,  156;  votes  against 
ratifying  treaty,  158;  President 
of  Constitutional  Convention, 
209;  First  Designate,  213; 
speech  at  State  banquet  to  Taft, 
262;  speech  at  Cathedral  Plaza, 
264;  supports  Dr.  Porras,  272; 
appeals  to  United  States,  273; 
visits  Washington,  278. 

Arthur,  Chester  A.,  President,  92, 
110,  200. 

Arton,  Panama  corruptionist,  97. 

Asia,  sought  by  Columbus,  1;  an- 
cient theories  of,  2;  Toscanelli's 
map  of,  6;  errors  concerning, 
8,9. 

Aspinwall,  see  Colon. 

Astor,  John  Jacob,  114. 

Atlanta,  U,  S.  cruiser,  at  Colon,  179. 

Atlantic  Ocean,  '*Sea  of  Dark- 
ness," 1;  highway  from  Europe 
to  Asia,  1;    early  theories  of,  2. 

Atrato  River,  discovered  by  Bas- 
tidas,  19;  explored  by  Amerigo 
Vespucci  and  La  Cosa,  19;  canal 
route  forbidden  by  Philip  II, 
34;  alleged  natural  waterway, 
34;  canal  routes  surveyed,  69, 
70;    Selfridge's  survey,  74. 

Austria,  Emperor  of,  arbitrator,  89. 

Austria-Hungary,  recognizes  Pana- 
ma, 186. 

Avila,  Gil  Gonzalez  de,  exploits  of, 
27;  treaty  with  Nicarao,  28; 
seized  by  Christopher  de  Olid,  30. 

Avila,  Juan  Arias  de,  son  of  Pe- 
drarias,  27. 

Avila,  Pedro  Arias  de,  see  Pe- 
drarias^ 


INDEX 


443 


Azores,  6,  8. 
Azua  River,  13. 
Azuero,  province  of,  153. 

Badajos,  Gonsalvo  de,  26. 

Bahamas,  mistaken  by  Columbus 
for  Philippines,  10. 

Bahia  Honda,  224. 

Bailey  and  Bates  survey,  47. 

Bailey,  Stephen,  62. 

Balboa,  Vasco  Nunez  de,  first 
visits  Isthmus  with  Bastidas,  21; 
flight  from  Hispaniola  to  Golden 
Castile,  21;  quarrel  with  En- 
ciso,  22;  Governor  of  Golden 
Castile,  22;  crosses  Isthmus  and 
discovers  Pacific  Ocean,  23;  ex- 
plorations, 23;  made  Adelan- 
tado,  24;  builds  first  ships  on 
Pacific,  25;  arrested  by  Pizarro, 
25;  judicially  murdered  by  Pe- 
drarias,  25. 

Barrett,  John,  American  Minister 
to  Panama,  215;  discusses  at- 
tempted revolution  with  Amador, 
248;  encourages  Amador,  249; 
warns  Huertas,  249;  advises  and 
aids  in  disbandment  of  army, 
253;  dinner  to  Taft  at  Panama, 
263. 

Bastidas,  Rodrigo,  at  Darien,  18; 
explorations,  19. 

Bastimentos,  Isla  de,  see  Provi- 
sion Island. 

Bastimentos  Point,  223. 

Batele  Point,  225. 

Bates,  Lindon  W.,  plans  for  canal, 
294. 

Bayamo  River,  217,  226. 

Bay  Islands,  visited  by  Columbus, 
13. 

Bayoneta  Island,  227. 

Beaupr6,  A.M.,  American  Minister 
at  Bogota,  143;  dispatch  to  Hay, 
144;  deceived  by  Colombian 
Government,  144;  reports  Amer- 
ican recognition  of  Panama,  182. 

Beers,  J.  R,,  aids  Panaman  revolu- 
tion, 162. 

Belcher,  Edward,  canal  plans,  47. 

Belen  River,  14. 

Belgium,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Belize,  occupied  by  England,  35, 
51,  54;  called  "British  Hondu- 
ras/' 56. 


Belly,  Felix,  canal  promoter,  65. 
Beniski,  canal  promoter,  45. 
Bennington,  gunboat,  at   Panama, 

248. 
Berosius,  quoted  by  Galvano,  2. 
Bertoncini,  C.  F.,  288. 
Biddle,  Nicholas,  at  Nicaragua  and 

Bidlack,  B.A.,'  on  Treaty  of  1846, 
202. 

Bigelow,  Poultney,  on  "Our  Mis- 
management at  Panama,"  345; 
his  meagre  opportunities  for  in- 
vestigation, 345;  answered  by 
Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  Secre- 
tary Taft,  and  Governor  Magoon, 
346;  his  lampoon  upon  the 
American  army,  348. 

Bishop,  Joseph  Bucklin,  Secretary 
to  Canal  Commission,  315. 

Black,  W.  M.,  286. 

Blaine,  James  G.,  Secretary  of 
State,  opposes  De  Lesseps's 
schemes,  87;  proposes  Pan- 
American  Congress,  88;  his  tac- 
tical blunder,  88;  moves  for 
abrogation  of  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  89;  his  letter  to  Lowell, 
90. 

Blanco,  Cape,  27. 

Bluefields,  56. 

Boca  de  Chiriqui,  220. 

Boca  del  Drago,  218. 

Boca  del  Toro,  IJnited  States  takes 
possession  of,  84;  province  of, 
212;   strait  and  town  of,  218. 

Boca  San  Pedro,  223. 

Bogotd,  gunboat,  fires  on  Panama, 
175. 

Bogotd,  negotiations  at,  130-149; 
Mosquera's  entry  into.  154;  re- 
lations of  Panama  with,  155; 
oppression  of  Panama,  158;  new 
law  for  Panama  enacted,  159. 

Bohio  Dam,  site  of,  229,  231,  290; 
proposed  lake,  231. 

Bohio  Soldado,  229. 

Bolivar,  province  of,  154;  com- 
missioners from,  to  Panama,  183. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  frees  Colombia 
from  Spain,  44,  150;  canal  plan, 
45. 

Bona  Island,  225. 

Bona  Speranza,  see  Cape  of  Good 
Hope. 


444 


INDEX 


Borico  Point,  27. 

Borland,  Solon,  mission  to  Cen- 
tral America,  63. 

Boston,  cruiser,  at  Panama,  179; 
orders  to  commander  of,  188- 
189;  second  visit  to  Panama, 
248. 

Bourdiol,  M.,  on  Caledonian  Bay- 
route,  70. 

Boyaca,  province  of,  154,  156. 

Boyd,  Federico,  joins  revolution, 
164;  member  of  Junta,  166; 
member  of  Executive  Board  of 
Republic,  176;  Commissioner  to 
United  States,  182,  209;  Sec- 
ond Designate,  279;  portrait, 
164. 

Brava  Point,  224,  227. 

Brazil,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Brid,  Demetrius  H.,  176,  209. 

Brin,  Juan,  209. 

Bristow,  Joseph  L.,  report  on 
Panama  Railroad,  307. 

British  Honduras,  see  Belize. 

Brito,  proposed  canal  terminus, 
62. 

Brooke,  Lieutenant,  286. 

Brujas  Point,  222. 

Brunet,  M.,  receiver  of  Panama 
Company,  108. 

Buccaneers  on  Isthmus,  34;  Walker, 
63. 

Buchanan,  James,  on  British  claims 
in  Central  America,  55;  sends 
Hise  to  Nicaragua,  58;  mission 
to  England,  63;  alarmed  at 
British  plans  at  Panama,  68; 
sends  surveyors  to  Isthmus,  70. 

Buchanan,  William  I.,  American 
Minister  to  Panama,  215;  action 
for  sanitation,  327. 

Buena  Vista,  229. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  negotiates  treaty 
with  J.  M.  Clayton,  60. 

Bunau-Varilla,  Philippe,  his  career, 
167;  joins  revolution  at  Ama- 
dor's request,  168;  wishes  to 
negotiate  treaty,  168;  Panaman 
Minister  to  United  States,  182, 
215;  makes  treaty,  182;  plans 
for  "Straits  of  Panama,"  293. 

Buppan  Bluff,  220. 

Burica  Point,  223. 

Burr,  William  H.,  Canal  Commis- 
sioner, 283;  member  of  Board  of 


Advisory  or    Consulting    Engi- 
neers, 316,  319. 

Cabesa  Cattiva,  Gulf  of,  13. 

Cab  fares  in  Panama,  381. 

Calabebora  River,  217. 

Caledonian  Bay,  35;  Wafer's  re- 
port, 36;  Paterson's  colony,  36; 
failure  of,  37;  survey  by  Milla, 
38;  various  schemes,  68-71; 
survey  by  Selfridge,  74;  site  of, 
223;     description,  227,  371. 

Calvo,  Bartholome,  153. 

Cambuta  River,  217. 

Camergo,  Sergius,  156. 

Cana  River,  220. 

Canal,  see  Nicaragua,  Panama, 
Ship,  etc. 

Canal  Commission,  appointed  by 
Grant,  73;  Ludlow's,  113;  Ad- 
miral Walker's  first,  113; 
Walker's  second,  116;  report 
of  1900,  120;  third  commission 
appointed,  282;  President's  in- 
structions to,  283;  organiza- 
tion of  work,  285;  need  of  re- 
organization, 297;  reorganiza- 
tion effected,  299;  President's 
orders  to  new  Commission,  300; 
further  changes,  315;  reports 
on  plan  of  canal,  321;  delay  in 
sanitation,  329;  improved  con- 
ditions in  Canal  Zone,  336- 
339. 

Canal  Zone,  first  proposed  by  W. 
H.  Seward,  73;  value  of,  101; 
asked  of  Colombia  by  United 
States,  151;  acquired  from 
Panama,  182,  214;  Panaman 
dissatisfaction  over,  256;  Gen- 
eral Davis  appointed  Governor, 
283;  government  organized,  285; 
Magoon  made  Governor,  300; 
sanitation,  328-336  (see  Sani- 
tation); improved  conditions 
of  life  and  work,  336;  reading 
rooms,  clubs,  etc.,  established, 
336;  commissary  stores,  337; 
gambling  abolished,  338;  Civil 
Service  rules,  339;  eight-hour 
law,  339;  Governor's  proclama- 
tion, 419;  first  Administrative 
Order,  423;  Panaman  protest, 
426;  revised  Executive  Order, 
430, 


INDEX 


445 


Canary  Islands,  discovered  by  Lewis 
of  Cerda,  3. 

Canaz,  Jose,  44. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  early  reports 
of,  4. 

Caperosa,  islands  of,  13. 

Cape  Verde,  discovered  by  Hes- 
perus, 2;  by  Henry  the  Navi- 
gator, 8. 

Caribbean  Sea,  navigated  by  Col- 
umbus, 11. 

Carmen  Messias,  229. 

Caro,  Miguel  A.,  158. 

Carreta  Point,  218. 

Carthagena,  founded  by  Ojeda,  20; 
province  declares  independence, 
152. 

Carthagena,  steamship,  brings  Co- 
lombian troops  to  Colon,  172; 
abandons  them  there,  178. 

Cartier,  Jacques,  28. 

Casaya  Island,  227. 

Cass,  Lewis,  Secretary  of  State, 
warns  France  from  Nicaragua, 
66;  on  American  rights  in  Pana- 
ma, 204. 

Castellon,  Francisco,  seeks  French 
aid  at  Nicaragua,  49. 

Castilla  del  Oro,  see  Golden  Cas- 
tile. 

Castle  Choco,  221. 

Catalina  River  and  Hills,  221. 

Cathay,  see  China. 

Cauca,  province  rebels,  153. 

Cauro  Pomt,  218. 

Cebaco  Island,  224. 

Ceron,  Alvaro  de  Saavedra,  pro- 
poses Panama  Canal,  31;  voyage 
to  the  Moluccas,  31;   death,  32. 

Cerro  Horquita,  216. 

Cerro  Picacho,  216. 

Cerro  Santiago,  216. 

Ceylon,  identified  with  Taprobane, 
7. 

Chagres  River,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 13;  surveyed  for  canal,  33; 
Lull  and  Menocal  report  on,  74; 
description,  217,  221;  menace 
to  canal,  295. 

Chagres,  town  of,  221. 

Cham6  Point,  225;    Island,  225. 

Changami  Island,  225. 

Charles  II  and  Mosquito  King,  52. 

Charles  V,  orders  search  for  Strait, 
29;    orders  canal  built,  32. 


Chepo  River,  217,  226 

Chevalier,  Michael,  67. 

Chiapes,  native  chief  of  Panama, 
23,  26. 

Chiari,  R.  Jos6  Maria,  176. 

Childs,  O.  W.,  surveys  Nicaragua 
route,  62. 

Chiman  River,  217,  226;  village, 
226. 

China,  sought  by  Columbus,  2; 
missionaries  to,  4;  Toscanelli's 
map,  6;  sought  by  Columbus, 
10;    recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Chinese  labour,  355. 

Chirica  Mola,  220. 

Chiriqui  Lagoon,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 14;  canal  survey  at,  71; 
Chiriqui  Improvement  Company, 
71;  United  States  takes  posses- 
sion of,  84;  description,  219. 

Chiriqui,  Province  of,  153,  212. 

Chiriqui  River,  217. 

Chorrera,  river  and  city,  225. 

Chucuito,  gunboat,  175. 

Chucunaque  River,  217. 

Church,  Roman  Catholic,  at  Pana- 
ma, 212. 

"Churchill's  Voyages,"  quoted,  52. 

Cibao,  mistaken  by  Columbus  for 
Japan,  11. 

Cipango,  see  Japan. 

Circuit  of  the  globe,  reckoned  by 
Toscanelli,  8;      by  Galvano,  9. 

Civil  Service  rules  in  Panama, 
339. 

Clarendon,  Earl  of,  55;  denies 
American  demands,  63. 

Clark,  Aaron,  47. 

Clark,  Captain,  of  Oregon,  115. 

Clay,  Henry,  Secretary  of  State, 
sympathizes  with  canal  project, 
44. 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  negotiated, 
61;  ratified,  62;  abrogation 
threatened,  63,  75,  87;  Blaine's 
negotiations  over,  87-92;  his 
tactical  blunder,  88;  Granville's 
reply,  91;  Frelinghuysen's  argu- 
ment, 92;  Granville's  reply,  93; 
challenged  by  Frelinghuysen- 
Zavala  Treaty,  110;  Senate  asks 
President  to  abrogate  or  modify, 
117;  first  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty 
dealing  with,  118;  abrogated 
and  superseded  by  second  Hay- 


446 


INDEX 


Pauncefote  Treaty,  119;  text, 
393. 

Clayton,  John  M.,  Secretary  of 
State,  sends  Squier  to  Nicaragua, 
59;  negotiations  with  Great 
Britain,  60. 

Clement,  Carlos,  164. 

Clement  VI,  Pope,  3. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  President,  \^ith- 
draws  Frelinghuysen  -  Zavala 
Treaty,  110;  repudiates  Ameri- 
can canal  policy,  110. 

Climate  of  Panama,  233. 

Clinton,  DeWitt,  45. 

Coaita  Point,  221. 

Coatzocoalcos  River,  explored  by 
Cortez,  29. 

Code,  Province  of,  212;  River,  217, 
221;    Hills,  221. 

Coiba  Island,  224. 

Colombia,  becomes  independent  of 
Spain,  44;  gives  Gorgoza  canal 
concession,  76;  De  Lesseps's  in- 
trigues, 83;  warned  by  United 
States,  84;  extortionate  prac- 
tices on  French,  103;  extends 
canal  concession,  108;  United 
States  canal  negotiations  with, 
130-149;  terms  of  protocol,  131; 
republic  in  a  bad  way,  133; 
covets  canal  purchase  price,  133; 
German  influences  in,  134;  revo- 
lution, 137;  double  dealing  to- 
ward United  States,  142;  Con- 
gress meets,  144;  extortionate 
demands,  146;  juggling  proposals, 
147;  lets  treaty  lapse,  147; 
negotiations  with  United  States 
ended,  149;  early  history  of  Re- 
public, 150;  first  Constitution, 
151;  Constitution  of  1832,  151; 
Constitution  of  1843,  152;  Con- 
stitution of  1853,  153;  amended 
Constitution,  153;  Mosquera's 
revolution,  154;  present  name 
adopted,  155;  Constitution  of 
1863,  155;  coup  d'Stat  by  Nunez, 
156;  condition  described  by 
Marroquin,  159;  inability  to 
deal  with  Panama  revolution, 
180;  no  serious  effort  made, 
181;  protests  against  American 
policy  in  Panama,  183;  relations 
with  Panama,  186;  General 
Reyes  becomes  President,   186; 


list  of  revolutions  in,  193;  limits 
of  power  under  Treaty  of  1846, 
197;  inequity  of  conduct  toward 
Panama  ^  199,  and  toward  United 
States,  200;  Treaty  of  1846, 
391. 

Colon,  city  of,  railroad  terminal, 
57;   looted  and  burned,  95. 

Colon  Bay,  222. 

Colon,  Province  of,  212. 

Colonization  in  Panama,  needed, 
354;  Chinese,  355;  negroes,  356; 
Russians,  Jews,  Boers,  Ameri- 
cans, 357;  Spanish  and  Italians, 
358. 

Columbia,  cruiser,  at  Colon,  257. 

Columbus,  Christopher,  founder  of 
Isthmian  canal  enterprise,  1; 
geographical  theories,  2;  corre- 
spondence with  Toscanelli,  5; 
recent  researches  concerning,  5; 
estimates  of  distance  from  Eu- 
rope to  China  and  Japan,  9; 
discovery  of  and  delusions  con- 
cerning America,  10;  reports 
visit  to  India,  11;  among  the 
Antilles,  11;  seeking  the  Golden 
Chersonesus,  12;  visits  Trinidad 
and  Gulf  of  Paria,  12;  seeks 
"Secret  of  the  Strait,"  12;  ex- 
plores Central  America,  Panama, 
and  Darien,  13-15;  persists  in 
errors,  15. 

Columbus,  Diego,  ill  treated  by 
King  of  Spain,  20. 

Columbus  Island,  218. 

Commissary  Stores  in  Canal  Zone, 
336. 

Companies:  Central  America  and 
United  States  Atlantic  and  Pa- 
cific Canal,  45;  "Compania  de 
Transito  de  Nicaragua,"  58; 
American  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Canal,  58;  Accessory  Transit, 
58;  Honduras  Interoceanic,  63; 
Central  American  Transit,  66; 
Maritime  Canal,  67,  97,  111; 
Chiriqui  Improvement,  71;  "La 
Soci6t6  Civile  Internationale  du 
Canal  Interoceanique,"  76;  Uni- 
versal Interoceanic  Canal,  80; 
Provisional  Interoceanic  Canal, 
80;  New  Panama  Canal,  109; 
Nicaragua  Construction,  112, 113; 
Grace-Eyre-Gragin       Syndicate, 


INDEX 


447 


114;     Panama  Canal  Company 
of  America,  122. 
Concha,  Jose  V.,  opposes  American 
canal  plan,  132;    under  German 
influence,  136;     quits  office  and 
goes  to  Europe,  139. 
Concord,  gunboat,  at  Panama,  179. 
Condamine,  Charles  M.  de  la,  advo- 
cates Nicaragua  canal,  38. 
Congress,    International   Engineer- 
ing, or  Scientific,  organized  by 
De  Lesseps,  77;   its  composition, 
78;     Committee  on  Route,  79; 
adopts  Panama  scheme,  80. 

Congress  of  Panama,  40. 

Congress,  Pan-American,  see  Pan- 
American  Congress. 

Congress,  United  States,  non-com- 
mittal resolutions  on  canal,  47; 
resents  De  Lesseps' s  scheme,  80; 
appropriation  for  control  of  Pana- 
ma route,  84;  declines  to  aid 
Eads's  scheme,  86;  requests 
abrogation  of  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  87;  action  against  De 
Lesseps  company,  97;  charters 
Maritime  Canal  Company,  111; 
great  canal  controversy  in,  112; 
provides  canal  commissions,  112; 
attitude  toward  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  117;  final  canal  debate, 
125;  Spooner  bill  adopted,  128; 
Marroquln's  letter  to  Senate, 
183;  controversy  over  purchase 
of  canal  supplies,  303;  adopts 
lock  plan  for  canal,  325;  text  of 
Isthmian  Canal  Law  or  Spooner 
bill,  400. 

Constitution  of  Panama,  provisions 
of,  209;  on  Legislature,  210; 
on  Executive,  211;  on  Judiciary, 
211;  on  Enactment  of  Laws,  21 1 . 

Consuls  at  Panama  protest  against 
bombardment,  176. 

Contadora  Island,  227. 

Contreras,  Alonzo  de,  30. 

Cordillera  de  Bando,  216;  of  Vera- 
guas,  221. 

Cordova,  Francisco  Hernandez  de, 
28. 

Corea  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Corinth  canal,  data  of,  438. 

Corozal,  230. 

Corral,  Miguel  de,  38. 

Cortez,  Hernando,  in  Mexico,  29; 


seeks  "Secret  of  the  Strait,"  29; 
explores  Tehuantepec,  29;  letter 
to  Charles  V,  29;  writes  of  Cali- 
fornia, 30;  thorough  exploration 
of  coasts,  30. 
Cosa,  Juan  de,  18;  death,  20. 
Costa  Rica,  visited  by  Columbus, 
14 ;  acquiescence  in  British  agres- 
sioas,  56;  plans  for  canal,  62; 
gives  concession  to  Maritime 
Canal  Company,  112;  recognizes 
Panama,  186. 

Cottu,  Baron,  97. 

Cramer,  Augustin,  38. 

Craven,  T.  A.,  surveys  Atrato 
region,  70. 

Crawl  Cay  Channel,  219. 

Crimmins,  John  D.,  114. 

Cristobal,  port  of,  228. 

Crocodiles,  River  of,  see  Chagres. 

Cromwell,  William  Nelson,  counsel 
for  New  Panama  Canal  Company, 
146;  Amador's  visit  to,  166;  dis- 
approves revolution,  166;  goes 
to  Paris,  167;  visits  Panama 
with  Taft,  257;  address  at  State 
banquet,  262;  relations  to 
Wallace's  retirement,  308. 

Cronstadt  canal,  data  of,  439. 

Cuba,  mistaken  for  Japan,  10; 
recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Cubanacan,  mistaken  for  Kublai 
Khan,  11. 

Cucalon,  P.,  176. 

Culebra  Cut,  231;  work  in,  290; 
Island,  225;  village,  230. 

Cundinamarca,  Province  of,  154, 
156. 

Currency,  of  Colombia,  depreciated, 
213;  new,  of  Panama,  213. 

Dams,  see  Bohio,  Gamboa,  Gatun. 

Darien  canal  route,  first  proposed, 
32;  surveys,  74,  75;  last  des- 
perate proposal  of,  127. 

Darien  del  Sur,  Gulf  of,  227. 

Darien,  Gulf  of,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 14;  River  of,  18;  Ojeda's 
explorations,  18. 

Dauchy,  W.  E.,  287. 

David,  City  of,  220,  223,  228; 
River,  223. 

David,  Edward,  raid  at  Nicaragua, 
35. 

Davila,  see  Avila  and  Pedrarias, 


448 


INDEX 


Davis,  Carlton  E.,  288. 

Davis,  C.  H.,  Rear-Admiral,  on 
Nicaragua  and  Panama  routes, 
71. 

Davis,  C.  K.,  Senator,  on  first  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty,  118. 

Davis,  George  W.,  General,  Canal 
Commissioner,  282;  Governor  of 
Canal  Zone,  283;  inaugural  proc- 
lamation, 285,  419;  member  and 
chairman  Board  of  Advisory  or 
Consulting  Engineers,  316,  319. 

Denmark,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

De  Soto,  Hernando,  28. 

Diaz,  Domingo,  General,  joins 
revolution,  164;  appeals  to 
United  States,  273;  visits  Wash- 
ington, 278;  Third  Designate, 
279. 

Diaz,  Pedro  A.,  joins  revolution, 
164. 

Dixie,  troopship,  at  Colon,  179. 

Dolphin,  dispatch  boat,  at  Colon, 
257. 

Dominguez,  Alcides,  176. 

Dose,  H.  F.,  285. 

Drake,  Francis,  in  South  Sea,  34. 

Drexel,  Morgan  &  Co.,  84. 

Dreyfus  case,  168. 

Duartis  Point,  224. 

Duran,  F.  Mutis,  Governor  of 
Panama,  137,  161. 

Earthquakes,  233;  possible  effect 
on  canal,  295. 

Ecuador,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Edmunds,  George  F,,  Senator,  canal 
policy,  96. 

Ehle,  Boyd,  285. 

Ehrman,  Felix,  reports  on  revolu- 
tion, 181. 

Ehrman,  Henry,  158. 

Eiffel,  G.,  contractor  at  Panama, 
95;   fined  and  imprisoned,  97. 

Eight  Hour  law,  339. 

Eminent  Domain,  international, 
205. 

Emperador,  see  Empire. 

Empire,  United  States  headquar- 
ters at,  99,  229. 

Enciso,  Martin  Ferdinand  de,  20; 
first  Spanish  book  about  America, 
21 ;  Governor  of  Golden  Castile, 
22;    quarrel  with  Balboa,  22. 

Endicott,  Mordecai  T.,  Rear-Ad- 


miral, Canal  Commissioner,  300; 
favours  sea-level  plan,  321. 

Engineering,  see  Panama  Canal 

Engineers,  Board  of  Advisory  or 
Consulting,  appointed,  316;  Presi- 
dent's instructions  to,  317;  re- 
port of  majority,  for  sea-level 
canal,  319;  report  of  minority, 
for  lock  canal,  319. 

Ernst,  Oswald  H.,  Colonel,  Canal 
Commissioner,  300;   resigns,  315. 

Escobedo,  Fernando  de,  35. 

Escoces  Point  and  Harbor,  223. 

Escudo  de  Veraguas,  220. 

Espinar,  J.  D.,  Governor  of  Pana- 
ma, 151. 

Espinosa,  Caspar  de,  acquits  Bal- 
boa, 25. 

Espinosa,  Gonzalez  Gomez,  27. 

Esf)inosa,  Manuel,  B.,  joins  revolu- 
tion, 164;  member  of  Junta, 
166;    portrait,  164. 

Espriella,  F.  V.  de  la,  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  176,  209;  Minis- 
ter of  Finance,  213;  replies  to  Lib- 
eral Directorate,  276;  consulted 
on  sanitation,  327. 

Estiva  Island,  225. 

Europe,  early  attitude  of,  toward 
world,  1. 

Evarts,  William  M.,  Secretary  of 
State,  82,  200. 

Evening  Post,  New  York,  letter  in, 
quoted,  178. 

Excavation,  French  errors  in,  106. 

Executive  of  Panama,  211. 

Fabrega,  Francisco  de,  153. 
Fabrega,  Julio  J.,  Minister  of  Public 

Instruction,   209;      Minister     of 

Justice,  213. 
Falcmar's  survey  at  Panama,  45. 
Fever,  see  Sanitation. 
Field,  Cyrus  W.,  78. 
Filos,  F.,  273. 
Fish,  Hamilton,  Secretary  of  State, 

negotiations  with  Great  Britain 

and  Nicaragua,  75. 
Flag  of  Panama,  213. 
Flamenco    or     Flamingo     Island, 

225. 
Fonseca,    Bay    of,    28;       British^ 

American  rivalry  for,  60. 
Fonseca  River,  217. 
Fontane,  Marius,  97. 


INDEX 


449 


Foraker,  J.  B.,  Senator,  on  first 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  119. 

Formosa,  6. 

France,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Frelinghuysen,  Frederick  T.,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  succeeds  Blaine, 
92;  replj.  to  Lord  Granville,  92; 
argument  against  Clayton-Bul- 
wer  Treaty,  92;  negotiates  treaty 
with  Nicaragua,  109. 

French  schemes  in  Nicaragua,  65; 
at  Panama,  75;  "Old  Imperial- 
ists," 76;  American  warnings 
against,  83;  causes  of  failure  at 
Panama,  99-107.     See  also  Les- 


Frenchman's  Creek,  220. 
Frijoles,  229. 

Froude,  J.  A.,  description  of  Pana- 
ma, under  De  Lesseps,  94. 
Fruit  Trade  at  Boca  del  Toro,  219. 
Fuerth,  Ignacio,  158. 

Galisteo,  Manuel,  surveys  Nica- 
ragua route,  38. 

Gallinas,  Cape,  18. 

Galvano,  Antonio,  history  of  early 
voyages  and  discoveries,  2;  geo- 
graphical theories,  9;  account  of 
Columbus's  last  voyage,  13; 
Ojeda's  and  Bastidas's  discov- 
eries, 18,  20;  Pedrarias,  24,  26; 
Cortez,  30;  Ceron  and  the  canal 
routes,  32. 

Gama,  Vasco  da,  2. 

Gambling  in  Canal  Zone  prohibited, 
339. 

Gamboa,  229 ;  dam  at,  290. 

Gamboa,  Ramon,  153. 

Ganges  River,  Columbus's  quest  of, 
14. 

Garachine,  Point,  227. 

Garay,  Jos^  de,  canal  promoter,  67. 

Garella,  Napoleon,  48. 

Garfield,  James  A.,  President,  87; 
death,  92. 

Gatun,  228;  proposed  dam,  230, 
290. 

George,  Frederick,  Mosquito  Prince, 
55. 

Germary,  interested  and  influential 
in  Colombia,  134;  recognizes 
Panama,  186. 

Gillette,  Cassius  W.,  plan  for  canal, 
294. 


Gisbome,  Lionel,  at  Caledonian 
Bay  and  Panama,  68. 

Glass,  Henry,  Rear-Admiral,  or- 
ders to,  188;  action  for  sanita- 
tion, 327. 

Gobernador  Island,  224. 

Goethe,  J.  W.,  on  Humboldt's 
canal  schemes,  42;  prophesies 
construction  of  canal  by  United 
States,  42;  on  England  at  Suez, 
43. 

Golden  Castile,  governed  by  Ni- 
cuesa,  20;  by  Balboa,  22;  by 
Pedrarias,  24. 

Golden  Chersonesus,  7. 

Golfito,  United  States  coaling  sta- 
tion, 84;    River,  217. 

Gomara,  F.  L.  de,  on  Columbus's 
last  voyage,  13;  on  Ojeda's  and 
Bastidas's  discoveries,  18;  on 
Gil  Gonzalez  de  Avila's  exploits, 
27;  on  Cortez,  30;  on  Ceron  and 
the  canal  routes,  32;  appeal  to 
Charles  V  for  canal,  33. 

Goodrich,  C.  F.,  Rear-Admiral,  248, 
249. 

Gorgas,  W.  C,  Sanitary  Officer  of 
Canal  Zone,  285;  begins  work, 
288;  methods  of  dealing  with 
yellow  fever,  331;  school  of  sani- 
tation, 333;  success  achieved,  334; 
offers  reward  for  case  of  fever, 
335.     See  Sanitation. 

Gorgona,  229. 

Gorgoza,  canal  promoter,  75;  gets 
concession,  76. 

Grace,  William  R.,  114. 

Grace-Eyre-Cragin  Syndicate,  114; 
concession  cancelled,  117. 

Gracias  k  Dios,  Cape,  13. 

"Graft"  at  Panama,  100. 

Granada  sacked  by  L'Olonnais,  35. 

Granadine  Confederation,  see  Col- 
ombia, 

Grant,  U.  S.,  President,  canal  policy, 
73;  appoints  Canal  Commission, 
73. 

Granville,  Lord,  effective  reply  to 
Blaine,  91;  reply  to  Freling- 
huysen, 93. 

Great  Britain,  interested  in  Hon- 
duras and  Nicaragua,  51;  prac- 
tical seizure  of  Mosquito  Coast, 
53;  scheme  to  acquire  all  Central 
America,   56;      seizure  of  Tigre 


450 


INDEX 


Island  and  Bay  of  Fonseca,  60; 
treaty  with  Nicaragua,  64;  arbi- 
tration with  Nicaragua,  89;  re- 
pl;y  to  Blaine,  91;  first  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty,  118;  second 
Hay-Pa  uncefote  Treaty,  119; 
offer  of  aid  at  Colon,  179;  recog- 
nizes Panama,  186;  text  of 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  393;  of 
H^y-Pauncefote  Treaty,  398. 

Great  Khan,  missions  to,  4;  Colum- 
bus accredited  to,  10;  Columbus's 
errors  concerning,  11. 

Grey  town,  bombarded  by  United 
States,  63;  work  on  canal  there, 
112. 

Grijalva,  Juan  de,  28. 

Grunsky,  Carl  E.,  Canal  Commis- 
sioner, 283. 

Guanico  Point,  224. 

Guardia,  Francisco  de  la,  158. 

Guardia,  Santiago  de  la.  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  War,  243; 
plot  against,  247;  attends  re- 
view, 248;  letter  to  Huertas, 
252. 

Guardia,  Santiago  de  la.  President 
of  State  of  Panama,  154. 

Guatemala,  asks  Pope  to  build 
canal,  48. 

Guerard,  Adolph,  member  of  Board 
of  Advisory  or  Consulting  En- 
gineers, 316,  319. 

Guerrero,  see  Amador. 

Guizot's  advocacy  of  canal  at 
Panama,  48. 

Gulf  of  Mexico,  7;  explored  by 
Pineda,  28. 

Hains,  Peter  C,  General,  Canal 
Commissioner,  300. 

Hanno  of  Carthage,  voyage  to 
Arabia,  2. 

Harper,  A.  C,  286,  287. 

Harrisse,  H.,  Columbian  researches, 
5. 

Harrod,  Benjamin,  Canal  Commis- 
sioner, 283,  300. 

Hatfield,  Chester,  canal  surveys,  74. 

Hay,  John,  Secretary  of  State, 
negotiates  treaty  with  Great 
Britain,  118,  119;  negotiates 
treaty  with  Colombia,  140;  warns 
Colombian  government,  146; 
Amador's    visit    to,    166,    169; 


American  policy  stated,  169; 
declines  dealings  with  revolu- 
tionists, 169;  negotiates  treaty 
with  Panama,  182;  describes 
Treaty  of  1846  as  a  covenant 
which  "runs  with  the  land,"  196. 

Hay-Bunau  Varilla  Treaty,  made, 
182;    text,  408. 

Hay-Herran  Treaty,  140;  opposed 
to  Bogotd,  142;   lapses,  147. 

Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  made,  118, 
119;    text,  398. 

Hayes,  Rutherford  B.,  President, 
canal  policy,  73;  rebuffs  De 
Lesseps,  81;  message  on  canal, 
81;    his  strenuous  policy,  82. 

Hecker,  Frank  T.,  Canal  Commis- 
sioner, 283;    resigns,  299. 

Henry  III  of  Castile,  4. 

Henry  the  Navigator,  2,  8. 

Hepburn  bill,  126. 

Herodotus,  geographical  theories 
of,  7. 

Herran,  Tomas,  Colombian  charg6 
d'affaires  at  Washington,  139; 
negotiates  treaty  for  canal,  140; 
reports    Amador's    doings,    167. 

Herrera,  Tomas,  Panaman  patriot, 
151;  ''Chief  of  State,"  152. 

Herz,  Cornelius,  97. 

Hesperides,  West  Indies  so  called,  2. 

Hesperus,  King  of  Spain,  dis- 
coveries of,  2. 

Heuer,  W.  H.,  75. 

Hiemra,  13. 

Higueras,  Cape,  13. 

Hise,  Elijah,  mission  to  Nicaragua, 
58;    work  repudiated,  62. 

Hispaniola,  Columbus  at,  13. 

Hitchcock,  Hiram,  112. 

Honduras,  British  aggressions  upon, 
59. 

Honduras,  British,  see  Belize. 

Honduras,  Cape,  13. 

Hospitals,  French  management  of, 
104. 

Hotel  rates  in  Panama,  381. 

Huasacualco,  see  Coatzacoalcos. 

Hubbard,  John,  keeps  peace  at 
Colon,  178. 

Huertas,  Esteban,  in  revolution, 
164;  receives  Colombian  officers, 
173;  arrests  them,  174;  com- 
mander in  chief  of  Panaman 
army,  180;   attempts  revolution, 


INDEX 


451 


238;  letter  to  Amador  demand- 
ing resignations  of  Ministers,  239; 
"Order  of  the  Day,"  244-  rails 
against  Victoria,  247;  plans  to 
seize  Amador  and  Guardia,  247; 
retirement  determined  upon,  248; 
resignation  demanded,  249;  pro- 
tests, 249;  letter  of  resignation, 
249;  letter  to  Guardia  refusing 
pension,  251;  accepts  pension 
and  retires,  252;  under  sus- 
picion, 252. 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  visits 
the  Isthmus,  39;  proposes  nine 
canal  routes,  39;  on  Nicaragua, 
40;  on  Panama.  40;  on  plan  of 
canal,  41;  on  Darien  route,  41; 
credits  ''legend  of  the  Strait," 
41;  on  tidal  levels,  46;  on  effect 
of  canal  on  Gulf  Stream,  46;  let- 
ter to  Salomon,  48. 

Humidity  at  Panama,  235. 

Humphreys,  A.  A.,  73. 

Hunter,  Henry  W.,  member  of 
Board  of  Advisory  or  Consulting 
Engineers,  316,  319. 

Hutin,  M.,  President  of  New  French 
Canal  Company,  correspondence 
with  Admiral  Walker,  122. 

Hylacomylus,  see  Waldseemiiller. 

Ilacomilus,  see  Waldseemiiller. 
Independent,  New  York,   P.   Bige- 

low's  article  in,  345. 
India,  early  voyages  to,  2;  Ptolemy's 

theories  of,  7;    Columbus's  quest 

of,  10. 
Indian  Ocean,  supposed  by  Ptolemy 

to  be  land  bound,  7. 
Indies,  West,  called  Hesperides,  2; 

discovered   by  Hesperus,  2;   by 

Carthaginians,  3. 
Innocent  IV,  Pope,  4. 
Isidore     of    Seville,     geographical 

theory,  2. 
Isla  del  Rey,  227. 
Islands  of  Colombia,  of  the  Isthmus, 

or  of  the  King,  227. 
Italy,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 
Iturralde,  Mateo,  158. 


Jackson,  Andrew,  President,  or- 
ders canal  surveys  at  Nicaragua, 
47. 


Jamaica,  Columbus  at,  13;  seized  by 

English,  35. 
Japan,  called  Cipango,  6;     sought 

by    Columbus,    10;       recognizes 

Panama,  186. 
Jeffries,  H.  O.,  165. 
Jeremy,  Mosquito  King,  52. 
Jewett,  Hugh  J.,  80. 
Jicaro  Island,  224. 
Jiminez,   Pastor,   joins   revolution, 

164. 
John,  Friar,  of  Piano  Carpini,  8. 
Johnson,  M.  O.,  288,  289. 
Juan,  George,  38,  46. 
Judiciary  of  Panama,  211. 
Juera  River,  224. 
Junta,  revolutionary,  formed,  163; 

reorganized,  166. 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  canal,  data  of, 
437. 

Kelly,  Frederick,  directs  canal 
route  surveys,  69. 

Kiel  canal,  data  of,  437. 

King,  Y.  P.,  United  States  Minister 
to  Colombia,  quoted,  157. 

Knox,  Philander  C,  Attorney- 
General,  investigations  in  Paris, 
130. 

Kublai  Khan,  Columbus's  error 
concerning,  11. 

La  Boca,  226. 

Labour  Problems  at  Panama,  353; 
Chinese  considered,  355. 

Lacroisade,  Dr.,  health  statistics, 
327. 

Lagarde,  Ernest,  285. 

Landlords  in  Panama,  380. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  119. 

Las  Cascades,  229. 

La  Trinchera,  342. 

Lawrence,  Abbott,  denounces  Brit- 
ish claims  on  Mosquito  Coast,  60. 

Lee,  Joseph,  Secretary  of  American 
Legation  at  Panama,  consulted 
by  Amador,  242;  warns  revolu- 
tionists, 243;  effect  of  his  warn- 
ing, 247;  midnight  appeal  to 
him,  248;  renews  warnings,  248; 
aids  in  disbanding  army,  253. 

Lefevre    Ernest  T.,  163. 

Legislature  of  Panama,  210. 

Le  Jeune,  Major,  brings  troops  to 
Ancon,  249. 


452 


INDEX 


Leon,  city  of,  sacked,  35. 

Leon,  Jos4  Maria  Vives,  158. 

Leon  XIII,  steamship,  180. 

Leones,  Island  of,  224. 

Lesseps,  Charles  de,  97. 

Lesseps,  Ferdinand  de,  seeks  con- 
cession at  Nicaragua,  72;  sends 
Wyse  to  Panama,  76;  organizes 
International  Engineering  Con- 
gress, 77;  inaugurates  work  at 
Panama,  80;  at  Washington  ai  d 
New  York,  81;  intrigues  witn 
Colombia,  83;  change  of  tone, 
84;  organizes  "American  Com- 
mittee," 84;  returns  to  France, 
85;  begins  work  on  canal,  94; 
"Le  Grand  Fran^ais,"  95;  over- 
whelmed with  disaster,  97;  death, 
98. 

Lewis  of  Cerda,  voyage  to  the 
Canaries,  3. 

Lewis,  Samuel,  162,  176. 

Lime  Point,  218. 

Limon  Bay,  14,  222. 

Linares,  Enrique,  176. 

Lindo,  Joshua,  167. 

Lion  Hill,  229. 

Lisa,  Point,  225. 

List,  Charles,  285. 

Lloyd's  survey  at  Panama,  45. 

L'Olonnais,  raids  Granada,  35. 

Lopez,  Ramon  Valdez,  joins  revo- 
lution, 164. 

Los  Indios  River,  217,  221. 

Los  Santos,  Province  of,  212;  City 
of,  225,  228. 

Louis,  St.,  King  of  France,  4. 

Lowell,  James  Russell,  Blaine's 
letter  to,  90. 

Ludlow,  William,  Canal  Commis- 
sioner, 113. 

Lull,  E.  P.,  surveys  at  Nicaragua, 
72,  74;  Panama,  74;  San  Bias, 
75. 

McClellan,  George  B.,  80. 

MacFarland,  Walter,  75. 

Macham,  adventures  and  discover- 
ies of,  in  Madeira,  3. 

Machico,  haven  of,  3. 

Machinery,  experimental  and  im- 
perfect, used  by  French,  105; 
preservation  of,  106. 

McKay,  Oscar  M.,  176. 

Madeira,  discovered  by  Macham,  3. 


Magdalena,  Province  of,  154,  166. 

Magellan,  Strait  of,  called  "Drag- 
on's Tail,"  4,  9;    discovered,  28. 

Magoon,  Charles  E.,  United  States 
Minister  to  Panama,  215;  visits 
Isthmus  with  Taft,  257;  in- 
fluence in  Panama  politics,  279; 
Counsel  to  Canal  Commission, 
283;  Canal  Commissioner  and 
Governor  of  Canal  Zone,  300; 
Minister  to  Panama,  300;  ad- 
mirable qualifications  for  place, 
303;  undertakes  sanitation  of 
Canal  Zone,  330;  success  of  his 
policy,  334;  improves  conditions 
of  life  and  work  in  Canal  Zone, 
336;  refutes  P.  Bigelow's  charges, 
346. 

Maine,  battleship  at  Panama,  179. 

Mala,  Cape,  224. 

Malaria,  see  Sanitation. 

Mamei,  229. 

Managua,  Lake,  28. 

Manchester  Ship  Canal,  data  of, 
438. 

Mandeville,  Sir  John,  7. 

Mandingo  route,  34. 

Mangalee  River,  221. 

Mangi  or  Mangu,  see  China. 

Manuel,  J.,  176. 

Manzanillo  Island  and  Bay,  222, 
223;    Point,  223. 

Map,  of  America,  seen  by  Don  Peter, 
4;  ToscaneUi's,  5;  Ptolemy's, 
7;  Columbus's,  10;  on  globe  of 
Orontius  Finaeus,  16;  Hima- 
boldt  on  early  maps,  16;  Wald- 
seemiiller's,  16;  Central  Amer- 
ican Canal  Routes,  41;  Republic 
of  Panama,  216;  Panama  Canal 
Route,  228;  Trade  Routes  com- 
pared, 385, 

Marble,  Cape  of,  13. 

Marco  Polo,  reports  of,  followed  by 
Toscanelli,  6,  7. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  negotiations 
with  Great  Britain,  63. 

Mariato  Pomt,  224. 

Marroquin,  Jos6  Manuel,  acting 
President  of  Colombia,  133;  atti- 
tude toward  Hay-Herran  Treaty, 
142;  describes  state  of  Colombia, 
159;  extraordinary  letter  to 
United  States  Senate,  183,  re- 
pels American  intriguer,  341, 


INDEX 


453 


Martinez,  Ferdinand,  6. 

Martinez,  Manuel,  175. 

Martinez,  Orondaste,  165. 

Martins,  see  Martinez,  Ferdinand. 

Matachin,  229. 

Mayflower,  naval  yacht,  at  Pana- 
ma, 179. 

Melendez,  Porfirio,  165. 

Mendez,  Manuel  M.,  176. 

Mendoza,  Carlos  A.,  joins  revolu- 
tionists, 164;  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice, 176,  209;  Third  Designate, 
213;     supports  Dr.  Porras,  272. 

Mendoza,  Diego  Hurtado  de,  30. 

Menelaus,  legendary  voyage  to 
India,  2. 

Menocal,  A.  G.,  surveys  at  Nicara- 
gua, 72,  74;  at  Panama,  74;  at 
San  Bias,  75;  at  International 
Engineering  Congress,  78;  in 
Nicaragua  Company,  80;  sur- 
veys Nicaragua  route,  111. 

Mercado,  Louis  de,  26. 

Maxico,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Michler,  Nathaniel,  surveys  Atrato 
region,  70. 

Milla,  Manuel,  surveys  Caledonian 
Bay  route,  38. 

Miller,  Warner,  112. 

MUls,  D.  O.,  114. 

Mindi,  228. 

Miraflores,  230. 

Mitchell,  Henry,  75. 

Monkey  Hill,  228. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  disputed  by 
Great  Britain,  63;  enforced 
against  France,  67;  defied  by 
De  Lesseps,  80;  discussed  by 
Frelinghuysen,  92;  and  by 
Granville,  93;  violated  by  first 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  118. 

Montezuma,  aids  in  search  for 
Strait,  29. 

Monti  jo.  Gulf  of,  224. 

Moody,  W.  H.,  Secretary  of  Navy, 
orders  intervention  in  Panama, 
137;  orders  concerning  revolu- 
tion,  178. 

Morales,  Eusebio  A.  joins  revolu- 
tion, 164;  Secretary  of  State, 
176,  209;  appeals  to  United 
States,  273;  visits  Washington, 
278. 

Morales,  Caspar,  26. 

Morantes,  Christopher,  28. 


Morazan,  President  of  Central 
America,  orders  canal  survey, 
47. 

Morgan  the  Buccaneer,  sacks  Pana- 
ma, 26,  35;  and  Porto  Bello, 
35. 

Morgan,  John  T.,  Senator,  112, 126. 

Moro,  Gaetano,  survey  at  Tehuan- 
tepec,  67. 

Morro  Puercos,  224. 

Morton,  Levi  P.,  80,  114. 

Moscoes,  see  Mosquito  Indians. 

Mosquera,  Tomas  C.  de,  negotiates 
with  Panama,  152;  leads  revo- 
lution, 154;  President  of  United 
States  of  New  Granada,  154. 

Mosquitia,   see   Mosquito   Coast. 

Mosquito  Coast,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 14;  first  war  on,  47;  British 
relations  with,  51;  practical 
British  seizure  of,  53;  declared 
autonomous  by  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria, 89. 

Mosquito  Indians,  origin  of,  51. 

Mosquitoes,  see  Sanitation. 

Mulatas  Islands,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 14;   description,  223. 

Murillo,  Manuel,  154. 

Murphy,  Dominic  I.,  283. 

Naos  Island,  225. 

Napoleon,  Louis,  plans  Nicaragua 
canal,  49;  pamphlet  on  the  sub- 
ject, 49;  plans  renewed,  65; 
final  defeat,  67. 

Nashville,  gunboat,  at  Colon,  171; 
lands  marines,  178;  cruise  to 
Porto  Bello,  179,  orders  to  com- 
mander of,  188. 

National  Assembly  of  Panama,  210. 

Navy  Bay,  222. 

Nelson,  Lord,  at  Nicaragua,  38,  54. 

New  Andalusia,  governed  by  Ojeda, 
20. 

New  Granada,  gives  canal  conces- 
sion to  French  speculator,  48; 
Treaty  of  1846,  391.  See  also 
Colombia. 

New  Spain,  discovered  by  Cartha- 
ginians, 3.     See  Mexico. 

"New  World,"  origin  of  phrase,  15 

New  York,  cruiser,  at  Panama,  248. 

Nicaragua,  described  by  Louis 
Napoleon  as  centre  of  New 
World,  49;    relations  with  Mos- 


454 


INDEX 


quito  Indians,  51;  British  ag- 
gressions in,  53;  treaty  with 
Great  Britain,  64;  French  in- 
trigues in,  66;  refuses  De  Lesseps 
a  concession,  72;  arbitration 
with  Great  Britain,  89;  negotia- 
tions over  canal,  114;  arbitra- 
tion with  canal  company,  117; 
recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Nicaragua  Canal:  Route  proposed, 
32;  advocated  by  Condamine, 
38;  surveyed  by  Galisteo,  38; 
canal  ordered  by  Congress  of 
Central  American  States,  45; 
United  States  orders  survey,  47; 
Louis  Napoleon's  pamphlet  on, 
49;  Oersted's  route,  62;  Childs's 
survey,  62;  Belly's  scheme,  65; 
De  Lesseps  seeks  concession,  72; 
Hatfield's  surveys,  74;  Lull  and 
Menocal's,  74;  MacFarland  and 
others,  75;  unanimously  favoured 
by  President  Grant's  commis- 
sion, 75;  rivalry  with  Panama, 
109;  survey  by  Menocal,  111; 
work  begun  in  1890,  112;  failure 
of  enterprise,  112;  efforts  at 
resuscitation,  113;  arbitration 
results  adversely  to  Maritime 
Company,  117;  cost  estimated  by 
third  Canal  Commission,  120; 
route  favoured  by  third  Canal 
Conmiission,  121;  Hepburn  bill 
approving  route,  126;  final  de- 
feat, 128. 

Nicaragua,  Lake,  first  heard  of  by 
Pedrarias,  26;  discovered  by 
Gil  Gonzalez  de  Avila,  27;  ex- 
plored by  Edward  David,  35; 
visited  by  Lord  Nelson,  38. 

Nicarao,  chief  of  Nicaragua,  28. 

Nichols,  A.  B.,  285. 

Nicuesa,  or  Niquesa,  Diego  de. 
Governor  of  Golden  Castile,  20; 
at  Darien  and  Veraguas,  21; 
death,  21. 

Nino.  Andrea,  28. 

Nobl?,  Alfred,  member  of  Board  of 
Advisory  or  Consulting  Engi- 
neers, 316,  319. 

Nombre  de  Dios,  visited  by  Colum- 
bus, 13;  by  Ojeda,  21;  site  of 
city,  223 

North  American  Review,  quoted,  73. 

North  Sea,  Caribbean  so  called,  13. 


North  Sea  Canal,  data  of,  437. 

Nueva  Andalusia,  see  New  Anda- 
lusia. 

Nunez,  Rafael,  Governor  of  Pana- 
ma, 153;  President  of  Colombia, 
156;  coup  d'etat,  156;  repudiates 
debts,  157. 

Oakes,  John  C,  317. 

Obaldia,  Jos4  de,  152-154. 

Obaldia,  J.  Domingo,  mission  to 
Bogotd,  161;  Governor  of  Pana- 
ma, 162;  arrested  by  revolu- 
tionists, 175;  Second  Designate, 
213;  Minister  to  United  States, 
215;  at  Panama  with  Taft,  257; 
First  Designate,  279. 

Obarrio,  Nicanor  de,  158;  joins 
revolution,  164;  member  of 
Junta,  166;  Secretary  of  War  and 
Navy,  176,  209,  249;  portrait, 
164. 

Obispo,  229. 

Oceans,  supposed  difference  in 
levels,  46. 

Ochoa,  Lopez,  28. 

Oersted,  Ajidreas,  surveys  of,  62. 

Official  Gazette,  Panama,  quoted, 
158. 

Ojeda,  Alfonso,  or  Alonzo,  visits 
Venezuela  or  Darien,  18;  Gov- 
ernor of  New  Andalusia,  20; 
Galvano's  account  of,  20;  dis- 
aster at  Carthagena,  20;  builds 
first  town  on  mainland,  21; 
death,  21. 

Oldman,  Mosquito  King,   52. 

Olid,  Christopher  de,  treason  against 
Cortez,  30. 

Ordaz,  Diego,  29. 

Oregon,  battleship,  voyage  of,  in 
1898,  115. 

Orillac,  Raoul,  163. 

Orinoco,  steamship,  180. 

Orontius  Finaeus,  16. 

Ortega,  Gerardo,  joins  revolution, 
164. 

Ortiz,  General,  165. 

Ospina,  General,  quoted,  178. 

Ospina,  President  of  Colombia,  153. 

Otero,  Quijano,  quoted,  150. 

Otoque  Island,  225. 

Outlook,  The,  London,  P.  Bigelow's 
article  in,  lampooning  American 
army,  348. 


INDEX 


455 


Oviedo,  Gonsalvo  Ferdinand  de, 
quoted  by  Galvano,  2. 

Pacheca  Island,  227. 

Pacific  Ocean,  Thinae  placed  in,  7; 
eliminated  by  Toscanelli,  9;  dis- 
covered by  Balboa,  23. 

Padilla,  gunboat,  175. 

Paitillo  Point,  226. 

Palmer,  A   H.,  45. 

Palmerston,  Lofd,  policy  in  Cen- 
tral America,  57. 

Panama,  Bay  of,  225,  226. 

Panama,  Canal:  First  proposed  by 
Cortez  and  Ceron,  31;  ordered 
by  Charles  V,  32;  forbidden  by 
Philip  II,  33;  routes  surveyed, 
68,  70,  71,  74;  Wyse's  conces- 
sion, 76;  adopted  by  French  com- 
pany, 77;  inaugurated  by  De 
Lesseps,  80;  work  begun,  94; 
story  of,  94-96;  final  disaster, 
96;  efforts  at  reorganization,  108; 
new  company  formed,  109;  cost 
estimated  by  American  commis- 
sion, 120;  disapproved  by 
American  commission,  121;  nego- 
tiations of  New  Panama  Canal 
Company  with  American  com- 
mission, 122;  crisis  in  affairs, 
124;  company  offers  to  sell 
for  $40,000,000,  125;  purchase 
recommended,  125;  route  pre- 
scribed by  Spooner  bill,  126; 
finally  adopted,  128;  right  of 
French  company  to  sell,  130; 
company's  anxiety  over  Colom- 
bia's conduct,  145;  description 
of  route,  230;  work  begun  by 
Americans,  280;  appointment  of 
Commission,  282;  organization 
of  work,  285;  Wallace  chief  en- 
gineer, 286;  engineering  prob- 
lems, 290;  four  plans  considered, 
291;  Wallace  favours  sea-level, 
293;  plans  of  Bunau  Varilla, 
293;  plans  of  Bates  and  Gillette, 
294;  advantages  of  sea-level 
plan,  295;  reorganization  of 
commission,  299;  controversy 
over  purchase  of  supplies,  303; 
retirement  of  Wallace,  308; 
Stevens  appointed  chief  engin- 
eer, 315;  changes  in  commission, 
315;    Board  of  Advisory  or  Con- 


sulting Engineers  appointed,  316; 
instructions  to,  317;  reports,  319; 
report  of  Stevens,  320;  reports 
of  commission,  321;  Taft's 
recommendations,  322;  Presi- 
dent's recommendations,  324; 
lock-canal  plan  adopted  by  Con- 
gress, 325;  lampoons  and  libels, 
340;  Poultney  Bigelow's  attack, 
345;  labour  problems,  353;  com- 
mercial importance  of  canal,  384; 
text  of  canal  law,  400;  text  of 
canal  treaty,  408. 

Panama,  City  of,  old,  founded  by 
Pedrarias,  26;  destroyed  by 
Morgan,  26,  35. 

Panama,  City  of:   site,  225;   water 
supply,  289;     sewers,  289;     im- 
pressions of,  370;     approach  to 
374;     streets,  375;     parks,  376 
slums,     376;        buildings,     376 
drinking  habits  of  people,  377 
Sunday  in,  379;  shops  and  shop 
ping,  380;     landlords  and  their 
ways,  380;  hotel  rates,  381;  cab 
fares,  381;     society,  382;     com- 
mercial importance,  384. 

Panama,  geographical  and  physical 
features   of,    215;       extent   and 
situation,  215;    boundaries,  216 
population,     216;        mountains 
216;     rivers,  217;     coasts,  217 
geology,  231;    earthquakes,  233 
climate,  233;    seasons,  234;  tem 
perature,   234;      humidity,   235 
rainfall,    236;        lampoons    and 
libels   upon,   343;      general  im- 
pressions of,  370. 

Panama,  Isthmus  of:  Visited  by 
Columbus,  14;  crossed  by  Balboa, 
23;  route  to  California,  57;  Louis 
Napoleon's  description  of,  77; 
insurrections  and  revolutions  on, 
193;  protection  of  transit  across, 
195;  topography  of,  230;  geo- 
logical peculiarities,  232;  lam- 
poons upon,  343;  colonists 
needed,  354. 

Panama,  Province  of,  212. 

Panama  Railroad,  on  Lloyd- 
Falcmar  route,  46;  construc- 
tion of,  57;  use  denied  to  bellig- 
erents, 177,  196;  shares  pur- 
chased by  IJnited  States,  306, 

Panama,  Republic  of.    Organized. 


456 


INDEX 


176;  Executive  Board  and  Minis- 
try, 176;  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, 177;  recognized  by- 
United  States,  182;  recognized 
by  other  nations,  186;  Constitu- 
tional Convention,  186;  American 
policy  toward,  187;  constitu- 
tional government  organized, 
209;  salient  features  of  Con- 
stitution, 209;  Legislature,  or 
National  Assembly,  210;  Ex- 
ecutive, or  President,  211; 
Judiciary,  211;  lawmaking,  211; 
division  and  organization  of 
Provinces,  212;  Roman  Catholic 
church  in,  212;  first  Administra- 
tion, 213;  flag,  213;  new  cur- 
rency, 213;  endowment  instead 
of  debt,  214;  diplomatic  relations 
with  United  States,  215;  at- 
tempted revolution,  238;  con- 
troversy with  United  States,  256; 
Taft's  mission  and  its  results, 
256-268;  political  dissensions, 
269  (see  also  Politics  in  Panama); 
general  elections  of  1906,  279; 
Magoon,  Minister  to,  300;  action 
for  sanitation,  327;  colonists 
needed,  354;  not  to  be  ''Ameri- 
canized," 364;  worthy  of  study, 
366;  trade  methods  in,  366; 
agricultural  and  other  resources, 
373;  commercial  importance, 
384;  text  of  Declaration  of  In- 
depe  dence,  405;  text  of  First 
Administrative  Order  of  United 
States  in  Canal  Zone,  423; 
Panaman  protest,  426;  revised 
Executive  Order,  430. 
Panama  Revolution,  150-186; 
warnings  of,  150,  160;  planned 
by  Arango,  162,  and  Amador, 
163;  Junta  formed,  163;  many 
recruits,  164;  a  Panaman  and 
not  an  American  movement,  165; 
need  of  expedition  and  absence 
of  violence,  170;  crisis  precipi- 
tated, 172;  Colombian  generals 
arrested,  174;  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment organized,  176;  Colom- 
bian troops  baffled,  177;  shipped 
for  home,  180;  American  policy, 
187;  crazy  fictions  about,  341; 
Declaration  of  Independence, 
text,  405. 


Panama,  State  of:  F.  Mutis  Duran, 
governor,  137;  insurrection  in, 
137;  United  States  intervention, 
137;  original  union*  with  Colom- 
bia, 151;  declares  independence, 
151;  rejoins  Colombia,  152; 
"sovereign  federal  State,"  153; 
relations  with  Bogotd,  155;  be- 
trayed and  oppressed  by  Colom- 
bia, 156;  ratifies  new  constitu- 
tion, 158;  continued  protests, 
159;  new  law  at  Bogotd,  159; 
insurrections  and  revolutions  in, 
193. 

Pan-American  Congress,  first,  44; 
second,  called  by  Blaine,  88; 
third,  approves  American  canal 
policy,  125. 

Paraiso,  230. 

Paria,  Gulf  of,  discovered  by  Co- 
lumbus, 12. 

Parida  Island,  223. 

Parisa,  native  chief,  27. 

Parita,  bay  and  city,  225. 

Parsons,  William  Barclay,  Canal 
Commissioner,  282;  member  of 
Board  of  Advisory  or  Consulting 
Engineers,  316,  319. 

Paterson,  William,  plants  colony 
in  Darien,  36;  canal  scheme,  37; 
failure  of  enterprise,  37. 

Paterson's  Point,  223. 

Patterson,  C.  P.,  73. 

Paul,  Felipe  F.,  158. 

Pauncefote,  Lord,  118. 

Pearl  Islands,  discovered  by  Balboa, 
23;  riches  of,  26;  description, 
226;  Taft's  party  visits,  264; 
memorable  visit  to,  386. 

Pearson,  Sir  Weetman,  builds  rail- 
road at  Tehuan tepee,  68. 

Pedrarias,  "Timour  of  the  Indies," 
24;  Governor  of  Golden  Castile, 
24;  cruelties,  24;  murders  Bal- 
boa, 25;  founds  city  of  Panama, 
26;  explorations  and  conquests, 
26;  plans  canal  at  Nicaragua, 
32;    death,  32. 

Pedro  Gonzalez  Island,  227. 

Pedro  Miguel,  230. 

Pedro  River,  220. 

Pelado  River,  226. 

Pensacola,  Taft  starts  from,  257; 
historic  significance  of,  257. 

Perez  y  Soto,  Panaman  representa- 


INDEX 


457 


tive  in  Colombian  Congress, 
161. 

Perico  Island,  225. 

Persia,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Peru,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Peter,  King  of  Aragon,  3. 

Peter  Martyr,  speaks  of  "New 
World,"  15;  on  Pedrarias,  24,  26. 

Peter,  Prince  of  Portugal,  travels 
of,  4. 

Phelps,  S.  L.,  80. 

Philip  II,  orders  surveys  for  canal, 
33;  forbids  canal,  33. 

Philip  III,  orders  surveys  of  Atrato 
River  route,  34. 

Philippine  Islands,  indicated  by 
Toscanelli,  6. 

Pico  Robaldo,  216. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  negotiations  with 
Great  Britain,  63. 

Pillars  of  Hercules,  2,  4, 

Pilon  de  Miguel  de  la  Borda,  221. 

Pineda,  Alvarez,  28. 

Pinzon,  Arias  Perez,  6. 

Pinzon,  Martin  Alonzo,  6. 

Pinzon,  Vincente  Yanez,  explora- 
tions, 19. 

Pizarro,  Francisco,  at  Uraba  with 
Ojeda,  21;  succeeds  Ojeda,  21; 
arrests  Balboa,  25. 

Pliny,  geographical  theories  of,  2, 
8. 

Politics  in  Panama,  269;  Dr. 
Porras,  270;  Liberal  Directorate 
appeals  to  United  States,  273; 
bitter  attack  upon  Panaman  gov- 
ernment, 274;  Espriella's  reply, 
276;  Liberal  leaders  visit  Wash- 
ington, 278;  Secretary  Root's 
reply  to  their  appeal,  278;  Gov- 
ernor Magoon's  influence,  279. 

Polk,  James  K.,  President,  sends 
Hise  to  Nicaragua,  58;  makes 
offer  for  Tehuan tepee  route,  67; 
on  Treaty  of  1846,  202. 

Ponce,  Fernando,  27. 

Popo  Island  and  mountain,  219. 

Population  of  Panama,  216,  354. 

Porras,  Belisario,  friends  plan  revo- 
lution, 238;  calls  on  Lee,  242; 
receives  warning,  243;  speaks  at 
State  banquet,  262;  record  as  a 
revolutionist,  270;  opposed  revo- 
lution of  1903,  270;  anti-Ameri- 
can  sentiments,    270;       Liberal 


leader,  270;  declared  not  to  be 
a  citizen,  271 ;  denounces  court's 
decision,  272;  appeals  to  United 
States,  273;  visits  Washington, 
278. 

Porto  Bello,  visited  by  Columbus, 
13;  by  Bastidas,  19;  sacked  by 
Morgan,  35;  description,  222. 

Portugal,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Prescott,  H.  G.,  172. 

Press,  subsidizing  of,  84. 

Provinces  of  Panama,  212;  funds 
for  public  works  apportioned  to, 
214. 

Provision  Island,  218;    Point,  221. 

Ptolemy,  geographical  theories  of, 
followed  by  Toscanelli,  5;  loca- 
tion of  Thinae,  7;  errors  of,  7; 
followed  by  Waldseemiiller,  16. 

Puercos  Point,  224. 

QuEBRANCHA,    Mountains  of,  222; 

River,  229. 
Quellennec,     Eugen,     member    of 

Board  of  Advisory  or  Consulting 

Engineers,  316,  319. 
Quibo  Island,  224  (see  Coiba). 
Quintero,  Manuel,  V,,  209;  Minister 

of  Public  Works,  213. 
Quisai,  9,  11. 
Quisqueya,  11. 

Raia  Point,  224. 

Rainfall  at  Panama,  236. 

Randolph,  Isham,  member  of  Board 
of  Advisory  or  Consulting  En- 
gineers, 316,  319. 

Raspadura,  Ravine  of,  41,  69. 

Reading  Rooms  established  in  Canal 
Zone,  336. 

Reclus,  Armand,  surveys  on  Isth- 
mus, 76. 

Recognition  of  Panama,  by  United 
States,  182;  by  other  govem- 
ents,  186;  principles  involved, 
198;  contrasted  with  recognition 
of  Confederate  States,  201. 

Reed,  Thomas  B.,  Speaker,  opposes 
canal  legislation,  116. 

Reinach,  Baron  Jacques,  97. 

Retreat,  Haven  of,  visited  by 
Columbus,  13. 

Revolutions,  see  Colombia,  and 
Panama  Revolution. 

Reyes,  Rafael,  Colombian  Commis- 


458 


INDEX 


sioner  to  Panama,  183;  fruitless 
efforts,  184;  visits  United  States, 
184;  extraordinary  offer  to 
United  States,  184;  President  of 
Colombia,  186. 

Riggs,  George  W.,  80. 

Rincon  Point,  221. 

Rio  Colorado,  opened,  35. 

Rio  Francisco,  visited  by  Columbus, 
13. 

Rio  Grande  (Caribbean),  visited 
by  Columbus,  13. 

Rio  Grande  (Pacific),  217,  225. 

Ripley,  Joseph,  member  of  Board 
of  Advisory  or  Consulting  En- 
gineers, 316,  319. 

Roatan,  visited  by  Columbus,  13. 

Robert,  Charles  Frederick,  Mosquito 
King,  56. 

Robert,  Mosquito  Prince,  55. 

Robinson,  Monroe,  45. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  President: 
Completing  Columbus's  work,  1; 
signs  Spooner  bill,  128;  receives 
Panaman  Minister,  182;  com- 
ments on  Colombian  offer,  185; 
on  Hay-Bunau  Varilla  Treaty, 
192,  214;  on  insurrections  in 
Panama  under  Colombian  rule, 
193;  on  American  policy  in 
Panama,  206;  news  of  his  re- 
election received  at  Panama,  247; 
energetic  work  for  canal,  282; 
appoints  third  Canal  Commis- 
sion, 282;  instructions  to  Com- 
mission, 283;  reorganizes  Com- 
mission, 299;  orders  to  Commis- 
sion, 300;  appoints  Board  of 
Advisory  or  Consulting  Engin- 
eers, 316;  instructions  to,  317; 
recommends  lock  canal,  324;  on 
gossip  and  libels,  349. 

Root,  Elihu,  Secretary  of  State,  re- 
plies to  appeal  of  Liberals,  278. 

Royal  Geographical  Society,  68. 

Rubruquis,  William  of,  4. 

Russia,  recognizes  Panama,   186. 

Ruysch's  map  of  the  world,  16. 

Sab  ANA  River,  227. 
Saboga  Island,  and  village,  227. 
St.  Lorenzo,  Castle  of,  221. 
St.  Mary's  Falls  canal,  data  of,  439. 
St.  Michael,  Gulf  of,  23,  227;  Island 
of,  227. 


St.  Thomas,  Island  of,  discovered 
by  Hesperus,  2. 

Salomon  &  Co.,  48. 

Sambu  River,  217. 

San  Bias  canal  route,  70,  75. 

San  Bias,  Mountains,  216;  Point, 
223;  Gulf,  223;  Indians,  223. 

San  Carlos,  Fort,  stormed  and  re- 
built, 35. 

Sanclemente,  President,  deposed, 
133. 

San  Cristoval  Bay,  223. 

Sandoval,  Gonzalo  de,  29. 

Sanitation,  French  neglect  of,  103; 
need  of,  288;  Gorgas  begins  work, 
288;  delays  and  obstructions, 
297;  the  fight  with  fever,  326; 
Humboldt's  errors,  326;  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt's  orders,  326; 
French  mortality  statistics,  327; 
outbreak  of  yellow  fever  in  Canal 
Zone,  328;  causes  of  the  trouble, 
329;  Magoon's  vigorous  action, 
330;  methods  of  work,  331; 
success,  334;  offer  of  reward  for 
case  of  fever,  335;  favourable 
vital    statistics  of  Panama,  335. 

San  Jose  Island,  227. 

ban  Juan  River  Nicaragua,  28; 
diverted  by  Escobedo,  35. 

San  Juan  River,  Panama  225. 

San  Miguel,  Gulf  of,  23,  227. 

San  Pablo  River,  217,  224. 

San  Pedro  River,  217. 

San  Salvador,  Island  of,  mistaken 
by  Columbus  for  East  Indies, 
10. 

Santa  Maria  River,  217. 

Santana,  229. 

Santander,  Province  of,  154,  156. 

Santiago  River,  217,  224;  City  of, 
228. 

Santo  Domingo,  Columbus's  errors 
about,  11. 

Sault  Ste.  Marie  canals,  data  of,  439. 

Scruggs,  William  L.,  history  quoted, 
34. 

Seasons,  see  Climate,  234. 

"Secret  of  the  Strait,"  sought  by 
Columbus,  12;  by  Bastidas,  19; 
by  Gil  Gonzalez  de  Avila,  27;  by 
De  Cordova,  De  Soto,  Morantes, 
Pineda,  Ochoa,  De  Grijalva- 
Verrazzano,  Cartier,  and  Magel, 
Ian,  28;  byCortez,  29;  doubts  of 


INDEX 


459 


its   existence,   30;      revived   by 
Gorgoza,  75. 
Selfridge,  T.  O.,  surveys,  74;     at 
International   Engineering    Con- 
gress, 78. 

Seligman,  J.  &  W.,  84. 

Seneca,  geographical  theories,  2,  8. 

Seward,  William  H.,  Secretary  of 
State,  policy  toward  Isthmus,  72, 
192,  195. 

Sewers  in  Panama,  289. 

Shaler,  J.  R.,  172. 

Shanton,  G.  R.,  285. 

Sharpe,  Captain,  freebooter  at 
Panama,  35. 

Sherman,  John,  113. 

Ship  Canals,  data  of,  436. 

Shonts,  Theodore  P.,  Canal  Com- 
missioner, 300;  Chairman  of 
Commission,  300;  on  purchase 
of  supplies,  304. 

Shops  and  shopping  in  Panama, 
380. 

Shufeldt,  R.  W.,  surveys,  74. 

Siam,  recognizes  Panama,  186. 

Sloane,  Sir  Hans,  quoted,  52. 

Snow  shovels  at  Panama,  100. 

Society  in  Panama,  382. 

Solis,  Juan  Diaz  de,  explorations,  19. 

Sosa,  Pedro  J.,  158. 

South  Sea,  13  (see  Pacific  Ocean). 

Spain,  first  interested  in  discov- 
eries, 3;  seeks  to  construct  canal, 
43;  loses  American  colonies,  43; 
American  war  with,  delays  canal, 
115. 

Spooner  bill,  126;  becomes  law,  128; 
text  of,  400. 

Spooner,  John  C,  Senator,  126. 

Sprattling,  L.  W.,  285. 

Squier.  E.  G.,  mission  to  Nica- 
ragua, 59;  his  work  disavowed, 
61. 

Steams,  Frederick  P.,  member  of 
Board  of  Advisory  or  Consulting 
Engineers,  316,  319. 

St'^phens,  John  L.,  recommends 
Nicaragua  route,  48. 

Stevens,  John  F.,  chief  engineer, 
315;  Canal  Commissioner,  316; 
favours  lock  canal,  317;  refutes 
P.  Bigelow's  charges,  346. 

Strabo,  geographical  theories,  2. 

Strain,  Isaac  C,  surveys,  69. 

*' Straits  of  Panama  "  proposed,  294. 


Strom,  C.  J.,  288. 

"  Stultiloquentia,"  340. 

Suez  Canal,  data  of,  436. 

Sunday  in  Panama,  379. 

Sweden    and    Norway,     recognize 

Panama,  186. 
Switzerland,    recognizes    Panama, 
186. 


Taboga  Island,  225. 

Taboguilla  Island,  225. 

Taft,  William  H.,  Secretary  of  War: 
Mission  to  Panama  in  1904,  256; 
starts  from  Pensacola,  257;  cor- 
dial reception  at  Panama,  258; 
significant  address  to  President 
Amador,  259;  conferences  with 
Panama  government,  260;  ad- 
dress at  State  banquet,  261; 
warning  against  revolutions,  261; 
success  of  mission  announced, 
264;  reception  and  address  at 
Cathedral  Plaza,  264;  apparent 
reference  to  Huertas  episode, 
265;  results  of  mission,  265; 
second  visit  to  Panama,  273; 
receives  Liberal  Directorate,  273* 
suggestions  concerning  Canal 
Commission,  298;  embodied  in 
President's  orders,  300;  order 
concerning  purchase  of  supplies, 
303;  recommends  purchase  of 
railroad  shares,  306;  interview 
with  Wallace,  308;  demands 
his  resignation,  310;  reconmiends 
appointment  of  Board  on  Ad- 
visory or  Consulting  Engineers, 
316;  recommends  lock  canal, 
322;  scathing  reply  to  P.  Bige- 
low,  346;  protests  against  cam- 
paign of  lies,  350;  on  justice  to 
Panama,  360;  text  of  first  Ad- 
ministrative Order,  423;  of  Re- 
vised Executive  Order,  430. 

Taprobane,  identified  with  Ceylon, 
7. 

Tararequi,  Island  of,  discovered,  26. 

Tavemilla,  village  of,  229;  Plain  of, 
231. 

Taylor,  Zachary  President  sends 
Squier  to  Nicaragua,  59. 

Tehuantepec,  canal  route  proposed, 
32;  surveyed  by  Cramer  and 
Corral,  38;   Mexican  scheme,  67; 


460 


INDEX 


ofifer  of  United  States,  67;    sur- 
veyed by  Shufeldt,  74. 

Tehuantepec,  Isthmus  of,  dis- 
covered, 28;  explored  by  Cortez, 
2 

Tehuantepec  railroad,  proposed  by 
J.  B.  Eads,  68,  85;  built  by 
Pearson,  68. 

Temperature,  234. 

Terraba  Point,  218. 

Thierry,  Baron,  45. 

Thinae,  6-9. 

Thompson,  Richard  W.,  84. 

Tiburon,  Cape,  223. 

Tides,  delusions  concerning,  46. 

Tiger  Channel,  220. 

Tiger  Hill,  229. 

Tiger's  Head,  221. 

Tigre  Island,  British-American  ri- 
valry for,  60. 

Tincuazer,  Eugen,  member  of  Board 
of  Advisory  or  Consulting  En- 
gineers, 316,  319. 

Tobey,  E.  C,  285,  288. 

Tolima,  State  of,  154. 

To ro Point,  222. 

Torres,  Colonel,  at  Colon,  172; 
efforts  to  reach  Panama, 
177. 

Toscanelli,  Paolo,  map  and  letter, 
5,  6;  geographical  theories,  5-7, 
reckons  circuit  of  globe,  8. 

Totten,  Colonel,  report  on  Panama 
canal  route,  70. 

Tovar,  General,  at  Panama,  172. 

Trade  routes  compared,  384. 

Trautwine,  J.  C,  surveys  Atrato 
region,  69. 

Treaties:  Anglo-Spanish  of  1670, 
51;  Aix-la-Chapelle,  53,  Paris, 
1763,  53;  Versailles,  54;  A  glo- 
Spanish  of  1786,  54;  United 
States-New  Granada,  57;  Rise's 
with  Nicaragua,  58;  Squier's 
with  Nicaragua,  59;  Clayton- 
Bulwer,  61;  British-Nicaraguan, 
64;  United  States — Colombian, 
71;  Dickinson-Ayon,72;  Freling- 
huysen-Zavala,  109;  first  Hay- 
Pauncefote,  118;  second  Hay- 
Pauncefote,  119;  Hay-Herran, 
140;  Hay-Bunau  Varilla,  182. 
(For  texts,  see  Appendices,  pp. 
391,  393,  398  408.) 

Trent.,  steamship.  345. 


Trinidad,  discovered  by  Columbus, 

12. 
Tumaco,  or    Tumaccus,   friend  of 

Balboa,  24. 
Turr,  Etienne,  76. 
Tuyra  River,  discovered    by    Pe- 

drarias,  26;  described,  217. 

Ulloa,  Antonio  de,  38. 

United  States,  Goethe's  prophecy 
concerning,  42;  interest  in  Isth- 
mian canal,  47;  resolution  by 
Congress,  47;  terms  proposed 
to  Colombia  for  canal,  131;  at- 
titude toward  German  schemes, 
136;  knowledge  of  impending 
revolution,  171;  preparations  to 
fulfil  treaty  obligations,  171; 
recognizes  Panama,  182;  policy 
toward  Colombia  and  Ptoama, 
187.  See  also  American  Policy 
and  Congress. 

Uraba,  Gulf  of,  discovered  by  Ojeda 
and  Bastidas,  18;  town,  built  by 
Ojeda,  21. 

Urava  Island,  225. 

Valdez,  Antonio  A.,  175. 

Valdez,  Hector,  165. 

Valiente  Point,  220;    Peak,  220. 

Valladolid  Island,  225. 

Vallarino,  Dario,  176. 

Vanderbilt,  Cornelius,  organizes 
company  at  Nicaragua,  58. 

Van  Rensselaer,  Stephen,  45. 

Vatican  Library,  legendary  manu- 
script in,  6. 

Vela,  Cabo  de  la,  18. 

Velasco,  Ferdinand  de.  Governor  of 
Golden  Castile,  surveys  Atrato 
River  route,  34. 

Velasquez,  Diego,  30. 

Venado  Island,  224. 

Venezuela,  mistaken  by  Columbus 
for  Garden  of  Eden,  12;  visited 
by  Ojeda,  18. 

Veraguas,  visited  by  Columbus,  13; 
by  Nicuesa,  21;  Province  of, 
united  with  Panama,  152;  Pana- 
man  Province  of,  212. 

Verrazzano,  Giovanni  da,  28. 

Vespucci   see  Amerigo. 

Victoria,  Nicolas,  J,,  209;  Minister 
of  Justice  and  Public  Instruc- 
tion, 213;  removal  demanded  by 


INDEX 


461 


Huertas,  238;  offers  resignation, 
242;  denounced  by  Huertas,  247. 

Vignaud,  Henry,  Columbian  re- 
searches, 5. 

Volcan  de  Chiriqui,  216. 

Wafer,  Lionel,  reports  on  Cale- 
donian Bay  route,  36. 

Waldseemiiller,  Martin,  map  of 
world,  16;  suggests  name  of 
America,  16. 

Walker,  John  G.,  Rear-Admiral, 
head  of  Canal  Commission,  113; 
makes  report,  116;  head  of  sec- 
ond Commission,  116;  visits 
Panama  with  Taft,  257;  Chair- 
man of  third  Commission,  282. 

Walker,  the  Filibuster,  63. 

Walker,  Patrick,  Regent  of  "Mos- 
quitia,"  56. 

Wallace,  John  F.,  Chief  Engineer  of 
canal,  286;  plans  of  work,  286; 
organization  of  staff,  287;  early 
embarrassments,  288;  engineer- 
ing problems,  290;  four  plans 
considered,  291;  favours  sea  level, 
293;  Canal  Conmiissioner,  300; 
retirement  from  Commission,  307; 
interview  with  Taft,  308;  Taft's 
criticism  of  him,  309;  his  reply, 
311;  statement  to  Congress 
314;  objections  to  Cromwell,  315. 


Water  Cay,  219. 

Water  Supply,  289;   delay  in,  298. 

Webb,  William  H.,  gets  concession 
in  Nicaragua,  66. 

Welcker,  J.  W.,  member  of  Board 
of  Advisory  or  Consulting  En- 
gineers, 316,  319. 

Welland  Canal,  data  of,  439. 

Werweer,  General,  45. 

West  Indies,  see  Indies. 

William  of  Rubruquis,  4,  8. 

Winslow,  Lanier  &  Co.,  84. 

Wyoming,  monitor,  at  Panama,  179. 

Wyse,  Lucien  N.  B.,  explor  s  Isth- 
mus, 76;  gets  concession  from 
Colombia  at  Panama,  76;  nego- 
tiations in  Nicaragua  and  New 
York,  77;  sent  to  Colombia  in 
1890.  108. 


Xaquator  River,  32. 

YcAZA,  Eduardo,  joins  revolution, 

164. 
Yellow  Fever,  see  Sanitation. 


Zachrisson,  Carlos  R.,  V,  joins 

revolution,  164. 
Zavala,  General  Joaquin,  109. 
Zipangu,  see  Japan. 


